State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0667

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rafael Sharif Hassan, II,
Appellant.

Filed April 10, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-10106

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his felony conviction for making threats of violence, arguing
that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to
terrorize the victim or acted in reckless disregard of that risk. We affirm.
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FACTS
On April 21, 2020, appellant Rafael Sharif Hassan, II went to his mother’s house in
Minneapolis to visit his two daughters. Hassan’s mother, T.M., lived there with two of her
daughters and her significant other, V.R.
When Hassan’s daughters arrived, T.M. went outside to meet them and brought
them into the house. Hassan left the house and tried to get into the car with the girls’
mother, who refused to let him in and drove away. Hassan returned to the house and told
T.M. that he was leaving and taking his daughters with him. When she refused to let him
do so, Hassan “went off the deep end” and became verbally abusive. They began to argue,
and Hassan threw a punch that T.M. managed to avoid. He then reached into the front
waistband of his pants and told T.M., “I will kill you.” T.M. saw Hassan place his hand
on a gun in his waistband as he told her he was going to “take her out.” One of T.M.’s
daughters entered the room, and Hassan said he would “take [her] out too.” While Hassan
was threatening them, he kept his hand on the gun in his waistband. T.M. was “terrified”
and picked up a baseball bat to protect herself. She believed Hassan was serious because
it was “not the first time” he had threatened her. T.M. told Hassan to leave. He refused,
so T.M. called the police.
V.R. was outside on the front porch when he heard Hassan say, “B-tch, I’ll f-ck you
up.” V.R. went back inside the house and saw Hassan “with his hands balled up like he
was about to do something.” Hassan yelled something at V.R. like “come outside” and “I
got something for you.” T.M. saw that Hassan still had his hand on the gun in his waistband
when he made these statements. V.R. then grabbed Hassan by the arm and took him
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outside. V.R. was not worried or scared for himself, but he was concerned for T.M. and
her daughter. He told Hassan, “Whatever you think you are about to do to me you better
go ahead and try it now.” Hassan backed away and again reached for his waistband, telling
V.R. to “come around the corner.” Eventually, Hassan walked away.
Minneapolis police officers responded to T.M.’s call. They found Hassan walking
near the house and arrested him. A search incident to the arrest did not reveal a gun or
other type of weapon. An investigator interviewed T.M. and V.R. over the next two days.
T.M. told the investigator that Hassan threatened her, her daughter, and V.R., and that she
believed Hassan had a gun. V.R. told the investigator that Hassan threatened to kill him.
Both T.M. and V.R. stated that Hassan repeatedly put his hand in his waistband, under his
shirt. No gun was ever recovered.
Hassan was charged with making threats of violence and felony domestic assault.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which T.M., V.R., one of the arresting officers, and
the investigator testified consistent with the facts described above. Hassan also testified,
telling a conflicting story and denying that he threatened to kill anyone or that he had a
gun. The jury found Hassan guilty of making threats of violence and not guilty of domestic
assault. The district court imposed a 36-month prison sentence.
Hassan appeals.
DECISION
Under Minnesota law, “[w]hoever threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any
crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk
of causing such terror . . .” is guilty of making a threat of violence. Minn. Stat. § 609.713,
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subd. 1 (2018). Intent to terrorize is generally proved using circumstantial evidence “by
drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the
circumstances,” and from a “victim’s reaction to a threat.” State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d
131, 136 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013). A
defendant acts in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror when he takes “deliberate
action in disregard of a known, substantial risk” of threatening another. State v. Bjergum,
771 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17,
2009).
Hassan argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intended to terrorize T.M. or acted in reckless disreg ard of that risk. The parties
agree that proof of Hassan’s intent turned on circumstantial evidence. We agree.
In assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, w e engage in a two-part
analysis. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Minn. 2010). First, we identify the
circumstances proved, deferring to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations and
weighing of the evidence. Id. at 473. Circumstances proved include evidence consistent
with the verdict and uncontroverted evidence presented by the state that does not contradict
the verdict. State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 473 (Minn. App. 2019). The absence of
evidence is not a circumstance proved. Id.
Second, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Palmer, 803
N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We do not view a circumstance proved
in isolation; we consider whether the circumstances proved on the whole are consistent
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with guilt and inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Hawes, 801
N.W.2d 659, 669 (Minn. 2011). And we do not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between
reasonable inferences. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013).
The circumstances proved at trial consist of the following. Hassan and T.M. had a
heated argument about whether Hassan could leave the house with his daughters. Hassan
tried to punch T.M., reached into the front of his waistband, put his hand on a gun, and told
her, “I will kill you.” He also stated , “B-tch, I’ll f-ck you up,” and told her that he was
going to “take [her] out.” T.M. was so terrified that she grabbed a baseball bat for
protection and called the police. She believed Hassan was serious because it was “not the
first time” he had threatened her. V.R. overheard one of Hassan’s statements. And when
V.R. entered the room, he saw Hassan “with his hands balled up like he was about to do
something.” As V.R. forcibly removed Hassan from the house , Hassan kept his hand on
the gun and challenged V.R. to “come around the corner.”
Having identified the circumstances proved, we next evaluate the reasonableness of
the inferences that might be drawn from them . Hassan twice declared an intention to kill
T.M., told her he would “f-ck [her] up,” and tried to punch her. T.M. believed his threat
was real. When viewed in the context of the circumstances proved as a whole, including
Hassan’s other words and actions and T.M.’s reactions, we conclude that the only
reasonable inference to be drawn is that Hassan threatened to kill T.M. with the purpose of
terrorizing her, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror. Hassan’s
proposed alternative hypothesis —that his statements merely expressed “transitory
frustration and anger” —is unreas onable when the circumstances proved are considered
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together. Hassan wanted to take his children away from T.M.’s house. When she refused
to let him do so, Hassan responded with verbal and physical acts that occurred both inside
and outside of the house and included express threats of bodily harm against three people.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we are not persuaded that there is a
reasonable inference of innocence. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to
reasonably conclude that Hassan was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of making threats
of violence against T.M.
Affirmed.