In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0538

In re the Marriage of:

Oliver Wilfred Cass, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

YeYing Cen,
Appellant.

Filed June 12, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-17-2558

Jane Binder, Binder Law Offices, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kathryn A. Graves, Jaime Driggs, Benjamin J. Hamborg, Henson & Efron, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of her motion to vacate the parties’ oral marriage-
dissolution stipulation, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because
(1) appellant did not have competent counsel, (2) the negotiations were not sufficiently
2
detailed, and (3) the district court did not ask appellant whether she considered the terms
of the stipulation fair and equitable. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant YeYing Cen (wife) and respondent Oliver Cass (husband) married in
2010. Husband was a gastroenterologist and wife was not employed. In 2014, wife moved
from Minnesota to Durham, North Carolina, to look for a home in which they could live
after husband retired. The couple purchased a home the following year. Due to wife’s
myriad health concerns, including sensitivity to electromagnetic frequencies and allergies
to plastic and nickel, the Durham home required extensive renovation s. During this time,
husband continued to live in the couples’ Minnesota home, at first regularly visiting wife
in Durham and later visiting less frequently. In 2017, husband petitioned to dissolve the
marriage. At that time, husband was nearing retirement.
In April 2018, wife moved the district court to place the dissolution proceedings on
inactive status, citing various medical conditions. Husband opposed the motion, asking
the district court to instead appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) to assist wife with managing
discovery.1 The district court granted only husband’s motion. Four months later, the
district court vacated the appointment because the parties agreed that discovery was
progressing, and wife’s lawyers could adequately represent her best interests.

1 Wife argued that she did not need a GAL because she had the mental capacity to
participate in the litigation and that her medical conditions only affected her physical
capacity to attend to discovery.
3
In April 2019, the district court reappointed the GAL, an experienced family law
attorney. The court reasoned that the case had “moved on to a different stage, and the
parties must be able to sufficiently understand the complex legal issues in this case in order
to arrive at a settlement or prepare for trial,” which was set for late July. And the court
ordered the GAL
to represent the best interests of [wife], and, after conducting
an independent investigation, advise the court as to what, if
any, accommodations are needed to assist [wife] in defending
this action with her attorney, and assist the court in addressing
the issues of spousal maintenance, division of assets and
allocation of debt.

In June, the GAL submitted a report documenting her investigation and assessment
of wife’s needs. The GAL noted that wife’s delay in providing financial and other
documentation to her lawyer was a recurring issue. After observing that wife had been
represented by four different lawyers during the course of the litigation, the GAL stated
that the three she had spoken with all believed that wife “ is highly intelligent and fully
capable of understanding the component parts of the marital estate and the math that belies
the parties’ respective nonmarital claims, cashflow analyses, etc.”
The GAL concurred with these assessments. She further reported that wife “has a
high level of proficiency in the English language” and appeared to understand the financial
issues. During a meeting with the court-appointed neutral financial expert (the expert), the
GAL observed that wife asked “high level, and very specific questions, regarding how [the
expert] reached his conclusions” about the parties’ assets. Wife’s conversation with the
4
expert included “excellent and informed questions about the various [financial] schedules
and underlying statements/data.”
But the GAL did have lingering concerns about wife’s “anxiety around her
environmental sensitivities and health,” and opined that these issues “continued to pose a
barrier to [wife] engaging in this divorce process as productively as is needed.” The GAL
reported that wife’s lawyers had “a good understanding of [wife’s] issues” and were
“skilled and equipped to assist her.” Ultimately, the GAL recommended the district court
allow her to assist wife “in processing her concerns, [to] ensure that [wife] is being
understood and that she is understanding . . . what will serve her best interests, including
being available for important events and producing information.” The district court
followed this recommendation.
The trial occurred on July 23 and 24. On the first day, wife’s lawyer informed the
district court that wife was having a reaction to a gadolinium
2 injection she received “over
a week ago.” Wife’s lawyer advised that the reaction could cause wife to “become dizzy
at times and . . . faint at times.” But the lawyer confirmed that wife “intends to be here and
participate.” The district court then had this exchange with wife:
DC: All right. Well, I appreciate that, Ms. Cen. Is it Ms.
Cen, right?
A: C-E-N, is fine.
DC: If you need to take a break you should let your attorney
know or let [the GAL] know and they’ll let the Court
know. All right?

2 Gadolinium is a contrast agent used in connection with magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI).
5
A: I want to point out just add Gadolinium based is banned
in Europe, but it’ s not banned in this country
unfortunately.
DC: Okay, thank you.
A: And so I have repeated in my images, and I just ought
to know this information just—
DC: Well, I’m glad you’re here today.
A: Thank you. I’m very happy to be here.

On the second day of the trial, it appeared that the parties held common positions
with respect to asset division. The district court suggested that the parties discuss
settlement. They did so, reaching a stipulation that wife’s lawyer put on the record. Wife
received more than $1 million in assets, including the Durham home. She agreed to pay
off the mortgage on the Durham home. In addition, husband agr eed to make a $100,000
cash payment to wife upon entry of the dissolution judgment and pay her an additional
$10,000 per month for six months. This division is consistent with wife’s pretrial proposal,
which the parties used to form the “framework” of the stipulation. Wife also agreed that
she would waive her claim for spousal maintenance; her lawyer repeatedly confirmed that
the parties intended that there would be no spousal maintenance.
After wife expressed concern that she would not have enough funds to pay off the
$489,000 mortgage on the Durham home, she spoke with the GAL off the record.
Following their discussion, the GAL reported that she had reviewed the financial
documents with wife and showed her that she had sufficient funds to pay off the mortgage,
and that wife wanted to enter into the stipulated agreement. Wife stated several times that
she understood her obligation to pay off the mortgage and intended to do so.
6
Wife then questioned whether she would have enough funds to pay the property
taxes on the Durham home in future years. Her attorney interjected, and the following
exchange occurred:
Q: Before you say any more, are you suggesting you do not
want this settlement and you do not want to settle this
case?
A: I want the settlement.
Q: Okay. Then what you’re saying is contradictory to
wanting the settlement. So you have to tell the court
whether you want this settlement or you don’t want this
settlement.
A: I want the settlement.
Q: Okay.
. . . .
Q: Then you understand if you want the settlement that
means you will receive the cash that you have which on
Exhibit 262 is over $850,000, plus the retirement, plus
your house, and plus the $100,000 from Mr. Cass plus
six monthly payments of $10,000 per month and those
will be the funds that are available to you, and you have
to use those funds to take care of yourself and then do
whatever you can to take care of yourself beyond that.
Do you understand that?
A: I do.
. . . .
Q: Ms. Cen, we have been discussing settlement in this
case now for a long time, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: We’ve been to two moderated settlement conferences,
we’ve [worked with the expert]. You’ve been
discussing settlement with me and with [wife’s other
attorney]. And you’ve also been discussing settlement
with the guardian [ad litem], correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you understand the settlement as had been read
into the record today?
. . . .
A: Yes.
. . . .
7
Q: And you understand that when as I read into the record
when this settlement is approved by the Court which we
anticipate it will be, then you will never be able to get
spousal maintenance from Mr. Cass; he is paying you
$10,000 per month for the next six months as an
additional property settlement, but you can never ask for
spousal maintenance again because the Court will lose
the authority to grant that request. Do you understand
that?
A: I understand that.
Q: And nevertheless you are asking the Court to enter this
settlement today?
A: Yes.
DC: All right. Do you have any questions of the Court?
A: No.

Thereafter, the district court accepted the stipulation.
On July 26, two days after entering into the agreement, wife sent a letter to the
district court indicating that she “was pressured by [her] attorneys to agree to the settlement
at the hearing.” The letter states that wife did not have enough time to consider husband’s
settlement proposal and requests “an opportunity to respond to [husband’s] counter offer.”
Three days later, wife sent another letter to the district court asserting that she would
not have agreed to the settlement had she not been “acutely sick from gadolinium
poisoning.” This letter states that wife “reject[s]” the settlement agreement. After wife
sent the second letter, her trial lawyers withdrew from the case.
On August 1, wife filed a pro se motion asking the district court to “add an addition
to the settlement on spousal maintenance of $15,000 per month for three and [a] half years.”
In her supporting affidavit, wife avers that due to “acute gadolinium poisoning, [she] failed
to express clearly that ‘[she] want[s] a settlement instead of the trial but this settlement
8
lacks spousal support.’” The motion references an October 1 hearing date, which was later
rescheduled to November 6.
On August 21, husband filed a proposed dissolution judgment and decree. Wife’s
GAL signed the document, confirming that it accurately reflected the parties’ agreement
as presented on the record at trial. On October 1, before the hearing on wife’s motion, the
district court signed the proposed judgment.
Wife appealed, arguing that the district court denied her due process by entering the
judgment and decree without (1) addressing her motion challenging the validity of the
stipulation and (2) adhering to Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 307(b). This court agreed, reversing
and remanding to allow wife an opportunity to be heard on her motion challenging the
validity of the oral stipulation. See generally Cass v. Cen, No. A19-1903, 2021 WL 317725
(Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2021).
On remand, wife renewed her motion to vacate the stipulation as “improvidently
made and in equity and good conscience ought not to stand.” Her supporting affidavit cites
purported inaccuracies in the financial information the parties used to reach the settlement;
her lack of mental capacity due to gadolinium poisoning; the “pressure from everyone” to
settle, which amounted to duress; and the failure by the district court to ask her if she was
waiving her right to spousal maintenance, and whether she felt it was fair and equitable to
do so.
Following a hearing, the district court denied wife’s motion. In a detailed order, the
district court found wife’s assertion that she “did not understand . . . the amount of money”
she was to receive “not credible.” It noted that the financial document that formed the
9
basis for the settlement was prepared at wife’s request by the expert. It also noted that wife
“was in the best position to know” that she had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars of
marital funds on attorney fees, and that she had acknowledged as much on the record. The
district court pointed to a “clear” record showing that wife agreed to waive spousal
maintenance in exchange for $160,000 from husband. Relevant to this appeal, it found that
wife (1) was represented by competent counsel, (2) the settlement negotiations were
extensive and detailed, and (3) although it did not specifically ask wife if she found the
agreement to be “fair and equitable,” she acknowledged that she understood and accepted
its terms.
Wife appeals.
DECISION
“Courts favor stipulations in dissolution cases as a means of simplifying and
expediting litigation, and to bring resolution to what frequently has become an acrimonious
relationship between the parties.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997) .
Because they are considered binding contracts, a party cannot withdraw from a stipulation
without the other party’s consent or permission of the court. Id. at 521-22. When
considering a motion to vacate a pre-judgment stipulation in a dissolution matter, the court
must determine “whether the stipulation was ‘improvidently made and in equity and good
conscience ought not to stand.’” Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. App.
2000) (quoting Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522). Stipulations entered pursuant to fraud or duress
that prejudice a party meet this standard. Id. (citing Tomscak v. Tomscak, 352 N.W.2d 464,
466 (Minn. 1984)).
10
In determining whether to vacate such a stipulation, district courts may consider the
so-called Tomscak factors, which include whether: (1) the moving party was represented
by competent counsel; (2) extensive and detailed negotiations occurred; (3) the party
agreed to the stipulation in open court; and (4) when questioned by the judge, the party
acknowledged understanding the terms and considering them fair and equitable. Glorvigen
v. Glorvigen, 438 N.W.2d 692, 695-96 (Minn. App. 1989). 3 This analysis focuses on
whether the district court proceedings “substantially complied” with each factor. Id. at
696. We will not reverse a district court’ s decision whether to vacate a dissolution
stipulation unless the district court abused its discretion. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d at 639.
One way a district court can abuse its discretion is by making findings of fact that lack
support in the record. See Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997); Bender
v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (citing this aspect of Dobrin).
Wife argues that the stipulation was improvidently made and in equity and good
conscience ought not to stand because (1) she was not represented by competent counsel,
(2) extensive and detailed negotiations did not occur, and (3) the district court did not ask
about, and she did not acknowledge, that she understood the terms of the stipulation and
considered them fair and equitable. None of wife’s arguments persuade us to reverse.

3 After Tomscak, the legislature amended the statute regarding obtaining relief from
dissolution judgments. Since then, we have held that a district court is not required to
consider the Tomscak factors, but it is not error to do so when addressing whether to grant
relief from a stipulation prior to entry of judgment. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d at 640. After
entry of judgment, a party may only seek relief under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2022).
Id.
11
Competence of Counsel
Wife first asserts that the district court clearly erred by finding that her trial lawyers4
were competent because they “never accurately calculated the bottom-line number for Wife
to show her what she would actually receive under the stipulation.” She contends that the
financial information the parties used was outdated and inaccurate, particularly because it
did not account for the hundreds of thousands of dollars she had already spent on legal fees
and her responsibility to pay off the mortgage on the Durham home. The district court
rejected these contentions, finding that wife “understood the nature of the agreement and
her statement that she did not understand . . . the amount of money she would have . . . is
not credible.”
The record supports this finding. The GAL’s report—submitted just one month
before trial— states that wife’s prior and current lawyers all agreed that wife is “highly
intelligent and fully capable of understanding” the financial aspects of the dissolution. The
GAL traveled to Durham to meet with wife, and personally observed that wife had “a solid
grasp of the numbers,” and that when wife had concerns, she “asked high level, and very
specific questions” about the expert’s calculations. Wife’s legal expenses were detailed in
her pretrial memorandum, are reflected in the expert’s calculations, and were paid from
marital funds. The expert specifically testified that any reduction in the balances of the
parties’ accounts—primarily due to wife’s expenditures —was accurately reflected in his
spreadsheets. And the trial transcript reveals that wife had ample opportunity to discuss

4 Wife retained her current lawyers during the first appeal.
12
the “bottom-line” with her lawyers and the GAL, and that she repeatedly stated that she
understood and accepted the terms of the stipulation.
Wife next contends that her trial lawyers were incompetent and subjected her to
duress because they let her enter the stipulation when she lacked capacity due to
gadolinium “poisoning.” She argues that the district court clearly erred by rejecting her
averment that she advised the court in chambers that she was “feeling very sick” and was
not in a position to participate in the trial. The record defeats wife’s contentions.
As the district court noted, the standard for contracting is whether wife possessed
“enough mental capacity to understand, to a reasonable extent, the nature and effect of what
[s]he is doing.” Timm v. Schneider, 279 N.W. 754, 755 (Minn. 1938) (quotation omitted).
The court found that wife met this standard. It rejected wife’s assertions about an in-
chamber discussion regarding her health, stating that no discussions took place in chambers
and that both wife and her lawyer affirmed at the start of trial that she was prepared to
participate. Throughout the two-day trial, wife never again mentioned the purported
“poisoning.” She did not ask to take a break or for any other accommodation, despite the
district court’s express invitation to do so. And the two physicians’ letters that wife
submitted in support of her motion are based on self-reported symptoms and do not contain
complete or accurate information that would compel the district court to doubt wife’s
mental capacity. As to her claimed duress, wife points to no evidence that her lawyer
coerced her “by means of threats or other circumstances that destroy[ed] [her] free will and
compel[led] her to comply” with her lawyer’s “demand.” Kremer v. Kremer, 912 N.W.2d
617, 628 (Minn. 2018) ; see also Kroeplin v. Haugen, 390 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Minn. App.
13
1986) (stating “pressure on appellant to reach an agreement on the terms of the dissolution
after such a lengthy period of negotiations does not amount to duress”), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 25, 1986).
Finally, wife argues that her trial lawyers were incompetent because they arranged
for husband to pay wife an additional $160,000 as “property” rather than as spousal
maintenance to avoid having to make a Karon waiver “that he knew could not be
sustained.”5 But wife cites no specific facts or testimony evidencing that her lawyer, or
anyone else, endeavored to circumvent the requirements of Karon. And she cites no legal
support for her implicit argument that Karon applies when the parties agree that spousal
maintenance will not be awarded.
Extensive and Detailed Negotiations
Wife contends that the district court clearly erred when it determined that the
parties’ negotiations— which included several mediations and two moderated settlement
conferences—were extensive and detailed because the “bottom-line figure showing Wife
what she would actually be receiving” was “nowhere to be found.”
At the hearing on wife’s motion to vacate the stipulation, wife’s lawyer expressly
waived this argument, stating, “The second [Tomscak] factor is[,] were there detailed and

5 See Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn. 1989) (explaining that, in a proceeding
in which spousal maintenance is awarded, the parties may agree to divest the district court
of jurisdiction to later modify the award) superseded in part by statute, 1989 Minn. Laws
ch. 248, § 7, at 838 (currently codified at Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5 (2022)), as
recognized in Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 746 n.6. (Minn. 1994); see also Butt v. Schmidt,
747 N.W.2d 566, 573 (Minn. 2008) (outlining the requirements that must be met to divest
a district court of jurisdiction).
14
extensive negotiations? . . . I don’t think that part of the factors is in dispute.” Later in the
same hearing, the district court asked wife’s lawyer to confirm that wife was waiving this
argument, to which the lawyer replied, “Yes . . . we’re not making an issue of that.”
Because wife did not challenge this Tomscak factor in the district court, we do not consider
it on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (holding that a
reviewing court only considers issues presented to and considered by the district court).
Fair and Equitable Settlement Terms
As to her third challenge, wife urges us to conclude that the district court clearly
erred because the court did not ask whether she considered the terms to be fair and
equitable. The parties acknowledge, as did the district court, that no one asked wife this
question. But both parties agree that “substantial compliance” —not literal compliance—
with the Tomscak factors is all that is required of the district court when determining
whether a stipulation was improvidently made.
Wife nevertheless insists that the district court’s failure to inquire is “fatal” under
“the circumstances surrounding the stipulation”—namely, that she: is not a native English
speaker, needed a GAL “due to concerns about her mental capacity,” was having a reaction
to gadolinium at the time of the stipulation, and had “clear difficulty following the
proceedings and understanding t he effect of the proposed agreement.” Once again, the
record defeats wife’s contentions.
First, while wife is not a native English speaker, the undisputed evidence shows that
she is highly proficient in the English language. Before moving to the United States, she
taught English at the university level. The district court credited the GAL’s report, which
15
includes observations that wife understands English and “is highly intelligent and has a
solid grasp of the numbers.” And the district court relied on its own observations of wife
throughout the court proceedings. As to wife’s capacity to understand complex financial
issues, the GAL expressed “a high level of confidence in [wife’s] understanding of the
calculations.” Wife’s lawyers agreed.
Second, wife’s lack- of-capacity argument is belied by a record that shows she
affirmed multiple times in her own words and through counsel that despite her “reaction”
to gadolinium she was prepared to participate and understood the proceedings.
Third, wife’s contention that the GAL was appointed “due to concerns about her
mental capacity,” is directly contradicted by the record. The district court originally
appointed the GAL to assist wife with managing discovery; as trial approached, it
reappointed the GAL to ensure wife was able “to sufficiently understand the complex legal
issues in this case in order to arrive at a settlement or prepare for trial.” The GAL expressed
no concerns about wife’s mental capacity to understand the issues presented in the
dissolution proceeding. Rather, the GAL’s concerns relate to wife’s “anxiety around her
environmental sensitivities and health.” Nowhere in the record is there an indicati on that
wife’s mental capacity was the reason for appointing a GAL. Similarly, the record defeats
wife’s contention that it is “clear” she had difficulty following the proceedings; she asked
specific questions and expressed her understanding of the underlying facts and settlement
terms multiple times during the proceedings.
16
On this record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that
the proceedings substantially complied with Tomscak. And we observe no other abuse of
discretion by the court in denying wife’s motion to vacate the stipulation.
Affirmed.