State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0663

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Clinton Daniel Mattingly,
Appellant.

Filed February 6, 2023
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-21-451

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

William T. Helwig, Carlton City Attorney, Sarah B. Helwig, Assistant City Attorney,
Rudy, Gassert, Yetka, Pritchett, & Helwig, A Fryberger Law Firm Practice Group, Cloquet,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Benjamin W. Koll, Robert H. Ambrose, Ambrose Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A Carlton County Sheriff’s Deputy watched a pickup truck that was towing a trailer
pull onto and move slowly down a highway’s shoulder before he stopped the truck and
discovered that its driver, Clinton Mattingly, was drunk. Mattingly challenges his
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consequent impaired- driving conviction, arguing that the district court should have
suppressed all evidence resulting from the traffic stop, which he asserts was
unconstitutional for lack of reasonable suspicion of any crime. He also argues that the
district court acted with partiality by considering facts not submitted as evidence at the
omnibus hearing. Because motorists violate the law by driving on the shoulder, except in
circumstances not relevant here, we hold that the deputy had reasonable suspicion to stop
Mattingly’s truck. And because the record does not support Mattingly’s assertion of
judicial misconduct, we reject his argument that he was denied his right to a fair hearing
administered by an impartial judge. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Clinton Mattingly drove his pickup truck past the parking lot of the Carlton County
Sheriff’s Office on Highway 45 (also named 3rd Street) late on a March night in 2021. The
truck towed a trailer hauling an all-terrain vehicle (ATV). Carlton County Deputy Sheriff
David Radzak was sitting in his patrol car waiting to leave the lot to enter the highway
when Mattingly’s pickup truck passed by. Deputy Radzak pulled onto the highway and
traveled behind the truck. Soon the deputy saw the truck signal a right turn, slow down,
and cross the fog line separating the lane of travel and the right shoulder. He watched the
truck continue slowly down the shoulder for about 20 seconds. Deputy Radzak activated
his squad car’s flashing red and blue overhead lights and pulled onto the shoulder behind
the truck.
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Mattingly stopped his truck and got out. He told Deputy Radzak that he thought the
straps securing the ATV had come loose. He said that he was about to reenter the roadway
but that the emergency lights prompted him to stop.
Deputy Radzak noticed that Mattingly was stumbling, slurring his speech, and
smelled of an alc oholic beverage. The deputy administered field sobriety tests, which
Mattingly failed. The state charged Mattingly, whose breath test revealed an alcohol
concentration of more than three times the per se impaired-driving limit of 0.08, with two
counts of second-degree impaired driving and one count of driving with a restricted license.
Mattingly moved the district court to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic
stop, arguing that the deputy lacked constitutional authority to stop him. The district court
held a contested omnibus hearing during which the only exhibit admitted into evidence was
dashcam video footage of the stop. Deputy Radzak testified that he turned on his
emergency lights to alert other motorists to avoid running into the slowing truck on the
shoulder, which he believed may have been stopping because of a mechanical issue. The
district court issued an order concluding that Deputy Radzak was not attempting to stop
Mattingly but was responding to circumstances that suggested Mattingly needed
assistance. The district court reasoned alternatively that the deputy had an articulable
reason to stop the truck. The district court’s order stated that it based its decision on its
“review of the squad video and all of the files, police reports, submitted briefs, the records
herein, and the arguments of counsel.”
Mattingly and the state proceeded with a stipulated-evidence trial under Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. The district court received additional
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evidence not presented in the omnibus hearing, consisting of police reports and the
chemical-test results, and it adjudicated Mattingly guilty of one count of second-degree
impaired driving.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Mattingly presents two arguments to contest the district court’s decision denying
his motion to suppress evidence resulting from the traffic stop. He first argues that the stop
violated his constitutional rights because the deputy seized him when he activated his
emergency lights without reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense. He next argues that the
district judge who denied the motion violated his constitutional rights by deciding the
motion out of partiality. Presented with a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress, we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). Both arguments fail under this
standard of review.
I
We are unpersuaded by Mattingly’s contention that Deputy Radzak lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop him. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect
an individual’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV;
Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d
353, 359 (Minn. 2004) ; cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). Police do not violate a
person’s right not to be unreasonably seized by stopping a person whom the officer
reasonably suspects was or may be involved in criminal conduct. State v. Diede, 795
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N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011). An officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic
stop if he sees a driver commit a traffic violation. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823
(Minn. 2004). For the following reasons, we are satisfied that Deputy Radzak had
reasonable suspicion to stop Mattingly’s truck, and we therefore do not address the district
court’s assistance-based justification for concluding that no traffic stop occurred.
Minnesota motorists may drive only on the roadway and may not cross the fog line
marking the lane of travel. Soucie v. Comm’ r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 464–65
(Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). They may not drive on the shoulder
except in circumstances not relevant here: “Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle
shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 1
(2020). A “roadway” includes only “that portion of a highway improved, designed, or
ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk or shoulder.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169.011, subd. 68 (2020). The legislature has carved out exceptions to the prohibition
against driving on the shoulder, such as to perform a U-turn or to operate certain buses.
Minn. Stat. §§ 169.19, subd. 2, .306 (2020). By leaving the roadway and operating on the
shoulder in a manner that meets no statutory exception, Mattingly engaged in driving
conduct for which a police officer could temporarily seize him by stopping his truck.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Mattingly’s assertion at oral argument that an
emergency exception applies. He relies on Minnesota Statutes section 169.18, subdivision
7(1) (2020), but his reliance is misplaced. That subdivision applies to roadways that have
“been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic” and prohibits a driver from
leaving his lane until he “first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety .”
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Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7. This lane-change statute does not expressly or implicitly
authorize a motorist to operate his vehicle on the shoulder for safety reasons. Although we
need not address the district court’s motorist- assistance rationale to justify the deputy’s
encounter with Mattingly, we observe that, if an emergency exception does exist and apply
here because Mattingly was experiencing a safety issue, the deputy had a reason to activate
his emergency lights wholly apart from reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense.
We are also not persuaded otherwise by Mattingly’s assertion that the district court
clearly erred by finding that Mattingly was driving erratically. The deputy did not stop the
truck based on erratic driving, and the findin g does not impact our reason for concluding
that the stop was justified. Mattingly’s assertion therefore at most reveals a harmless error.
II
We are particularly unpersuaded by Mattingly’s other contention, which is that the
district court judge decided the suppression motion with partiality. Having an impartial
judge is a basic protection of due process in the criminal justice system, and we review de
novo whether a defendant was denied that protection. State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238,
249, 253 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 2 (“A Judge Shall
Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially, Competently, and Diligently.”).
Mattingly’s argument on this issue is not compelling.
We begin our consideration of Mattingly’s serious allegation of judicial partiality
by presuming that the district court judge “will set aside collateral knowledge and approach
cases with a neutral and objective disposition.” Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 248–49 (quotation
omitted). This presumption exists because judges who administer bench trials, or make
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judgments in hearings outside of trial, will often examine and then reject evidence on
various grounds or will accept evidence for some purposes but reject it for others. The
presumption requires Mattingly to point to evidence of the judge ’s bias. See State v.
Burrell, 743 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. 2008). Mattingly builds his accusation of judicial
partiality on the district court’s allegedly basing its order denying his suppression motion
on its “review of the squad video and all of the files, police reports, submitted briefs, the
records herein, and the arguments of counsel” when the police reports should not have been
considered in the decision. This conflict between the order’s “review of” statement and the
evidence submitted during the hearing, argues Mattingly, reveals that the district judge
relied on improper evidence and had already made up his mind before considering the
hearing evidence.
The first problem with the argument is that the record undermines it. It is true that
the district court must base its suppression-motion decision on evidence submitted during
the suppression proceeding. State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 141 N.W.2d 3, 13 (Minn.
1965). But the record reveals that the state did not introduce the police reports as evidence
until March 2022, four months after the district court issued its November 2021 order
denying the suppression motion. This suggests that the district court’s two-page o rder
disposing of the motion appears to errantly include the police reports as material reviewed.
The second problem with the argument is that, even if the language reflects more than a
clerical error, a district judge’s basing his suppression decision on a police report in
addition to the proper evidence submitted in the suppression hearing is far more likely to
indicate simple legal error than unconstitutional judicial bias against the defendant.
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Mattingly does not argue that we should consider reversing the suppression order because
the district court based its decision on the wrong evidence (an argument that would fail
based on our de novo conclusion that the deputy’s stop was constitutionally valid). He
argues only that the district court’s stated bases reveal that it acted on the judge’s alleged
bias. We reject the argument.
Mattingly adds that the district court must have based its finding that his driving
conduct consisted of “erratic stopping and then starting” on the police reports because the
suppression-hearing evidence did not establish that Mattingly erratically stopped or started
his truck. But his argument fails because the police reports also do not mention erratic
stopping or starting.
The record does not show that the district court in fact relied on police reports to
reach its decision, and even if it did, Mattingly has failed to persuade us that errantly relying
on police reports would establish the district judge’s partiality against him.
Affirmed.