State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0566

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kelsey Christine Bauler,
Appellant.

Filed April 3, 2023
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Yellow Medicine County District Court
File No. 87-CR-20-226

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin Peralta, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Mark Gruenes, Y ellow Medicine County Attorney, Granite Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues on appeal that her conviction of aiding and abetting first-degree
sale of a controlled substance must be reversed because of insufficient circumstantial
evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 3, 2020, an agent of the Brown- Lyon-Redwood -Renville County Drug
Task Force arranged a controlled purchase of methamphetamine in Granite Falls,
Minnesota.1 The drug operation consisted of an undercover officer and a confidential
informant (CI) w ho planned to buy one ounce of methamphetamine for $750 from J.R. at
a gas station. About a month before the drug operation, appellant Kelsey Christine Bauler’s
boyfriend, J.R., contacted Jessica Weber for some “dope .” Weber had known appellant
since kindergarten, and because Weber did not like J.R., she told J.R. that she would talk
to appellant only. Weber arranged the drug sale with appellant and had a “full range and
flourishing communication” with her.
On the day of the proposed drug sale, plans deviated when J.R. communicated to
the undercover officer and CI that appellant would show up instead. J.R. also provided
them with a description of appellant and appellant’s vehicle. Eventually, a van matching
the description provided by J.R. arr ived at the gas station.

1 These facts are based on testimony and evidence received at the jury trial held on October
28, 2021.
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Appellant drove the van and approached the undercover vehicle that the undercover
officer and the CI were in. She entered the undercover vehicle and directed them to drive
to Almich’s grocery store in Granite Falls. The undercover officer and CI followed her
lead and drove there. Upon arriving, appellant exited the undercover vehicle to buy food
at Almich’s to avoid “looking suspicious.” Weber testified that on the day of the sale, she
and appellant had planned to meet at the gas station . However, when appellant did not
show, Weber decided to leave town after first stopping at Almich’s. At Almich’s, Weber
received a call from appellant . The undercover officer testified to hearing appellant ask
Weber about her location and Weber responding that she was at Almich’s.
Appellant and Weber came out of the grocery store , they entered Weber’s vehicle,
and Weber drove next to the undercover vehicle. Because Weber did not feel comfortable
undertaking the drug sal e at the grocery store, she suggested they go somewhere else.
Weber and appellant entered the undercover vehicle , and the undercover officer drove
outside of town by a gravel road. The drug sale took place while the undercover officer
was driving and Webe r and appellant were in the back seat. The undercover officer
“handed [Weber] the money and she gave [the undercover officer] the methamphetamine.”
Weber and appellant were later arrested. Weber was convicted of first -degree sale of
methamphetamine while respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with aiding and
abetting the first-degree sale of methamphetamine in violation of Minn. Stat §152.021,
subd. 1(1) (20 18). Appellant’s case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found appellant
guilty, and the district court sentenced appellant to 48 months in prison. This appeal
follows.
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DECISION
I. Standard of review
Appellant argues that the state failed to prove beyond a r easonable doubt that she
intended to aid and abet in the first -degree sale of methamphetamine. We are not
convinced.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, “appellate courts carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude defendant ’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted) .
“A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the first degree if on one or
more occasions within a 90- day period the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures
of a total weight of 17 grams or more containing methamphetamine.” Minn. Stat
§ 152.021, subd. 1(1). Moreover, “[a] person is criminally liable for a crime committed by
another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels , or conspires with or
otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat § 609.05, subd. 1 (2018).
“The state must prove that the defendant knew [her] alleged accomplice was going to
commit a crime and the defendant intended her presence or actions to further the
commission of that crime.” State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it
must be assumed that the fact -finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the
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verdict.” State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation and citations
omitted).
II. Weber and the undercover officer’s testimonies constituted direct evidence
that appellant knew about the sale of methamphetamine and intentionally
aided Weber to commit that crime.

Appellant argues th at the circumstantial-evidence standard applies. We disagree.
Instead, the record shows that the evidence received at the jury trial is direct evidence. See
State v. Flowers, 788 N.W.2d 120, 133 n.2 (Minn. 2010) (stating that, when state presented
direct evidence on each element of aiding and abetting first -degree murder, court would
not apply circumstantial-evidence standard of review).
“[D]irect evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris , 895
N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation and citations omitted). In contrast,
“circumstantial evidence [is] evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts
in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. While knowledge and intent are generally proved
by circumstantial evidence, they may be proved by direct evidence through witness
testimony. Witness testimony “is direct evidence when it reflects a witness’s personal
observations and allows the jury to find the defendant guilty without having to draw any
inferences.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) . As discussed below, two of
the state’s witnesses presented direct evidence of appellant’s (1) knowledge and (2) intent.

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A. Weber’s and the undercover officer’s testimonies provided direct
evidence that appellant knew Weber planned to commit a crime.

Weber’s testimony reveals that appellant knew that J.R. had contacted Weber to
purchase methamphetamine. Appellant knew this because Weber only wanted to speak
with her and not J.R. about the drug sale , making appellant the point person for
communicating about the sale. Weber also arranged the price of the drug sale with
appellant over the phone as she was arriving at Granite Falls. Later that day, appellant
contacted Weber to inquire where she wanted to conduct the drug sale. Weber’s testimony
provides direct evidence that appellant knew that, by contacting Weber, Weber intended to
commit a first-degree controlled-substance sale.
The undercover officer testified that appellant acted as the intermediary between
him, the CI , and Weber. Once J.R. would not come, J.R. told the CI and the undercover
officer that appellant was “coming up there now . . . then . . . she’ll just jump in.” J.R. then
said, “[I]t [i]s my old lady so.” In response, the undercover officer asked if appellant had
the “full thing,” and J.R. responded with “you . . . talk to her.” When appellant arrived at
the gas station, she entered the undercover vehicle like J.R. said she would. As a result,
the undercover officer’s testimony also provided direct evidence of appellant’s knowledge
of the crime.
B. Weber’s and the undercover officer’s testimon ies presented direct
evidence that appellant intended that her presence or actions would
further the commission of the crime.

Appellant introduced Web er to the undercover officer and the CI. The undercover
officer testified that appellant directed him and the CI to Weber’s location at Almich’s.
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Weber testified that appellant had a “full range and flourishing communication” with her .
And when Weber did not feel comfortable conducting the drug sale at Almich’s, appellant
could have used this opportunity to retreat but instead she followed Weber’s lead to go to
a different location. Appellant entered the undercover vehicle with Weber where the drug
sale took place. Appellant’s presence and actions therefore are direct evidence that
appellant intended to further the commission of first -degree controlled-substance sale.
Based on the record, there is sufficient direct evidence through Weber ’s and the
undercover officer’s testimonies to support appellant’s conviction of aiding and abetting
the drug sale of methamphetamine.2
Affirmed.

2 Because we conclude that the state presented sufficient direct evidence, we need not apply
the circumstantial-evidence standard . See Flowers, 788 N.W .2d at 133 n.2. Nevertheless,
appellant cannot meet that standard. After a careful review, the circumstances proved are
consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt and are inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt. State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 411 (Minn. 2016) .