State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0611

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stephanie Louise Clark,
Appellant.

Filed March 27, 2023
Reversed
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-6206

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Caitlinrose H. Fisher, Matthew D. Forsgren, Forsgren Fisher McCalmont DeMarea Tysver
LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Eric E. Doolittle, Appelman Law Firm, LLC, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge

Appellant argues that her conviction for second-degree murder must be reversed
because (1) the district court’s supplemental jury instructions materially misstated the law
of self-defense; (2) the district court abused its discretion in the admission of witness
testimony; and ( 3) the district court abused its discretion by preventing appellant from
presenting testimony relevant to her departure request at sentencing . We determine the
district court materially misstated the law of self-defense by defining “imminent” as
“immediately” and by failing to tailor the instruction to the unique circumstances of the
case, and we therefore reverse on this basis. Based on this determination, we do not reach
the remaining issues.
FACTS
In 2020, appellant Stephanie Louise Clark was in a romantic relationship with D.B.
Clark, her five-year-old son, and D.B. lived in Clark’s home. D.B. became abusive toward
Clark approximately a month and a half after he moved into her home. This abuse became
progressively worse over time and, by January 2020, occurred nearly every day. D.B.
prevented Clark from socializing with her friends or family members and did not permit
her to leave the home without his permission. D.B. also yelled at, pushed, kicked, and
slapped Clark. When D.B. became angry with Clark, he forced her to kneel in a “kneeling
spot” in front of a door and hit her in the head if she did not comply. On at least one
occasion, D.B. held a loaded firearm to Clark’s head. D.B. kept several firearms around
the home and frequently paced around the home with a firearm.
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On March 5, 2020, D.B. and Clark got into an argument. D.B. forced Clark to kneel
in her “kneeling spot” and punched her with a closed fist. D.B.’s violence continued to
escalate that evening as he held a loaded firearm to Clark’s head. Clark later left the home
to pick up her son. After Clark returned home, D.B. continued hitting her, punched her
with a closed fist, and hit her in the face with a basketball. D.B. threatened Clark by saying,
“Wait for tonight. Wait for [your son] to go to bed. I’m going to break your ribs.” Clark
was afraid D.B. “was gonna beat [her] to death.” Clark testified, “I remember feeling
terrified. I remember feeling like I wasn’t gonna wake up. I remember being scared for
my son.” Clark picked up a nearby firearm and shot D.B. D.B. went into the bedroom,
where Clark picked up a second gun and shot him again. D.B. died of multiple gunshot
wounds.
On March 6, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Clark with second-
degree intentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2020).
Following trial, the jury found Clark guilty of the offense and the district court imposed a
306-month prison sentence. Clark now appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court erred in its jury instructions because it materially misstated
the law of self-defense and failed to tailor the instructions to the unique facts of
the case.
Clark challenges the district court’s definition of “imminent” in response to the
jury’s question to define the term as found in the jury instruction describing Minnesota’s
self-defense law. See Minn. Stat. § 609.19 (2020) (setting forth Minnesota’s law regarding
murder in the second degree). A district court has “considerable latitude in selecting jury
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instructions, including the specific language of those instructions.” State v. Peltier, 874
N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016). However, “jury instructions must fairly and adequately
explain the law of the case.” Id. A district court errs in instructing the jury when its
instructions “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d
566, 581 (Minn. 2009). An appellate court reviews jury instructions as a whole to
determine whether they accurately reflect the law. State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362
(Minn. 2011). We review jury instructions for an abuse of discretion, and a court abuses
its discretion when its instructions erroneously state the law. See id. at 364 (holding that
district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury by an instruction that was an
erroneous statement of the law). In response to a question from the jury, the district court
may “give additional instructions.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(3).
Clark argued at trial that she acted in self-defense when she shot D.B. because she
feared he would kill her or hurt her son. An individual “may act in self-defense if . . . she
reasonably believes that force is necessary and uses only the level of force reasonably
necessary to prevent the bodily harm feared.” State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258
(Minn. 2014). A defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to support a self-
defense claim. State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006). If the defendant
meets that burden, the state must disprove one or more of the self-defense elements beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id.
Minnesota law permits the use of reasonable force against another “when used by
any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2020). Further, deadly force may be used “when necessary in
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resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or
another to great bodily harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.065 (2020). The Minnesota
Supreme Court has articulated the following four-part test when interpreting § 609.065:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm;
(3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and
(4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid
the danger.
Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 629 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). This form of self-
defense is referred to as the justifiable taking of life.
In its final instructions, the district court instructed the jury on the law of self-
defense, which was consistent with the jury instructions guide. The district court stated:
The defendant asserts the defense of the justifiable
taking of life. No crime is committed when a person
intentionally takes the life of another if the person’s action was
taken in resisting or preventing an offense of a physical nature
the person reasonably believed exposed her to death or great
bodily harm.
. . . .
The defendant may use all force and means she
reasonably believes necessary and that would appear to a
reasonable person in similar circumstances to be necessary to
prevent death or great bodily harm that appears to be imminent.
The kind of degree of force a person may lawfully use in self-
defense is limited by what a reasonable person in the same
situation would believe to be necessary. Any use of force
beyond that is unreasonable.
During deliberations the jury sent a note to the district court asking, “What is the
[legal] definition [of the term] imminent?” After conferring with counsel, and over Clark’s
objection, the district court instructed the jury that: “To fear imminent great bodily harm
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or death means that the person must fear that such harm will occur immediately.” The
district court agreed with the state’s recommendation and based its reasoning on the model
jury instructions for criminal-sexual-conduct offenses, which provides that “‘[t]o fear
imminent great bodily harm’ means that the person must fear that such harm will occur
immediately.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIM.JIG, 12.03 (202 2). The district court also
relied on State v. Boyce, which described the difference between heat-of -passion
manslaughter and self-defense. 170 N.W.2d 104, 112-13 (Minn. 1969). After providing
its instruction on the definition of the term “imminent,” the district court excused the jury
to continue deliberating. Shortly thereafter, t he jury found Clark guilty of second-degree
murder.
We are persuaded that the district court materially misstated the law because it
incorrectly instructed the jury that “imminent” means that “such harm will occur
immediately.” There is no legal basis for this erroneous instruction. “[W]hen instructing
on self-defense, courts must use analytic precision.” State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 833
(Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). Caselaw does not define the term “imminent” in the
context of the law of self-defense as it is raised in this context. The district court relied on
Boyce, which states that
the justification or excuse which exonerates a defendant from
all criminal responsibility depends, not on the state of his
emotions at the time of the killing, but rather on the quality of
his judgment with respect to the danger to be apprehended from
others and the alternative methods by which the danger could
have been avoided. Acts sufficient to incite a passion in a
person having ordinary control over his emotions would not
necessarily cause such a man to consider himself in danger of
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death or grievous bodily harm or cause a reasonable person to
think it necessary to kill in order to preserve himself.
170 N.W.2d at 112-13.
Upon review, we determine that the district court misread Boyce. The district
court’s jury instruction seemingly conflated the elements of heat-of-passion manslaughter
with the justifiable-taking-of-life defense. The district court’s supplemental instruction
relied on the definition of heat of passion and the emotion that is required to reduce a
murder to manslaughter, as opposed to whether an actor reasonably believes that deadly
force is necessary.
The Minnesota Supreme Court instructs that a district court must consider the
individual facts of each case to determine whether the situation is one in which “the
ordinary reasonable person would consider killing necessary to avert the danger of death
or grievous bodily harm.” Id. at 113. This analysis “turns on the character of the danger
to be apprehended and the available alternatives rather than on the defendant’s emotional
reaction to the situation.” Id. As stated, the district court’s instruction focused on Clark’s
emotional reaction and relied on the heat-of-passion discussion in Boyce, rather than on the
justifiable-taking-of-life analysis. The correct analysis includes a temporal component
guided by the unique facts of each case.
As discussed above, the facts of the case are tragic. The district court should have
followed the supreme court’s admonition to tailor the jury instructions to these facts—
particularly in light of D.B.’s escalating and violent abuse against Clark—rather than
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making a blanket statement that “imminent” meant “immediate.” The law requires a more
nuanced instruction, based on the unique facts of each case.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not defined the term “imminent” in the law of
self-defense. And it is for the supreme court—rather than the district court or this court on
appeal—to define this term. We find decisions from other states persuasive. However,
and we may “look outside Minnesota when our own jurisprudence is undefined.” State v.
Willis, 898 N.W.2d 642, 646 n.4 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). We are impressed by
the Kansas Supreme Court’s recognition of the unique nature of domestic abuse as it relates
to a claim of self-defense. State v. Hundley involved a situation where a wife killed her
abusive husband. 693 P.2d 475, 476 (Kan. 1985). The Kansas Supreme Court determined
that the use of the term “immediate” instead of “imminent” in the jury instructions was
reversible error. Id. at 478. The court explained that the use of the word “immediate”
“places undue emphasis on the immediate action of the deceased, and obliterates the nature
of the buildup of terror and fear which had been systematically created over a long period
of time.” Id. at 479; see also State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 506 (Wash. 1993) (explaining
that “imminent” has less to do with proximity in time than “immediate”).
We find the analysis presented in these cases to be persuasive. Our own law is
undefined as to the precise definition of “imminent” and, in the absence of a defined term,
the district court should have tailored its instructions to the particular facts of this case.
See Boyce, 170 N.W.2d at 112-13. “[T]he elements of self-defense are by nature very
specific to the person apprehending fear and the very particular circumstances causing
fear.” State v. Bjork, 610 N.W.2d 632, 636-37 (Minn. 2000) (citing State v. Nystrom, 596
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N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. 1999)). Instead, the district court engrafted a requirement onto
the term “imminent” that does not exist in our caselaw. Given D.B.’s violent actions
against Clark, the jury could have found that Clark was in imminent danger of great bodily
harm, even if such danger was not immediate. By instructing the jury that “imminent”
means “immediate,” the district court telegraphed to the jury that holding a loaded gun to
a person’s head and threatening harm does not qualify as an imminent threat. We therefore
conclude that the district court misstated the law by making a blunt instruction to the jury
that “imminent” means “immediate.”
II. The district court’s error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A district court abuses its discretion when its instructions to the jury erroneously
state the law. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d at 362. For the reasons discussed above, we determine
that the district court misstated the law. We further determine that the error was not
harmless. See State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2010) ( “If the court erred in
its instructions, we review the error to determine whether it was harmless.”). An erroneous
jury instruction “does not merit a new trial if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 181 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Clark asserts that the district court’s misstatement of the law significantly prejudiced
her and prevented the jury from weighing D.B.’s significant history of domestic abuse.
Clark argues that the jury, if properly instructed on the definition of the term “imminent,”
could have found that she acted in self-defense and that her conduct was reasonable. We
agree that a more nuanced definition is appropriate and will turn on the unique facts of each
case. A defendant who asserts a self-defense claim must also show that the use of force
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was reasonable. State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Minn. 2001) (“To find that a
defendant acted in self-defense, a jury must . . . find that the defendant reasonably believed
that force was necessary.”). Additionally, the degree of force used in self-defense must not
exceed what is deemed necessary to a reasonable person in similar circumstances. State v.
Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. 1997). It is the duty of the fact -finder to make this
reasonableness determination. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 403.
Here, Clark testified about D.B.’s violent behavior. The jury, if properly instructed,
may have determined that Clark’s use of force was reasonable in light of these
circumstances. However, the district court’s supplemental instruction, which was given at
a critical stage of the jury deliberation s, placed a thumb on the scale for the prosecution.
We therefore determine that the district court’s supplemental jury instruction was both
erroneous and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse
Clark’s conviction.
1
Reversed.

1 Clark raises two additional arguments on appeal. First, Clark claims the district court
abused its discretion by permitting a witness to testify about Clark’s firearm training.
Second, Clark contends the district court erred at sentencing by preventing her from
introducing testimony to support her request for a downward departure. Based on our
decision that Clark is entitled to reversal, we need not reach these arguments.