State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0618

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Walter James Abrams,
Appellant.

Filed April 10, 2023
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-20306

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Two family members of appellant Walter James Abrams came forward and reported
allegations of sexual assault by Abrams for instances when they were children. Having
2
been convicted of first-degree and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, Abrams appeals
on the grounds that the district court erred when it allowed testimony from Abrams’s
supervised-release agent regarding prejudicial pornographic search terms found on
Abrams’s cellphone and testimony by Abrams’s biological niece regarding a prior instance
of sexual assault by Abrams when she was a child. Because the district court’s admission
of the pornographic-search-term evidence and biological niece’s relationship evidence did
not significantly affect the verdict, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Abrams with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct 1 and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. 2 The
first-degree criminal- sexual-conduct charge stemmed from allegations that Abrams
sexually assaulted his daughter on 15 separate occasions between 2012 and 2017, when
daughter was between the ages of six and ten years of age. The second-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct charge stemmed from allegations that Abrams sexually assaulted
his sister’s stepdaughter (niece) between 2006 and 2007, when she was between the ages
of 11 and 12 years of age. Abrams pleaded not guilty.
In late October 2021, the matter proceeded to trial. Daughter, niece, Abrams,
Abrams’s sister, another daughter of Abrams, Abrams’s sister’s biological daughter
(biological niece), and Abrams’s supervised-release agent testified at trial. The following

1 In violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(a) (2020).
2 In violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1(h)(iii) (2020).
3
is a summary of daughter’s, niece’s, biological-niece’s, and the supervised-release-agent’s
testimonies.
Daughter
In March 2020, when she was 13 years old, daughter’s grades were slipping, and
she was not acting like herself according to her mother and grandmother. Daughter
testified that she knew Abrams was going to be released from prison and she started feeling
anxious because it brought up memories of Abrams sexually assaulting her when she was
a child. S he became scared he would do it again once he was released. She decided to
confide in her maternal grandmother. Her grandmother then told daughter’s mother, an d
mother reported the allegations of sexual assault to the police. Daughter was interviewed
by a children’s advocacy center, and a recording of this interview was played at trial.
Daughter reported to the center approximately 15 different instances of Abrams’s
molestation between the years 2012 and 2017. Daughter claimed she was between the ages
of six and ten during those instances, because Abrams went to prison when she was ten and
she had not seen him since then. In each instance, daughter was usually asleep when
Abrams would undress her, touch her vagina with his hands and his penis, and sometimes
lick and bite her ears. According to daughter, Abrams told her that “it will be [their] little
secret.” In one specific instance, daughter explained that Abrams had tied her and her sister
up when they were naked. And Abrams’s biological niece had walked into the room while
this was happening because daughter had been screaming. In response, Abrams allegedly
4
threatened his biological niece with a gun or a knife. 3 Daughter said that she tried to tell
her paternal grandmother about what Abrams was doing to her when she was six years old,
but her paternal grandmother did not believe her and told her to go back to sleep.
Niece
After daughter came forth with her reports against Abrams, daughter’s mother
reached out to niece because she knew of similar allegations that niece had made when she
was a child. Niece decided to call the police and make a report. Niece testified that Abrams
molested her when she was between 11 and 12 years old, approximately around
2006 to 2007. Niece explained that Abrams sexually assaulted her when she was sleeping
on a pullout couch with biological niece at Abrams’s mother’s home when Abrams laid
behind her, touched her chest, put his hand in her pants, “play[ed]” with her “private area,”
digitally penetrated her vagina, and pressed his penis against her buttocks. A few weeks
after the assault, niece told two of her older sisters, and then told her father, because niece
was feeling suicidal. Her father directed niece to confront Abrams in the presence of a
group of her family members—which she did—but no one in her family believed her. 4
Abrams’s sister (niece’s stepmother) testified that she did not believe niece at the time she
came forward with her allegations of molestation by Abrams and that niece and biological
niece were both lying at trial as well.

3 Abrams’s other daughter, who was allegedly present for this instance of sexual assault as
well, testified at trial that this entire incident did not occur.
4 Abrams testified that he remembered niece coming forward with this allegation in a group
setting with her father, but he denied that accusation.
5
Niece testified that she eventually left Minnesota to get away from the Abrams
family. She said that Abrams’s sister tried to bribe her to not testify against Abrams and
recant her statement. But Abrams’s sister denied that allegation at trial.
Biological Niece
Biological niece also testified that Abrams molested her when she was between the
ages of four and eight, but Abrams was not charged for this allegation. She said that she
and niece grew up together and were like sisters. Biological niece testified that Abrams
sexually assaulted her by touching her nipples and vagina. She said that she also tried to
tell her stepfather (niece’s father) and her mother (Abrams’s sister) after the incident
happened, but her mother did not believe her and thought she was lying. Although
biological niece testified that the Abrams family treated her poorly, she also said that she
does not hate Abrams for what he did to her, she loves him because he is her family. Also,
biological niece testified that she did not witness Abrams’s daughters tied up in a room
together, as daughter testified, but that she remembered being at the home when both girls
were sharing a room and Abrams was present.
Supervised-Release Agent
In May 2020, three years after the most recent instance of alleged molestation of his
daughter, Abrams’s cellphone was searched because Abrams was not complying with his
supervised release conditions relating to his release from prison. Abrams’s supervised
release agent discovered pornographic searches on Abrams’s phone from March 2020 to
May 2020, which included search terms such as:
6
• “Daddy and daughter porn”;

• “Daddy f-----g minor daughter”;

• “Scared teen begs stepdaddy to sleep in his bed”;

• “All in the family episode one: daddy punishes
stepdaughter for her bad behavior”; and

• “Daddy’s unexpected visit, stepdaughter’s no becomes
yes.”

But the supervised release agent acknowledged on cross-examination that Abrams was
living with two teenage boys at the time, aged 12 and 14, when the pornographic searches
occurred.

At the close of trial, the state and Abrams gave their closing arguments before jury
deliberation. The state mentioned the biological niece’s testimony in closing argument
three times, reminding the jury that they cannot convict Abrams for these alleged prior acts
of sexual assault . Throughout the trial and in his closing argument, Abrams maintained
that he was innocent, that the three alleged victims’ testimony was untruthful, and that the
women in his life were out to get him, because that is a natural byproduct of having “nine
children by five [ different] women.” The jury found Abrams guilty of both counts of
criminal sexual conduct.5

5 During deliberations, the jury sent the district court a note that they could not come to an
agreement on the second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charge but that they reached an
agreement on the first -degree criminal- sexual-conduct charge. After the district court
re-read the jury instruction on unanimous verdicts, the jurors came back with two guilty
verdicts one hour and 30 minutes later.
7
In February 2022, Abrams was sentenced on both counts of criminal sexual conduct.
He was sentenced to 158 months for the second-degree conviction and 300 months for the
first-degree conviction, to be served concurrently.
Abrams appeals.
DECISION
Abrams asserts that the district court erred on two evidentiary rulings: (1) admitting
the supervised release agent’s testimony regarding the pornographic search terms found on
his cellphone and (2) admitting, as relationship evidence, the biological niece’s testimony
about prior sexual assaults by Abrams when she was a child.
Since both issues on appeal relate to evidentiary rulings, we apply an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review because these determinations rest within the sound
discretion of the district court, and we will not reverse these decisions absent a clear abuse
of the district court’s discretion. State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014); see also
State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (stating that a district court’s decision
to admit relationship evidence in a domestic-abuse prosecution is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion). “ A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark,
927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
But even if the district court erroneously admitted evidence, the burden still rests on
the appellant to establish that the admission of the evidence was not harmless— that there
is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the
wrongfully admitted evidence not come into trial. State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 472
8
(Minn. 2019). In making that determination, this court considers the strength of the
evidence of guilt, how the evidence was presented and whether it was highly persuasive, if
the evidence was used in closing argument, and the defense’s ability to counter the
evidence. State v. Hall, 764 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Minn. 2009); see also State v. Courtney,
696 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Minn. 2005) (explaining that the determination of harmless error in
wrongfully admitted evidence considers the whole record, including all previously
mentioned factors, with no one factor being entirely dispositive).
Turning to the law governing the admission of evidence, rule 401 of the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence states that “[r]elevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” But relevant
evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. Minn. R. Evid. 403. Finally, when balancing the probative value of
the evidence against the potential unfair prejudice against the defendant in trial, unfair
prejudice is not merely damaging or severely damaging evidence, it is “evidence that
persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell,
719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the pornographic
internet searches from Abrams’s cellphone.

Abrams contends that the pornographic searches from his cellphone were admitted
in error because they were not relevant and, even if they did have any probative value, the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed that value. Additionally, he argues
9
that the error was not harmless, and the jury was improperly swayed by this evidence at
trial.6 The district court allowed the admission of this evidence because it was highly
probative, given that one of the alleged victims was Abrams’s daughter.
Here, applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the pornographic search terms through the supervised
release agent’s testimony because the pornographic search terms were relevant and the
prejudice to Abrams did not outweigh their probative value. Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403. The
pornographic search terms are relevant because the nature of the searches—relating to
father-daughter pornography—shows a sexual proclivity of Abrams that is consistent with
the charges against him. See State v. Bates, 507 N.W.2d 847, 851- 52 (Minn. App. 1993)
(holding that evidence that shows a sexual interest in young children was relevant to prove
whether an element of criminal sexual conduct was present in alleged contact with child
victims), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 27, 1993).7

6 Abrams asserts that the pornographic search terms were also improperly admitted under
the guise of character evidence. See State v. Blair, 402 N.W.2d 154, 156
(Minn. App. 1987) (holding character evidence is not admissible when used to show that
the person acted in conformity with their character, but it can be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident). This argument fails. The district court
appropriately admitted the pornographic search terms because this evidence shows a
similar victim demographic, which connects to Abrams’s criminal intent and impulse, not
character propensity. Id.
7 Still, Abrams argues that the remoteness in time between the searches in 2020 from
daughter’s allegations between 2012 and 2017 makes the evidence irrelevant. We disagree.
The remoteness in time likely makes the evidence less relevant, but it does not remove all
probative value. See State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 689 (Minn. 2006) (laying out a
balancing test for remote prior bad act evidence).
10
Nor is the probative value of the pornographic cellphone searches outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice to Abrams. First, the pornographic searches were admitted
in a limited capacity through the supervised release agent’s testimony. The probation
officer only read out the search terms—he did not present any videos or pictures relating
to those pornographic searches. Second , watching pornography, and by extension
searching for pornographic materials, is not illegal and was less prejudicial to Abrams than
a criminal act would have been. Finally, Abrams was able to rebut the credibility of this
testimony and implant doubt as to whether he made the searches himself by pointing out
that Abrams was living with two teenage boys at the time the searches occurred. In sum,
although some prejudice may have occurred through this evidence’s admission, it did not
substantially outweigh its probative value, especially given the deference provided to the
district court in making these balancing determinations.8

8 Even if the pornographic-search -terms evidence was admitted in error, the error was
harmless because (1) the evidence was not highly persuasive given the limited way it was
presented by the supervised release agent in his testimony, (2) the defense had the ability
to counter the evidence on cross-examination of the agent, and (3) the state only mentioned
this evidence once in its closing argument. See Hall, 764 N.W.2d at 842 (explaining that
an appellate court considers the strength of the evidence of guilt, ho w the evidence was
presented and whether it was highly persuasive, if the evidence was used in closing
argument, and the defense’s ability to counter the evidence in determining whether
wrongfully admitted evidence was harmless); see also State v. Blanche,
696 N.W.2d 351, 369 (Minn. 2005) (holding that an error is harmless if the guilty verdict
is surely unattributable to the error).
11
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence about Abrams’s alleged sexual abuse against his minor biological
niece.

Abrams next asserts that his biological niece should not have been allowed to testify
because her testimony was not relevant, and any probative value was substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice to him. Additionally, he argues that the error in allowing
her to testify was not harmless and severely impacted the jury’s verdict. The district court
allowed the biological niece to testify, reasoning that her testimony was admissible under
Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 (2022), which permits the introduction of “relationship
evidence,” and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice to Abrams because it provided insight into the Abrams family and the
delayed nature of the reports by the two alleged victims.
A district court has discretion to admit relationship evidence in domestic-abuse
cases, such as criminal-sexual-conduct cases . State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441
(Minn. App. 2017). Specifically, the relationship-evidence statute defines relationship
evidence as:
Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

Minn. Stat. § 634.20.

Applying this statute to the record here, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that the biological niece’s testimony was relationship evidence because
12
the biological niece is a family member who was alleging domestic conduct, which
includes criminal sexual conduct, against Abrams. Id.; Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 2(a)(3) (2022). On top of meeting the statutory definition of relationship evidence,
the testimony had high probative value because it provided relevant context into Abrams’s
relationship with other family members outside of the two testifying victims, and insight
into why the two alleged victims’ reports of sexual assault were delayed.
See State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. App. 2008) (“Evidence that helps to
establish the relationship between the victim and the defendant or which places the event
in context bolsters its probative value.”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008) . Biological
niece’s testimony shows that the Abrams family had a history of not believing the children
who claimed sexual assault by Abrams and provided context for how Abrams has
interacted with other children within the family.
Nor was the relevance of this relationship evidence substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to Abrams. Although biological niece’s testimony bolstered the
credibility of niece and daughter, especially with regard to the delayed reporting of their
allegations, it also bolstered Abrams’s credibility. For instance, biological niece denied
daughter’s claim that she walked in on her being tied up by Abrams, and she said she loves
Abrams, even after everything that had happened between them. Finally, any prejudice to
Abrams from this testimony was mitigated by two cautionary instructions, provided before
the testimony was introduced and before jury deliberations. This is especially true when
we are to assume the jury followed the district court’s limiting instruction, which directed
the jury “not to convict [Abrams] on the basis of similar conduct on a prior occasion.”
13
State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 509 (Minn. 2005); see also State v. Ware,
856 N.W.2d 719, 729 (Minn. App. 2014) (stating that a district court’s limiting instruction
mitigates the risk that a jury may give undue weight to relationship evidence). Thus the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted biological niece’s testimony as
relationship evidence.9
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
pornographic-search-term and relationship evidence because the evidence was relevant and
its potential for unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value.
Affirmed.

9 Even if the relationship evidence was admitted in error, any error was harmless given the
entire trial record. Biological niece’s testimony was not highly persuasive because it
lessened the credibility of daughter’s testimony when she rebutted seeing daughter tied up
by Abrams; the state’s theory of the case did not rely heavily on biological niece’s
testimony because it was only mentioned three times out of the state’s 30- page closing
argument; and the defense had the opportunity to counter the evidence at trial through
cross-examination. See State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015) (explaining
that the prosecutor’s sparse use of relationship evidence was not prejudicial to the
defendant); see also Hall, 764 N.W.2d at 842 (stating that an appellate court considers
whether the testimony was highly persuasive, if the evidence was used in closing argument,
and the defense’s ability to counter the evidence in determining whether wrongfully
admitted evidence was harmless).