Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State of Minnesota v. Jose Arriage Soto, Jr. 855 N.W.2d 303
- State v. Guzman 892 N.W.2d 801
- In Re Ashman 608 N.W.2d 853
- State v. Wukawitz 662 N.W.2d 517
- In Re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Shaughnessy 606 N.W.2d 670
- State v. Robledo-Kinney 615 N.W.2d 25
- 963 N.W.2d 214 not in our corpus
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0619
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Vincent James Tran,
Appellant.
Filed February 27, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge
Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-21-3034
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Jennifer K. Buske, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for second-degree burglary,
appellant challenges his 38-month executed sentence. Appellant argues that the district
court erred by finding that he violated the terms of his plea agreement while on conditional
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release pending sentencing and abused its discretion by sentenc ing him to 38 months in
prison. In his pro se supplemental brief, appellant raises similar issues. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Vincent James Tran with one
count of first-degree burglary and one count of second-degree burglary after Tran
reportedly entered a residence without permission and took electronic items. The
complaint further alleged that Tran had used ecstasy prior to committing these offenses.
On October 20, 2021, Tran pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary pursuant to a
plea agreement with the state. The plea agreement contemplated that Tran would be
conditionally released prior to sentencing to enter treatment. At the plea hearing, Tran’s
counsel summarized the plea agreement as follows:
Your Honor, on court file ending 3034 Mr. Tran would
be pleading guilty to Count 2. The remaining counts will be
dismissed. There’s two parts to this plea agreement, Your
Honor, depending upon how Mr. Tran does in treatment . . . .
If he’s successful—successfully completes treatment or
a portion prior to sentencing, 38 months will be stayed for a
period left to the Court, he’ll get credit for time served in the
amount of 110 days, PSI, remaining terms to the Court.
Now, if he leaves the program, gets kicked out, uses or
fails to remain law abiding, he’s agreeing to be committed to
the Department of Corrections for a period of 38 months.
(Emphasis added.) When asked if the agreement was correctly stated, counsel for the state
responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”
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Prior to the hearing, Tran signed a plea agreement outlining the following specific
conditions of the deal:
Count I:
• Dismissed
Count II: CONDITIONAL PLEA AGREEMENT
Option A (If successfully completes Treatment (or a
portion prior to sentencing))
• 38-Months Stayed for a period left to the court;
• Credit for 110-actual days as of October 20, 2021;
• PSI; and
• Remaining Terms to the court.
Option B (If leaves the program, gets kicked out, uses, or
fails to remain law abiding)
• 38-Months Committed to the Department of
Corrections
(Emphasis added.)
The district court accepted Tran’s guilty plea and authorized him to be released to a
treatment facility. The district court instructed Tran: “[Y]ou are ordered to successfully
complete treatment and any aftercare, education, halfway house, anything they recommend
for you, you are ordered to successfully complete that.” The district court asked Tran what
would happen if he “violate[d] any conditions of release” and Tran responded, “I’ll go to
prison.”
The district court set a sentencing date for January 7, 2022. Counsel for Tran then
asked the district court to clarify the conditional portion of the plea agreement as it related
to sentencing, stating:
Say the recommendation is a year-long [treatment] program, I
think [counsel] and I had talked about we don’t need to wait
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for sentencing for a year, rather a good portion. So if he
comes—when we come back on January 7, if he hasn’t
completed the full [treatment] program but yet he’s still doing
well, he’s still in, we’re still at the 38 months stayed.
The district court responded that it was ordering Tran to successfully complete treatment
but would not deviate from the 38-month stayed sentence unless Tran “leaves without
successfully completing, if he uses or he gets kicked out, [is] not cooperating, those kinds
of things.” Following the plea hearing, the district court filed a conditional-release order.
The order specifically required Tran to “[r]emain law-abiding,” and successfully complete
treatment, among other conditions.
On October 25, 2021, Tran entered a treatment program at Twin Town. Although
reports indicate that Tran’s participation during treatment was lacking, Tran was
successfully discharged from the program on November 19 and entered a sober housing
program as part of his recommended aftercare. That same day, Tran was unsuccessfully
discharged from the sober housing program “due to noncompliance” with drug-testing
rules. He was later arrested and transported to jail. While in jail, Tran engaged in conduct
that resulted in new criminal charges for fifth-degree assault and felony damage to
property.
Wright County Court Services filed a conditional-release-violation report, alleging
that Tran (1) “[f]ailed to successfully complete treatment”; (2) “[ f]ailed to submit to
testing”; and (3) “[f]ailed to have no assaultive or aggressive behavior, verbal or physical.”
The report also indicated that Tran failed to remain law abiding.
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On February 2, 2022, the department of corrections filed a presentence investigation
report (PSI). The PSI included the following “Final Assessment”:
[Tran’s] stint at Twin Town could be looked at as a
success as he moved down to sober living, however [Tran] did
not participate and when he got to sober living, was hostile,
combative, and ended up getting kicked out. [Tran] then came
back to jail and his combative behavior continued. [Tran]
wound up obtaining new charges, which would void his
conditional plea agreement for failure to remain law abiding.
At the sentencing hearing, Tran’s counsel argued that , under the terms of the plea
agreement, Tran was entitled to be sentenced to probation rather than imprisonment .
Tran’s counsel contended that Tran met the conditions of the plea agreement because he
successfully completed treatment. Tran’s counsel further argued that Tran’s discharge
from the sober-living facility should not be considered in the court’s sentencing decision
because “aftercare” was not a condition of the plea agreement. With respect to Tran’s
alleged violation of the condition that he remain law abiding, Tran’s counsel acknowledged
that Tran did have new criminal charges but noted that Tran did not have any new
convictions since plea ding guilty. Tran then addressed the court, stating, “obviously we
got new charges and stuff like that, but, you know, they are petty charges, though.” The
state requested that the district court impose an executed sentence because Tran failed to
comply with the conditions of the plea agreement that he complete treatment and remain
law abiding.
The district court denied Tran’s request for probation and sentenced Tran to
38 months in prison. The district court recognized that Tran had completed primary
treatment but found that he was unsuccessful with the recommended aftercare. The district
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court also found that Tran had not remained law abiding because he was facing two new
felony charges from his time in jail and a video showed Tran “assaulting someone at the
jail.” Tran appeals the execution of his sentence.
DECISION
Tran argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an executed
sentence because he met the requirements for a stayed sentence under the terms of his plea
agreement. He asks this court to remand to the district court with instructions that he
receive a stayed sentence of 38 months. The state counters that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by imposing an executed sentence because Tran violated conditions of
his plea agreement by failing to follow through with aftercare and failing to remain law
abiding.
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). Whether the district
court abused its discretion by sentencing Tran requires this court to review the terms of the
conditional plea agreement and the district court’s findings of fact regarding the violations
of the plea agreement.
The terms of a plea agreement are interpreted subject to the principles of contract
law. In re Ashman, 608 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2000). When reviewing a plea agreement
and its conditions, this court looks at “what the parties to the plea bargain reasonably
understood to be the terms of the agreement.” State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 527
7
(Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). “[W]e generally temper contract principles with
safeguards to insure the defendant receives what is reasonably due in the circumstances,
and in close cases, plea agreements should be construed to favor defendants.” Ashman,
608 N.W.2d at 858 (citation and quotation omitted). “What the parties agreed to involves
an issue of fact to be resolved by the district court.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674
(Minn. 2000). On appeal, “[a] district court’s findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous.” State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. 2000).
“[F]indings are clearly erroneous when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). But the interpretation
of a plea agreement is an issue of law that this court reviews de novo. Brown, 606 N.W.2d
at 674.
Here, the conditional plea agreement included two alternative paths for sentencing.
Option A stated that Tran would receive a sentence of 38 months stayed for a period left
up to the court with credit for time served if he “successfully completes [t]reatment (or a
portion prior to sentencing).” Option B stated that if Tran “leaves the [treatment] program,
gets kicked out, uses, or fails to remain law abiding,” his sentence would be executed, and
he would be committed to the department of corrections for 38 months. (Emphasis added.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court executed his 38-months sentence, finding that
Tran did not satisfy the conditions of his plea agreement because he did not successfully
complete the aftercare portion of the treatment program and because he failed to remain
law abiding.
8
Tran argues that he is entitled to a probationary sentence under option A because he
satisfied the single requirement of option A— that he successfully complete treatment or a
portion of it. He further argues that successfully completing aftercare at a sober housing
program was not a condition of the plea agreement. And while Tran does not dispute that
he received two felony charges after he was discharged from treatment, he contends that
any failure to remain law abiding after discharge is not a violation of the plea agreement
and does not subject him to sentencing under option B. We disagree.
The conditional plea agreement provided that if Tran failed to remain law abiding,
the district court would execute Tran’s 38-month sentence. The condition to remain law
abiding did not include any time constraints or other limiting instructions. Instead, the
condition simply required Tran “to remain law abiding.” Because it is undisputed that Tran
faced new criminal charges stemming from his time in jail, the district court did not err by
finding that Tran violated this condition of his plea agreement.1
Tran’s failure to remain law abiding was a sufficient basis by itself for the district
court to impose an executed sentence rather than probation. Option B of the conditional
plea agreement plainly stated that Tran would be sentenced to a 38-month executed
sentence if he “leaves the program, gets kicked out, uses, or fails to remain law abiding.”
1 In a reply brief, Tran’s counsel concedes that Tran failed to remain law abiding after his
discharge from treatment. But in his pro se supplemental brief, Tran argues that he did
remain law abiding. We interpret Tran’s argument as a challenge to the factual findings of
the district court. Because the record shows that Tran obtained an assault charge while in
jail and a video shows Tran “assaulting someone at the jail,” we cannot say the district
court clearly erred in finding that Tran did not remain law abiding. Tran also argues that
he was not properly discharged from aftercare. But again, Tran provides no support in the
record for this argument. Thus, we cannot say the district court erred in its factual findings.
9
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, we need not determine whether the district court erred by
considering Tran’s discharge from recommended aftercare as a separate basis for executing
Tran’s sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by senten cing
Tran to 38 months’ imprisonment.
Affirmed.