State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0674

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eric John Peterson,
Appellant.

Filed February 27, 2023
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-21-675

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Amber Pederson, Assistant County
Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Conn olly, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of first-degree driving while impaired and
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, arguing that the district court erred by
denying his pretrial motion to suppress. We affirm.
2
FACTS
On June 25, 2021, a St. Louis County Sheriff’s Deputy was on patrol near a gas
station and saw appellant Eric John Peterson putting gas in his car. The deputy recognized
Peterson from previous encounters and ran a license-plate query on the Minnesota Driver
and Vehicle Services (DVS) system. The query revealed that Peterson’s driving status was
canceled-inimical to public safety (canceled-IPS). After Peterson drove away, the deputy
initiated a traffic stop. The deputy searched Peterson’s vehicle and found drug
paraphernalia and methamphetamine. Blood-test results later revealed that Peterson was
under the influence of methamphetamine. Respondent State of Minnesota charged
Peterson with one count of first-degree driving while impaired and one count of fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance.
Peterson moved to suppress the evidence found as a result of the traffic stop,
asserting that the stop was unconstitutional. The district court held a contested evidentiary
hearing on that issue. The deputy testified that the DVS system indicated that Peterson’s
driving status was can celed-IPS. That testimony was supported by the district court’s
receipt of a certified copy of Peterson’s driving record, which indicated that his license was
canceled-IPS when the stop occurred . The district court concluded that the information
from the DVS provided a lawful basis for the traffic stop and denied the motion to suppress.
Peterson agreed to stipulate to the prosecution’s case under Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4, thereby preserving his right to obtain appellate
review of the district court’s pretrial ruling. The district court found Peterson guilty as
charged and sentenced him to serve 54 months in prison. Peterson appeals.
3
DECISION
Peterson contends that his convictions must be reversed because the state failed to
prove that his driving privileges were “actually canceled” at the time of the traffic stop. He
asserts that “the narrow dispositive issue before this Court is whether the State proved that
[his] license was canceled—[IPS] ” at the time of the traffic stop.
The parties proceeded under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, which allows a
defendant to stipulate to the prosecution’s case to obtain appellate review of a pretrial
ruling. In doing so, “[t]he defendant and the prosecutor must acknowledge that the pretrial
issue is dispositive.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(c). Peterson argues that the parties
agreed that the dispositive issue on appeal would be whether the state proved that he was
driving with a canceled license at the time of the traffic stop. He notes his lawyer’s
statement in district court that “[w]e are preserving the issue as to whether or not [Peterson
was] actually . . . canceled as [Inimical] to Public Safety” and that “if the Court of Appeals,
in fact, determines that [Peterson] was not canceled, then there’s no basis for the stop.”
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether Peterson’s traffic stop was
unconstitutional. In determining that issue, we apply well-established constitutional law
governing traffic stops and reject Peterson’s assertion that if his license “was not canceled
then there’s no basis for the stop.” As explained below, that is a misstatement of law,
which does not bind this court.1 See State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn.
1990) (“[I]t is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law,

1 We therefore do not address Peterson’s five arguments regarding why the record is
inadequate to prove that his driver’s license was “actually” canceled-IPS.
4
and that responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel’s oversights, lack of research, failure
to specify issues or to cite relevant authorities.” (quotation omitted)).
The United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution prohibit
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
But a police officer may initiate a limited, investigatory stop “if the officer has reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn.
App. 2012) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). “The factual basis required
to support an investigatory stop is minimal.” Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 703
N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing State v. McKinley, 232 N.W.2d 906, 909
(Minn. 1975)).
“When an officer observes a violation of the traffic laws, there is reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle.” State v. Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 2019). But
the “actual violation of the vehicle and traffic laws need not be detectable.” State v. Pike,
551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996). The police need only “show that the stop was not
the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court’s legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
496, 502 (Minn. 2008) . We review the undisputed facts and “determine, as a matter of
law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221
(Minn. 1992).
5
Peterson argues that his traffic stop was unlawful because , although the arresting
officer “testified that the computer database indicated that [his] license was canceled, the
[s]tate failed to provide any evidence establishing that the information in the database was
correct.” We are not aware of authority providing that an officer’s reliance on current DVS
records cannot provide a reasonable basis for a traffic stop unless the state later proves that
the records were correct. Indeed, Peterson does not cite such authority. Instead, he relies
on his assertion that this court is bound by the parties ’ purported agreement that “if the
Court of Appeals, in fact, determines that [Peterson’ license] was not canceled, then there’s
no basis for the stop.”
Traffic stops are routinely based on DVS record checks conducted from police
squad cars. See, e.g., Pike, 551 N.W.2d at 921-22 (upholding traffic stop based on officer’s
license-plate check, which revealed the registered owner’s license was revoked). And the
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is constitutional for an officer to make a brief,
investigatory, [traffic] stop of a vehicle if the officer knows that the owner of the vehicle
has a revoked license,” as long as the officer is “unaware of any facts which would render
unreasonable an assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle.” Id. at 920. Under the
reasoning of Pike, we similarly conclude that it is constitutional for an officer to make a
traffic stop based on current DVS records, so long as the officer is unaware of any facts
that would make an assumption that the records are accurate unreasonable. The record
does not reveal any basis to conclude that the deputy in this case was aware of such facts.
We note that even if the DVS records in this case were incorrect, it does not
necessarily follow that the resulting stop was invalid because “honest, reasonable mistakes
6
of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d
243, 254 (Minn. 2003). So long as the deputy was unaware of any facts reasonably
suggesting that the DVS records regarding Peterson’s license status were inaccurate, his
reliance on incorrect DVS records would constitute an unobjectionable mistake of fact.
Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that the deputy “had a reasonable
articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop,” that the deputy acted “with a good faith
reliance on the accuracy of the data on his squad computer,” and that “even if the driving
status was reported incorrectly, it would qualify as a reasonable mist ake of fact and not
invalidate the stop.”
Peterson submitted a pro se brief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in district court. That issue was not addressed in the district court’s pretrial order
denying the motion to suppress. Thus, it is not properly before this court. See S tate v.
Sterling, 782 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that under Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 4, our “review is limited to the pretrial order that denied the motion to
suppress”). Moreover, Peterson’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is based on his
mistaken belief that the traffic stop was unlawful if the state failed to prove that his driving
privileges were actually canceled at the time of the stop. As explained above, abs ent a
showing that the officer’s reliance on the accuracy of the DVS records was unreasonable,
the records provided a lawful basis for the traffic stop, regardless of their accuracy.
Affirmed.