In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. M. L.,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0569

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. M. L.,

Commissioner of Human Services,
Legal Custodian.

Filed October 24, 2022
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-JV-20-357

Rachel L. Osband, Fiddler Osband LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for appellants A.M.C. 1 and
R.C.)

Jenna M. Eisenmenger, Georgie K. Brattland, Heimerl & Lammers LLC, Minnetonka,
Minnesota (for respondents T.S. and S.S.)

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Jennifer L. Christensen, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent Carver County Health and Human Services)

Dianne Schafer, Chaska, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.

1 Appellant A.M.C. shares initials with another individual identified in this opinion. For
clarity, we refer to appellant A.M.C. as “A.C.” throughout the opinion.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
By order filed after an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied appellants’
motion for an adoptive placement of a child. On appeal from that order, appellants argue
that the district court abused its discretion by determining they failed to prove that
respondent-county acted unreasonably in not placing the child with them. We affirm.
FACTS
This case involves the permanent placement of J.J.B. (the child), born in November
2020. The child’s parents had two older children—A.M.C. and A.L. —born in May 2014
and August 2017, respectively.
Background
Both older children had been placed outside of the home by Olmsted County Health
and Human Services. The mother’s parental rights to both older children were
involuntarily terminated, and the father’s parental rights were voluntarily terminated. A.L.
died at a young age. A.M.C. was eventually placed with the appellants in this case, A.C.
and R.C., who adopted A.M.C. in April 2018. Because A.C. is the sister of their maternal
grandmother, A.C. is the great aunt of both A.M.C. and the child. A.C. and R.C. live in
Colorado with A.M.C.
Shortly after his birth, the child was screened in for a 24-hour investigation by
respondent Carver County Health and Human Services (the county) and, in December
2020, was placed in an out-of-home foster-care placement with his maternal grandparents.
The child and the child’s mother had been living with his maternal grandparents, and the
3
child’s mother was removed from the home to allow for the placement to occur. The
county continued to work on a case plan and visitation with the child’s mother and to make
reasonable efforts toward reunification with both parents.
The county identified respondents S.S. and T.S. as relatives living nearby who could
provide respite care for the child while he was in the grandparents’ care. T.S. is a cousin
to the child through the child’s grandfather. S.S. and T.S. began providing respite care in
January 2021. Around this time, A.C. and R.C. informed the county of their interest in
caring for the child as a foster-to-adopt placement.
The county initiated a relative search and sent an initial letter to identified relatives
on February 3, 2021. Both couples, A.C. and R.C. and S.S. and T.S., responded that they
were foster-care options and permanent-placement options for the child. The county began
the process of compiling an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)2
request for A.C. and R.C. in April 2021. In May 2021, the county received information
from the mother’s attorney that the mother wished to discuss a consent-to-adopt agreement
with S.S. and T.S. Following her failure to appear at a scheduled permanency hearing in
July 2021, however, the mother’s rights to the child were involuntarily terminated by a
finding of default. Based on concerns about the child’s safety in the grandparents’ care,

2 The ICPC is an agreement requiring compliance and cooperation between the public
authorities when foster or adoptive placements are made across state lines. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260.851 (2020). Among its requirements is that “[p]rior to sending, bringing or causing
any child to be sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a
preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public
authorities in the receiving state written notice.” Id., art. 3(b). The receiving state is then
responsible for determining whether the transfer and placement would be “contrary to the
interests of the child.” Id., art. 3(d).
4
the county removed the child from his foster placement with his grandparents in June 2021
and placed him in the home of S.S. and T.S. The father’s rights to the child were
involuntarily terminated by a finding of default in late August 2021.
Prior to the termination of the father’s parental rights, the county requested a
foster-to-adopt home study for A.C. and R.C. from the relevant agency in Colorado. In
September 2021, while that request was pending, the county received S.S. and T.S.’s
completed home study. In October 2021, the county signed an adoption-placement
agreement with S.S. and T.S. On November 1, 2021, the county submitted the
adoption-placement agreement to the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS).
And on the following day, November 2, 2021, the county received the completed home
study from the Colorado agency, recommending approval of A.C. and R.C. as an option
for the child’s placement.
District Court Proceedings and the Evidentiary Hearing
In October 2021, A.C. and R.C. moved to intervene in the case and for video
visitation with the child, and the district court held a post-permanency review hearing and
a hearing on the motion for intervention. At the same time, S.S. and T.S. also moved to
intervene in the case. A.C. and R.C. then notified the court and parties that they intended
to file a motion for adoptive placement. The district court granted both motions for
intervention and set a hearing date for A.C. and R.C.’s motion for adoptive placement.
In December 2021, the district court held a nonevidentiary hearing on A.C. and
R.C.’s motion for adoptive placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(a)(2) (Supp.
2021). At that hearing, the district court ruled that A.C. and R.C. made a prima facie
5
showing that the county had been unreasonable in failing to make the requested adoptive
placement. The district court then set an evidentiary hearing, as required by statute, to
address whether the county had, in fact, been unreasonable in failing to make the requested
placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(c)-(e) (Supp. 2021).
The district court held the evidentiary hearing over several days throughout January
and February 2022, during which it heard the testimony of the county caseworkers, the
guardian ad litem (GAL), and extended family members, including S.S., T.S., A.C., and
R.C. An expert in early-childhood attachment and an expert in sibling relationships in
foster care and adoption also testified. The district court heard testimony about the
caseworkers’ involvement with the potential placements, the relationship difficulties
between A.C. and the child’s maternal grandmother and other members of A.M.C.’s
extended family, and the lack of contact between A.M.C. and her grandmother.
In April 2022, the district court filed an order denying A.C. and R.C.’s motion. The
order addressed the application of the Minnesota Foster Care Sibling Bill of Rights, Minn.
Stat. § 260C.008 (2020), to this case and included individualized findings on the needs of
the child to ensure his best interests are met pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2
(Supp. 2021). The district court determined first that A.C. and R.C. failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the county was unreasonable in failing to place the child
with them for adoption and second that the county had acted reasonably in not placing the
child with them. The district court also ruled that it was in the child’s best interests to
remain in S.S. and T.S.’s care while his adoption with them is finalized, that the child
should actually remain in S.S. and T.S.’s care while his adoption is finalized, and that the
6
child shall have contact with A.C., R.C., and A.M.C. pursuant to a written contact plan
agreed to by the parties.
A.C. and R.C. appeal.
DECISION
A.C. and R.C. assert both (1) that the record does not support the district court’s
determination that the county properly considered appellants as a placement option for the
child and (2) that the district court erred by not finding that the child should be placed with
them. In addition, A.C. and R.C. argue that the district court misapplied the law when
assessing the county’s reasonableness and misapplied Minnesota’s sibling-preference law
by not placing the child with A.C. and R.C., who had already adopted his sibling. We
disagree.
We begin by reviewing the statutory framework for adoptive placements. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6 (Supp. 2021),3 establishes the process for motions and hearings
to order adoptive placement. “[A]fter the district court orders [a] child under the
guardianship of the commissioner of human services, . . . a relative or the child’s foster
parent may file a motion for an order for adoptive placement . . . if the relative or the child’s
foster parent” has an adoptive home study approving the relative or foster parent to be an
adoptive-placement option. Id., subd. 6(a). If the movant makes a prima facie showing

3 The legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6, in 2022. See 2022 Minn. Laws
ch. 98, art. 8, § 27, at 208. Because the changes became effective August 1, 2022, pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (2020), and the district court’s juvenile-protection order that the
county acted reasonably in not placing the child with A.C. and R.C. for adoption was
entered on April 5, 2022, we review the order under the former version of the statute.
7
that the agency has been unreasonable in failing to make the requested adoptive placement,
the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing. Id., subd. 6(b), (c).
Section 260C.607 requires that, at any evidentiary hearing that may be necessary,
the agency first present evidence explaining why it did not make an adoptive placement
with the movant. Id., subd. 6(d). “The moving party then has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency has been unreasonable in failing to make
the adoptive placement.” Id. If the district court finds that the agency was unreasonable
in failing to make the adoptive placement and that the relative or foster parent requesting
placement is “the most suitable adoptive home to meet the child’s needs” based on the
statutory best-interests factors, the district court “may order the responsible social services
agency to make an adoptive placement in the home of the relative or the child’ s foster
parent.” Id., subd. 6(e).
We review a district court’s decision after an evidentiary hearing on a requested
adoptive placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6, for an abuse of discretion. See
id. (stating district court “may” order relative adoptive placement if it finds agency
unreasonably failed to make requested placement); In re Welfare of Child. of J.D.T.,
946 N.W.2d 321, 327- 28 (Minn. 2020) (noting, in a juvenile-protection appeal, that a
statute’s use of “may” confers discretion on the district court). “A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d
257, 262 (Minn. 2022)).
8
If an evidentiary hearing is held, the party moving for adoptive placement bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency was unreasonable in
failing to make the requested adoptive placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(d).
Borrowing from another context in which courts review the reasonableness of an agency’s
action, we consider two factors: (1) whether the reasons given by the agency for its action
are legally sufficient, and (2) if the reasons are legally sufficient, whether those legally
sufficient reasons have a factual basis in the record. RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington,
861 N.W.2d 71, 75-76 (Minn. 2015); see Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 217-18
(Minn. App. 2010) (noting on review of district court’s discretionary, custody- related
decision that “the district court must identify both its decision . . . as well as the underlying
reason(s) for that decision”).
A. The district court did not err in determining that the county was not
unreasonable in not placing the child with A.C. and R.C.
A.C. and R.C. argue that the district court should have found that the county was
unreasonable in not placing the child with them for adoption. They argue that the district
court should not have found a factual basis in the record for the reasons on which the county
relied for its placement decision. They also argue that the district court misapplied the law
by conflating two different requirements of the applicable statute. Based on our review,
we disagree.
9
1. The district court’s determination that the county’s placement
decision was not un reasonable was based on adequ ate factual
support in the record.

A.C. and R.C. primarily argue that the reasons on which the county relied for its
placement decision lack a factual basis in the record, and therefore, the district court should
have found that the county failed to properly consider A.C. and R.C. for the child’s
placement. Based on our review of the record, we disagree.
In a juvenile-protection case, an appellate court will not set aside a district court’s
finding of fact unless the finding is clearly erroneous. See In re Welfare of P.R.L.,
622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 2001) (addressing appellate review of factual findings in a
termination-of-parental-rights case). The clear-error standard of review is “a review of the
record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021); see In re Welfare of Child of J.H.,
968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney in a juvenile-protection
appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “When the record reasonably supports the
findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable
basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223 (quotation
omitted).
When applying the clear -error standard of review, appellate courts (1) view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do
not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus,
an appellate court need not engage in an extended discussion of the evidence to
demonstrate the correctness of the district court’s findings; rather, it need only fairly
10
consider all the evidence and determine that the evidence reasonably supports the decision.
Id. at 222; J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601 n.6 (applying these aspects of Kenney on appeal in a
juvenile-protection case); see Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App.
2000) (discussing clear-error standard of review).
The process for identifying and notifying relatives and considering them as a
potential adoptive placement is established by Minn. Stat. § 260C.221(a) (Supp. 2021).4
The statute requires that the county identify and notify relatives of a child in need of
placement, appropriately involve relatives who respond to the notice in a manner indicating
they would consider being a placement for the child, and continue to consider those
relatives pursuant to the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2. The county must
first consider “relatives”—those related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption— for
adoptive placement, while “ensur[ing] that the child’s best interests are met by requiring
an individualized determination of the needs of the child and of how the selected placement
will serve” the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a).5
Here, the district court determined that the county identified and considered A.C.
and R.C. as a relative- placement option. The district court heard testimony that shortly

4 The legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 260C.221 in 2022. See 2022 Minn. Laws ch. 98,
art. 8, § 20, at 198-203. The changes became effective August 1, 2022. See Minn. Stat.
§ 645.02. Thus, because the district court order in question was filed on April 5, 2022, we
review the decision under the former version of the statute.

5 The legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 260C. 212, subds. 1, 2, in 2022, and the amended
statute became effective August 1, 2022, under Minn. Stat. § 645.02. See 2022 Minn. Laws
ch. 98, art. 8, § 18, at 192-97. Again, we review the decision under the former version of
the statute.
11
after the case was initiated in December 2020, the county became aware that A.C. and R.C.
were related to the child and that they had adopted A.M.C. The district court also heard
testimony that the county sent an initial relative-search letter to identified relatives,
including A.C., R.C., S.S., and T.S., in February 2021 and that the caseworker was aware
that A.C. and R.C. had responded to the letter and requested to be considered as a
permanency option.
A.C. and R.C. contend that the district court clearly erred in finding that A.C. and
R.C. “were at least considered placement options by [the county] as early as February
2021,” arguing that identifying and notifying a relative is not the same as considering that
relative for placement. The record shows, however, that the case worker testified that she
understood A.C. and R.C. to be among the relatives who wished to be considered as a
permanent placement option for the child and that, as early as February of 2021, the county
was considering “all possible permanency options.”
The district court found that, while the county eventually favored placement and
permanency with S.S. and T.S., the county did consider placement with A.C. and R.C. from
the early stages of its work in this case. This finding is supported by the record, including
the caseworker’s testimony regarding an internal best-interests “consult” and evaluation in
April 2021, during which placement with A.C. and R.C. and placement with S.S. and T.S.
scored similarly. The caseworker also testified that the fact that A.C. and R.C. reside in
Colorado and had not facilitated A.M.C. having contact with A.M.C.’s extended family
12
weighed against A.C. and R.C. as a placement option in this case.6 The caseworker further
testified that based on the “consult,” a follow-up questionnaire was sent to both potential
placements. The caseworker stated that the county considered both prospective
placements’ responses to the questionnaire and that the county concluded that placement
with S.S. and T.S. was more favorable based on those responses.
Additionally, the district court heard the caseworker’s testimony that the county
initiated an ICPC process for A.C. and R.C. in April and that in her experience, the ICPC
process can be quite lengthy. A.C. and R.C. contend that the county did not initiate or
pursue the ICPC process in a timely fashion, thereby permitting the child to further bond
with S.S. and T.S. during the delay and prejudicing A.C. and R.C. The parties dispute
whether the reasons the county cited for the delays in completing the ICPC and home study
were justified.
On this point, the district court heard testimony from the caseworker that the county
initiated the ICPC as soon as was practicable, and the ICPC request introduced into
evidence was signed by the caseworker in April 2021. The caseworker testified that she
requested medical records from the child’s various health providers sometime in the spring
of 2021 to complete the ICPC request and that the child’s healthcare providers informed
her of a backlog in records requests that was causing delays. The county provided evidence
that it was advised by the Minnesota Department of Human Services that medical records,

6 The county’s report resulting from the April 2021 internal consultation notes that A.M.C.
had not been allowed to see the maternal grandparents since her adoption and that no phone
calls or video chats between A.M.C. and the grandparents were taking place.
13
while not typically required, would be helpful for an ICPC assessment in this case because
of the child’s health needs. The caseworker further testified that the process was paused
because, prior to the termination of the mother’s rights, the county understood from the
mother’s attorney that the mother was willing to sign a consent-to-adopt agreement with
S.S. and T.S. According to the caseworker, that agreement and a contact plan were drafted,
but the mother ceased contact with the county and her attorney shortly thereafter.
A.C. and R.C. dispute the sincerity of the county’s reasons for the delays. First, to
show that the county did not request medical records until late July 2021, A.C. and R.C.
point to a single reference in the caseworker’s chronological notes indicating that in July,
she faxed a request for the child’s birth medical records to one healthcare provider. Next,
A.C. and R.C. allege that the thinness of the record surrounding the potential
consent-to-adopt agreement suggests that the ICPC delays were purposeful. And finally,
A.C. and R.C. allege that by entering into an adoption-placement agreement with S.S. and
T.S. before receiving A.C. and R.C.’s home study, the county failed to review or assess the
home study for A.C. and R.C.
A.C. and R.C. fail to acknowledge, however, that the district court found the
caseworker’s testimony about the timing of the ICPC process credible and that the district
court also received a county report to the court from mid-July 2021 that was consistent
with the timeline of events the caseworker described. Moreover, the caseworker testified
that the county reviewed and thoroughly considered the home study, and its review further
solidified the county’s position preferring placement of the child with S.S. and T.S.
14
Ultimately, A.C. and R.C. propose an alternate narrative surrounding the ICPC and
home-study processes and the reasons for the delays. We note that when evidence relevant
to a factual issue consists of conflicting testimony, as here, the district court’s decision is
“necessarily based on a determination of witness credibility, which we accord great
deference on appeal.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428-29 (Minn. App.
2007).
In reviewing for clear error, our role is not to reweigh the evidence; rather, we
“review . . . the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision” that the
district court made, and the fact that the record might support a finding other than the one
the district court made does not show that its finding is wrong. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221-22. Here, the district court’s finding that the county “continued to evaluate [A.C. and
R.C.] as an adoptive placement option” throughout the proceeding is supported by evidence
in the record. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the county acted reasonably when it considered A.C. and R.C. for
placement of the child pursuant to the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 260C.221 (Supp.
2021).
2. In assessing the county’s reasonableness, the district court did not
misapply the law.

A.C. and R.C. also argue that the district court misapplied Minn. Stat. § 260C.607,
subd. 6(e), by “conflating the determination of [the county]’s unreasonableness with
regards to the requested placement” with the “second, separate inquiry” into the suitability
of the original placement or the requested placement based on the best-interests factors.
15
As we understand A.C. and R.C.’s argument, they claim that the district court erred by
focusing on the county’s rationale in support of the child’s placement with S.S. and T.S.
rather than focusing on the county’s alleged misconduct toward A.C. and R.C. Whether
the district court correctly applied the law is a legal question that we review de novo. In
re A.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn. App. 2000).
Section 260C.607 states:
At the evidentiary hearing, the responsible social services
agency shall proceed first with evidence about the reason for
not making the adoptive placement proposed by the moving
party. The moving party then has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency has been
unreasonable in failing to make the adoptive placement.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(d). Then, if the district court finds that the agency has
been unreasonable and that the moving party provides the most suitable home for the
child’s needs under the best-interests factors, the district court “may” order the requested
placement. Id., subd. 6(e).
The statute requires the county to provide, and thus the district court to consider,
“evidence about the reason for not making” A.C. and R.C.’s proposed adoptive placement.
Id., subd. 6(d). The statutory language does not require the district court to consider only
evidence of the county’s alleged misconduct towards A.C. and R.C. when considering the
county’s reasonableness, as A.C. and R.C. contend. A.C. and R.C. point to no authority
for this interpretation of the statutory language. Rather, the statute plainly requires the
county to provide evidence about its reasons for not making the requested placement and
the moving party to prove that the agency was unreasonable.
16
Our review of the record shows that the district court considered the county’s
conduct with respect to A.C. and R.C.—as well as the county’s reasons for not placing the
child with A.C. and R.C. and instead placing the child with S.S. and T.S.—to evaluate
whether the county was unreasonable in denying placement with A.C. and R.C. For
example, the district court found, based on the caseworker’s testimony, that the county
(1) reviewed the Olmsted County file related to A.C. and R.C.’s adoption of A.M.C. to
gain an understanding of the family’s history; 7 (2) first contacted A.C. and R.C. on
February 1, 2021; and (3) was in at least monthly contact with A.C. and R.C. thereafter.
The district court found that, while there “could have and should have been more ongoing
contact” between the county and A.C. and R.C. for concurrent planning and to facilitate
contact between the siblings, the county’s level of contact was not unreasonable. The
district court also inquired into delays in the county’s ICPC process for A.C. and R.C.,
finding it was not unreasonable for the county to wait for receipt of the child’s medical
records before submitting the ICPC documentation to the Colorado agency.
For those reasons, we discern no misapplication of the law in the district court’s
determination of whether the county was unreasonable under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd.
6(d), (e), based on a review of the county’s actions beyond the county’s conduct toward
A.C. and R.C.

7 The Olmsted County file is not a part of the record in this appeal.
17
B. The district court did not err by determining that the child should be
placed with relatives other than A.C. and R.C.
A.C. and R.C. argue that the district court should have placed the child with them
because it is in the child’s best interests to be placed with them and with his sibling—
A.M.C. They argue that the district court abused its discretion by not placing the child
with A.C. and R.C. pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6, because it did not weigh
the child’s best interests appropriately and that the district court misapplied Minnesota law
creating a preference for children to be placed with siblings for foster and adoptive
placements. Again, we disagree.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
placing the child with S.S. and T.S. and not with A.C. and R.C.
was in the child’s best interests.
Section 260C.607, subdivision 6(e), states that the district court “ may” order an
agency to make a placement requested by motion “if the court finds that the agency has
been unreasonable in failing to make the adoptive placement and that the relative or the
child’s foster parent is the most suitable adoptive home to meet the c hild’s needs” under
the statutory best-interests factors. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(e) (emphasis added).
Because we conclude that the district court’s determination that the county did not act
unreasonably was not clearly erroneous and did not result from misapplication of the law,
we need not review the district court’s determination that placement in S.S. and T.S.’s
home is in the child’s best interests to conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by not placing the child with A.C. and R.C. under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607,
subd. 6.
18
Even so, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that permanent placement with S.S. and T.S. is in the child’s best interests.
The district court determined that the best-interests factors weighed in favor of placement
with S.S. and T.S. primarily due to (1) the child’s close bond with S.S. and T.S.; (2) the
likelihood that the child will be able to have ongoing relationships with immediate and
extended family, including his half-siblings and, potentially, his biological parents, if he
remains in Minnesota with S.S. and T.S.; and (3) the possibility for the child and A.M.C.
to develop a healthy bond despite his not being placed with A.C. and R.C. The record
includes testimony from the GAL, S.S. and T.S., and the two expert witnesses in support
of these findings.
A.C. and R.C. argue that the district court should have credited A.C.’s account of
the tension in her relationship with the child’s grandmother and the reasons for A.C.
withholding contact between A.M.C. and A.M.C.’s Minnesota relatives, rather than the
testimony of the child’s grandfather, the caseworkers, and S.S. and T.S., in its findings on
the willingness of each of the couples being considered as permanent placement options to
promote contact between the child and his extended family. On appeal, “we do not disturb
findings of fact based on conflicting evidence . . . unless manifestly and palpably contrary
to the evidence as a whole.” In re S.G., 828 N.W.2d 118, 127 (Minn. 2013) (quotation
omitted); see also In re Termination of Parental Rights of Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625
(Minn. App. 2003) (holding that determination of a child’s best interests is not susceptible
to an appellate court’s global review of the record because the district court is best placed
to make credibility determinations with regard to best interests).
19
Given the district court’s substantial degree of latitude in determining whether
adoption by one set of parties or another promotes the child’s best interests, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the best-interest s factors
favored permanent placement with S.S. and T.S. rather than A.C. and R.C. S.G.,
828 N.W.2d at 125-26 (stating that “in any particular case . . . the [district] court has a
substantial degree of latitude in determining whether the child’s best interests favor
adoption” by one party or another (quotation omitted)).
2. The district court did not misapply the law in determining that
the county did not act unreasonably by not placing the child with
his sibling.
Finally, A.C. and R.C. argue that the district court misapplied the law by
(1) “disregarding” Minnesota’s preference for children to be placed with siblings for foster
and adoptive placements, established by Minn. Stat. § 260C.008 and known as the
Minnesota Foster Care Sibling Bill of Rights and (2) failing to comply with the preference
to place siblings together set forth in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(d). Because the
district court did consider the preference for placement with siblings in Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.212, subd. 2(d), and whether the county complied with the requirements of Minn.
Stat. § 260C.008, we disagree.
First, t he district court addressed the application of the Minnesota Foster Care
Sibling Bill of Rights in its order.
8 In particular, the district court noted that Minn. Stat.

8 The district court determined that the Minnesota Foster Care Sibling Bill of Rights does
not control in this case because Minn. Stat. § 260C.008, subd. 2, states that “the rights
under this section are established for the benefit of siblings in foster care,” but the child’s
sister, A.M.C., was not in foster care at the time of the child’s placement. The district court
20
§ 260C.008, subd. 1(a)(1), states that a child placed in foster care who has siblings has the
right to “be placed in foster care homes with the child’s siblings, when possible and when
it is in the best interest of each sibling, in order to sustain family relationships.”
A.C. and R.C. argue that the district court disregarded important policy goals
underlying the sibling -placement preference, asserting that the child should have been
placed in the same home as his sister, A.M.C., at the time of initial placement. A.C. and
R.C. further point to the disadvantage they faced in the context of the county’s
consideration of the child’s best interests in making its permanent -placement decision
because they were not caring for the child and did not have the same opportunity to engage
with the child that S.S. and T.S. have had.
The district court acknowledged this potential disadvantage, but it also determined
that until the parents’ rights were terminated, the county was required to make reasonable
efforts to reunify the child with his parents. The district court could not ignore the policy
favoring reunification underlying the laws that apply to the fundamental rights of parents
to the parent-child relationship. Evidence in the record shows that the county attempted to

reasoned that the statute applies only to siblings who “are placed in foster care together or
at least closely in time.” The district court further noted that Minn. Stat. § 260C.008,
subd. 1(a), states that the purpose of placing siblings together in foster-care homes is “in
order to sustain family relationships,” seeming to understand this to refer to the strong
bonds of siblings raised in the same family structure. The district court distinguish ed the
situation here, in which the child and A.M.C. only met and began to develop a bond after
the child’s placement.
Because the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 260C.008, subd. 1(a), prefers foster
placement with siblings “when it is in the best interest of each sibling,” and the district
court found here that placement with relatives other than A.C. and R.C. was in the child’s
best interests, we do not reach this question of statutory interpretation.
21
work a case plan with the child’s mother and father, offering services until the mother’s
rights were terminated in July and the father’s rights were terminated in late August 2021.
Thus, the district court found that it was reasonable for the county to temporarily place the
child with relatives in Minnesota while required reunification efforts were ongoing prior
to the termination of parental rights.
In considering the permanent placement of the child and applying the Minnesota
Foster Care Sibling Bill of Rights, the district court relied primarily on its determination
that “it is decidedly in [the child’s] best interests to be placed with and adopted by” S.S.
and T.S. The district court made several findings that support its determination, including
but not limited to the child’s secure attachment to S.S. and T.S. and their commitment to
facilitate the child’s visitation with his extended family. See In re Adoption of C.H.,
554 N.W.2d 737, 742 (Minn. 1996) (stating that when considering the effect of a relative
preference on competing adoption petitions, a statutory preference does not require
automatic grant of an adoption petition, but rather the “touchstone of [the court’s] analysis”
remains the child’s best interests (quotation omitted)). Because we conclude that the
district court made its determination to place the child with S.S. and T.S. instead of A.C.
and R.C. after properly considering the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 260C.008, subd. 1 ,
we discern no error.
Second, Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(d), states that siblings “should be placed
together for foster care and adoption at the earliest possible time unless it is documented
that a joint placement would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings
or unless it is not possible after reasonable efforts by the responsible social services
22
agency.” We have held that the requirement for agencies to make every effort to place
siblings together “is not without exception,” noting that siblings should not be placed
together when it is documented that a joint placement would be contrary to the well-being
of any of the siblings. In re Welfare of Child. of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Minn. App.
2013); see Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(d).
Here, the district court recognized that A.C. and R.C.’s adoption of the child’s
sibling was “one of the primary considerations in this case.” However, the district court
also looked to the principle enshrined in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a), that “the policy
of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the child’s best interests are met by requiring an
individualized determination of the needs of the child.” See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 571
(emphasizing that an individualized determination of the child’s needs and how the
selected placement will serve those needs ensures the child’s best interests will be met).
On this point, the district court heard testimony from the caseworkers and the GAL
that the child had formed a secure attachment with S.S. and T.S. and that the GAL and
caseworkers had concerns for the child’s development if that attachment was disrupted .
The GAL testified to the importance of mitigating trauma to the child by avoi ding the
disruption of removing the child from a placement where he is connected to the caretakers.
The GAL also testified that, while she would “always advocate for siblings to remain
together,” in this case, the facts that the child did not have a preexisting relationship with
his sibling, that a disruption of the child’s secure attachment to S.S. and T.S. would be
concerning, and that S.S. and T.S. were willing to support relationships between the child
and his family, including his sister, were relevant to her assessment of the child’s best
23
interests. The district court found this testimony “compelling.” The district court also
received both testimony and a report from the county’s expert witness on attachment issues,
who testified that children under the age of two years old are especially vulnerable to
developmental harm and forming insecure attachments if subjected to multiple placements
and that a child in a securely attached relationship should be moved only for compelling
reasons, such as neglect.
9
Ultimately, in determining that the county’s decision to place the child somewhere
other than with his sibling was reasonable, the district court reviewed evidence that the
child was securely attached to T.S. and S.S. and risked losing that secure attachment if his
placement was changed. Because the district court engaged in an individualized
determination of the child’s needs to ensure the child’s best interests will be met, and
because it based its ruling about the child’s best interests on evidence that the placement

9 An expert on the importance of sibling relationships also testified and submitted a report
on behalf of A.C. and R.C. The expert testified about the importance of sibling
relationships to an adopted child’s sense of belonging and identity. The district court’s
order refers to this expert’s testimony only once, specifically her statement about the ability
of siblings to create healthy bonds even when living apart. The order contains no other
findings addressing this expert’s testimony and is silent on whether the district court found
the expert’s testimony to be credible and why. We note that district courts must “assure
that findings and conclusions . . . are always detailed, specific and sufficient enough to
enable meaningful review.” Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993); see Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn.
1976) (noting, on appeal of a custody award, that findings of fact explaining a district
court’s exercise of its discretion are necessary to “(1) assure consideration of the statutory
factors by the [district] court; (2) facilitate appellate review of the [district] court’s custody
decision; and (3) satisfy the parties that this important decision was carefully and fairly
considered by the [district] court”); In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R., 943 N.W.2d 661,
669-70 (Minn. App. 2020) (citing this aspect of Rosenfeld in a juvenile-protection appeal).
24
A.C. and R.C. requested would be contrary to the child’s well-being, we conclude that the
district court did not misapply the law under Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(d).
Placing siblings together is a preference under Minn. Stat. § 260C.008 and a
placement-decision factor under Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(d). Our review of the
record shows that the district court appropriately addressed both the factor and preference
regarding siblings.
In sum, the district court did not err when it denied A.C. and R.C.’s motion for
adoptive placement of the child.
Affirmed.