A22-0560 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed December 12, 2022

The holding in the court’s own words

Because we conclude that any error did not affect Laspina’s substantial rights, we affirm.

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0560

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony Thomas Laspina,
Appellant.

Filed December 12, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-20-1233

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Anthony Thomas Laspina challenges the district court’s order revoking
stays of adjudication of three criminal charges against him. He argues that the district court
committed reversible plain error by failing to provide him with a written copy of a
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probation-violation report before accepting his admissions to the alleged violations and
revoking the stays of adjudication. Because we conclude that any error did not affect
Laspina’s substantial rights, we affirm.
FACTS
On April 3, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Laspina with second-
degree assault,1 three counts of threats of violence, 2 gross-misdemeanor obstructing legal
process,3 and misdemeanor assaulting a public -safety dog.4 Laspina pleaded guilty to the
three counts of threats of violence in exchange for stays of adjudication on those three
counts and dismissal of the other counts. At sentencing, the district court stayed the
adjudication of the three threats-of-violence counts, dismissed the remaining counts, and
placed Gibbs on supervised probation.
On January 20, 2022 , the state filed a probation-violation report . It alleged that
Laspina violated conditions of probation by (1) failing to contact his probation officer when
he missed a meeting on January 13, 2022; (2) failing to abstain from using or possessing
mood-altering substances when 118.38 grams of methamphetamine were found in his
residence; and (3) failing to refrain from engaging in threats or acts of violence when he
became aggressive in a police interview and kicked a hole in the wall. At the first probation-
violation hearing, which was held via videoconference the same day that the report was
filed, Laspina was represented by counsel, who told the district court that he had “discussed

1 See Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2018).
2 See Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2018).
3 See Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2018).
4 See Minn. Stat. § 609.596, subd. 2a (2018).
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the probation violation with Mr. Laspina” and that Laspina “understands the nature of the
violations.” Laspina denied the violations, and a second hearing was scheduled.
Four days later, on January 24, the state filed an addendum to the probation-
violation report, adding a fourth alleged violation for failing to abstain from the use of
mood-altering substances. This alleged violation was based on a January 20 sample that
tested positive for methamphetamine. At the second videoconference hearing held the same
day that the amended report was filed, defense counsel told the district court, “Mr. Laspina
and I had a conversation. Kind of given the circumstances as to how this arose in the alleged
violation.” Defense counsel requested a continuance of the hearing to pursue discussions
with the state, which the district court granted.
On January 31, a third videoconference hearing was held. Laspina and the state
reached an agreement under which Laspina would admit two of the alleged violations—
failing to contact his probation officer as directed (the first alleged violation) and use or
possession of mood-altering substances (the fourth alleged violation); the state would
withdraw the remaining two alleged violations; the stays of adjudication would be revoked
and convictions entered; and concurrent prison sentences of 18, 21, and 24 months would
be imposed but with execution stayed. Through colloquies with defense counsel and the
prosecutor, Laspina stated that he understood the conditions of his probation, that he knew
the rights he was giving up by admitting to the alleged violations, that he was of clear,
sound mind on that day, and that he was freely and voluntarily admitting that he
intentionally and inexcusably violated his probation. Laspina was then questioned about
the factual basis for his admitted violations, and he testified to missing a required meeting
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with his probation officer on January 13 and to testing positive for methamphetamine on
January 20 because he had used methamphetamine.
The district court found Laspina’s violations to be intentional and inexcusable. The
district court revoked the stays of adjudication; imposed the agreed-upon concurrent
sentences of 18 months, 21 months, and 24 months; stayed execution of the sentences; and
continued Laspina on probation.
Laspina appeals.5
DECISION
Laspina argues that the revocation of the stay s of adjudication should be reversed
because the district court failed to either provide him with a written copy of the probation-
violation report or obtain a waiver of his right to receive a written report. He contends that
this failure violated his right to due process under the United States Constitution and his
rights under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As Laspina acknowledges, because he did not raise his objection to the district court,
the plain-error standard of review applies. See State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 278-79,
281 (Minn. 2015) (applying plain-error review to unobjected-to alleged failure to comply
with rule 27.04 and stating that plain-error applies to review of unobjected-to constitutional
violation). “In order to meet the plain error standard, a criminal defendant must show that
(1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s

5 The state did not file a brief, and we ordered the appeal to proceed per Minnesota Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03, which directs that, when a respondent fails to file a brief,
the matter is to be decided on the merits.
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substantial rights.” State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016) (citing State v.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). If the defendant satisfies the first three prongs
of the plain-error test, appellate courts “may correct the error only if it ‘seriously affect[s]
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” State v. Crowsbreast,
629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467
(2001)
(alteration in original). If a defendant “fails to establish that the claimed error
affected his substantial rights”—the third prong—a reviewing court need not address the
other prongs. State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn. 2007).
Laspina argues that the district court’s claimed failure to provide him a written copy
of his probation-violation report plainly violated his rights under Minnesota’s Rules of
Criminal Procedure and his constitutional due-process rights. As to the former, Laspina
cites Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.04, which states that, in probation-
revocation proceedings, “the court . . . must [g]ive the probationer a copy of the violation
report, if not already provided.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 2(1)(b). Laspina asserts
that the failure to provide him a copy of the report was a plain error because it contravened
an unambiguous rule of criminal procedure. He relies on the supreme court’s decision in
Beaulieu, which concluded that a district court’s failure to provide a rights advisory
mandated by rule 27.04 in a probation-revocation proceeding was plain error. 859 N.W.2d
at 282. As to Laspina’s constitutional argument, Laspina relies on caselaw establishing that
written notice of claimed violations is required as a matter of due process before a person’s
parole or probation may be revoked given the liberty interest at stake. See Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)
(holding that minimum procedural protections, including
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written notice of claimed violations of parole, are required under the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution before parole may be revoked); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
782 (1973)
(extending the same minimum due-process requirements to probation
revocation).
Laspina’s argument asks us to rule that the district court’s asserted failure to provide
him with a written copy of a probation- violation report6 was plain error under rule 27.04
and the U.S. Constitution. He asks us to do so although the asserted failure took place in
the context of a proceeding to revoke a stay of adjudication in which probation was not
revoked but was continued. But we need not address the question of plain error if Laspina
has failed to establish that the asserted error has affected his substantial rights , as required
by the third prong of the test. See Goelz , 743 N.W.2d at 258 . We therefore turn to t he
substantial-rights prong.
A plain error affects the substantial rights of the defendant when “there is a
reasonable likelihood that the error substantially affected” the decision. State v. Strommen,
648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002). Thus, “[t]he court’s analysis under the third prong of
the plain error test is the equivalent of a harmless error analysis.” State v. Matthews, 800
N.W.2d 629
, 634 (Minn. 2011).
Laspina argues that the district court’s failure to provide him with a written copy of
the violation report affected his substantial rights because, without it, he lacked sufficient
information to consult fully with counsel, to negotiate an agreement with the state, and to

6 The transcripts of the three videoconference hearings contain no discussion of whether
Laspina was provided a copy of the written report and addendum.
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counter the evidence and statements against him with mitigati ng evidence or reasons why
the stays should not be revoked. This argument is unpersuasive.
Laspina contends that his discussions with his attorney about the violations were
insufficient to inform him of the alleged violations. However, Laspina’s counsel told the
district court that he “discussed the probation violation with Mr. Laspina” and that Laspina
“understands the nature of the violations.” Laspina’s attorney also said that they “had a
conversation” regarding “the circumstances as to how this arose in the alleged violation.”
The alleged violations described in the report were brief and uncomplicated. Laspina’s
claim that his attorney’s descriptions were insufficient to understand the circumstances is
unconvincing.
Moreover, Laspina demonstrated that he fully understood the alleged violations and
the conditions of his probation when the state questioned him about them:
[STATE]: If I ask you anything that is confusing or if [the
videoconferencing platform] gets in the way of our
communicating, would you please let me know?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
[STATE]: Okay. You signed a probation agreement, a contract
with [defense counsel] back on September 16th of 2021, is that
right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
[STATE]: And there were certain conditions that you agreed
to follow, correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Correct.
[STATE]: Did [defense counsel] review those with you?
THE DEFENDANT: I believe so.
[STATE]: Did you understand all of them?
THE DEFENDANT: Yep.
The state then asked Laspina about the first violation for failure to contact his
probation officer to which he was admitting:
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[STATE]: Okay. So, there were certain obligations and we’re
going to review two of them in particular today. The first one
is a violation of condition number two; contact your probation
officer as directed. Now it’s my understanding that you were
doing well and then what happened as specifically in January?
Specifically in January did you report to probation as directed?
THE DEFENDANT: No, I missed one.
[STATE]: Okay and you had an obligation on the second
Thursday of each month, is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
[STATE]: Okay and so that was January 13th of 2022?
THE DEFENDANT: Right.
[STATE]: Okay, was there a reason that you didn’t check in?
THE DEFEDANT: You know, I think I just spaced it out.
[STATE]: So, an explanation but not an excuse, no legal
excuse for it?
THE DEFENDANT: No, no.
The state then questioned Laspina about the violation for possession or use of mood-
altering substances to which he was admitting:
[STATE]: Okay and then also now condition number 14, that
was do not use or possess any mood-altering substances unless
prescribed by a physician and submit to random testing at the
request of the probation officer at your own expense. Now,
let’s talk about use, specifically were you asked to give a drug
test by probation agents in January?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
[STATE]: Okay and tell me, we’re looking specifically at
January 20th, is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: I couldn’t tell you the exact date but
around that time.
[STATE]: Sure, yeah, no reason to dispute if the reports say
that it was the 20th, that’s when you gave this test?
THE DEFENDANT: No, no reason to, no.
[STATE]: What were the results of the test?
THE DEFENDANT: Positive I think for meth.
[STATE]: Okay, why was that?
THE DEFEDANT: Because I had used.
[STATE]: Okay, when did you use?
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know, several times the week
prior.
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[STATE]: The week prior leading up to --
THE DEFENDANT: -- yeah --
[STATE]: -- leading up to that test or leading up to the arrest?
THE DEFENDANT: Leading up to the arrest.
[STATE]: Okay, all right. Your Honor, I believe that’s
sufficient for these two violations.

Laspina demonstrated his knowledge of the nature of the alleged violations by
answering specific fact questions about the violations, including when and why they
happened. Moreover, Laspina has identified no testimony or evidence that he was unable
to marshal in order to dispute the alleged violations. Nor has he identified any information
that he was unable to gather in order to negotiate some agreement with the state or to resist
revocation of the stay of adjudication. In sum, Laspina has failed to carry his burden to
demonstrate that any error in failing to give him a written copy of the probation-violation
report affected his substantial rights.
Because Laspina’s substantial rights were not affected, the district court did not
commit reversible plain error by not providing him with a written copy of the probation-
violation report.
Affirmed.