State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0622

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shevirio Kavirion Childs -Young,
Appellant.

Filed March 20, 2023
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-14898

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Pa ul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from his conviction for being an ineligible person in possession of a
firearm, appellant contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his
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presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the fair -and-just standard and by
failing to rule on his motion for a downward durational departure at sentencing. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2021, law enforcement received a tip that two individuals inside a T -
Mobile store were carrying large firearms. Officers went to the s tore. They located
appellant Shevir io Kavirion Childs -Young and fifteen- year-old S.D.J. and patted them
down f or weapons. Officers felt a firearm on the body of Childs -Young and, in a search
incident to arrest, found a handgun with a large-capacity magazine in appellant’s right pant
leg. At the time, Childs-Young was prohibited from possessing firearms based on a third-
degree assault adjudication from 2020. Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant
with being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020).
After his initial appearance, Childs -Young was released from custody on electronic
home monitoring. The district court also ordered that he remain law abiding, attend all
court appearances, and refrain from possessing a firearm or ammunition. A probation
officer supervised Childs-Young’s release.
In September, the district court held a plea hearing. Childs-Young’s guilty plea was
a “straight plea” to the charged offense, rather than a negotiated plea agreement. According
to Childs-Young’s plea petition, in exchange for his guilty plea, the stat e would consider
(1) dismissing another ineligible person in possession of a firearm case against him in
Hennepin County Juvenile Court , and (2) discharging him from probation on another
juvenile case. Further, the plea petition stated that the state woul d argue for a 60- month
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sentence and the defense would argue for sentencing departures. In establishing the factual
basis for Childs -Young’s guilty plea, defense counsel only asked leading questions that
Childs-Young answered in the affirmative. The distr ict court ordered a presentence
investigation (PSI) and scheduled a sentencing hearing .
After the plea hearing but before sentencing, Childs -Young violated his release
conditions, leading the state to charge him for new crimes. First, Childs-Young failed to
comply with electronic home monitoring, so the district court revoked his conditional
release and issued a warrant for his arrest . Childs-Young was not apprehended on the
warrant and failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. When officers arrested Childs -
Young on November 30, he possessed a firearm while driving a car. The state charged
Childs-Young again with being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm. About a
month later, Childs-Young failed to return to custody aft er being granted a three -hour
furlough to attend a funeral . On January 10, Childs -Young appeared via Zoom and the
district court ordered him to return to custody and informed him of an active warrant for
his arrest. Childs-Young ignored the district cour t’s order. Days later, police officers
discovered Childs-Young in his car. Childs-Young evaded police while driving his car
with his seven- month-old daughter inside. Before being caught and arrested, Childs -
Young ran into an officer’s squad car, causing over $1,000 in damages.
In February 2022, the district court held a sentencing hearing. The state argued
Childs-Young should receive the mandatory 60- month sentence for his offense and that
there was no basis to depart based on Childs -Young’s post-plea criminal conduct. Childs-
Young moved the district court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Minn.
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R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. He argued that given the added cases against him “having this
plea accepted and the conviction entered is prejud icial.” The district court denied Childs -
Young’s motion. In the alternative, Childs-Young moved the district court for a downward
dispositional departure based on his difficult past, history of trauma, history of depression,
and difficult home life. Childs -Young noted he needed therapy and treatment so he could
care for his two young children. Additionally, Childs -Young moved for a downward
durational departure , arguing that the circumstances were less onerous than the typical
ineligible possession case because Childs -Young was not involved in any suspected
criminal activity when he was found in possession of the weapon.
The district court pointed out that Childs-Young shared in his PSI that his childhood
was stable. The district court also noted that Childs-Young did not appear remorseful, did
not follow through on court -ordered community supervision, acquired new criminal
charges, and fled after the district court granted him a furlough. The district court denie d
Childs-Young’s motions, found him guilty and sentenced him to 60 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Childs -Young’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it. Dikken
v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017). But a district court may allow withdrawal
before sentencing where it is “fair and just” to do so. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2.
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The fair-and-just standard is “less demanding . . . than the manifest-injustice standard 1, but
it does not permit withdrawal of a guilty plea for simply any reason.” State v. Townsend,
872 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted) .
District courts must give due consideration to two factors i n determining whether
withdrawal would be fair and just : “(1) the reasons a defendant advances to support
withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the [s]tate given reliance on
the plea.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010) . The burden is on the
defendant to provide reasons for withdrawal, and the burden is on the state to show that
withdrawal would cause prejudice. Id. This court reviews a district court ’s decision to
deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard for an
abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare case.” Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266
(Minn. 1989); see also Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97.
Childs-Young argues it was fair and just to allow him to withdraw his plea because
his current criminal charge prejudiced his ability to defend his newer criminal charges .
Childs-Young further asserts that the new charges rendered his prior plea illusory because
what had been contemplated by the plea, a stay, would be realistically off of the table.2 We

1 District courts must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea whenever “withdrawal is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
2 Childs-Young also argues for the first time on appeal that it would have been fair and just
for the district court to allow him to withdraw his plea because (1) the factual basis for the
offense was established only by defense counsel’s leading questions; and (2) Childs-Young
lacked maturity and may not have understood the consequences of pleading guilty. B ut
Childs-Young did not raise these arguments under the fair -and-just standard before the
district court. And he does not now argue they constitute a manifest injustice. Thus, we
do not reach the issues here. Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (stating
that generally, an appellate court will address only the issues that the record shows were
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disagree that these reasons support fair -and-just withdrawal. Around two months after
Childs-Young’s guilty plea, he allegedly possessed a firearm and was charge d with
unlawful possession by the state in a separate court file. A conviction here may present
some hardship for Childs -Young in defending against his subsequent unlawful possession
case, but any hardship is rightfully attributed to Childs -Young’s own post -plea criminal
conduct rather than to the plea itself. Further, Childs -Young’s guilty plea was a “straight
plea” and did not involve a negotiated agreement to dismiss additional cases or to guarantee
a stay ed sentence. The record shows that the state would contemplate dismissing and
resolving active cases involving appellant that existed before the plea hearing, not later
cases arising from his post-plea conduct. And the plea left sentencing to the district court’s
discretion. On these facts, it is hard to conclude Childs -Young’s plea was illusory.
Childs-Young further asserts the state failed to establish it would have been unduly
prejudiced by him withdrawing his guilty plea. But the district court need not find
prejudice to deny a plea-withdrawal motion when the defendant provides no “substantiated
reasons for withdrawal of his plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98; see also State v. Cubas ,
838 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Minn. App. 2013) (“Even when there is no prejudice to the state, a
district court may deny plea withdrawal under rule 15.05, subdivision 2, if the defendant
fails to advance valid reasons why withdrawal is fair and just.”) , rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
31, 2013).

presented to and considered by the district court in making its decision) ; see also State v.
Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2003)
(declining to consider appellant’s plea withdrawal issues not presented to and considered
by the district court).
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This is not a “rare case” requiring reversal. Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 266. Be cause
Childs-Young failed to advance substantiated reasons for withdrawal of his plea under the
fair-and-just standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.
See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a presumptive
guidelines sentence and did not articulate reasons for refusing to grant a
durational departure.

“We afford the trial court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse
sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). A district court must impose a sent ence within
the guidelines “unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances
that distinguish a case and overcome the presumption in favor of the guidelines sentence.”
Id. at 308. We affirm when the district court “carefully eva luated all the testimony and
information presented” before imposing a presumptive sentence. State v. Johnson, 831
N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). But if the district
court does not depart, it “is not required to explain its reasons for imposing a presumptive
sentence.” Id. We “will not generally review a district court’s exercise of its discretion to
sentence a defendant when the sentence imposed is within the presumptive guidelines
range.” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July
20, 2010).
Childs-Young contends the district court failed to rule on his request for a downward
durational departure and the case must be remanded for resentencing. At his sentencing
hearing, Childs -Young moved for both dispositional and durational departures. Childs-
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Young argued that his difficult past, including trauma, depression, and need for therapy
were factors that supported a dispositional departure. The record reveals the district court
reviewed Childs -Young’s PSI report. The district court noted that Childs -Young had told
the PSI writer that he had a stable childhood. The district court also observed that Childs -
Young’s lack of remorse and his post -plea criminal conduct made it “apparent . . . that he
does not deserve a dispositional departure.”
In support of a durational departure, Childs -Young argued the circumstances of his
offense were less onerous than the typical prohibited person in possession of a firearm case
because he was not involved in any suspected criminal activity at the time of possession.
The district court articulated no rationale for denying Childs -Young’s durational departure
motion as it did his disposit ional departure motion. Instead, the district court denied both
departure motions and imposed the presumptive sentence of 60 months in prison for
Childs-Young’s offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5(b) (2020) (requiring any
defendant convicted of ineligible possession of a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2), to be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than five years);
State v. Fleming , 869 N.W.2d 319, 323 n.1 (Minn. App. 2015) (stating a statutorily
mandated sentence is the presumptive sentence), aff’d, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). The
district court did not fail to rule on Childs -Young’s durational departure motion. And
“[a]lthough the [district] court is required to give reasons for departure, an explanation is
not required when the court considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the
presumptive sentence,” as it did here. State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App.
1985); see also Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925. Because the district court “evaluated all the
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testimony and information presented” in considering arguments from the state and Childs -
Young along with the PSI, we discern no abuse of discretion. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at
925.
Affirmed.