St. Louis County Gildea, C.J. Tyrone James White, Appellant, vs.

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-0662
St. Louis County Gildea, C.J.
Tyrone James White,
Appellant,
vs.
Filed: February 1, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
_______________________
Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdor f Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota, for
appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Na thaniel T. Stumme, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent.

_______________________
SYLLABUS
Appellant’s postconviction claims are ba rred by the 2-year time limit in Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (202 2), and do not satisfy the inte rests-of-justice exception in
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2022).
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
2
OPINION
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
In 2003, a jury fo und Tyron James White guilty of several offenses, including
first-degree felony murder, and attempted first-degree premeditated murder. In this appeal,
White asserts that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying his second
postconviction petition, which alleges that the jury foreperson was biased because she and
one of the potential witnesses worked at the same place. Because the district court did not
abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Our opinions in White’s previous direct and postconviction appeals set forth the
facts underlying his convictions. State v. White (White I ), 684 N.W.2d 500, 502–04
(Minn. 2004); White v. State (White II), 711 N.W.2d 106, 108–09 (Minn. 2006). In this
case, we focus on the facts and procedure rele vant to the claims made in White’s second
postconviction petition.
In April 2001, White and three others traveled from Minneapolis to White’s friend
T.C.’s apartment in Duluth. White and two others went to the apartment while the fourth
person waited in the car. White joined T.C. and a man, M.W ., in the kitchen. White and
M.W. argued. On signal from White, the two others entered the kitchen. One of them shot
M.W. several times. M.W. died. T.C. pleaded for her life, but on a signal from White the
shooter shot her in the face. She survived.
T.C.’s roommate, T.H., worked at the Fond-Du-Luth Casino at the time of the
shooting and was a potential witness. At work, T.H. went by a nickname.
3
The jury foreperson also worked at the Fond-Du-L uth Casino. When asked by
White’s counsel during voir dire, the jury foreperson denied knowing anyone on the
witness list, even though T.H.’s full name appe ared on the list. Wh ite’s attorney did not
inquire further. But White’s attorney could have known that T.H. worked at the Fond-Du-
Luth Casino because the State disclosed a po lice report that includ ed information about
T.H., including where she worked.
White’s lawyer asked the jury foreperson questions about her work. He asked
questions about her ability to work on a team and resolve disputes. When White’s attorney
asked if she “tr[ies] to listen to both sides” in a dispute, the jury foreperson responded,
“Yeah. We – there’s – everybody’s been there in that department for a number of years, so
we’re kind of all real close, you know, know each other pretty well and each other’s habits
and stuff.”
T.H.’s name came up during T.C.’s test imony. During her testimony, T.C.
mentioned T.H.’s nickname twice. And at one point, she identified T.H. by her legal name.
T.H.’s name did not come up again, and she did not testify.
The jury found White guilty of several offenses, incl uding first-degree felony
murder, and attempted first-degree murder. The district court entered convictions on those
two counts and imposed consecutive sentences of life and 180 months, respectively.
White appealed his convictions. He raised four claims on dire ct appeal, but none
related to alleged misconduct by the jury foreperson. See White I, 684 N.W.2d at 502. We
affirmed. Id. at 509.
4
Shortly after, White filed a petition for pos tconviction relief alleging, among other
claims, that the district court erred by failing to excuse the jury fo reperson on the ground
that she was not impartial and that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to request
a Schwartz hearing regarding the connection between the foreperson and T.H.1 The district
court rejected those claims, and we affirmed. White II, 711 N.W.2d at 108–12.
We rejected White’s ineffective assistan ce claim because White failed to produce
any evidence to show the jury foreperson was not impartial. Id. We acknowledged White’s
allegation that a police report stated that T.H. worked at the casino but found “no statement
or report mentioning such a statement in the district court record,” and White did not attach
the report.2 Id. at 112. But we observed that “[i]f [T.H.] was in fact employed at the casino
and the foreperson knew her, it is possible th at the foreperson had previous knowledge
about the case that prevented her from being impartial.” Id. In addition, we concluded that
White’s claim of juror misconduct was procedurally barred because White “knew or should
have known of these claims at the time of his direct appeal.” Id. at 109.
White’s federal habeas petition was denied in 2014, after which White hired a
private investigator. See White v. Dingle (White III), 757 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2014).
That investigator did little to no work for White, but White’s attorney refused to return the

1 The hearing procedure and the name Schwartz come from the case Schwartz v.
Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960).

2 In its decision rejecting White’s federa l habeas claim, the Eighth Circuit later
concluded that even with the police report, “[t]he trial reco rd contained no evidence that
[the foreperson] and [T.H.] knew each other, that [the foreperson] had prior knowledge of
the case, or that [the forepers on] could not be impartial.” White v. Dingle (White III),
757 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2014).
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investigative fee to White. White found a ne w investigator, but he was unable to contact
the jury foreperson, and the investigation stalled during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The investigation eventually restarted, however, and on March 12, 2021, the
investigator briefly spoke with the jury foreperson over the phone a bout T.H. The
conversation suggests that the jury foreperson may have known T.H. and White argues that
the jury foreperson seemed irritated with the investigator at times.
In 2022, White filed the postconviction petition at issue here and requested an
evidentiary hearing and a new tria l. In this petition, he asse rted that he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to a tr ial before an impartial jury and received ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. White argued that his investigator’s interview of
the jury foreperson establishe s that the foreperson knew T. H., and her agitation with his
private investigator is evid ence of the foreperson’s hostility toward White. White also
asserted that his trial counse l was ineffective because counsel did not try to remove the
foreperson from the jury and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
an issue about the juror’s impartiality on appeal.
The district court summarily denied th e second postconviction petition as time-
barred and procedurally barred.3

3 Claims are procedurally barred if they were raised on direct appeal, or if they were
known or should have been known but were not raised on direct appeal. State
v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). Because we conclude that White’s petition
is time-barred, we do not reach the district court’s alternative conclusion that the petition
was procedurally barred.
6
White appeals the denial of his second postconviction petition, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion when it summarily denied the petition.
ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s summary denial of a postconviction petition for an
abuse of discretion. Martin v. State, 969 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 2022). In so doing, we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
Eason v. State, 950 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Minn. 2020).
On appeal, White’s argument focuses on whether the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing his pe tition without an evidentiary h earing. But no hearing is
required if the claims are time-barred. Griffin v. State, 961 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Minn. 2021).
White was convicted in 2003, and we affirmed White’s conviction on August 6, 2004. His
conviction became final 90 days later—on November 4, 2004. See Moua v. State ,
778 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 2010) (discussing finality of convictions). In 2005, the
Legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2022), which set forth the 2-year time
bar and provided that convictions that were final before the date of the amendment would
be subject to a 2-year limitation effective August 1, 2005. See Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136,
art. 14, § 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1097–98 . Thus, July 31, 2007 was the last date that
White could have filed a tim ely postconviction petition. Th e parties agree that White
missed this deadline, making his petition untimely under subdivision 4(a).
Section 590.01, subdivision 4(b) (2022), how ever, provides five exceptions to the
2-year time bar in subdivision 4(a), including the interests-of-justice exception, which
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White invokes.4 This exception applies to petitions th at are not “frivolous” and when the
untimely consideration of the petition is in the “int erests of justice.” Caldwell v. State ,
976 N.W.2d 131, 141 (Minn. 2022); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (requiring
that the petitioner establish “to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous
and is in the interests of justice”). But the exception “relate[s] to the reason the petition
was filed after the 2–year time limit in subdivision 4(a), not the substantive claims in the
petition.” Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. 2012); Caldwell, 976 N.W.2d at
141. Put differently, to establish the interests of justice referred to in subdivision 4(b)(5),
the petitioner “must allege an injustice that caused the delay in filing the petition.” Hooper
v. State, 888 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Minn. 2016).
The district court found that White had not “identif[ied] an injustice that caused him
to miss subdivision 4(a)’s deadline.” We agree. The trial record contained evidence of the
potential connection between the jury foreperson and T.H. And White relied on his theory
that the two knew each other in his first petition for postconviction relief. Fifteen years
later, White renewed this theory, supported now with his investigator’s report. But he has
not identified an injustice th at caused that delay. See Rickert v. State , 795 N.W.2d 236,
242 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that the interests-of-justice exception was met when the trial

4 Under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2022), the interest s-of-justice exception
must have been invoked within 2 years of the date White kne w or should have known of
the claim. Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 558–60 (Minn. 2012). White first raised this
claim in his 2006 postconviction petition. See White II, 711 N.W.2d at 109, 112. But the
State did not invoke subd. 4(c), so it has forfeited the argument. Carlton v. State ,
816 N.W.2d 590, 601 (Minn. 2012) (“[T]he statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(c), is not jurisdictional and therefore is subject to [forfeiture] by the State.”).
8
transcript was not delivered until 2 days before the statute of limitations expired).
To be sure, White complains that he was denied a Schwartz hearing and that without
a Schwartz hearing, he has been unable to prove his claim of juror misconduct. But nothing
in the record suggests that those denials were improper or otherwise unjust.5
Similarly, White’s reliance on his struggl es with previous counsel and private
investigators is also misplaced because nothi ng in the record sugge sts that conduct of
counsel or the investigators was improper or unjust. See Hooper, 888 N.W.2d at 142.
Because White failed to establish an injustice that caused the delay in filing of his petition,
we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied White’s
second postconviction petition as untimely.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.

5 White argues that it was not his fault that he lacked evid ence to show juror
misconduct because courts have repeatedly denied him a Schwartz hearing. White argues
that Schwartz creates a circular standard: it requi res White to show evidence of juror
misconduct while also declining him a hearing to explore juror misconduct. The Schwartz
hearing balances the interests of litigants while also disincentivizing juror harassment. See
Schwartz, 104 N.W.2d at 303; see also Olberg v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 191 N.W.2d 418,
425 (Minn. 1971) (“Many cases may arise wh ere there is utterly no suspicion of jury
misconduct. It may be argued that in such situations a Schwartz hearing is possible only
after a juror has been contacted by the losing party. The answer to this argument is simply
that attorneys should not be allowed to contact and harass jurors who render verdicts of a
nonsuspicious nature.”). White’s failure to meet his burden to show prima facie evidence
of juror misconduct does not render the standard circular; it merely suggests that there was
no juror misconduct. See White III, 757 F.3d at 756 (concluding that there was no evidence
of bias when considering the police report). It is not unjust for a court to deny a Schwartz
hearing when the hearing is not warranted.