In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S.B.G., Parent.

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-0589

Court of Appeals McKeig, J.
Took no part, Moore, III, J.

In the Matter of the Welfare of
the Child of: S.B.G., Parent.
Filed: June 21, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
________________________

Travis J. Smith, Kayla M. Johnson, William C. Lundy, Smith & Johnson, Slayton,
Minnesota, for appellant S.B.G.

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota, for respondent
Nobles County Community Service Agency.

Brooke Beskau Warg, Natalie Netzel, Mitchell Hamline School of Law Child Protection
Clinic, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mallory K. Stoll, Blahnik, Prchal & Stoll, PLLC, Prior Lake, Minnesota, for amicus curiae
Institute to Transform Child Protection.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The juvenile court has subject-matter jurisdiction over cases involving the
termination of parental rights of presumed fathers.
2. The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if a parent is convicted of
an offense that requires registration as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 1b(a) (2022); these offenses include convictions for both offenses enumerated in the
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predatory offender registration statute and non-enumerated offenses that arise out of the
same circumstances as a charged enumerated offense.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
MCKEIG, Justice.
Appellant-father S.B.G. was convicted of an offense that arose out of the same
circumstances as an offense enumerated in the predatory offender registration statute.
While S.B.G. was incarcerated, respondent- mother, I.Q., gave birth to a child, H.Q.
H.Q. was adjudicated as a child in need of protection or services. The juvenile court
ordered genetic testing to determine paternity . S.B.G.’s genetic test confirmed that he is
the child’s biological father, but he was not adjudicated as the father. The social services
agency petitioned to terminate S.B.G.’s parental rights because of his conviction for an
offense that requires registration as a predatory offender. After a contested hearing, the
district court, acting as a juvenile court, terminated S.B.G.’s parental rights. S.B.G.
appealed the termination of his parental rights arguing, for the first time, that the juvenile
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights. S.B.G. also
raised a statutory interpretation argument about the interplay between the child protection
and predatory offender registration statutes. The court of appeals determined that the
juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, rejected S.B.G.’s statutory
interpretation argument, and affirmed the juvenile court’s termination of parental rights.
We affirm.
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FACTS
S.B.G.’s Relevant Criminal History
In November 2019, the State charged S.B.G. with six counts arising out of his sexual
conduct or communication with a minor; only counts two and six are relevant here.
Count two charged S.B.G. with soliciting a child through electronic communication to
engage in sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1) (2022). This
crime is an enumerated offense that requires registration as a predatory offender. Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(2)(v) (2022). Count six charged S.B.G. with distributing via
electronic communication material that describes sexual conduct to a child in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(3) (2022). This offense is not listed in the predatory
offender registration statute. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b (2022). S.B.G. pleaded
guilty to count six, and the district court accepted his plea. The district court sentenced
S.B.G. to 36 months’ incarceration in December 2020.
Child Protection Proceedings
I.Q. gave birth to H.Q. on March 4, 2021. Respondent Nobles County Community
Service Agency (the County) petitioned to have H.Q. adjudicated as a child in need of
protection or services (CHIPS) under the juvenile protection provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001–.637 (2022).1 The CHIPS petition listed both S.B.G.

1 Minnesota Statutes provide various circumstances in which a child can be
considered CHIPS. Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6. CHIPS cases are filed after a county
social services agency investigates and determines there is proof that a child meets the
statutory criteria to be adjudicated as CHIPS . See generally Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 45
(specifying the procedures pertaining to the filing of a CHIPS petition). The Minnesota

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and another man as potential fathers and participants in the CHIPS petition and
proceedings. In an order after an admit/deny hearing, the Nobles County District Court,
acting as a juvenile court,2 explained that the two alleged fathers had voluntarily agreed to
complete genetic testing to determine H.Q.’s biological father and that “[e]xpedited child
support proceedings ha[d] been initiated and paternity [could] also be established through
that process.”3 The juvenile court adjudicated H.Q. as a CHIPS in April 2021. The

Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure explain that the purpose of these cases is to “secure
for each child under the jurisdiction of the court a home that is safe and permanent.” Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 1.02(a).

2 There are no separate family or juvenile court divisions in Nobles County.
Consequently, when handling child protection matters, the district court acts as a juvenile
court. See Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(5) (2022) (providing the district courts with “the
jurisdiction of a juvenile court as provided in chapter 260”); Minn. Stat. § 260.012 (2022)
(explaining juvenile court duties in child protection matters). We will refer to the Nobles
County District Court as the “juvenile court” throughout this opinion so as not to conflate
the powers of the juvenile court with the powers of a district court. See Vang v. State,
788 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Minn. 2010) (Dietzen, J., concurring) (“[W]hen a district court
judge is acting as a juvenile court judge, that judge is limited by the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court as provided in chapter 260.”).

3 This court is required to “create an ex pedited child support hearing process to
establish, modify, and enforce child support” in IV-D cases . Minn. Stat. § 484.702,
subd. 1(a)–(b) (2022). An IV-D case is a case where a party has assigned the S tate the
right to child support because the party receives public assistance or the party “has applied
for child support services under title IV-D of the Social Security Act.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.26, subd. 10 (2022), cited in Minn. Stat. § 484.702, subd. 1(f) (2022). The purpose
of the expedited child support process is to create a streamlined and uniform system that is
easily accessible to parties and “results in timely and consistent issuance of orders.” Minn.
Gen. R. Prac. 351.02, subd. 1.

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juvenile court de termined that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply. 4 In
December 2021, following a review hearing, the juvenile court determined that S.B.G. “is
the Father of [H.Q.]” and noted that “[p]aternity was established through DNA testing,
showing Father’s probability at 99.99%.” The juvenile court removed the other alleged
father from the proceedings and listed S.B.G. as H.Q.’s father.
Once the positive genetic test confirmed S.B.G. as H.Q.’s biological father, he
became a presumed father, and the juvenile court changed S.B.G.’s status from a
participant with limited rights to a party with full status in the CHIPS proceedings. 5 See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.150, subd. 2(a) (2022) (providing that a positive genetic test requires
the court to treat the biological father as a presumed father in proceedings under chapter
260C). Although S.B.G. was never adjudicated as H.Q.’s father,6 the record suggests that
S.B.G. never contested the determination that he is H.Q.’s father.
In December 2021, the County petitioned to terminate S.B.G.’s parental rights in a
separate court file. The petition requested termination because S.B.G. was convicted of an
offense that arose “out of the same set of circumstances” as another charged offense that is

4 The Indian Child Welfare Act “establishes minimum federal standards for the
removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of Indian children in
foster or adoptive homes.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 28.01; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.

5 Under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure, “participants” have
only limited rights, see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 33.02, subd. 1, while “parties” have
significantly more rights, see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 32.02.

6 Although our record on appeal is limited, neither S.B.G. nor the C ounty contests
that S.B.G. was not adjudicated as H.Q.’s father. The record also reflects that S.B.G.
neither petitioned to be adjudicated as a father nor sought custody rights.
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enumerated in the predatory offender registration statute, requiring S.B.G. to register as a
predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a) (“[A] person shall register
under this section if” they were “charged with or petitioned for a felony violation of . . . any
of the following, and convicted of . . . that offense or another offense arising out of the
same set of circumstances.” ( emphasis added)); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9)
(providing that a parent’s conviction for certain offenses, including offenses requiring
registration as a predatory offender, is a statutory ground for termination of parental
rights).7 The County argued that termination would be in H.Q.’s best interests, given
S.B.G.’s criminal record and because I.Q. was the custodial parent, so H.Q. would not be
displaced by termination of S.B.G.’s parental rights.
Because the petition stated a prima facie case that S.B.G. committed an offense that
would require registration as a predatory offender, the juvenile court relieved the County
of its obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification between S.B.G. and H.Q.
See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(6) (2022) (permitting the juvenile court to relieve the county
of making reasonable efforts at reunification if there is a prima facie case that a parent has
committed an offense requiring registration as a predatory offender).
In March 2022, the juvenile court held a contested termination of parental rights
proceeding. The juvenile court received eleven exhibits without objection. Both the

7 Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.503, subd. 2(a) (2022), “[t]he responsible social services
agency must ask the county attorney to immediately file a termination of parental rights
petition when . . . the parent has committed an offense that requires registration as a
predatory offender under” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a) or (b).
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County social worker and the assigned guardian ad litem testified for the County; S.B.G.
and his mother testified on his behalf.
The social worker testified that S.B.G. stated an interest in being involved with
H.Q., but S.B.G. did not presently have a bond with H.Q. and had not taken action that
demonstrated an intent to maintain a relationship. The social worker testified that S.B.G.
could not provide a stable environment for H.Q. when he was released from prison and that
she was concerned about H.Q.’s “safety and [S.B.G.’s] ability to safely parent her,” given
his admitted lack of parenting skills, his criminal history, and the child’s vulnerability.
Similarly, the guardian ad litem did not believe that S.B.G. could keep H.Q. safe from harm
or provide H.Q. with a stable and permanent living environment and also testified that
S.B.G.’s parental rights should be terminated . The guardian ad litem testified that she
agreed with the conclusion in her report, which stated that termination of S.B.G.’s parental
rights would be in H.Q.’s best interests.
S.B.G. did not dispute the juvenile court’s finding that he is H.Q.’s father and
affirmatively testified that he is H.Q.’s father. S.B.G. testified that he wanted to spend time
with H.Q. but noted that he did not have parenting experience so he would proceed slowly
in building a relationship with H.Q.
In April 2022, the juvenile court terminated S.B.G.’s parental rights. The juvenile
court concluded that S.B.G. was convicted of a crime that will require registration as a
predatory offender based on his December 2020 conviction because it arose from the “same
or similar circumstances” as a charged offense that is enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 1b(a)(2)(v). Accordingly, the juvenile court concluded that the County proved by
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clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination existed. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9) (providing that a parent’s conviction of certain offenses,
including an offense requiring registration as a predatory offender, is a statutory ground for
termination of parental rights). The juvenile court also concluded that the County proved
by clear and convincing evidence that terminating S.B.G.’s parental rights was in H.Q.’s
best interests.
S.B.G. appealed. In re Welfare of Child of S.B.G., 981 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. App.
2022). S.B.G. argued for the first time on appeal that the juvenile court “did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over this case on the ground that there is no legally recognized
parent-and-child relationship between him and H.Q.”8 Id. at 227 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court of appeals determined that juvenile courts have exclusive and original
jurisdiction over termination of parental rights cases. Id. at 228 (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.101, subd. 2(1); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 24.01, subd. 2). The court of appeals noted
that it did “not doubt that an absence of parentage may be dispositive of the merits of a

8 Despite his argument on appeal, S.B.G. never contested the juvenile court’s finding
that he is H.Q.’s father. S.B.G. was present and involved throughout the year-long CHIPS
proceedings and was afforded all the procedural rights given to parties. S.B.G. confirmed
in his direct testimony that he is H.Q.’s father and wanted a relationship with his child.
S.B.G. also acknowledged his paternity and parental rights by asking the court to “deny
the request to terminate [his] parental rights.” Consequently, up until S.B.G.’s appeal, it
appears everyone involved in this case considered S.B.G. as H.Q.’s father. S.B.G. now is
seemingly attempting to invent a subject-matter-jurisdiction argument because
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited. See Seehus v. Bor–Son Constr., Inc.,
783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010) (“Defects in subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time, and cannot be waived by the parties.”). S.B.G. received a full and fair
opportunity before the juvenile court to argue that his parental rights should not be
terminated and only now argues that he was never H.Q.’s legal father in an effort to get a
second opportunity at the parental-rights apple.
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termination-of-parental-rights case,” so parentage may need to be determined as part of the
termination proceedings if a party contests parentage. Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals
determined the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction over S.B.G.’s case. Id.
Second, S.B.G. argued that Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9), and the statutes
referenced therein unambiguously authorized termination of parental rights only if the
conviction was for an offense specifically enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)
or (b). S.B.G. , 981 N.W.2d at 229. The County argued, by contrast, that “the relevant
statutes are unambiguous in providing for the termination of parental rights if a parent is
required to register as a predatory offender pursuant to the provisions of section 243.166,
subdivision 1b(a) or (b), regardless of whether the parent was convicted of an enumerated
offense.” Id. at 230.9
The court of appeals held that the County’s interpretation of the statutes was the
only reasonable interpretation. Id. at 231. The court of appeals concluded that S.B.G.’s
interpretation was unreasonable because neither Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9), nor
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(g)(5), contain any language limiting the termination requirement to
only offenses enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a) or (b). S.B.G., 981 N.W.2d
at 230–31. Accordingly, the court of appeals determined the juvenile court did not err by

9 Neither party contested the juvenile court’s finding that S.B.G. will be required to
register as a predatory offender upon his prison release because count two from the
November 2019 complaint is an enumerated offense that requires registration as a
predatory offender (soliciting a child through electronic communication to engage in sexual
conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1)) and count six arose from “the
same set of circumstances” as count two. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(2)(v).
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terminating S.B.G.’s parental rights because he was convicted of an offense that required
registration as a predatory offender. Id. at 231.10
S.B.G. petitioned this court for further review.
ANALYSIS
S.B.G. makes two arguments in this appeal. First, S.B.G. argues that the juvenile
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights. Second,
S.B.G. contends that the court of appeals misinterpreted the statutes governing termination
of parental rights and predatory offender registration. We address each issue in turn.
I.
We first address S.B.G.’s argument that the juvenile court did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights. “Jurisdiction is a question of
law that we review de novo.” In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn.
2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction ‘to hear and determine a particular
class of actions and the particular questions’ presented generally depends on the scope of
the constitutional and statutory grant of authority to the court.” McCullough & Sons, Inc.
v. City of Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Robinette v. Price,

10 S.B.G. argued two additional issues before the court of appeals that were not raised
in our court. First, the court of appeals determined the juvenile court did not err by failing
to consider whether the County made reasonable efforts to reunify him with H.Q. because
S.B.G. was convicted of an offense that will require him to register as a predatory offender.
S.B.G., 981 N.W.2d at 231–32. Second, the court of appeals determined the juvenile court
did not err in concluding that termination of S.B.G.’s parental rights was in H.Q.’s best
interests. Id. at 233.
11
8 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. 1943)). In Minnesota, “court rules can also define
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. The Minnesota Constitution provides the “district court”
with “original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases.” Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3. Not
every judicial district or county has a separate judge who acts as a juvenile court
judge—Nobles County is one such example. Consequently, the district court in those
counties sometimes acts as the juvenile court. See Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(5) (2022)
(providing that the district courts have “the jurisdiction of a juvenile court as provided in
chapter 260”).
S.B.G. raised the subject-matter-jurisdiction argument for the first time on appeal,
and the court of appeals determined that, given that juvenile courts have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over termination of parental rights cases, it was clear the juvenile
court had subject-matter jurisdiction over S.B.G.’s case, “which is among the class of cases
known as termination-of-parental-rights cases.” S.B.G., 981 N.W.2d at 228. The court of
appeals noted that “an alleged absence of parentage does not defeat a [juvenile] court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction over a termination-of-parental-rights case.” Id. S.B.G. argues
that the juvenile court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate his rights as a
non-adjudicated father because the statutory grant of jurisdiction gives the juvenile court
the jurisdiction to terminate the rights only of a parent to a child, and a non-adjudicated
father is not a legal parent under the Minnesota Statutes. The County argues that
non-adjudicated fathers still have some rights, duties, and obligations, and the existence of
those rights, duties, and obligations gives the juvenile court subject-matter jurisdiction to
terminate the existing rights a non-adjudicated father possesses.
12
S.B.G. rests his jurisdictional argument on Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1, which
states, “The juvenile court may upon petition, terminate all rights of a parent to a
child . . . .” (Emphasis added.) According to S.B.G., Minn. Stat. § 260.301, subd. 1, means
that the juvenile court only has subject-matter jurisdiction over cases involving a parent,
and he has not been adjudicated as a parent. S.B.G.’s reliance on this statute is misplaced
because chapter 260C has a specific jurisdiction section—Minn. Stat. § 260C.101. 11
This jurisdiction section provides that juvenile courts have “original and exclusive
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning . . . the termination of parental rights to a child.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 2(1); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 24.01, subd. 2 (“The
juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings described in Minn.

11 S.B.G.’s argument under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1, is better understood as
an argument about the merits because that statute details the findings a juvenile court has
to make before it can involuntarily terminate parental rights. The statute requires findings
that a statutory ground for termination exists, the termination is in the child’s best interests,
and the social services agency made reasonable efforts at reunification. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subds. 1, 7, 8. Upon making those findings, the juvenile court “may upon
petition, terminate all rights of a parent to a child.” Id., subd. 1. A person could challenge
the termination of their parental rights to a child if they have no paternal relationship to
that child. But termination proceedings and permanency timelines do not get waylaid while
parentage is determined. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 24.05 (“The pendency of a parentage
matter shall not extend the permanency timelines set forth in these rules and Minn. Stat
§ 260C.503.”). Even so, a non-adjudicated parent, like S.B.G., could pursue a paternity
determination through a separate family court filing under the Minnesota Parentage
Act—something S.B.G. has failed to do . See Minn. Stat. § 257.57 (2022). This statute
provides a mechanism for non-adjudicated parents to contest their paternity if they do not
think they should be subject to a termination proceeding because they are not a child’s
parent. But that is not the case here. S.B.G. never contested his paternity or the genetic-test
results. And S.B.G. never sought a hearing on paternity; rather, he admitted that he is
H.Q.’s father and still does not contest his paternity.
13
Stat. § 260C.101.”). This section, by its plain language, gives juvenile courts original and
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases concerning the termination of parental rights to a child.
As the County points out, there are rights, duties, and obligations held by people
who are not considered the legal parent of a child. For example, presumed fathers have a
number of rights and duties. A positive genetic test pursuant to the Minnesota Parentage
Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51–.75 (2022), “shall” be used to treat the biological father as “a
presumed father under section 257.55 ,” which includes the right to be notified of
proceedings and “to be assessed and considered for day-to- day care” of the child. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.150, subd. 2(a). Presumed fathers can bring an action under the Parentage
Act to declare the existence or nonexistence of a father-and-child relationship. Minn. Stat.
§ 257.57, subd. 1. A determination that a father-an d-child relationship exists carries with
it significant, fundamental parental rights like the right to make decisions about the care,
custody, and control of the child. See, e.g., SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 820
(Minn. 2007). A positive genetic test that proves paternity to a 92 percent likelihood or
greater, as is the case here, allows the court to “order the alleged father to pay temporary
child support.” Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(a).12 If a child is under county custody after
an emergency removal hearing, the juvenile court “shall” order the social services agency
to develop a visitation plan that promotes the parent-child relationship, and once a positive

12 We note that the statute also requires the genetic test to be “completed in a
laboratory accredited by the American Association of Blood Banks.” Minn. Stat. § 257.62,
subd. 5.
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genetic test is obtained under the Minnesota Parentage Act, the presumed father is included
in that visitation plan. Minn. Stat. § 260C.178, subd. 3(a), (d).
Here, a positive genetic test proves S.B.G.’s paternity to a 99 percent probability.
That DNA test creates “an evidentiary presumption” that S.B.G. is H.Q.’s biological father.
Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(b). The genetic test required the juvenile court to treat S.B.G.
as if he were a presumed father under section 257.55. Minn. Stat. § 260C.150, subd. 2(a)
(providing that in proceedings under chapter 260C, “a positive test result under
section 257.62, subdivision 5, shall be used by the court to treat a person determined to be
the biological father of a child by a positive test as if the individual were a presumed father
under section 257.55”). As a presumed father, S.B.G. was entitled to the limited rights,
duties, and obligations discussed above. Additionally, the juvenile court made S.B.G. a
party to the proceedings and granted all the corresponding procedural rights that allowed
him to participate fully in the termination proceedings. 13 Accordingly, S.B.G.’s case
involved “the termination of parental rights to a child,” and the juvenile court had “original
and exclusive jurisdiction” over S.B.G.’s case. Minn. Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 2(1).
Our conclusion is also bolstered by the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection
Procedure, the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption Registry (Minn. Stat. § 259.52 (2022)), and
the procedural safeguards afforded to S.B.G. here.

13 These procedural rights include the rights to notice, legal representation, be present
at hear ings, conduct discovery, bring motions, participate in settlement agreements,
subpoena witnesses, make arguments in support of or against the petition, present evidence,
cross-examine witnesses, request review of a referee’s findings, request review of the
court’s disposition if there has been a change in circumstances, bring post-trial motions,
and appeal orders from the court. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 32.02.
15
First, because Minn. Stat. § 260C.150, subd. 2(a), requires the juvenile court to treat
presumed fathers as parents under c hapter 260C, the county must “immediately file a
termination of parental rights petition when . . . the parent has committed an offense that
requires registration as a predatory offender, ” as was the case for S.B.G. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.503, subd. 2(a)(6) (2022). This requirement to immediately file a termination
petition is a permanency timeline requirement, and the “pendency of a parentage matter”
does not extend the permanency timelines in Minnesota Statutes section 260C.503. Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 24.05. In other words, once the genetic test established that S.B.G. is H.Q.’s
presumed father, the C ounty had to immediately petition to terminate his parental rights
because of his criminal history, and those termination proceedings could not be halted or
delayed while a parentage matter was resolved. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.503, subd. 2(a)(6).
Depriving the juvenile court of jurisdiction in cases like this would bind the county’s
hands until biological fathers, like S.B.G., deigned to have their parental rights adjudicated.
This would controvert the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure and result in children
floating in limbo until a biological father felt like adjudicating his parental rights, or the
county independently pursued a paternity action on the child’s behalf. Neither of these
delays would be in a child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (“The
paramount consideration in all juvenile protection proceedings is the health, safety, and
best interests of the child.”); id., subd. 3 (“The paramount consideration in all proceedings
for . . . the termination of parental rights is the best interests of the child.”).
Second, the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption Registry gives the juvenile court grounds
to terminate a putative father’s rights to a child. A putative father is “a man who may be a
16
child’s father, but who: (1) is not married to the child’s mother on or before the date that
the child was or is to be born; and (2) has not established paternity according to section
257.57 in a court proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 259.21, subd. 12 (2022). Putative fathers are
required to register with the Minnesota Department of Health within 30 days of a child’s
birth, and a failure to register “is prima facie evidence of sufficient grounds to support
termination of the putative father’s parental rights under section 260C.301, subdivision 1.”
Minn. Stat. § 259.52, subds. 7, 8. Thus, under the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption Registry,
the juvenile court has jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of non-adjudicated
fathers. Consequently, depriving the juvenile court of subject-matter jurisdiction in cases
like S.B.G.’s, in which a father has not been adjudicated as the father, would controvert the
established jurisdiction in the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption Registry.
Finally, we have also stated that the statutes governing adoption, parentage, and
termination of parental rights are “intertwined in a framework governing a most important
social relationship—that between a parent and a child.” In re Paternity of J.A.V.,
547 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Minn. 1996). This “framework establishes a balance between the
best interests of the child—paramount in all circumstances —and others having legitimate
interests” like the child’s biological father. Id. (citations omitted). We have explained that
proceedings under any of these three schemes permanently change a child’s relationship
with their parents, and the “common thread” among these statutes is that changes in these
relationships “cannot occur without notice to the interested parties and a hearing where the
parties can appear and be heard on what is in the best interests of the child.” Id. Under
this logic, S.B.G.’s arguments fall short. He was given notice of the CHIPS proceedings
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from the beginning, and the juvenile court made S.B.G. a party to the proceedings as soon
as the DNA test results confirmed his paternity. S.B.G. acknowledged and repeatedly
stated that he is H.Q.’s father and wanted to develop a relationship with her. S.B.G. was
afforded all of the procedural rights given to parties during the termination proceedings.
Depriving the juvenile court of subject-matter jurisdiction in cases like S.B.G.’s
would controvert the purposes of the juvenile protection system and have negative impacts
on children. This is so because it would lead to prolonged termination proceedings when
a presumed father who does not contest parentage, like S.B.G., drags his feet and does not
seek adjudication. This scenario harms children, like H.Q., who will face an extended time
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and wait longer for a permanency
decision— which could mean a longer time in out-of-home placements or foster care.
We conclude that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction over S.B.G.’s
case, given its original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the termination of
parental rights to a child under section 260C.101.
II.
Next, we address S.B.G.’s argument that the court of appeals incorrectly interpreted
the statutes governing termination of parental rights and predatory offender registration .
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” In re Welfare of
J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2013). “Under the de novo standard, we do not defer
to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise independent review.” Wheeler
v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).
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“The aim of statutory analysis is to effectuate the intent of the legislature.” State v.
Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). “The first step in statutory interpretation is
to determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.” State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). “A statute is ambiguous when its
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Riggs,
865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015). “If the Legislature’s intended meaning is clear from
the plain text of the statute, we follow that plain meaning.” State v. McReynolds,
973 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2022).
There are a number of statutes at issue in this analysis. First, we consider Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, which specifies the findings a juvenile court must make before
terminating parental rights. Section 260C.301 points to Minn. Stat. § 260.012(g) in
defining one of the statutory grounds to terminate parental rights. Section 260.012(g), in
turn, points to the predatory offender registration statute, Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)
or (b). We walk through these statutes step-by -step to determine whether the statutes are
ambiguous.
Section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(9), provides that the juvenile court can
terminate parental rights if it finds that “the parent has been convicted of a crime listed in
section 260.012, paragraph (g), clauses (1) to (5).” In turn, section 260.012(g)(5) includes
in its list of crimes any “offense that requires registration as a predatory offender under
section 243.166, subdivision 1b, paragraph (a) or (b).”
19
Minnesota Statutes section 243.166 is the predatory offender registration statute.
Section 243.166, subdivision 1b(a)(2), states that “[a] person shall register under this
section if . . . the person was charged with . . . a violation of, or attempt to violate . . . any
of the following [offenses] and convicted of . . . that offense or another offense arising out
of the same set of circumstances.” Subdivision 1b(a)(2) lists offenses that require
predatory offender registration. In other words, there are two circumstances under which
a person is required to register as a predatory offender under section 243.166,
subdivision 1b(a)(2): the person is charged with a violation of one of the enumerated
offenses and convicted of that offense, or the person is charged with a violation of one of
the enumerated offenses and convicted of another offense “arising out of the same set of
circumstances” as the enumerated offense. Included in the list of enumerated offenses is
“soliciting a minor to engage in sexual conduct in violation of” Minn. Stat. § 609.352,
subd. 2a(1). Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(2)(v).
S.B.G. asserts that the phrase, “an offense that requires registration as a predatory
offender” in section 260.012(g)(5), unambiguously refers only to the offenses specifically
enumerated in section 243.166, subdivision 1b(a). He asserts that this is so because the
enumerated offenses are the only offenses that automatically trigger the requirement to
register as a predatory offender. The plain language of section 260.012(g)(5) does not
support S.B.G.’s argument, however, because section 260.012(g)(5) does not contain any
limits on the use of the predatory offender registration statute. Rather, the statute broadly
applies to any offense that requires registration as a predatory offender under
section 243.166, subdivision 1b(a) or (b). Under those paragraphs of the predatory
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offender registration statute, an “offense” requires registration as a predatory offender if
the convicted offense is an enumerated offense, or if the convicted offense is not
enumerated but arose out of the same circumstances as a charged enumerated offense.
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a). Accordingly, we determine that the only reasonable
interpretation of these statutes is that the phrase, “an offense that requires registration as a
predatory offender” in section 260.012(g)(5), includes convictions for enumerated offenses
in section 243.166, subdivision 1b(a) or (b), and convictions for non-enumerated offenses
that arose out of the same circumstances as an enumerated offense.
All that is left, then, is to apply these unambiguous statutes to S.B.G.’s
circumstances. S.B.G.’s criminal background is uncontested by either party. In
November 2019, the State charged S.B.G. with six counts—count two charged S.B.G. with
a violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1); count six charged S.B.G. with a violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(3). These charges arose from S.B.G.’s sexually explicit
electronic communication with a child in August 2019. S.B.G. pleaded guilty to count six,
and the district court accepted his plea. The parties do not contest the juvenile court’s
finding that S.B.G. will be required to register as a predatory offender when he is released
from prison because count two is an enumerated offense that requires registration as a
predatory offender and count six arose from the same set of circumstances as count two.
See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(2)(v). Thus, the juvenile court could terminate
S.B.G.’s parental rights because he “has been convicted of a crime” that “requires
registration as a predatory offender under section 243.166, subdivision 1b, paragraph (a).”
Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9); 260.012(g)(5). Accordingly, the juvenile court did
21
not err by determining that clear and convincing evidence supports the statutory ground for
termination in S.B.G.’s case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed.

MOORE, III, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.