Lauren Peterson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0518

Lauren Peterson,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Minneapolis, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed December 12, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-21-3182

Tim Phillips, Law Office of Tim Phillips, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kristyn Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Gregory P. Sautter, Assistant City Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman , Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary judgment dismissal of her claims for malicious
prosecution and negligence, arguing that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary
judgment on both claims. We conclude that because the record contains no evidence of
malice, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on appellant’s malicious
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prosecution claim. In addition , because the alleged acts in support of the negligence claim
involved the exercise of discretion , respondents are immune from liability and the district
did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim. We affirm.
FACTS
The parties do not dispute the f ollowing facts. On August 24, 2020, a journalist for
Alpha News , R.B., was assaulted while covering a protest. R.B. captured the assault on
camera and the video was posted to the Alpha News Facebook page. R .B. reported the
assault to the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD). Dean Christiansen,1 a Sergeant with
MPD, saw the video on the Alpha News Facebook page while at home, and the next day
he assigned himself to investigate possible assault charges.
Christiansen spoke to R.B. who stated she and Alpha News had “gotten a couple
tips” regarding the identity of the woman who assaulted her in the video. Based on this
information, R.B. believed that the woman was appellant Lauren Peterson. Following their
conversation, Christiansen searched the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension website and
found a Lauren Peterson who lived in St. Anthony. He saw the driver’s license photo and
believed th at she was the same person as the assailant in the video. Christiansen then
uploaded Peterson’s driver’s license photo to the evidence system. After their
conversation, R.B. forwarded Christiansen a message from another person, A .A., who
identified Peterson as the assailant and described Peterson’s prior education and place of

1 Christiansen passed away during the proceedings, and the district court granted a request
by Respondent City of Minneapolis to substitute itself for Christiansen and to dismiss
Christiansen’s estate with prejudice. We refer to both initial parties as “respondents.”
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work. Christiansen emailed A.A., requesting the Facebook link for Peterson’s Facebook
account. Christiansen compared Peterson’s social media photographs and her driver’s
license photo to the Alpha News video and concluded that she was the individual in the
video. He believed Peterson was wearing the same glasses in the Facebook photographs
as the person in the Alpha News video.
Christiansen submitted a complaint intake form to the Minneapolis C ity Attorney’s
Office to request charges against Peterson. Christiansen’s complaint intake form was
assigned to Assistant City Attorney C lair Cole. After reviewing the evidence provided by
Christiansen, Cole decided to charge Pete rson and drafted the probable cause statement in
the criminal complaint. Both Christiansen and a deputy city attorney signed the complaint
and submitted the c omplaint to a judge in the Fourth Judicial District who also signed the
complaint, initiating criminal charges against Peterson .
Christiansen emailed a copy of the criminal complaint to R.B. Alpha News later
published the criminal complaint online. Two days later , Peterson received a “very
derogatory and crude” Facebook message from a stranger. She later received another
Facebook message with a link to an Alpha News article. Peterson discovered from reading
the article that “someone with [her] name, living in St. Anthony, had been charged.”
Peterson contacted a criminal defense attor ney who confirmed that she had been charged.
Peterson’s attorney then informed Cole that Peterson was not the person in the video,
providing evidence that at the time of the assault, Peterson was out of town. After obtaining
this information, the city attorney dismissed the criminal complaint against Peterson. Cole
informed Christiansen that the case was dismissed because of the receipt of “credible
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documents and pictures that this Lauren Peterson was out of t own at the time of the
offense.” Christiansen responded , “Wow, sorry about that. I thought I had a good ID. I’ll
start looking again.”
Peterson filed a complaint against respondents , alleging one claim of malicious
prosecution and one claim of negligenc e. Respondents moved for summary judgment on
both claims. The district court conducted a hearing and subsequently granted the motion,
dismissing the two claims with prejudice. Specifically, the district court concluded that
both claims failed on their merits , and alternatively, that respondents were immune f rom
liability for both malicious prosecution and negligence. Peterson appeals.
DECISION
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law “when the record
reflects a complete lack of proof on an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim.” Lubbers
v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995). We review a district court’s application
of the law and its determination that there are no genuine issues of material fact de novo.
STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76–77 (Minn. 2002). The
evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was
granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). I n opposing summary
judgment, however, “general assertions” are not enough to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul , 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn.
1995). Instead, “[t]o present a genuine issue of material fact, affidavits must be based on
personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.” Dunham v.
Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 569 (Minn. App. 2006) , rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006) . In
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addition, “[m]ere speculation or conjecture about a fact will not prevent summary
judgment.” Smits as Tr. for Short v. Park Nicollet Health Servs., 979 N.W.2d 436, 454
(Minn. 2022).
I. Because there is no evidence of malice in the appellate record, the district court
did not err when it granted summary judgment o n Peterson’s malicious
prosecution claim.

The elements of a malicious prosecution claim are as follows: (1) the action was
brought without probable cause; (2) the action was instituted and prosecuted with malicious
intent; and (3) the action terminate d in favor of the charged individual. Kellar v.
VonHoltum, 568 N.W.2d 186, 192 (Minn. App. 1997) (citing Jordan v. Lamb, 392 N.W.2d
607, 609 (Minn. App. 1986) , rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1986)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct.
31, 1997). Malice is “a state of mind to be proved as a fact,” Allen v. Osco Drug, Inc., 265
N.W.2d 639, 646 (Minn. 1978) (quoting Hanowitz v. Great N. Ry. Co., 142 N.W. 196, 197
(Minn. 1913)), and has been defined as “institut[ing] a groundless prosecution knowingly
and willfully,” Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 570-71, n.4. A cause of action for malicious
prosecution “has always been carefully circumscribed, and not favored in law ” because
“public policy favors prosecutions and affords such protection of another in good faith and
on reasonable grounds as is essential to public justice.” Lundberg v. Scoggins, 335 N.W.2d
235, 236 (Minn. 1983) (quotation omitted) .
In this case, Peterson surmises that the criminal complaint was filed with malice,
but only points to the fact s that Christiansen viewed the video while at home and later
assigned himself to investigate the case. Without more, t hese facts cannot establish that
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Christiansen knowingly and willfully initiated a groundless prosecuti on. Thus, the district
court did not err when it granted summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim.
II. Because the acts alleged in support of Peterson’s negligence claim involve the
exercise of discretion, respondents are immune from Peterson’s negligence
claim.

“Official immunity . . . protects public officials from the fear of personal liability
that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.”
Elwood v. Cnty . of Rice , 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. 1988). “Consistent with this
purpose, common law official immunity does not protect officials when they are charged
with the execution of ministerial, rather than discretionary, functions, that is, where
‘independent action’ is neither required nor desired.” Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep.
Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. 2004) (citation omitted) . Thus, the “critical
distinction” is whether the acts involved are discretionary or ministerial. Wiederholt v.
City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 1998). “A discretionary decision is one
involving more individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the professional
goal and factors of a situation.” Id. By contrast, “a ministerial duty is one in which nothing
is left to discretion; it is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a
specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[T]he
existence of a policy that sets a sufficientl y narrow standard of conduct will make a public
employee’s conduct ministerial if he is bound to follow the policy.” Mumm v. Mornson ,
708 N.W.2d 475, 491 (Minn. 2006).
In this case, we conclude that the acts involved required the exercise of discretion
for two reasons. First, Peterson only points to a single policy, MPD Policy 10- 203, as
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evidence of the ministerial nature of Christiansen’s conduct, but that policy is inapplicable
to this case. According to an MPD officer who provided a declaration, MPD Policy 10-
203 “exclusively concerns the management of informants who are registered with the MPD
as sources for evidence on criminal activity.” A.A., the tipster in this matter, was not an
informant registered with the MPD. Instead, A.A. voluntar ily provided the information ,
and MPD Policy 10-203 does not cover or address voluntary informants. Peterson has thus
failed to point to a policy and articulate a specific ministerial duty.
Second, the primary act at issue centers on Christiansen’s decision to request that
the city charge Peterson with a crime. Christiansen’s recommendation is based on a
probable cause determination , reflecting individual and professional judgment .
Christiansen’s probable cause analysis required that he weigh specific facts given his
professional experience, including the comparison he made between the person in the video
and Peterson’s driver’s license photo as well as the determination he made regarding
Peterson’s glasses. This analysis cannot be accurately characterized as a certain, absolute,
or imperative determination arising from fixed facts.
2

2 One exception to official immunity exists when the official acts with malice in carrying
out a discretionary act. E.g., Kariniemi v. City of Rockford , 882 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn.
2016) ( noting that official immunity protects a public official fr om liability for
discretionary acts “ unless the official is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong”). We
already determined that the record does not contain evidence that Christiansen acted with
malice, so this exception to official immunity does not apply.
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III. Because official immunity protects Christiansen, the city of Minneapolis is
protected from liability as well.

While o fficial immunity protects public officials acting in their official capacity
from suit, “[v]icarious official immunity protects a governmental entity from liability based
on the acts of an employee who is entitled to officia l immunity.” Dokman v. Cnty. Of
Hennepin, 637 N.W.2d 286, 297 (Minn. App. 2001) ( citing Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at
316), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2002) ; see also, e.g., Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38,
42-43 (Minn. 1992) (holding that official immunity extends vicariously to city in lawsuit
concerning the acts of a police officer). Because official immunity protects C hristiansen,
the city of Minneapolis is protected as well, and the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the city.
Affirmed.