In re the Guardianship and Conservatorship of Carolyn Neu

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0578

In re the Guardianship and Conservatorship of Carolyn Neu

Filed December 12, 2022
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-PR-21-4038

Ryan A. Carlson, Halvorson Legal, Howard Lake, Minnesota (for appellant Carolyn Neu)

David T. Johnson, Amundson, Johnson & Schrader, P.A., Paynesville, Minnesota (for
respondents Julie Robinson and Steven Neu)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court ’s decision to appoint a conservator for her
estate, arguing that the district cour t made insufficient findings and otherwise failed to
support its decision. Alternatively, appellant contends the district court abused its
discretion when it decided not to appoint her choice of conservator. We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
Appellant Carolyn Neu (“Carolyn”) is an 82-year-old woman with four adult
children: respondent Julie Robinson (“Julie”), respondent Steven Neu (“Steven”), Allen
Neu (“Allen”), and Paul Neu (“Paul”).1 Carolyn lived with her husband until he passed
away in June 2021. Days after her husband’s death, Carolyn moved in with Paul who also
acted as Carolyn’s primary caretaker. Around that time, Julie and Steven petitioned the
district court for guardianship and conservatorship; specifically, for the district court to
appoint a neutral professional to oversee Carolyn and her affairs. In their petition, Julie
and Steven expressed concerns about Paul limiting the family’s access to Carolyn and not
providing Carolyn continuous care. Carolyn objected to Julie and Steven’s petition. Paul
filed a cross-petition requesting that the district court appoint him as guardian and /or
conservator for Carolyn.
The district court held a two -day evidentiary hearing where the district court heard
testimony from all of Carolyn’s children and received evidence from all parties. Carolyn
did not testify. According to a report by a court-appointed visitor, Carolyn expressed her
view that she did not need a guardian or conservator. But , if the district court appointed a
guardian and/or conservator, she would prefer Paul’s appointment.
At the evidentiary hearing, t he district court heard testimony regarding Carolyn’s
ability to manage her own finances. Steven testified that he discovered his parents’
financial difficulties in early 2020. Steven realized his parents had many overdue bills and

1 Since appellant and many of her children share a last name, we refer to appellant and her
children by their first names.
3
that their credit score had declined more than 200 points over approximately six months .
Steven also testified that his parents had fallen victim to several financial scams. Due to
these issues, Carolyn and her husband granted Steven power of attorney. Carolyn and her
husband’s financial situation began to improve once Steven intervened. Despite th is
improvement, both Steven and Paul testified that Carolyn could not handle her finances
independently.
The district court received medical documents detailing Carolyn’s cognitive
abilities. The documents revealed that Carolyn had been diagnosed with la te-onset
Alzheimer’s disease. These documents stated Carolyn “demonstrated cognitive/linguistic
deficits in attention, memory, problem solving, orientation, oral expression, speech
comprehension, reading comprehension, and writing.” Additionally, the dis trict court
received a statement from Carolyn’s primary care provider, which expressed support for
the guardianship and conservatorship. The provider indicated that Carolyn continued to
have “moderate cognitive deficits” and that “she had definitely worsened” since the earlier
evaluation.
Julie, Steven, and Allen expressed concern s about Paul controlling Carolyn’s
affairs. Paul’s siblings all testified that Paul inhibits contact with Carolyn. They expressed
concern that Paul may financially abuse or manipulate Carolyn. Julie and Steven expressed
concern that Carolyn removed Steven’s power of attorney shortly after their father’s
passing and that Paul was currently the only person with power of attorney over Carolyn.
Steven expressed co ncern that Paul gave himself a raise for being Carolyn’s caretaker.
Allen detailed that Paul said he could take out $30,000 a year from his parents’ accounts
4
as a tax -free gift. Due to these concerns, Julie, Steven, and Allen testified that a neutral
third-party professional should oversee Carolyn’s affairs.
After the evidentiary hearing, t he district court denied the petition to appoint a
guardian and grant ed the petition to appoint a conservator. In doing so, t he district court
appointed a neutral professional conservator, rather than Paul. The district court explained
that Paul had exhibited some concerning conduct when it came to Carolyn’s affairs . The
district court determined that “to prevent any potential future manipulation of Carolyn
Neu’s finances, the [c]ourt finds appointment of a [professional] conservator necessary.”
Carolyn appeals.
DECISION
Carolyn challenges both the district court’s decision to appoint a conservator and,
alternatively, the district court’s decision not to appoint Carolyn’s conservator of choice.
We review a district court’s determination to appoint a conservator for an abuse of
discretion. In re Guardianship of Pates , 823 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Minn. App. 2012). “A
district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the
evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts
on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v.
Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)). Additionally, we will not set aside the
district court’s factual findings “unless they are clearly erroneous, giving due regard for
the [district] court ’s determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses.” In re
Conservatorship of Lundgaard, 453 N.W.2d 58, 60- 61 (Minn. App. 1990). “We will not
conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, ‘on the entire evidence,’ we are ‘left with a
5
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” In re Commitment of
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) ( quoting N. States Power Co. v. Lyon Food
Prods., Inc., 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 ( Minn. 1975)). We address each argument in turn
below.
I.
Carolyn first contends that the district court abused its discretion when it appointed
a conservator because its findings were insufficient as a matter of law and not supported
by the evidence.
A district court may appoint a conservator if it finds:
(1) by clear and convincing evidence, the individual is
unable to manage property and business affairs because
of an impairment in the ability to receive and evaluate
information or make decisions . . . ;

(2) by a preponderance of evidence, the individual has
property that will be wasted or dissipated unless
management is provided . . . ; and

(3) the [individual’s] identified needs cannot be met by less
restrictive means, including but not limited to use of
appropriate technological assistance, supported
decision making, representative payee, trusts, banking
or bill paying assistance, or appointment of an attorney-
in-fact under section 523.01.

Minn. Stat. § 524.5-409, subd. 1(a) (2020). The district court “must make specific findings
particular to the [individual] why less restrictive alternatives do not work.” Id.,
subd. 1(a)(3).
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A. Impairment

Carolyn contends the district court’s findings to support its conclusion that she
cannot manage her property and business affairs due to an impairment are insufficient and
not supported by the evidence . We are not persuaded.
First, Carolyn challenges the district court’s decision that she has an impairment due
to her diagnosis with Alzheimer’s disease, arguing the diagnosis is stale. Carolyn compares
her diagnosis to that in In re Guardianship of Haggenmiller, No. A19-2081, 2020 WL
4280032, at *4 (Minn. App. July 27, 2020). 2 But Haggenmiller is distinguishable. There,
the diagnosing physician refused to testify because she had not recently evaluated the
person subject to conservatorship. Id. In contrast, Carolyn’s primary care provider
submitted a statement to the district court, opining that Carolyn needed a conservator. The
provider described that Carolyn’s evaluation “revealed moderate cognitive deficits” and
opined that her condition “ha[s] definitely worsened” since her initial evaluation.
Therefore, the district court ’s finding that Carolyn has an impairment bec ause of her
diagnosis with Alzheimer’s disease is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Second, Carolyn argues the record does not provide clear and convincing evidence
that she is impaired in her ability to manage her property and business affairs. In Pates,
we affirmed the district court’s impairment finding where Pates had abnormally limited
“verbal working and calculation skills . . . due to their memory loss and Alzheimer’s
disease.” 823 N.W.2d at 886 (noting that Pates had “missed payment on at least one bill”).

2 We observe that Hagenmiller is a nonprecedential opinion, but we recognize, in the
context of this case, it has persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
7
We concluded the record supported the district court’s impairment finding with clear and
convincing evidence because the district court relied on “medical record[s], [a] physician’s
statement, the visitor’s report, and testimony from [the] family.” Id.
This case is similar to Pates. Here, the district court found that Carolyn: (1) “was
diagnosed with late onset Alzheimer ’s disease ”;3 (2) had “demonstrated
cognitive/linguistic deficits in attention, memory, problem solving, orientation, oral
expression, speech comprehension, reading comprehension, and writing” ; (3) “has
struggled to pay her bills on time ”; and (4) “could not handle her own finances .” These
findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence, relied upon by the district court,
including Carolyn’s medical records, financial history, and testimony from her children.
For these reasons, t he district court ’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Carolyn “is unable to
manage [her] property and business affairs because of an impairment in [her] ability to
receive and evaluate information.” See Minn. Stat. § 524.5-409, subd. 1(a).

3 Carolyn contends we should only review the f indings the district court lists under the
subsection titled “Carolyn Neu is Unable to Manage Property and Business Affairs because
of an Impairment in the Ability to Receive and Evaluate Information.” However, the
specific placement of a finding within a district court’s order does not matter if the findings,
when taken as a whole, are sufficient to support the conclusions of law. See Big Lake
Lumber, Inc. v. Sec. Prop. Invs., Inc., 836 N.W.2d 359, 366- 67 n.8 (Minn. 2013).
8
B. Wasted or Dissipated Property
Carolyn next contends the district court’s findings to support its conclusion that her
property would be wasted or dissipated unless management is provided are insufficient and
not supported by the evidence . Again, we are not persuaded.
In Pates, the district court found Pates was “vulnerable to being taken advantage of,
especially in financial matters” and that “[i]t appear[ed] that she [was] easily influenced by
individuals in decisions she ha[d] made regarding her assets, her estate planning, and
regarding the sale of her home.” 823 N.W.2d at 886. To support these findings, the district
court observed a series of modifications Pates had made to her will, power of attorney, and
health-care directive. Id. The district court also referenced testimony showing that certain
individuals that Pates trusted were exploiting her finances. Id.
Here, the district court similarly found that Carolyn could “be easily manipulated
into handing over money and being financially exploited” and that she was “vulnerable to
being taken advantage of when it comes to financial matters.” The record supports these
findings. As the district court noted, “Carolyn has been subject to three money- wire
scams.” Additionally, Julie, Steven, and Allen all expressed concern that Paul may
financially exploit Carolyn. Paul’s siblings noted his significant raise, his discussion of a
$30,000 gift, and his sudden position as Carolyn’s sole power of attorney.
The record reflects the district court ’s findings were not clearly erroneous. Id. at
885. The record contains a preponderance of the evidence supporting the finding that
Carolyn’s property will be wasted or dissipated unless management is provided. Therefore,
9
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it used this statutory factor to support its
appointment of the conservator. See Minn. Stat. § 524.5-409, subd. 1(a).
C. Less Restrictive Means
Carolyn finally argues the district court failed to “make specific findings particular
to why less restrictive alternatives do not work [for Carolyn]” as required by Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-409, subd. 1(a)(3). Carolyn also contends the district court’s findings on this factor
are not supported by the evidence. We are not persuaded.
Our cases illustrate the “specific findings” necessary to comply with Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-409, subd. 1(a )(3). Pates, 823 N.W.2d at 886-887. In Pates, we concluded the
district court made sufficient findings that Pates “was susceptible to influence by . . . her
attorneys in fact.” 823 N.W.2d at 887; see also In re Guardianship of Jaeger , No. A21-
0153, 2021 WL 4059765, at *6 (Minn. App. Sept. 7, 2021) (concluding district court made
sufficient findings when individual consistently failed to pay bills despite “the power of
attorney, health-care directive, and trust agreement in place” ).4
Here, the district court made similar findings. The district court determined that :
(1) “Carolyn has shown she is vulnerable to being taken advantage of when it comes to
financial matters”; (2) “Carolyn’s dementia affects her attention span, memory, problem
solving skills”; (3) “Carolyn has been manipulated and scammed out of a significant
amount of money multiple tim es”; (4) “[a]fter Carolyn’s husband’s death, Paul gave

4 While Jaeger is nonprecedential, we recognize the persuasive value regarding the
“specific findings” necessary to comply with Minn. Stat. § 524.5-409, subd. 1(a )(3). See
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
10
himself a significant raise”; and ( 5) “the timing of the change in Carolyn’s power of
attorney” concerned the district court “ especially when Paul was planning to give himself
a $30,000.00 gift and kne w Carolyn lacked capacity .” Thus, t he district court made
sufficient findings on the less -restrictive-means factor . See Pates , 823 N.W.2d at 887;
Jaeger, 2021 WL 4059765, at *6.
The district court’s findings are also supported by the record . In finding that
Carolyn “is vulnerable to being taken advantage of when it comes to financial matters,” the
district court referred to Carolyn’s dementia and the multiple wire-fraud scams. Regarding
Paul, the district court found Julie, Steven, and Allen’s concerns about Paul to be credible
and, on that basis, determined Paul should not be Carolyn’s sole caretaker . Pechovnik v.
Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) ( noting that the district court ’s
credibility findings can be implicit) . We do not decide issues of witness credibility.
Lundgaard, 453 N.W.2d at 60-61.
The district court made the required “specific findings” and did not abuse its
discretion when it determined that Carolyn’s “identified needs cannot be met by less
restrictive means.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-409, subd. 1(a).
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it appointed
Carolyn a conservator. Pates, 823 N.W.2d at 885.
II.
Alternatively, Carolyn contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
did not appoint her choice of conservator: Paul. When appointing a conservator, a district
court must consider those persons given statutory priority. Minn. Stat. § 524.5- 413(a)
11
(2020). However, “[t]he court, acting in the best interest of the person subject to
conservatorship, may decline to appoint a person having priority and appoint a person
having a lower priority or no priority.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5- 413(c) (2020), see Pates , 823
N.W.2d at 887 (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a
conservator lower in the priority list). When conducting the best -interests analysis, a
district court may weigh the potential for intrafamily conflict. See In re Guardianship of
Wells, 733 N.W.2d 506, 507- 08 (Minn. App. 2007) (affirming appointment of third -party
conservator despite person subject to conservatorship expressing preference for one of her
daughters due to intrafamily conflict) , rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007).
Carolyn correctly observes that Paul is higher on the priority list than a professional
conservator.5 However, the district court determined that appointing a professional
conservator, rather than Paul, was in Carolyn’s best interest . As described above, the
district court found Julie, Steven, and Allen’s concerns about Paul credible. We defer to
the district court’s credibility determinations. Lundgaard, 453 N.W.2d at 60- 61. And, as
is the case here, we affirm decisions to appoint a lower-priority person as conservator when
the district court expresses concern about financial exploitation. See Pates, 823 N.W.2d at
886-887.

5 Pursuant to section 524.5- 414(a), Paul satisfies the following priority criteria: (i) “ a
person nominated as conservator by the respondent ,” (ii) “ an agent appointed by the
respondent to manage the respondent's property under a durable power of attorney,” (iii)
“an adult child of the respondent ,” and (iv) “an adult who is related to the respondent by
blood, adoption, or marriage .” A “professional conservator” is given the lowest priority.
Id. (a)(9).
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The district court also determined that appointing a professional conservator would
help to avoid intrafamily conflict . The district court noted that : (1) “Steven, Allen, and
Julie have all expressed hard feelings toward their brother Paul” and (2) “Steven [], Julie
[], and Allen have all voiced their concerns about financial exploitation.” Further, t he
record shows examples of conflict between Paul and his siblings. The district court
appropriately weighed avoiding further conflict between the siblings when it appointed a
professional conservator. Wells, 733 N.W.2d at 508.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it appointed a
professional conservator instead of Carolyn’s choice: Paul.
Affirmed.