In re the Marriage of: Angela Marie Backman, petitioner, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0602

In re the Marriage of:
Angela Marie Backman, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Charles Robert Backman,
Appellant.

Filed May 1, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-FA-11-3317

Jillian K. Morris, Jason C. Kohlmeyer, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office, Chtd., Mankato,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Michelle K. Olsen, Jacob M. Birkholz, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
On a motion to modify an award of permanent spousal maintenance, this court’s
opinion in Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. App. 2019) , prevents the district
court from finding that the obligee has potential income only if the obligor argues that the
obligee failed to make reasonable efforts to increase his or her earning capacity by
obtaining additional education or vocational training.

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OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
This appeal concerns a motion to modify an award of permanent spousal
maintenance. At the time of the dissolution, the maintenance obligee was unemployed
because of poor health. Eight years later, the maintenance obligor moved to modify the
maintenance award and argued that the obligee’s health had improved, that she is earning
income through employment, and that she has the potential to increase her earned income.
The district court denied the modification motion without considering whether the obligee
has the potential to in crease her earned income. The district court reasoned that the
dissolution judgment and decree did not expressly require the obligee to increase her
earning capacity by obtaining additional education or vocational training. We conclude
that the district court erred by reasoning that the absence of such a requirement forecloses
a finding that the obligee has the potential to increase her earned income in other ways.
We also conclude that the district court erred by denying the obligor’s motion for a
vocational evaluation of the obligee. We further conclude that the district court did not err
by granting the obligee’s motions for need-based attorney fees. Therefore, we affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Angela Marie Backman and Charles Robert Backman were married in 1995. They
have three joint children, two of whom are now adults. In 2011, Angela petitioned for
dissolution of the marriage. The parties stipulated to a judgment and decree, which the
district court approved in 2012.
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The parties’ economic circumstances at the time of the dissolution were set forth in
the stipulated decree and are described in the district court’s later orders resolving the
modification motion. At the time of dissol ution, Angela was unemployed. She was
receiving Social Security disability benefits of $927 per month, which included amounts
for herself and for each of the three children. Her reasonable monthly expenses for herself
only (excluding expenses for the children) were $4,500. Charles’s pre-tax gross income
was $135,000 per year (i.e., $11,250 per month), and his after-tax income was $101,750
per year (i.e., $8,479 per month). His reasonable monthly expenses for himself only
(excluding expenses for the children) were $3,350. The stipulated decree requires Charles
to pay Angela permanent spousal maintenance of $2,650 per month.
In April 2020, Charles moved to modify the spousal maintenance award as well as
his child-support obligation. Charles alleged three changes in circumstances: two of the
parties’ three children had reached the age of majority, his employer had temporarily but
indefinitely reduced his salary by 20 percent because of the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic, and Angela’s income had increased because she had obtained employment.
The parties engaged in discovery related to the modification motion. In November
2020, Charles moved for an order requiring Angela to submit to a vocational evaluation at
Charles’s expense. In February 2021, Angela filed an affidavit in which she described in
detail her ongoing physical and mental-health issues and diagnoses and stated that her
condition has worsened since the dissolution, during which time she has had five surgeries.
She also stated that she was in a motor-vehicle accident in 2017, which led to additional
medical complications. She stated that, since 2018, she has worked at a grocery store
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approximately five to eleven hours per week at a wage of $11.30 per hour. She explained
that the job is “an opportunity for me to get out of the house and interact with other people,
which generally is beneficial for my mental health.” She also provided other current
information about her income and expenses.
In March 2021, the district court denied Charles’s motion for a vocational
evaluation. The district court reasoned that it would be inappropriate to impute or attribute
potential income to Angela for two reasons. Citing this court’s opinion in Carrick v.
Carrick, 560 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. App. 1997), the district court stated that there is no
evidence that Angela has limited her income in bad faith. Citing this court’s opinion in
Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. App. 2019), the district court stated that the
dissolution decree did not expressly impose on Angela an obligation to increase her earning
capacity.
Charles requested reconsideration by arguing that the district court had misapplied
Madden and by asserting that Angela’s health had “improved immensely” since the
dissolution. The district court denied the request for reconsideration. Three months later,
after taking Angela’s deposition, Charles submitted a second request for reconsideration,
which recited certain facts disclosed in the deposition. For example, Charles stated that
Angela had turned down a job offer that would have paid her $15 per hour and that no
physician or psychologist has limited the number of hours that she can work each day. The
district court denied Charles’s second request for reconsideration.
In October 2021, the district court denied Charles’s motion to modify spousal
maintenance. The district court made various findings concerning the parties’ incomes and
5
expenses. In its conclusions of law, the district court again cited Madden and explained
that, because the decree “included no express (or even implicit) obligation that [ Angela]
make efforts to increase her earning capacity, this Court concludes that it is inappropriate
to now impute income to her for a failure to do so.” The district court also repeated its
earlier finding that Angela has not limited her income in bad faith. The district court
concluded that the parties’ incomes and expenses had changed only slightly such that there
is not a substantial change in circumstances that would make the existing spousal
maintenance award unreasonable and unfair.
Charles moved for amended findings. In March 2022, the district court amended
some findings related to the parties’ incomes and expenses. The district court’s findings,
as amended, are that Angela presently receives Social Security disability benefits of $894
per month, of which $131 is for the parties’ one minor child, leaving $763 for herself; that
she has $400 per month in earned income through her employment; and that she receives
$2,650 per month in spousal maintenance. The district court found that Angela’s
reasonable monthly expenses are $4,031. The district court found that Charles’s pre-tax
gross income is $135,000 per year (i.e., $11,250 per month) and that his after-tax income
is approximately $101,750 per year (i.e., $8,479 per month), which is the same as his gross
income at the time of dissolution. The district court found that Charles’s reasonable
expenses are $3,975 per month.
Charles appeals.

6
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err by denying Charles’s motion to modify spousal
maintenance on the ground that this court’s opinion in Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d
688 (Minn. App. 2019), does not allow the district court to find that Angela has potential
income?
II. Did the district court err by denying Charles’s motion for a vocational
evaluation?
III. Did the district court err by granting Angela’s motion s for need-based
attorney fees and by awarding her $6,500?
ANALYSIS
I.
Charles’s first and primary argument is that the district court erred by denying his
motion to modify spousal maintenance. He contends that the district court erroneously
applied this court’s opinion in Madden to preclude a finding that Angela has potential
income, which limited his ability to show a substantial change in circumstances.
A.
Spousal maintenance is defined by statute to mean “payments from the future
income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2022). If a party requests spousal maintenance, a district court
must engage in a two-step analysis. First, a district court must consider whether the spouse
seeking spousal maintenance either
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(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable
needs of the spouse considering the standard of living
established during the marriage, especially, but not limited to,
a period of training or education, or

(b) is unable to provide adequate self-support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate
employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2022). This threshold inquiry asks, in essence, whether the
party seeking spousal maintenance has made a “showing of need.” Curtis v. Curtis, 887
N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 2016). A party has a need for spousal maintenance if, considering
the standard of living during the marriage, the party is unable to provide for his or her
reasonable expenses through employment income or investment income or a combination
of both. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1; Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252.
Second, if a party has a need for spousal maintenance, the district court may award
spousal maintenance “in amounts and for periods of time, either temporary or permanent,
as the court deems just, . . . after considering all relevant factors.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 2; se e also Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Minn. 1982). Eight
relevant factors are prescribed by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a)-(h). The
first statutory factor is “the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to the party, and the party’s ability to meet needs
independently.” Id., subd. 2(a). The second statutory factor is “the time necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
8
appropriate employment, and the probability, given the party’ s age and skills, of
completing education or training and becoming fully or partially self-supporting.” Id.,
subd. 2(b). The sixth statutory factor is “the age, and the physical and emotional condition
of the spouse seeking maintenance.” Id., subd. 2(f). No single factor is dispositive. Broms
v. Broms, 353 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Minn. 1984).
B.
A district court may, upon a motion, modify an award of spousal maintenance if the
moving party makes a showing of one or more statutory modification factors, any of which
makes the existing maintenance award “unreasonable and unfair.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2(a), (b) (2022); see also Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 267 (Minn. 2021). If
the moving party makes such a showing, the district court may modify the maintenance
award, in which case it would determine the amount and duration of the modified award
by applying the same statutory factors that are relevant to an initial award of spousal
maintenance, as those factors “exist at the time of the [modification] motion.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(e) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.552); see also Honke, 960 N.W.2d at 267-
68; Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 635-36 (Minn. 2009); Madden, 923 N.W.2d at 696.
One of the statutory modification factors that may support a finding of a substantial
change in circumstances is the “substantially increased or decreased gross income of an
obligor or obligee.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)(1). In determining a party’s “gross
income,” a district court must apply the statutory definition of that term in chapter 518A.
See Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 1 (2022); Lee, 775 N.W.2d at 635 n.5; Newstrand v.
Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015). The
9
statutory definition of “gross income” refers to section 518A.29. Minn. Stat. § 518A.26,
subd. 8. Section 518A.29 states that “ gross income” includes “any form of periodic
payment to an individual,” such as salaries, wages, and disability benefits, among other
things, and also includes “potential income under section 518A.32.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.29(a) (2022).
A district court may find that a party has potential income if the party “is voluntarily
unemployed, underemployed, or employed on a less than full-time basis, or there is no
direct evidence of any income.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (2022). A party “is not
considered voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or employed on a less than full-time
basis upon a showing by the [party] that . . . the unemployment, underemployment, or
employment on a less than full-time basis is because a [party] is physically or mentally
incapacitated or due to incarceration.” Id., subd. 3, 3(3). If it is necessary to determine the
amount of a party’s potential income, the district court must do so based on one of three
methods:
(1) the [party]’s probable earnings level based on
employment potential, recent work history, and occupational
qualifications in light of prevailing job opportunities and
earnings levels in the community;

(2) if a [party] is receiving unemployment
compensation or workers’ compensation, that [party]’s income
may be calculated using the actual amount of the
unemployment compensation or workers’ compensation
benefit received; or

(3) the amount of income a [party] could earn
working 30 hours per week at 100 percent of the current federal
or state minimum wage, whichever is higher.

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Id., subd. 2.
This court generally applies an abuse -of-discretion standard of review to a district
court’s decision on a motion to modify spousal maintenance. Hecker v. Hecker , 568
N.W.2d 705, 709- 10 (Minn. 1997). A district court abuses its discretion if it makes
findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the
motion in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
C.
In this case, Charles sought to modify spousal maintenance by proving that, for two
reasons, Angela’s gross income has increased since the dissolution. First, Charles asserted
that Angela had obtained employment and was earning wages, which was not so at the time
of the dissolution. Second, Charles asserted that Angela is able to work more hours each
week than she actually works or to obtain a different job with a higher rate of pay and, thus,
has potential income that exceeds her earned income. The district court agreed with the
first part of Charles’s argument but disagreed with the second part. Only the second part
of Charles’s argument is at issue on appeal.1

1The district court included Angela’ s actual earnings in its finding of her gross
income based on her affidavit, in which she stated that she is working and specified the
amount of her earned income. It was appropriate for the district court to do so. The first
statutory factor relevant to the amount and duration of a spousal maintenance award
includes “the party’s ability to meet needs independently.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 2(a). Angela’s actual earned income is directly relevant to her ability to meet her
needs independently. This court has stated that an award of permanent spousal
maintenance “does not preclude an obligor from subsequently demonstrating that a
recipient has, in fact, become self-sufficient.” Kemp v. Kemp, 608 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn.
App. 2000). Similarly, an award of permanent spousal maintenance does not prohibit an
11
The district court rejected the second part of Charles’s argument based primarily on
its reasoning that this court’s Madden opinion applies and precludes a finding that Angela
has potential income. In Madden, we discussed the differences between temporary and
permanent spousal maintenance. We stated that, as a general matter, “if a district court
makes an award of temporary spousal maintenance in a dissolution decree, there is an
‘assumption that the party receiving the award not only should strive to obtain suitable
employment and become self-supporting but that he or she will attain that goal.’” Madden,
923 N.W.2d at 697 (quoting Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 198 (Minn. 1987)). As
a consequence, “if a party moves to modify an award of temporary spousal maintenance,
the district court may attribute income to the recipient of spousal maintenance if he or she
has failed to make reasonable efforts to find suitable employment or to otherwise become
self-supporting,” such as by “‘ obtaining vocational training or work experience.’” Id.
(quoting Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 708).
We stated further in Madden that, if a district court makes an award of permanent
spousal maintenance at the time of dissolution, “without any conditions requiring the
recipient to make efforts to increase his or her earning capacity,” the award typically
“implies that the recipient will not become fully self-supporting, and has no obligation to
increase his or her earning capacity.” Id. at 699. But the recipient “may have an obligation

obligor from proving that an obligee has increased his or her gross income and, thereby,
increased the degree of his or her partial self -sufficiency. See, e.g., Sinda v. Sinda, 949
N.W.2d 170, 175-77 (Minn. App. 2020) (affirming modification of amount of temporary
spousal maintenance based on obligee’s increased gross income by rejecting obligor’s
argument for greater reduction).
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to make a reasonable effort to become partially self-supporting” and, thereby, “to increase
his or her degree of self-sufficiency and correspondingly reduce the need for spousal
maintenance.” Id. at 698. We explained that, “if a district court determines that a recipient
of permanent spousal maintenance should make reasonable efforts to increase his or her
earning capacity so as to become partially self-supporting, the district court must expressly
impose that obligation on the recipient” at the time of dissolution. Id. at 699.
Without such an express statement, a recipient of permanent
spousal maintenance is not on notice that, contrary to the
implication of such an award that the recipient has no
obligation to increase his or her earning capacity, his or her
inaction might lead to an adverse decision on a subsequent
motion to modify spousal maintenance.

Id. Accordingly, we concluded, “A district court may attribute income to a maintenance
recipient based on the recipient’s failure to make reasonable efforts to increase his or her
earning capacity through additional education or vocational training only if the district
court previously had expressly imposed such an obligation on the recipient.” Id. at 700
(first emphasis added). Because the district court had awarded permanent spousal
maintenance in Madden without requiring the obligee to increase her earning capacity, we
concluded that the court erred by attributing potential income to her when ruling on the
motion to modify spousal maintenance. Id.
2

2The circumstances of Madden implicated the first statutory factor relevant to the
amount and duration of a spousal maintenance award, “the party’s ability to meet needs
independently,” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a), and arguably implicated the second
statutory factor, “the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, and the probab ility, given
the party’s age and skills, of completing education or training and becoming fully or
partially self-supporting,” id., subd. 2(b).
13
The circumstances of this case are different from the circumstances of Madden.
Unlike the spousal-maintenance recipient in Madden, Angela had a limited earning
capacity at the time of dissolution because of issues related to her physical and mental
health. Given the underlying cause of Angela’s limited earning capacity, there was no
apparent reason to believe that the limitations could be alleviated by additional education
or vocational training. In his modification motion, Charles did not ask the district court to
impute potential income to Angela on the ground that she had failed to obtain additional
education or vocational training . Rather, Charles asked the district court to impute
potential income to Angela for other reasons that are unrelated to her education and
vocational training.3
Caselaw illustrates that an obligee’s health may affect the need for spousal
maintenance and the amount and duration of an award. See, e.g., Arundel v. Arundel, 281
N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1979); Cashman v. Cashman, 256 N.W.2d 640, 641 (Minn. 1977).
Caselaw also illustrates that the progressive worsening of an obligee’s health may cause an
increase in reasonable monthly expenses, which may give rise to a substantial change in
circumstances warranting a modification of spousal maintenance. See Rydell v. Rydell ,
310 N.W.2d 112, 114-15 (Minn. 1981). This court has recognized that reality by stating,
“Clearly, a deterioration in a party’s health provides adequate grounds for a substantial

3The circumstances of this case implicate the first statutory factor relevant to the
amount and duration of a spousal maintenance award, “the party’s ability to meet needs
independently,” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a), and the sixth statutory factor, “the age,
and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance,” id.,
subd. 2(f).
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change in circumstances.” Sand v. Sand, 379 N.W.2d 119, 124 (Minn. App. 1985) (citing
Rydell), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 31, 1986). By the same logic, a n improvement in an
obligee’s health may give rise to an increase in either earned income or potential income,
which could result in a substantial change in circumstances that makes the existing award
unreasonable and unfair. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a). Accordingly, the district
court must consider the possibility of potential income when finding Angela’s gross
income at the time of the modification motion, to the extent that the requirements of section
518A.32 are satisfied, without regard for whether the dissolution decree impose d on
Angela an obligation to obtain additional education or vocational training.
Thus, the district court erred by denying Charles’s motion to modify spousal
maintenance on the ground that Madden applies and prevents the district court from finding
that Angela’s gross income includes potential income. Given the circumstances of this
case, such a finding is not foreclosed by Madden. Therefore, we reverse and remand for
further consideration of Charles’ s motion, including his argument that Angela’s gross
income at the time of the modification motion includes potential income. 4 After
considering the parties’ evidence and comparing Angela’s gross income at the time of the
dissolution decree to her gross income at the time of the modification motion, the district
court shall proceed to consider whether there has been a substantial change in

4We are aware that the district court discussed potential income in its analysis of the
issue of child support. But the district court expressly stated that potential income is not
part of its analysis of the issue of spousal maintenance because of Madden.
15
circumstances that makes the existing mainte nance award unreasonable and unfair. 5 We
express no opinion as to whether the standard for modifying spousal maintenance has been
satisfied.
II.
Charles also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a
vocational evaluation of Angela.
A motion for a vocational evaluation is governed by rule 35 of the rules of civil
procedure. Wills v. Red Lake Mun. Liquor Store, 350 N.W.2d 452, 453-55 (Minn. App.
1984). The rule provides:
In an action in which the physical or mental condition
or the blood relationship of a party, or of an agent of a party,
or of a person under control of a party, is in controversy, the
court in which the action is pending may order the party to
submit to, or produce such agent or person for a physical ,
mental, or blood examination by a suitably licensed or certified
examiner. The order may be made only on motion for good
cause shown and upon notice to the party or person to be
examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time,
place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and
the person or persons by whom it is made.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 35.01. “The rule does not require that the party to be examined place his
or her condition in controversy, but only that the condition be in controversy.” Haynes v.

5On remand, the district court also shall revisit its finding that Angela has not limited
her earned income in bad faith. The district court cited this court’s opinion in Carrick v.
Carrick, 560 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. App. 1997), in connection with that finding. This court
more recently has held that a district court need not find bad faith in order to find that an
obligee is able to become fully or partially self-supporting after dissolution. See Passolt v.
Passolt, 804 N.W.2d 18, 22-25 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011).
Thus, the absence of bad faith also does not preclude a finding of potential income. See id.
16
Anderson, 232 N.W.2d 196, 199 (Minn. 1975). “The nature and extent of the showing that
must be made to demonstrate ‘good cause’ under the rule differs from case to case, turning
largely upon the nature of the examination sought.” Id. This court has affirmed a district
court’s order for a vocational evaluation in a personal-injury case in which the parties
disputed “[w]hether plaintiff will be able to obtain gainful employment” and his “future
ability to earn wages.” Wills, 350 N.W.2d at 455.
In this case, the district court did not engage in the analysis contemplated by the rule
and the accompanying caselaw. Rather, the district court determined that a vocational
evaluation was inappropriate on the ground that the district court was not allowed to find
potential income. We have concluded above that Madden does not apply and that the
district court must consider Charles’s argument concerning potential income. See supra
part I. Thus, Madden does not foreclose the possibility of a vocational evaluation, which
conceivably might lead to the discovery of evidence that is relevant to the issue of potential
income.
This conclusion is not meant to imply that Charles necessarily is entitled to a
vocational evaluation. A rule 35 examination is “not available as a matter of right.”
Loveland v. Kremer, 464 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Minn. App. 1990). Rather, the moving party
must establish good cause for a vocational evaluation, which inevitably calls for a case-by-
case determination. H aynes, 232 N.W.2d at 199. One of the relevant considerations is a
balancing of “the need for the examination and the anticipated probative value of the
evaluation” against “any unnecessary intrusion on the examinee’s privacy.” Id. at 200. A
17
district court has “broad discretion” in ruling on a motion for a rule 35 examination. Kresko
v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 31, 1989).
Thus, the district court erred by denying Charles’s motion for a vocational
evaluation of Angela on the basis of Madden. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further
consideration of Charles’s motion, which is intertwined with his motion to modify spousal
maintenance. On remand, the district court shall consider, among other issues, whether
Angela’s physical or mental condition is in controversy and , if so, whether Charles has
shown good cause for an examination.
III.
Charles last argues that the district court erred by granting Angela’s motions for
need-based attorney fees and by awarding her $6,500.
In a proceeding under chapter 518 or chapter 518A of the Minnesota Statutes, the
district court “shall award attorney fees, costs, and disbursements in an amount necessary
to enable a party to carry on or contest the proceeding” if it finds:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith
assertion of the party’ s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding;

(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and

(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay
them.

18
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of
review to a district court’s award of need-based attorney fees. Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d
814, 825 (Minn. 1999).
In this case, Angela twice moved for need-based attorney fees. In August 2021, she
sought $12,888 in fees for time spent by her attorneys between May 2020 and August 2021.
In October 2021, the district court granted that motion in part and awarded Angela $5,000
in fees. In February 2022, she sought $3,200 in fees for time spent by her attorneys in
November and December 2021. In March 2022, the district court granted that motion in
part and awarded Angela $1,500 in attorney fees. In the two orders, the district court made
identical findings:
A certain amount of attorney fees, costs, and
disbursements are necessary for [Angela] to have presented a
good faith assertion of her rights, and those fees will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of this
proceeding;

[Charles] has the means to pay a certain amount of
attorney fees, costs, and disbursements; and

[Angela] does not have the means to pay for all of her
incurred attorney fees, costs, and disbursements.

An appropriate amount of attorney fees, costs, and
disbursement, representing the amount necessary to assert her
rights, an amount [Charles] has the means to pay, and the
amount that [Angela] does not have the means to pay, is
[$5,000 or $1,500].

Charles contends that the district court erred by not making adequate findings to
support its conclusions. Specifically, Charles contends that the district court “did not
discuss income, debts, or assets of the parties” and that, as a consequence, this court is
19
unable to review the district court’s award. He contends further that he does not have the
means to pay Angela’s attorney fees and that Angela does have the means to pay them.
The district court’s orders awarding attorney fees do not explain the three required
findings in detail. But a lack of detail is not necessarily fatal to the awards. In Gully, the
district court did not make the first required finding, but the supreme court nonetheless
upheld the district court’s fee award on the ground that the district court’s order
“reasonably implie[d]” that the responding party had the ability to pay the moving party’s
fees. 599 N.W.2d at 825-26. The supreme court’s willingness to infer the missing finding
also was justified by the fact that the district court “was familiar with the history of the
case” and “had access to the parties’ financial records.” Id. at 826; see also Ludwigson v.
Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 448-49 (Minn. App. 2002).
In this case, the district court was familiar with the case and had access to the parties’
financial records because of the extensive proceedings on Charles’s motions, which
required findings of the parties’ incomes and expenses. The district court filed its two
orders on attorney fees simultaneously with its orders resolving Charles’s motions for
modification and for amended findings. The same judge was assigned to the case
throughout the modification proceedings. The district court made nuanced findings that
Charles “has the means to pay a certain amount of” Angela’s fees and that Angela “does
not have the means to pay all of her” fees. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the district court did
not err on the ground that its findings are inadequate.
Charles also contends that the district court erred by finding that he has the means
to pay some of Angela’s attorney fees. He asserts that his reasonable monthly expenses of
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$3,975 exceed his monthly after-tax income of $3,188. But the district court found that
Charles’s after-tax income is more than $3,188. The district court found that his after-tax
income is $8,479 per month, and Charles has not challenged that finding. Given the district
court’s findings, Charles has a monthly surplus of $1,854 after paying his reasonable
monthly expenses and paying spousal maintenance of $2,650. Thus, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by finding that Charles has the means to pay less than half of
Angela’s attorney fees.
Charles last contends that the district court erred by finding that Angela does not
have the means to pay all of her attorney fees. He asserts that she has monthly after -tax
income of $4,079, has purchased a vehicle, has improved her home, and has received more
than $26,000 in a settlement of a personal- injury lawsuit arising from the 2017 motor-
vehicle accident. Given the district court’s findings, the sum of Angela’s monthly after-
tax income and the spousal maintenance award is $3,813, which is less than her reasonable
monthly expenses of $4,031. The record reflects that the lawsuit settlement occurred
approximately two years before Charles ’ motion to modify and four years before the
district court’s awards of attorney fees, that Angela used some of the settlement proceeds
to buy a vehicle for the adult children, that she recently borrowed money to purchase a
vehicle and to replace a leaky roof on her home, that she refinanced her home to pay off
debts, that she owes approximately $28,000 on a personal loan, and that she still owes
money to her attorney. Given the evidentiary record, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by finding that Angela does not have the means to pay all of her attorney fees.
See Beck v. Kaplan, 566 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. 1997) (affirming award of need- based
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fees on ground that obligee otherwise “would be required to deplete the limited capital
assets available to her” (quotation omitted)).
Thus, the district court did not err by granting in part Angela’s motions for need-
based attorney fees and by awarding her a total of $6,500.
DECISION
The district court erred by denying Charles’s motion to modify spousal maintenance
without considering whether Angela’s gross income at the time of the modification motion
includes potential income. The district court erred by denying Charles’s motion for a
vocational evaluation of Angela based on the mistaken premise that it would be error to
make a finding of potential income. The district court did not err by granting in part
Angela’s motions for need-based attorney fees and by awarding her a total of $6,500.
Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings, as
described above in parts I and II.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.