State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0573

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Pao Choua Yang,
Appellant.

Filed March 6, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Pine County District Court
File No. 58-CR-19-718

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Michelle R. Skubitz, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, Pine City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for first- degree drug possession, arguing that
(1) the methamphetamine discovered during a search incident to his arrest should have
2
been suppressed because the officers did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
he was involved in a crime, and (2) the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
officers to testify about the circumstances that led to their encounter with appellant. We
affirm.
FACTS
On the afternoon of January 20, 2019, R.S. contacted law enforcement to report her
vehicle stolen. She told a Mille Lacs Tribal Police Officer (officer) that she loaned the
vehicle to her mother, who planned to drive appellant Pao Yang to the Twin Cities. R.S.
further explained that her mother and Yang got into an argument at a gas station in Forest
Lake, and when her mother went inside the station, Yang drove away in the vehicle without
her. The officer contacted the Forest Lake Police Department, which marked the vehicle
stolen.
A little more than one hour later, R.S. called the officer to advise t hat Yang had
contacted R.S.’s sister about dropping the vehicle off at Walmart in Pine City, and that
R.S.’s friend saw the vehicle at Grand Casino in Hinckley. The vehicle was not found in
either location. But the officer informed casino security that he was looking for Yang and
asked them to contact him if they saw Yang at the casino. Later that evening, R.S. informed
the officer that her vehicle was at McDonald’s in Hinckley. The officer found the vehicle
there, but not the keys. Shortly thereafter, R.S. told the officer that Yang had given the
keys to a mutual friend, and that she intended to pick up the vehicle the next day. Just
before 9:00 p.m., the officer informed Forest Lake police that the vehicle had been
recovered.
3
Early the next morning, casino security notified the officer that Yang was on the
gaming floor. The officer went to the casino with a Pine County Sheriff’s Deputy to speak
with Yang about the vehicle incident. The two met Yang on the g aming floor and asked
him for identifying information. During this interaction, Yang attempted to walk away
multiple times and the officer informed Yang that he was not allowed to do so because he
was being detained. When the officers relayed Yang’s identifying information to the Pine
County Sheriff’s Office, they learned that Yang had active arrest warrants. The deputy
arrested Yang on the warrants.
While searching Yang incident to the arrest, the deputy found a bag of “crystallized
substance” in Yang’s jacket pocket. Yang said that the substance was “bath salts” but
immediately corrected himself to say it was “sidewalk salt.” Subsequent testing by the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension revealed the substance was
methamphetamine.
Yang was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance. He moved
to suppress the 94 grams of methamphetamine found on his person as the fruit of an
unreasonable seizure. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the officers “had
a reasonable, articulable, and objective basis for suspecting” Yang had stolen a vehicle.
And the court determined there was nothing unreasonable about the officers “confirming
[Yang’s] identity” or arresting him on the warrants.
Prior to trial, Yang moved to exclude testimony that the officers were looking for
him because he was a suspect in a stolen-vehicle investigation and that they arrested him
on outstanding warrant s. The prosecutor explained that this limited testimony provided
4
relevant context as to why the officers approached and arrested Yang and would not be
offered to prove that Yang stole a vehicle or violated probation (the reason for the arrest
warrants). The district court denied Yang’s motion but told his attorney that “[i]f the
questioning or testimony goes beyond” the limited evidence the state planned to introduce,
“I certainly expect that you will raise an objection and we can address it at that time.”
At trial, the officer testified on direct examination that he was involved in a stolen-
vehicle investigation, Yang was identified as a suspect, the vehicle was recovered, and at
the time he encountered Yang he still wanted to speak with him about the situation. He
further testified that he encountered Yang at Grand Casino Hinckley and when he learned
of the outstanding warrants, Yang was arrested and searched. The deputy testified to the
same effect. Yang did not object. Rather, on cross-examination, Yang’s counsel asked the
officer additional questions about the stolen-vehicle investigation. And Yang testified at
length about the events that led to the stolen-vehicle report, his interaction with the officers
at the casino, and his arrest warrants.
The jury found Yang guilty as charged, and the district court imposed a 95 -month
prison sentence. Yang appeals.
DECISION
I. Yang’s seizure was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10
of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. A seizure
occurs when “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
5
person would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions
nor free to terminate the encounter.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995)
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983), and United States v. Mendenhall ,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). Warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable, unless a
recognized warrant exception applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 474
(1971); State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). The state has the burden to
show that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d
243, 250 (Minn. 2003).
One recognized exception to the warrant requirement is that a law-enforcement
officer may temporarily seize an individual to investigate if the officer has a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Taylor,
965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021 ). This includes situations in which the officer
reasonably suspects that the individual engaged in past criminal conduct. See United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 n.2 (1981) (“Of course, an officer may stop and question a
person if there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is wanted for past criminal
conduct.”).
The existence of reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances,
including “the officer’s general knowledge and experience, the officer’s personal
observations, information the officer has received from other sources, the nature of the
offense suspected, the time, the location, and anything else that is relevant.” Applegate v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987). The showing required to
establish reasonable suspicion is low. Taylor , 965 N.W.2d at 758. We review de novo
6
whether a seizure is supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn. 1999).
Yang argues that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to seize him at the
casino because the stolen-vehicle investigation was based on second-hand information. He
points out that the vehicle-theft alert had been canceled and contends that Yang’s act of
returning the vehicle so quickly dispelled any suspicion that he intended to steal it. And
he further asserts that his seizure was constitutionally unreasonable because (1) it did not
serve the public interest, (2) the officers could have questioned him later at his home or
another location, and (3) the purported theft occurred in a county that was outside the
jurisdiction of both officers. None of these arguments persuade us to reverse.
First, the fact the officers did not speak directly to R.S.’s mother does not preclude
a determination that they reasonably suspected that Yang stole the vehicle. Reasonable
suspicion requires “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d
at 752. And while the officers’ testimony about the stolen-vehicle investigation was
limited, the record shows that they received information that Yang was involved in a crime:
The owner of the vehicle reported it stolen, identified Yang as the person who stole it, and
kept the police informed of Yang’s actions while he had the vehicle in his possession.
These circumstances easily clear the low threshold of reasonable suspicion that Yang had
committed a crime, permitting the officers to stop and question him. See Cortez, 449 U.S.
at 417 n.2.
7
Second, the suggestion that Yang’s act of returning the vehicle dispelled reasonable
suspicion is unavailing. A person commits motor-vehicle theft when they “drive[] a motor
vehicle without the consent of the owner or an authorized agent of the owner, knowing or
having reason to know that the owner or an authorized agent of the owner did not give
consent.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(17) (2018). Nothing in the statute exonerates a
person who later returns the vehicle or abandons it. Because Yang cites no authority for
his remaining arguments, we do not consider them. See State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d
910, 915 (Minn. 2015) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported
by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on
appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quotation omitted)).
An officer may seize a person reasonably suspected of past criminal activity.
Because Yang does not challenge the officers’ actions in arresting him on the outstanding
warrants, we discern no error by the district court in denying Yang’s suppression motion.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing limited testimony
about the stolen-vehicle investigation and Yang’s arrest warrants.

“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and we
will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855
N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). Relevant evidence is that “having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. But
even relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. And while “[e]vidence of another
8
crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith,” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), it may be admitted to provide
the context for a police encounter or investigation, Ali, 855 N.W.2d at 249 (citing State v.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 743 (Minn. 1998)).
Yang asserts that the district court abused its discretion because the officers’
testimony that he was a suspect in a stolen-vehicle investigation and that he had active
arrest warrants was irrelevant to the drug charge, highly prejudicial, and violated rule
404(b)’s prohibition against prior crime and bad-act evidence. We are not persuaded.
In Griller, our supreme court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting testimony about a letter sent to the police or the content of police interviews
with neighbors, both of which triggered the investigation of Griller and the excavation of
his backyard that led to the discovery of two bodies. 583 N.W.2d at 743. The supreme
court reasoned that the testimony “provided the jury with the context necessary to explain
how the investigation against Griller began and why the police were excavating [Griller’s]
backyard.” Id. Griller controls our analysis in this case.
Yang’s reliance on State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 2002), does not convince
us otherwise. Litzau was charged with first- degree possession of a controlled substance.
650 N.W.2d at 180. At trial, an officer testified “that the police had received a tip from a
‘reliable source’ who said that [Litzau] . . . ‘was carrying—transporting drugs’” in his
vehicle. Id. at 183. The supreme court agreed with Litzau that testimony to this effect was
inadmissible hearsay because “[t]here was no reason for the officers ’ testimony about the
substance of the informant’s conversation which pointed directly to [Litzau’s] guilt of the
9
crime for which he was on trial.” Id. Here, by contrast, the officers’ testimony was limited
to stating that they approached Yang because he was suspected of stealing a vehicle— not
the offense for which Yang was on trial — and that they arrested him because he had
outstanding warrants. The challenged testimony had no bearing on Yang’s guilt of the
crime for which he was on trial. As in Griller, it merely established the reason why the
officers approached Yang at the casino and why they arrested him.1
In sum, Yang’s seizure was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. And the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting brief
testimony from the arresting officers regarding the context of the seizure.
Affirmed.

1 Yang also states that the district court “appeared to invoke the ‘immediate episode’
doctrine of admissibility.” Th is doctrine allows admission of evidence of other offenses
only where the other offenses and the charged offense are “linked together in point of time
or circumstances so that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other.” State v.
Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 316 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). The record defeats
Yang’s argument. The district court made no mention of the doctrine, and expressly stated
that it admitted the testimony as “appropriate context” for the investigative seizure.