Salat Issa Salat, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0532

Salat Issa Salat, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 27, 2022
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-18-6764

Soren Paul Petrek, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant argues the postconviction court erred when it found he waived his right
to a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and in compliance with Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01. 1
We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Salat Issa Salat with five counts
relating to a domestic -abuse incident.2 Appellant appeared before the district court for
trial. After the district court swore in appellant’s Somali interpreter, the following
exchange occurred:
THE COURT: And , [defense counsel], it ’s my understanding
that your client intends to wa ive his right to a jury trial and
proceed to a [bench] trial. Is that still what your client wishes
to do?
DEFENSE COUNSEL : That is, Your Honor.
THE COURT: If you could please inquire?

1 Appellant also argues that he timely filed his petition for postconviction relief. Despite
the postconviction court finding that appellant filed an untimely petition, the
postconviction court still addressed the petition on its merits. Thus, this issue is moot since
we can offer no effective relief . Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015)
(holding an issue is moot if “an award of effective relief is no longer possible”).
2 The state charged appellant with one count of domestic assault by strangulation under
Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2018); one count of terroristic threats under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713, subd. 1 (2018); one count of misdemeanor d omestic assault—attempt or
intention to inflict bodily harm under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2) (2018); one count
of misdemeanor a ssault—commits act to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death
under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2018); and one count of fourth- degree property
damage under Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 3 (2018).
3
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL :
Q. [Appellant], you and I have had a chance to discuss now on
a couple of occasions your right to have a jury trial in this
matter; is that correct?
A. Mmm.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And I ’ve explained to you that in a felony case you could
have a jury of 12 persons determine whether you were guilty
or not. All 12 would have to be unanimous before finding you
guilty.
A. Correct.
Q. I’ve also explained to you that you can just have the judge
determine whether you were guilty or not.
A. Yes.
Q. And we ’ve discussed this on a couple of occasions. We ’ve
discussed the pros and cons of just having a judge decide and
just having the jury decide.
A. Yes.
Q. I ’ve explained to you that it ’s your decision whether you
have a jury trial or not, not mine.
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. Yeah?
A. Yes.
Q. And that I’m here to advise you.
A. Yes.
Q. And after discussing this last week, you determined that you
would – had preferred to have the judge decide whether you
were guilty or not as opposed to having a jury decide whether
you were guilty or not.
A. Yes.
Q. And, again, that was your decision, not mine?
A. Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL : Is that sufficient, Your Honor?
THE COURT: It is for me. Anything further about the waiver,
[prosecutor]?
PROSECUTOR: No, Your Honor.

The district court proceeded with a bench trial. The district court found appellant guilty of
all five counts. The district court sentenced appellant to a stay of imposition for one count
of terroristic threats and did not sentence appellant for the other four counts .
4
Appellant filed a petition for pos tconviction relief requesting the postconviction
court vacate appellant’s convictions. Appellant argued that the waiver of his right to a jury
trial was not sufficiently knowing and voluntary under the United States and Minnesota
constitutions, and the waiver did not comply with rule 26.01. The postconviction court
denied appellant’s petition for postconviction relief on the merits.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant contends the postconviction court erred when it found that appellant
waived his right to a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and in compliance with rule 26.01.
Specifically, appellant argues that the phrase “after being advised by the court of the right
to trial by jur y” in rule 26.01, subd ivision 1(2)(a), requires the district court to speak
directly to a defendant for a waiver to be valid, especially when a defendant requires an
interpreter and has no experience with the district court. We review these issues de novo.
State v. Bey, 975 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2022).
A defendant is entitled to a trial by jury under both the United States and Minnesota
constitutions. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl . 3; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art . 1,
§§ 4, 6. In Minnesota, the right to a jury trial attaches whenever the state charges a
defendant with an offense that has an authorized penalty of incarceration. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 1(1)(a); State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. 2011).
A defendant may choose to waive this right to a jury and instead proceed to a bench
trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2); State v. Tlapa, 642 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. App.
2002), rev. denied (Minn. Jun 18, 2002). A defendant ’s waiver must be know ing,
5
voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn. 1991) . Whether a
defendant knowingly, voluntar ily, and intelligent ly waives a constitutional right depends
on the facts and circumstances of the case, including the defendant’s background,
experience, and conduct. State v. Little , 851 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. 2014) (citing State
v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. 2012) ).
Rule 26.01, subdivision 1(2)(a), details the proper method for a defen dant to waive
their right to a jury trial on the issue of guilt:
The defendant, with the approval of the court, may waive a jury
trial on the issue of guilt provided the defendant does so
personally, in writing or on the record in open court, after being
advised by the court of the right to trial by jury , and after
having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.

(Emphasis added .) We have held that the waiver rule must be strictly construed. Tlapa,
642 N.W.2d at 74 (citing State v. Ulland, 357 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Minn. App. 1984)).
That said, rule 26.01, subdivision 1(2)(a), sets forth a “relatively painless and simple
procedure to protect” a defendant ’s constitutional right to a jury trial. State, City of Tracy
v. Neuman, 392 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Minn. App. 1986). The district court need not make a n
exhaustive inquiry into why the defendant waived their right to a jury. Ross, 472 N.W.2d
at 654. But the district court must ensure the defendant is adequately informed of their
rights, and the district court’s caution in accepting the waiver must increase with the gravity
of the offenses with which the defendant is charged. Id. at 653. The nature and extent of
the inquiry into a defendant ’s decision to waive a jury trial may vary with the circumstances
of a particular case. Id. at 654. Although it is advisable, a defendant need not be told in
6
each case that a jury consists of twelve members of the community, that a defendant may
participate in selection of these jurors, that a jury ’s verdict must be unanimous and that, if
a defendant waives their right to a jury, then the judge alone will decide their guilt or
innocence. Id. The critical question is “whether the defendant underst ands the basic
elements of a jury trial.” Id.
Here, the record shows that , although the district court did not speak directly to
appellant, appellant’s counsel —upon the court ’s request —advised appellant of many of
the rights listed in Ross and obtained his express waiver in open court . Appellant’s
discussion with his counsel addressed that (1) appellant had a right to a twelve-person jury;
(2) this jury would have to be unanimous to find appellant guilty; (3) appellant could elect
to have the judge decide his guilt instead of a jury; and (4) the waiver decision belonged
solely to appellant. Throughout this colloquy, appellant affirmed that he had discussed all
these matters previously with his counsel and affirmed his d ecision to waive a jury trial .
The district court found the waiver sufficient.
This discussion exceeded the detail and breadth of other waivers appellate courts
have affirmed. See Ross, 472 N.W.2d at 653; State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 890
(Minn. 1979). For example, in Pietraszewski, the district court asked the defendant only if
he wished to waive his right to a jury trial, to which the defendant replied, “That ’s true,
Your Honor.” 283 N.W.2d at 890. The Pietraszewski court held that, a lthough a more
thorough inquiry should have been made, reversal was not required. Id. Here, appellant’s
counsel advised him in open court of “the basic elements of a jury trial.” Ross, 472 N.W.2d
at 654. Then appellant personally affirmed he would like to proceed with a bench trial.
7
Appellant argues we must strictly construe rule 26.01, subd ivision 1(2)(a), so
“advised by the court” does not include “advised by counsel in front of the court.” But
there is a distinction between th e previous cases calling for strict compliance with rule
26.01’s language and appellant’s case. Ulland, 357 N.W.2d at 347; State v. Sandmoen,
390 N.W.2d 419, 423-24 (Minn. App. 1986) ; Tlapa, 642 N.W.2d at 74. In the previous
cases, we reversed because the defendant did not personally state their waiver on the record.
See, e.g., Tlapa, 642 N.W. 2d at 75 (“[A]t no time was [defendant] asked to state his waiver
of a jury trial, to acknowledge that he had in fact waived that right, or even to acquiesce in
his attorney’s statement of the waiver.” (emphasis added)). We have noted that “where the
[defendant] was present when his attorney purported to waive a jury trial, the court should
have addressed the [defendant] directly to make sure that he concurred in the waiver .”
Sandmoen, 390 N.W.2d at 423 (emphasis added). “As we view the rule, strict compliance
is required in order to assure that the waiver is voluntarily and intelligently made.” Id. at
423-24 (emphasis added) . Here, appellant showed that “he concurred in the waiver” when
he stated so on the record. Id. at 423. Thus, with thorough advisement fr om his counsel,
appellant waived his right to a jury knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Further, we have affirmed waivers when the district court did not directly “advise”
a defendant. State v. Jones, No. A03-1826, 2004 WL 2340077, at *2 (Minn. App. Oct. 19,
2004), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2004) ;3 cf. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94- 96
(Minn. 2010) (holding the district court did not err when defense counsel performed a task

3 We observe that Jones is a nonprecedential opinion, but we recognize its persuasive value.
See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
8
that another rule places on the d istrict court). In Jones, we affirmed a jury -trial waiver
based on the defendant ’s written waiver as well as a discussion between the defendant and
counsel at a pretrial hearing. Jones, 2004 WL 2340077, at *2. We concluded that the
totality of the circumstances reflected the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived their right. Id. (citing Ross, 472 N.W.2d at 654). Here, appellant
clearly stated his waiver on the record and affirmed he had discussed this deci sion with his
attorney previously. Much like Jones, the totality of the circumstances show appellant
waived his right to a jury trial knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Appellant finally argues that this case is like Tlapa because both involve a defendant
who required an interpreter. 642 N.W.2d at 75. We are not persuaded. The Tlapa court
expressed concern that, “[a]lthough we do not doubt that [the defendant] ’s attorney
discussed with him a choice between a bench trial and a jury trial, those discussions were
private, and we can only assume that an interpreter was available to assist [the defendant]
in understanding and appreciating his attorney’ s explanation.” Id. Here, appellant’s
discussions with his attorney w ere not entirely private. The district court observed
appellant discuss his rights with his attorney in open court through a court -approved
interpreter.
This case is closer to State v. Pha, No. A04-2183, 2005 WL 2129166, at *4 (Minn.
App. Sept. 6, 2005).4 In Pha, we affirmed a jury-trial waiver despite the defendant arguing
that “his waiver was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made because he is

4 We observe that Pha is a nonprecedential opinion, but we recognize its persuasive value.
See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
9
unfamiliar with the legal system and wished to speak more about the matter with the aid of
an interpreter.”5 Id. We concluded the defendant ’s “counsel clearly explained the basic
elements of a jury trial as outlined in Ross, and [the defendant] stated unequivocally that
he wished to waive his right to a jury.” Id. As in Pha, appellant had an “extensive
discussion—aided by an interpreter —of jury- trial procedures ” on the record with his
attorney, which shows appellant waived his right to a jury knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. Id.
In sum, t he record establishes that appellant waived his right to a jury trial
knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently, and in compliance with rule 26.01. Appellant
reviewed “the basic elements of a jury trial” with his counsel on the record , before the
district court, and personally affirmed his choice to proceed with a bench trial. Ross, 472
N.W.2d at 654.
Affirmed.

5 According to appellant’s brief, appellant had no experience with the district court before
this case.