State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0553

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jory Daniel Wiebrand,
Appellant.

Filed December 19, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-20-10963, 27-CR-20-11960

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Zachary Stephenson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer L. Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to impose restitution, raising the
following two arguments : (1) the record lacked sufficient facts to support the restitution
order; and (2) the district court failed to consider appellant’s ability to pay restitution.
2
Because the restitution request satisfied the statutory requirements for ordering restitution
paid to the Crime Victims Reparations Board (CVRB) and because the district court
properly considered appellant’s ability to pay, we conclude the district court did not abuse
its discretion in ordering restitution.
FACTS
In April and May 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jory
Wiebrand with various offenses in thirteen case files. Wiebrand ultimately pleaded guilty
to four counts of first -degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of second -degree
criminal sexual conduct, and he agreed to pay restitution in all of the charged cases. At
sentencing, the district court ordered restitution to be paid to the CVRB in the amounts of
$10,780.39 and $44.09 for victims B.M. and J.K., respectively. 1 The district court advised
Wiebrand that he would have 30 days to contest the restitution order . Wiebrand submitted
an affidavit challenging restitution within the 30-day timeframe . T he district court
scheduled a contested restitution hearing. In lieu of an evidentiary hearing, however, the
parties stipulated to evidence and submitted their arguments in writing.
The district court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence established the
specific payments made by the CVRB to rei mburse the victims for their expenses .
Additionally, the district court considered Wiebrand’s ability to pay and determined that
“it is within [Wiebrand’s] means to pay the restitution ordered .” The district court ordered

1 The restitution awards relating to the other victims are not challenged in this appeal.
3
Wiebrand to pay “a reasonable amount per month toward restitution from his prison wages
after he obtains employment.” Wiebrand appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the CVRB’s Restitution Request
Wiebrand first argues that the information provided by the CVRB does not establish
a sufficient factual basis for the restitution award. We are not convinced because the record
includes the CVRB payment orders detailing the amounts that the CVRB paid the victims.
Restitution reques ted by the CVRB is governed by Minnesota Statutes section
611A.04, subd ivision 1a (2022). The permissive language of this provision contemplates
restitution requests being accompanied by a copy of the CVRB payment orders, if any are
issued, that show the amounts paid by the CVRB to the victim:
The Crime Victims Reparations Board may request restitution
on behalf of a victim by filing a copy of orders of the board, if
any, which detail any amounts paid by the board to the victim.
The board may file the pay ment order with the [district] court
administrator or with the person or agency the [district] court
has designated to obtain information relating to restitution.

The statutory provisions for restitution requests submitted by the CVRB differ from
the provisions governing direct restitution requests by a victim, which are set forth in
Minnesota Statutes section 611A.04, subdivision 1 (2022). Unlike CVRB requests
pursuant to subdivision 1a, direct victim requests under subdivision 1 “must describe the
items or elements of loss, itemize the total dollar amounts of restitution claimed, and
specify the reasons justifying these amounts, if resti tution is in the form of money or
4
property.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1. We generally review a restitution order for an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. 2021) .
In this case, Wiebrand argues that the CVRB’s submissions did not describe “the
nature and amount of the losses with reasonable specificity,” citing State v. Keehn , 554
N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. App. 1996), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1996) and State v. Fader,
358 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1984). Both cases, however, concern direct victim request s,
not requests made by the CVRB. Importantly, Wiebrand does not that argue the statute is
ambiguous, make any statutory interpretation analysis, or challenge the restitution award
on the grounds that the CVRB failed to provide a list of the amounts paid to the victims. 2
After reviewing the record, it is clear that the CVRB fulfilled its statutory obligations. The
CVRB submitted payment orders detailing the dates, places, and amounts it paid the
victims. Bec ause w e decline to adopt a new legal rule extending Keehn and Fader to
restitution requests submitted by the CVRB and because the CVRB’s submissions satisfied
subdivision 1a, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.
II. Consideration of Wiebrand’s Ability to Pay
Wiebrand also argues that the district court failed to consider his ability to pay. We
conclude, however, that the district court adequately considered Wiebrand ’s ability to pay.

2 To the extent that portions of Wiebrand’s brief could be construed as asserting procedural
errors prior to the initial restitution order or asserting errors regarding the timelines in
subdivision 1a , such arguments are unavailing. Wiebrand does not challenge any aspect
of the contested process that followed the initial order and makes no argument that any
such errors affected the ultimate outcome of the ensuing proceeding. Thus, we need not
address the merits of these arguments. See State v. Cloutier , 971 N.W.2d 743, 749 (Minn.
App. 2022) (“[E]rror without prejudice is not grounds for reversal.”), rev. granted on other
grounds (Minn. May 17, 2022).
5
The restitution statute requires district courts to “consider . . . the income, resources,
and obligations of the defendant .” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (2022). Although
the district court need not make specific findings regarding ability to pay, it must “expressly
state, either orally or in writing, that it has considered” those factors. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d
at 659, 664-65. The record must contain sufficient evidence about those factors to facilitate
the district court ’s consideration of them. Id. Moreover, “Minnesota courts have uphel d
restitution orders even when the appellant may not be able to pay the restitution amount.”
State v. Alexander , 855 N.W.2d 340, 344- 45 (Minn. App. 2014) (listing cases affirming
restitution awards where the defendant is in prison, ordered to pay restitut ion from prison
earnings, or unable to pay the entire restitution award). We review the district court ’s
findings of fact for clear error and its ultimate order of restitution for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015).
In this case , t he district court considered Wiebrand’s ability to pay. It explicitly
determined that Wiebrand was physically capable of working and would be able to work
while incarcerated . The district court also noted that while Wiebrand ’s income may be
stagnant while he serves his time in prison, the total of his weekly earnings over the course
of the next thirty years is nearly double the amount of restitution. Finally, the district court
determined that b ased these factors, Wiebrand’s work history in the community, and his
ability to work after his release from prison, it was within Wiebrand ’s means to pay the
restitution ordered. These findings are supported by the record, and we discern no abuse
of discretion in the district court ’s consideration of Wiebrand’s ability to pay.
Affirmed.