Luke Mitchell Rebentisch, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0625

Luke Mitchell Rebentisch, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed December 27, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-21-181

Isabel L. McClure, Brandt Kettwick Defense, Anoka, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Sarah A Mezera, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In t his appeal from a district court order denying recission of the revocation of
appellant’s driver’s license, appellant argues that the district court erred by determining
that an officer had reasonable , articulable suspicion to request a preliminary breath test
(PBT) from appellant. We affirm.
2
FACTS
On January 16, 2021, appellant Luke Mitchell Rebentisch called 911 after being
involved in a motor-vehicle accident. At approximately 5:32 p.m., an officer with the Coon
Rapids Police Department responded to the call. When the officer arrived at the scene, he
spoke with appellant, who was wearing a face mask. Appellant told the officer that he was
driving southbound on Hanson Boulevard with a green light while the other driver, F .A.,
was traveling northbound on Hanson Boulevard. Appellant asserted that F.A. had a red
light when she tried to make a U-turn going southbound on Hanson Boulevard and collided
with appellant’s motor vehicle. The officer then spoke with F.A.
F.A. confirmed that she was headed northbound on Hanson Boulevard and was
approaching the intersection to make a left turn. Upon arriving, F.A. asserted that she went
into the left -turn lane and received a green turn arrow. She made a U -turn going
southbound on Hanson Boulevard when appellant ran a red light going southbound and hit
her. F.A. also informed the officer that she smelled an odor of alcohol coming from
appellant and believed that he may be under the influence. The officer decided to speak
with appellant again.
This time appellant had removed his mask and the officer smelled an odor of alcohol
coming from appellant , despite being a few feet away from him. Appellant admitted to
drinking vodka earlier that day around noon. Even though the officer did not determine
who was at fault for the accident , the officer concluded that, based on the damage to the
vehicles, appellant’s vehicle struck F.A.’s vehicle from behind. Based on the accident, the
damage to both vehicles , the odor of alcohol emanating from appellant , and appellant’s
3
admission to drinking, the officer suspected that appellant might be impaired by alcohol.
The officer requested that appellant take a PBT, and appellant agreed.
The PBT results showed an alcohol concentration of 0.11. For that reason, the
officer requested assistance from a DWI officer. The DWI o fficer took over the DWI
investigation and ultimately arrested appellant for DWI. Appellant submitted to a breath
test, which revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.10, above the legal limit of 0.08. The
Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant’s driving privileges and
appellant petitioned for judicial review. The district court heard the matter and su stained
the revocation of appellant’s driving privileges. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the officer did not have reasonable , articulable suspicion to
request that appellant submit to a PBT. We are not persuaded. “Reasonable suspicion
must be based on specific , articulable facts,” and the police officer must have “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.”
State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). The reasonable,
articulable suspicion standard is not high, but it must be based on more than a hunch. State
v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008). Reasonable, articulable suspicion can
arise when there is evidence of sufficient indica of intoxication. Mesenburg v. Comm ’r of
Pub. Safety, 969 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Mar. 15, 2022). When
determining whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists, courts consider the totality of
the circumstances. See State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 251 (Minn. 2007).
4
An officer may request a PBT from a person when the officer has “reason to believe
from the manner in which a person is driving, operating, controlling, or acting upon
departure from a motor vehicle, or has driven, operated, or controlled a motor vehicle, that
the driver may” have been driving while impaired. Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1 (2020);
see also State, Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Juncewski , 308 N.W.2d 316, 320- 21 (Minn. 1981).
“We review a district court’s determination regarding the legality of an investigatory traffic
stop and questions of reasonable , [articulable] suspicion de novo.” Wilkes v. Co mm’r of
Pub. Safety, 777 N.W.2d 239, 242- 43 (Minn. App. 2010) .
This court recently addressed this same issue. See Mesenburg, 969 N.W.2d. at 644.
In that case, we concluded that a trooper had reasonable, articulable suspicion to request a
PBT based on (1) Mesenburg’s speeding; (2) an odor of alcohol emanating from
Mesenburg; and (3) Mesenburg denying drinking. Id. at 648. In this case, t he officer had
stronger evidence than the trooper in Mesenburg to support his reasonable, articulable
suspicion. Like in Mesenburg, the o fficer detected an odor of alcohol coming from
appellant. The difference here is that appellant admitted to drinking earlier in the day and
had been involved in an accident. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to request that appellant submit to a
PBT.
While it is clear from the record that the three factors of the accident, the odor of
alcohol and the admission of alcohol gave rise to the officer’s reasonable , articulable
suspicion, appellant appears to argue that the officer relied on a single factor alone without
considering the other two factors. Appellant’s argument is misguided . The officer’s
5
suspicion first started after observing the damage to both vehicles. Appellant had damage
in the front left of his vehicle while F.A. had damage in the left rear of her vehicle. Based
on the damage to the vehicles, the officer determined that appellant’s vehicle struck F.A.’s
vehicle from behind. Then when the officer spoke with appellant again, the officer smelled
an odor of alcohol emanating from appellant. As a result, the officer asked appellant
whether he had been drinking, and appellant admitted to drinking vodka earlier in the day.
The accident, odor of alcohol, and admission of alcohol consumption combined provided
sufficient indic ia of intoxication to give rise to the officer’s reasonable , articulable
suspicion. Mesenburg, 969 N.W.2d at 644. Therefore, the district court properly
determined that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to request that appellant
submit to a PBT.
Affirmed.