State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0621

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Willie B. Brown, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed June 5, 2023
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-10755

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant argues his conviction for second-degree murder must be reversed and
remanded because the district court abused its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence of
a drive-by shooting committed shortly after the murder. In a pro se supplemental brief,
2
appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction and that
the district court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motions and admitting
challenged evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Willie B. Brown Jr.
with the second-degree murder of D.H. Shortly after, the state charged Brown with a
drive-by shooting and second-degree assault that occurred on the same date as D.H.’s
murder and at a location nearby. This is the second appeal related to these charges.
First Trial and First Appeal
The district court granted the state’s motion to join the two complaints for trial. A
jury found Brown guilty of all three charges, and Brown was sentenced to 386 months for
the second-degree murder and 48 months for the drive-by shooting, to be served
consecutively. Brown appealed. On appeal, this court reversed the convictions and
remanded for a new trial. Relevant to an issue in this appeal, we concluded that joinder was
improper because it would be “error [to] admit[] the evidence of the
drive-by-shooting/second-degree assault in the trial for D.H.’s murder.” State v. Brown ,
No. A19-0409, 2020 WL 4932785, at *11 (Minn. App. Aug. 24, 2020) (Brown I).
Second Trial and Second Appeal
On remand, the state first proceeded on the drive-by- shooting and
second-degree-assault charges. After an April 2021 trial, a jury found Brown guilty of both
charges.
3
In July 2021, the state moved to admit Spreigl evidence1 of Brown’s drive-by
shooting and second-degree assault in the upcoming trial of the second-degree -murder
charge. The district court granted the state’s motion in part and allowed the state to offer
limited evidence of the drive-by shooting.
During the second- degree-murder trial, the state called 20 witnesses. Brown
represented himself and testified on his own behalf, denying that he shot D.H. The
following summarizes the evidence received during the second trial on the murder charge.
Around 4:00 a.m. on April 26, 2018, T.F. woke up when she hear d an argument
outside her Minneapolis home. T.F. stepped outside and saw her cousin, D.H., get into
D.H.’s car, a black Chevrolet Impala. D.H. was driving and Brown was in the passenger’s
seat when the car drove away. T.F. knew D.H. and Brown; they visited her home almost
every day.
At 5:06 a.m., police responded to a ShotSpotter 2 alert about one mile from T.F.’s
home. The responding officer discovered D.H.’s body with three gunshot wounds; D.H.
was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy revealed D.H.’s death resulted from a

1 “Spreigl evidence” refers to evidence of the defendant committing “another crime, wrong,
or act” as defined in Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), which states that such evidence may not be
used to prove character or propensity but may be used for other limited purposes. See also
State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 168 (Minn. 1965) (requiring the state to submit notice
of intent to offer evidence of prior crimes at trial).

2 ShotSpotter is a “gunshot-detection technology employed by police departments,
including the Minneapolis Police Department.” State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 797 n.2
(Minn. 2019).
4
gunshot wound to his neck, where a bullet struck his carotid artery. Law enforcement
recovered three casings in proximity to where the officer found D.H.’s body.
Also during the early morning of April 26, 2018, T.F. dropped a family member off,
returned home at about 5:20 a.m., and saw Brown with an “extended clip hanging out” of
his pocket on the porch of her home. T.F. left and returned home again at 6:00 a.m., when
she saw Brown near D.H.’s black Impala.
Around 6:50 a.m., a car-wash surveillance camera recorded Brown in D.H.’s black
Impala. Brown used a “hose sprayer” to wash D.H.’s black Impala. The video recording,
which was received into evidence and played for the jury, showed Brown with a jacket and
carrying black shoes and, later, without a jacket. The shoes and jacket in the car-wash
recording were later found at the car wash and determined to have traces of D.H.’s blood.
At about 7:00 a.m., T.F. saw Brown drive D.H.’s car on the street outside her home;
Brown was holding a gun. T.F. testified that Brown fired the gun. T.F. dialed 911, as she
had earlier that morning to report seeing Brown with an extended clip. Police responded,
and, while officers were present, Brown approached T.F.’s home on foot from the
backyard. Police arrested Brown. Two witnesses reported seeing Brown arrive near T.F.’s
home in a black Impala, park the car, and exit it. When police followed Brown’s path from
the parked Impala to T.F.’s home, officers found two guns, including a .40 caliber Smith
and Wesson.
The jury received forensic evidence of several items. First, forensic analysis
matched the bullet that killed D.H. with a bullet casing found outside T.F.’s home; both
were fired by the Smith and Wesson gun found near T.F.’s home. Second, Brown’s
5
thumbprint was found on the extended clip of the Smith and Wesson gun. Third, forensic
testing of swabs taken from blood at the car wash matched D.H.’s blood, which was
admitted as evidence.
The jury found Brown guilty of second-degree murder. The district court sentenced
Brown to 386 months’ imprisonment. Brown appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence
that Brown fired a gun outside T.F.’s home shortly after D.H. was murdered.

Brown contends that the district court abused its discretion for two reasons: (1) this
court’s decision in Brown I determined that evidence of the drive-by shooting was
inadmissible Spreigl evidence in the second -degree-murder trial; and (2) the Spreigl
evidence of the drive-by shooting admitted in the murder trial was not relevant, and any
probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
A. Law of the Case
Brown contends that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the district court from
admitting the Spreigl evidence during the second trial and argues that Brown I held Spreigl
evidence was inadmissible on retrial. “The law of the case doctrine functions to bar issues
that were previously considered and denied in the same case.” Smith v. State, 974 N.W.2d
576, 581 (Minn. 2022).
In Brown I, we determined that the district court improperly joined the charges for
drive-by shooting and second-degree assault with the charge for second-degree murder.
2020 WL 4932785, at *9-11. In reaching this decision, we analyzed the “admissibility of
6
hypothetical Spreigl evidence,” which we also called “other acts evidence,” and we
considered whether joinder was prejudicial. Id. at *10-11. “[J]oinder is not prejudicial if
evidence of each offense would have been admissible Spreigl evidence in the trial of the
other.” State v. Fitch, 884 N.W.2d 367, 379 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
In assessing whether the joinder of charges caused prejudice, we first determined it
would be error to admit evidence of D.H.’s murder in a trial for the drive-by
shooting/second-degree assault. Brown I, 2020 WL 4932785, at *11. After considering
T.F.’s testimony about the drive-by shooting, we first determined that “the added probative
value of the other acts evidence is outweighed by its potential for prejudice.” Id. Second,
we determined that it would be error to admit evidence of the drive-by
shooting/second-degree assault in a trial for D.H.’s murder. Id. After considering the
eyewitness and forensic evidence linking Brown to D.H.—including T.F.’s testimony, the
car-wash recording, and ballistics—we concluded that T.F.’s testimony “that Brown was
still driving the black Impala 30 minutes later would be of limited probative value” in a
murder trial. Id. We also determined that the Spreigl evidence “is almost certainly going to
influence the jury’s deliberation.” Id . After analyzing other issues not relevant here, we
reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at *13, *16.
Brown relies on our probative-value/prejudicial-effect analysis in Brown I to argue
that law of the case prevented the district court from admitting Spreigl evidence during the
second trial. In Brown I, however, we considered the improper joinder of charges and
analyzed the prejudice of “[h]ypothetical Spreigl [e]vidence” of the drive-by shooting; we
did not review a district court’s decision to admit limited Spreigl evidence, as occurred
7
during the second trial. Id. at *10-11. Our remand instructions in Brown I highlight that the
remand included the possibility that Spreigl evidence would be offered and received during
the second trial. The opinion stated: “On remand, should the state seek to introduce
evidence of other acts in the second -degree murder trial or in the drive-by
shooting/second-degree assault trial, it must make clear what specific other acts it seeks to
introduce and under what specific legal basis. In addition, for each other act, the state must
satisfy the respective standards of proof and the applicable balancing tests for Spreigl
evidence . . . .” Id. at *15.
During the second trial, the district court limited the Spreigl evidence to Brown
firing “one shot” and did not allow evidence that Brown fired at T.F.’s home. The district
court also limited the evidence in other ways, as explained below. Because the district court
limited the Spreigl evidence during the second trial, and because our decision in Brown I
reviewed a decision to join charges based on “[h]ypothetical Spreigl [e]vidence,” the
law-of-the-case doctrine did not prevent the district court from admitting the Spreigl
evidence in the second trial. Id.
B. Spreigl Analysis
Brown alternatively argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
Spreigl evidence of the drive-by shooting because the evidence was not relevant and its
probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Brown. “A district
court’s decision to admit Spreigl evidence [under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)] is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). An appellant
8
who claims that “the trial court erred in admitting evidence bears the burden of showing an
error occurred and any resulting prejudice.” Id.
The district court allowed, over Brown’s objection, T.F.’s testimony that she saw
Brown drive D.H.’s black Impala and discharge a firearm outside her home about two
hours after D.H. was found dead. The state sought to introduce this testimony along with
forensic evidence that the bullet casings found outside T.F.’s home matched the murder
weapon and were fired by the Smith and Wesson gun that had Brown’s thumbprint. The
district court agreed with the state that the Spreigl evidence of the drive-by shooting tended
to prove that Brown “possessed the murder weapon shortly after the murder” and “fired
the murder weapon,” which “establish[es] identity and opportunity.”
The district court observed that “[w]hile the evidence is obviously prejudicial to
[Brown], the Court took steps to minimize that prejudice,” including limiting the evidence
to one shot being fired “for the sole purpose of identifying” Brown. The district court also
precluded testimony that the shot was fired at T.F.’s home and cautioned the attorneys not
to refer to “drive- by” shooting. The district court read a limiting instruction to the jury
when the evidence was received and again before closing arguments.
Spreigl evidence, or “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act,” cannot be
admitted “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); see State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 266 (Minn.
2019) (stating that Spreigl evidence “is not admissible to demonstrate that the defendant
(a) has a propensity to commit crimes and (b) acted in accord with that propensity”) .
Spreigl evidence may be admitted to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
9
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). To
admit Spreigl evidence, prosecutors must satisfy five factors:
(1) prosecutors must give notice they intend to use evidence of
other bad acts; (2) those bad acts must be proved by
clear-and-convincing evidence; (3) prosecutors must say what
the evidence will be used to prove; (4) the evidence must be
relevant and material to the case; and (5) prosecutors must
show that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed
by its potential for prejudice.

Smith, 932 N.W.2d at 267. On appeal, Brown challenges the district court’s conclusions on
factors four and five.
1. Spreigl Factor Four
Brown argues that the Spreigl evidence of the drive-by shooting was not admissible
because “[t]he evidence was not relevant to the State’s case.” Relevant evidence has “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R.
Evid. 401. While implicitly acknowledging the Spreigl evidence has some relevance,
Brown contends that the Spreigl evidence was unnecessary because the state had other
evidence linking Brown to the gun used to shoot D.H. See State v. Gomez, 721 N.W.2d
871, 879 (Minn. 2006) (stating that in balancing probative value and potential prejudice,
the district court should consider the state’s “need for the evidence” (emphasis omitted)
(quotation omitted)). According to Brown, the Spreigl evidence was unnecessary because
police found the Smith and Wesson gun nearby after they arrested Brown, the Smith and
Wesson gun ballistically matched the gun that shot D.H., the Smith a nd Wesson gun had
10
an extended clip with Brown’s thumbprint, and other evidence tended to prove that Brown
drove D.H.’s car after the murder.
We disagree that the Spreigl evidence was unnecessary. Although Brown correctly
points out that his thumbprint on the extended clip is probative of his possession of the
Smith and Wesson gun, the thumbprint does not prove the time of his possession. As the
district court stated, “no one knew when [Brown’s] fingerprint got on the murder weapon.
It could have happened long before the murder. In addition, the fingerprint was on the
extended magazine, not the firearm itself. It therefore does not establish that [Brown] ever
used the firearm.” Though there is other evidence in the record connecting Brown to the
Smith and Wesson gun, his possession of the gun and D.H.’s black Impala shortly after the
murder is still highly probative. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the Spreigl evidence was needed by the state to “establish identity and
opportunity.”
2. Spreigl Factor Five
Brown contends that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
probative value of the Spreigl evidence outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice. See
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (stating that Spreigl evidence is inadmissible unless “the
probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to
the defendant”). “[U]nfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means,
giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005).
We have already discussed the probative value of T.F.’s testimony about Brown
possessing and shooting the murder weapon. Even though other evidence also linked
11
Brown to the murder weapon, no other evidence showed that Brown possessed and shot
the murder weapon on the morning D.H. was shot.
Brown argues the potential for unfair prejudice is high because T.F.’s testimony
“suggested that [Brown] had a general propensity for violence and using a gun.” We
acknowledge the challenged evidence carries the potential for unfair prejudice—the district
court considered that potential and limited the scope of the Spreigl evidence. The district
court ruled that the evidence was limited to Brown firing one gunshot, did not allow T.F.
to testify that the gunshot was fired at T.F.’s home, and instructed the attorneys that there
be no mention of a “drive-by” shooting. Second, the district court gave a limiting
instruction to the jury before T.F.’s testimony and repeated a similar instruction before
closing arguments. We assume that the jury heeded the cautionary instruction. See Smith,
932 N.W.2d at 268 (concluding that Spreigl evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, in part
because “the district court gave a proper limiting instruction” and the state reminded the
jury during closing argument of the limited use of the Spreigl evidence). Finally, the
prosecuting attorney reminded the jury during closing arguments that Brown was not
charged with any crime based on the events at T.F.’s home.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence was not outweighed by the
potential for unfair prejudice. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the Spreigl evidence.
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II. Pro Se Arguments
In a pro se supplemental brief, Brown argues (A) there was insufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction, (B) the district court erred in denying his motion to present
alternative-perpetrator evidence, (C) the district court abused its discretion by denying a
motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, (D) the district court abused its discretion
by failing to dismiss the case for an illegally conducted search, (E) the district court erred
in admitting certain evidence, and (F) the district court erred in not removing the trial judge.
These issues will be addressed in turn.
A. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
Brown correctly points out that much of the evidence against him is circumstantial.
The supreme court has defined circumstantial evidence as “evidence from which the
factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris ,
895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence
always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.”
Id.
In reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain convictions,
appellate courts use a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99
(Minn. 2013). The first step is to determine the circumstances proved, deferring to the
“jury’s acceptance of the proof.” Id. (quotations omitted). Appellate courts assume the jury
believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. Id. at 599.
Second, an appellate court determines “whether the circumstances proved are consistent
13
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotations
omitted). The circumstances proved are described in the factual overview.
In arguing that the circumstances proved a rational hypothesis other than guilt,
Brown relies on his own testimony that he was present when D.H. was shot and fled the
scene. We reject Brown’s alternative hypothesis because it is not based on the
circumstances proved by the state’s evidence . Silvernail established that we defer to the
jury’s acceptance of proof. Id. at 598-99. The state’s evidence included matching the
ballistics of the murder weapon to the Smith and Wesson gun Brown discharged from
D.H.’s black Impala when near T.F.’s home, Brown’s thumbprint on the extended clip of
the Smith and Wesson, the car-wash video recording of Brown with D.H.’s car shortly after
the murder, and the recovery of D.H.’s blood-stained clothes from the car wash. Examining
the circumstances proved in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances
proved do not support a rational hypothesis inconsistent with Brown’s guilt.
B. The district court did not err in denying Brown’s motion to present
alternative-perpetrator evidence.

Before trial, Brown moved to admit evidence of an alternative perpetrator based on
his own testimony that D.H. pointed a gun at someone just hours before his murder. The
district court denied the motion, a decision Brown challenges on appeal.
Appellate courts review the denial of a motion to present alternative-perpetrator
evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Woodard, 942 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Minn. 2020).
In considering alternative-perpetrator evidence, a district court follows a two-step process.
Id. First, the district court determines whether the foundation for the evidence has been
14
properly laid. Id. at 141-42. In so doing, the district court analyzes whether the evidence
has “an inherent tendency” to connect the alleged perpetrator to the commission of the
crime. Id. at 142 (quotation omitted). Second, the district court considers the admissibility
of the evidence. Id. If the first step is not satisfied, the district court need not consider the
second step. Id.
Brown’s motion stated he would testify that D.H. pointed a gun at someone hours
before his murder. Brown’s motion, however, did not allege he would offer evidence that
the person at whom D.H. pointed a gun killed D.H. The district court denied Brown’s
motion for lack of foundation, reasoning that Brown was “not actually
offering . . . alternative perpetrator evidence. Instead, this is more consistent with a simple
not guilty plea.” At trial, Brown was allowed to testify that D.H. pointed a gun at someone
else and that he fled after an unknown third party murdered D.H.
On appeal, Brown repeats his pretrial motion but does not contend that he was
prejudiced by the district court’s ruling. For example, Brown does not allege that he was
not allowed to offer other evidence that another person murdered D.H. We conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s motion because the proffered
evidence did not tie the alternative perpetrator to D.H.’s murder. Even if we assume error,
any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Brown presented the proffered
evidence through his own testimony. See State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn.
2012) (“An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was surely
unattributable to the error.” (quotation omitted)).
15
C. The district court had jurisdiction.
For the first time on appeal, Brown argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because “there was no indictment issued nor was there a grand jury summoned.” Generally,
we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d
354, 357 (Minn. 1996) . A jurisdictional challenge, however, may be raised at any time.
State v. Losh, 739 N.W.2d 730, 732 n.1 (Minn. App. 2007), aff’d, 755 N.W.2d 736 (Minn.
2008). We conclude Brown’s argument lacks merit. Although an offense punishable by life
imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment, “[a]ny other offense defined by state law
may be prosecuted by indictment or by a complaint.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1.
The state charged Brown by complaint with second-degree murder, which is punishable by
a sentence of “not more than 40 years.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1 (2016). Because
Brown was charged by complaint with an offense that is not punishable by life
imprisonment, we conclude the district court had jurisdiction.
D. The district court did not err by denying Brown’s motion to dismiss.
Before the second trial on the second-degree murder charge, Brown moved to
dismiss because “the state engaged in an illegal search of [Brown’s] body.” Brown relied
on Brown I, in which we concluded that evidence from blood drawn from Brown should
have been suppressed because the search warrant lacked probable cause. 2020 WL
4932785, at *13. On remand, the district court suppressed the evidence obtained from the
blood draw but denied Brown’s motion to dismiss because the search did not “rise to the
level [of] dismissing the case.” Although Brown did not cite Minn. Stat. § 63 1.21 (2022)
in arguing to the district court that the second-degree murder charge should have been
16
dismissed, we construe his argument as seeking dismissal “in furtherance of justice.” We
review a district court’s decision on a dismissal in furtherance of justice for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Hart, 723 N.W.2d 254, 259-60 (Minn. 2006).
In arguing the district court should have dismissed his case, Brown relies on Winston
v. Lee, which held that it was “unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” to require the
suspect in an attempted robbery to undergo surgery under general anesthesia to remove a
bullet for forensic analysis. 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) (quotation marks omitted). The
Supreme Court also noted that without the forensic analysis, there was still “substantial
additional evidence that the [defendant] was the individual who accosted the victim.” Id.
at 754. Brown’s comparison of his case to that in Winston is unpersuasive. In Winston, the
Supreme Court did not dismiss the charges against the defendant.
Brown cites no other caselaw for the proposition that the district court abused its
discretion when it den ied his motion to dismiss the second-degree murder charge. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it suppressed the evidence
from the blood draw and determined the invalid search did not “ rise to the level [of]
dismissing the case.”
E. The district court did not err in admitting challenged evidence.
Brown argues that the district court erred by admitting five pieces of evidence over
his objection: a photograph of a handgun, D.H.’s blood-stained clothing recovered from
the car wash, photographs of the crime scene and bullet casings, recordings of 911 calls
from the day of D.H.’s shooting, and D.H.’s watch, which Brown was wearing when he
17
was arrested. Brown argues the evidence was not admissible under Minnesota Rules of
Evidence 401, 402, and 403.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as “having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable.” Minnesota Rule of Evidence 402 states that relevant
evidence is generally admissible, and “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403 excludes relevant evidence if the “probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or . . . needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and
[appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2 014). “[A]n appellant who alleges an error in
the admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove that
there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly
affected the verdict.” State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted).
In challenging the admission of the five pieces of evidence, Brown contends that
each item “cause[d] an unfair prejudice against” him and therefore should have been
excluded. Brown does not articulate the nature of the alleged unfair prejudice. Four pieces
of evidence tend to prove that Brown was connected to the murder— the handgun, D.H.’s
blood-stained clothing, photographs of the crime scene and bullet casings, and D.H.’s
watch. The 911 recordings tend to corroborate T.F.’s testimony about events on April 26,
18
2018. Based on our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in admitting the five pieces
of evidence. Even if we assume error, Brown fails to argue that there is a reasonable
possibility that any of the challenged evidence, which is cumulative of other evidence,
significantly affected the verdict. For these reasons, we reject Brown’s challenge to the five
pieces of evidence.
Brown also challenges the admission of the car-wash recording. Brown, however,
did not object to the admission of the car-wash recording at trial. We therefore review this
challenge for plain error. Appellate courts review unobjected-to error under the “plain error
test.” State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016). “In order to meet the plain error
standard, a criminal defendant must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was
plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. “An error is plain if
it is clear and obvious; usually this means an error that violates or contradicts case law, a
rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn.
2010). “When an appellant failed to object to the evidence at trial, and on appeal fails to
prove that the error affected his substantial rights, the claim . . . is not properly before us.”
State v. Drew, 889 N.W.2d 323, 330 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). Brown cites
no legal authority supporting a claim of plain error. Thus, this argument fails on the first
two steps of the plain-error test, and we need not consider it further. See Myhre,
875 N.W.2d at 804 (stating that a criminal defendant must satisfy each step of the
plain-error test).
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F. No error occurred in denying Brown’s motion to remove the trial judge.

Brown argues that it was error to deny his motion to remove the trial judge for cause.
“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the trial court and
[appellate] court[s] will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” Hooper v. State,
680 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Minn. 2004) . Brown claims removal was required because the trial
judge was the same judge who presided in the proceedings leading to his first conviction,
which was reversed in Brown I. On remand after the appeal, Brown moved to remove the
trial judge for cause before his second trial for drive-by shooting and second-degree assault.
Brown did not seek to remove the trial judge before his second trial for second-degree
murder. Thus, we review the removal issue for plain error, as already described above. See
Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804. But Brown cites no legal authority supporting a claim of plain
error. This challenge therefore fails on the first two steps, and we need not consider it
further. See id. (stating that a criminal defendant must satisfy each step of the plain-error
test).
Affirmed.