State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0695

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott Solon Schaefer-Bonovsky,
Appellant.

Filed May 15, 2023
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-21-2370

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting
evidence of appellant’s prior domestic conduct against the victim as relationship evidence
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under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2022). Because the district court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting the challenged evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Scott Solon Schaefer -Bonovsky and H.W. grew up together. They
“reconnect[ed]” in December 2017 and began a relationship. H.W. and Schaefer-Bonovsky
broke up, but they reunited in December 2020, and H.W. “immediately” began living with
Schaefer-Bonovsky in Avon. Before her relationship with Schaefer- Bonovsky, H.W. had
two children with A.J.
In December 2021, a jury convicted Schaefer -Bonovsky of one count of stalking
under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a) (2020), and seven counts of domestic assault under
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2020); all offenses involved H.W. and occurred between
January and March 2021. The following summarizes the evidence received during the jury
trial.
Around January 17, 2021, H.W.’s employer fired her for poor attendance.
Schaefer-Bonovsky picked up H.W. from work, and on the drive home, they began to
argue. Schaefer-Bonovsky accused H.W. of “cheating on him,” which H.W. denied.
Schaefer-Bonovsky was “not letting the cheating go” and told H.W. that he did not believe
H.W. got fired for “having bad attendance.” H.W. was “sick of it,” so she lied and said she
had cheated. Schaefer-Bonovsky “slapped [H.W.] across the face” and “hit [her] twice on
both sides of [her] face and by [her] ears.”
After the January 17 incident, Schaefer-Bonovsky would not allow H.W. to “be on
a phone call without him by [her] side.” Also, H.W. could not move freely around the
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apartment “most of the time” because Schaefer -Bonovsky used locks on doors inside the
apartment for which H.W. “couldn’t have a key.” In addition, Schaefer -Bonovsky put
“holes . . . in the wall with drills, hammers, screwdrivers” to “scare [H.W.] into doing stuff
that [she] didn’t want to do.”
On February 4, 2021, Schaefer-Bonovsky told H.W. that he was upset because she
did not respect him as much as she did A.J., the father of H.W.’s children.
Schaefer-Bonovsky “squirted [lubricant] all over” H.W.’s clothes, and H.W. “said some
things to . . . make [Schaefer-Bonovsky] upset.” Schaefer-Bonovsky grabbed H.W.’s arm,
pushed her down on the bed, headbutted her, and slapped her on the side of her face. H.W.
covered her face with her hands, and Schaefer-Bonovsky purposely hit H.W.’s hands so
that her knuckles would “drag into [her] eye sockets,” resulting in “black and blue eyes.”
H.W. also had bruising down her arm and injuries to her lip and nose.
On February 21, 2021, H.W. told Schaefer-Bonvosky that she wanted to attend her
son’s birthday party at A.J.’s house without Schaefer-Bonovsky. Schaefer-Bonovsky told
H.W. she “couldn’t leave the house unless” he was with her. H.W. “told him [she] was
going to leave regardless” and “called him names.” Schaefer-Bonovsky choked H.W.,
slapped her in the face, and split her lip.
On March 22, 2021, Schaefer-Bonovsky and H.W. argued over H.W. “wanting to
leave.” Schaefer-Bonovsky “choked [H.W.] up against the closet wall,” and she responded
by “hit[ting] him right in the forehead.” Schaefer-Bonovs ky slapped H.W., which caused
her lip to bleed. H.W. left the apartment when Schaefer-Bonovsky’s mother, who lived
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below them, came to “get [H.W.] out.” H.W. later returned to the apartment, and
Schaefer-Bonovsky “apologized.”
On April 2, 2021, H.W. moved out of the apartment she shared with
Shaefer-Bonovsky. On April 5, H.W. contacted a high -school acquaintance, who was a
sheriff’s deputy, and “mentioned some instances of domestic violence.” The sheriff’s
deputy arranged a meeting for H.W. at her local police department for later the same day,
but H.W. did not attend. Four days later, H.W. “changed her mind ” and gave a statement
to a local law-enforcement officer describing the physical violence she experienced during
her relationship with Schaefer-Bonovsky. At the time of her statement, H.W. did not have
any physical injuries or photos of her injuries. She explained that Schaefer-Bonovsky had
“deleted” the photos from her phone.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Schaefer-Bonovsky with one count of
stalking and seven counts of domestic assault. Before trial, the state moved to admit
evidence of two domestic assaults from 2018 and two violations of a domestic-abuse
no-contact order (DANCO) as relationship evidence under Minn. S tat. § 634.20. At a
hearing on the motion, Schaefer-Bonovsky objected to the proposed relationship evidence
as lacking probative value and being unfairly prejudicial.
The district court granted the state’s motion to admit the relationship evidence. The
district court determined that the relationship evidence was “probative on the issue of the
victim’s credibility and . . . helpful in establishing the relationship between the victim and
the defendant” and would “place the charged events in context.” The district court reasoned
that the relationship evidence “may be particularly helpful . . . in assessing the credibility
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of the witnesses in light of the fact that the victim’s report of [the 2021] offenses to law
enforcement was delayed and physical evidence of the alleged assaults is lacking.”
At trial, H.W. testified about two 2018 domestic assaults. On May 25, 2018,
Schaefer-Bonovsky hit H.W. on “the side of [her] head multiple different times,” “choked
[her] to the point where [she] urinated,” and punched her eye , causing it to swell shut. On
May 28, 2018, Schaefer-Bonovsky “slapped [H.W.] in the face” and “choked [her] again”
so that she urinated. The district court admitted photographs taken of H.W.’s injuries on
May 28, 2018, along with a text message including more photographs from the same day.
A DANCO was issued after the May 2018 incidents, yet H.W. testified that
Schaefer-Bonovsky called her twice while the DANCO was in effect.
In addition to H.W., the state called the following witnesses: the sheriff’s deputy
who spoke with H.W. on April 5, the police officer who took H.W.’s statement, and an
expert on domestic violence. Schaefer-Bonovsky did not testify or call any witnesses.
The jury ret urned guilty verdicts on all charges. In a special verdict, the jury also
found that Schaefer-Bonovsky had five or more prior felony convictions and that the
present offenses were committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct. The district court
imposed an enhanced sentence of 102 months in prison on Schaefer -Bonovsky’s stalking
conviction and entered judgments of conviction on all seven counts of domestic assault.
Schaefer-Bonovsky appeals.
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DECISION
Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting,
as relationship evidence, four instances of domestic conduct between him and H.W. that
occurred in 2018.
In general, evidence of prior criminal offenses unrelated to the crime for which a
person is on trial is inadmissible. State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965); see
also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) (generally excluding evidence of “another crime, wrong, or
act”). An exception exists for “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic conduct . . . unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20; see State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004)
(adopting Minn. Stat. § 634.20 as a rule of evidence). “Domestic conduct” includes, among
other things, “evidence of domestic abuse” and “violation[s] of a domestic abuse no contact
order.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
The supreme court has held that “evidence of similar conduct in domestic abuse
trials is relevant and admissible unless it should be excluded for the reasons listed” in Minn.
Stat. § 634.20. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 159. This evidence, as described in Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20, “is commonly referred to as relationship evidence.”
1 State v. Matthews,

1 We note that relationship evidence under section 634.20 refers to “[e]vidence of domestic
conduct,” even though relationship evidence in the context of Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) refers
to “character evidence that may be offered to show the strained relationship between the

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779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). Appellate courts review the admission of relationship
evidence for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 553. The appellant “must prove that the admission
of evidence was erroneous and prejudicial.” Loving, 775 N.W.2d at 879. Appellate courts
“will reverse the district court’s ruling if the error substantially influenced the jury ’s
decision.” Id.
In his brief to this court, Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that (1) the relationship
evidence “had little probative value”; (2) any probative value was “substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”; and (3) “there is a reasonable possibility
that the improperly admitted relationship evidence substantially affected the jury’s
verdict.” We address these arguments in turn.
A. Probative Value
Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that the “relationship evidence had little probative
value” because this was “not a case that was difficult to prosecute,” such as one “where the
complainant claims she does not remember the events.” We disagree that the probative
value of relationship evidence is tied to the difficulty of a case.
The probative value of relationship evidence is well established by caselaw. The
supreme court has recognized the “inherent” probative value “of evidence of past acts of
violence committed by the same defendant against the same victim.” State v. Williams,
593 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. 1999). “Domestic abuse is unique in that it typically occurs
in the privacy of the home, it frequently involves a pattern of activity that may escalate

accused and the victim [and] is relevant to establishing motive and intent,” State v. Loving,
775 N.W.2d 872, 880 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
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over time, and it is often underreported.” McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161. Thus, under Minn.
Stat. § 634.20, “evidence of prior conduct between the accused and the alleged
victim . . . may be offered to illuminate the history of the relationship, that is, to put the
crime charged in the context of the relationship between the two.” Id. at 159. In State v.
Andersen, we determined that evidence of the defendant’s “verbal[] and physical[] abuse[]”
of the victim “earlier in their relationship” had “obvious probative value” because it
“informed the jury of the nature of their relationship, the times that [the victim] felt afraid
of [the defendant], and the times that [the defendant] attempted to manipulate, control, and
restrain her.” 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017); see also State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d
635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (determining that evidence that the defendant twice violated an
order for protection was “probative of a material fact, namely the history of [the defendant
and victim’s] relationship”); State v. Lindsey , 755 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. App. 2008)
(stating that evidence establishing the relationship between the victim and the defendant
has probative value). Like the relationship evidence admitted in Andersen, H.W.’s
testimony about the 2018 abuse by Schaefer -Bonovsky and about his DANCO violations
provided context for their relationship.
The district court also determined that the 2018 relationship evidence tended to
prove H.W.’s credibility. At trial, Schaefer-Bonovsky tried to discredit H.W. by arguing
that she repeatedly failed to call the police and that her delay in reporting showed the
assaults “didn’t happen.” Thus, the evidence of Schaefer-Bonovsky’s 2018 abuse was
probative of H.W.’s credibility. See Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757 (concluding that
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relationship evidence that helped the jury judge witness credibility “had significant
probative value”).
Schaefer-Bonovsky contends that “it is unclear how acts of domestic conduct nearly
three years earlier put the charged crimes in context” or made H.W. “more credible, unless
the jury engaged in impermissible bad character reasoning.” Minnesota courts, however,
have upheld the admission of relationship evidence and determined it was probative even
though it occurred up to nine years befor e the charged offense. See, e.g., State v. Benton,
858 N.W.2d 535, 538, 542 (Minn. 2015) (affirming the admission of the defendant’s acts
of domestic abuse against his sister and ex-girlfriend as relationship evidence even though
the acts occurred six or seven years earlier); State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 724, 730
(Minn. App. 2014) (affirming the admission of the defendant’s acts of domestic abuse
against an ex-girlfriend as relationship evidence even though the acts occurred about four
and nine years before the charged crime).
In sum, evidence about Schaefer-Bonovsky’s 2018 domestic assaults and DANCO
violations had probative value because the evidence showed the nature of H.W. and
Schaefer-Bonovksy’s relationship and was relevant to H.W.’s credibility.
B. Danger of Unfair Prejudice
Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that the danger of unfair prejudice was high because the
evidence of Schaefer- Bonovsky’s 2018 assaults of H.W. and DANCO violations “could
only have served to persuade the jury that . . . [Schaefer-Bonovsky] must have acted in
conformity with that character by assaulting [H.W.] again” in 2021.
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“When balancing the probative value against the potential prejudice, unfair
prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather,
unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair
advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted). “Evidence that is probative,
though it may arouse the passions of the jury, will still be admitted unless the tendency of
the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means overwhelms its legitimate probative force.”
State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478-79 (Minn. 2005).
We conclude that the relationship evidence admitted against Schaefer-Bonovsky
was not unfairly prejudicial. Before the relationship evidence was introduced at trial, the
district court twice gave a cautionary instruction that the evidence was “being offered for
the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationship between”
Schaefer-Bonovsky and H.W. and that the jury was “not to convict [Schaefer-Bonovsky]
based on [his] conduct” from 2018. During the final jury instructions, the district court read
the cautionary instruction a third time.
Minnesota courts have repeatedly upheld the admission of relationship evidence
when paired with cautionary instructions. See, e.g., Benton, 858 N.W.2d at 542; Andersen,
900 N.W.2d at 441-42. Here, the district court “minimized any potential prejudice” to
Schaefer-Bonovsky by providing several cautionary instructions about the relationship
evidence. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757; s ee Ware, 856 N.W.2d at 730 (“[T]he danger of
unfair prejudice in this case is low because the district court gave the jury a cautionary
instruction.”). And appellate courts “must presume that juries follow instructions given by
the [district] court.” Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 550.
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In addition, the number of instances admitted as relationship evidence was limited.
The supreme court has upheld the admission of relationship evidence involving up to 12
prior incidents of domestic conduct. Id. at 553. H.W.’s testimony was limited to four prior
incidents involving Schaefer-Bonovsky and accounted for only a small portion of the trial
transcript.
Thus, based on the district court’s three cautionary instructions and the limited
number of prior instances offered as relationship evidence, the danger of unfair prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value.
C. Substantial Influence on the Jury’s Verdict
Because we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
2018 incidents as relationship evidence, we need not consider Schaefer-Bonvosky’s
argument that the relationship evidence substantially influenced the jury’s decision. But
even if we assume the district court abused its discretion by admitting the relationship
evidence, we would nonetheless conclude that the relationship evidence did not
substantially affect Schaefer-Bonovsky’s rights.
To obtain relief on appeal, Schaefer-Bonovsky must show he was prejudiced by the
relationship evidence. See Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 755 (stating that appellant has the
burden to establish prejudice). “A conviction obtained through erroneous admission of
evidence must be reversed if there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Benton, 858 N.W.2d at 541 (quotation
omitted). In determining whether the admission of relationship evidence significantly
affected the verdict, appellate courts “consider [1] whether the district court provided the
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jury a cautionary instruction, [2] whether the State dwelled on the evidence in closing
argument, and [3] whether the evidence of guilt was strong.” State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d
263, 274 (Minn. 2017). We address Schaefer-Bonovsky’s arguments in light of these three
considerations.
First, Schaefer-Bonovsky argues the district court’s cautionary instructions were
“insufficient to defeat the jury’s natural inclination to consider the prior assaults as
propensity evidence.” As detailed above, the district court provided three cautionary
instructions throughout the trial, and we assume that the jury followed these instructions.
See Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 550.
Second, Schaefer-Bonovsky argues the “relationship evidence was a critical part of
the state’s case.” We disagree. The state did not dwell on the relationship evidence in
closing argument. See Benton, 858 N.W.2d at 542 (determining that the admission of
relationship evidence was harmless where the state made “sparse use of relationship
evidence in closing argument”). The prosecuting attorney only broadly referred to the 2018
incidents between Schaefer-Bonovsky and H.W during its closing arguments. The
prosecuting attorney argued that “[i]n context of this relationship and the context of their
history together, . . . Schaefer-Bonovsky knew that [H.W.] would be in fear, and that is
what it caused whenever he slapped her.”
The prosecuting attorney also reminded the jury that during the 2018 phone calls
violating the DANCO, Schaefer-Bonovsky tried to “encourage [H.W.] not to call law
enforcement ever again.” The prosecuting attorney argued, “That’s the reason [H.W.]
didn’t ultimately call law enforcement in these instances.” The prosecuting attorney
13
cautioned the jury on rebuttal that “the incidents from 2018 are not to be used by you to
determine any type of guilt for [Schaefer- Bonovsky]” but could be used “to help you
determine the credibility of [H.W.].”
Third, the record evidence supporting Schaefer-Bonovsky’s convictions was
relatively strong. H.W.’s testimony about the 2021 assaults was detailed and largely
consistent with her prior statements to law enforcement. The state offered photographs of
Schaefer-Bonovsky’s apartment that showed additional locks and holes in the wall. The
state also offered text messages between Schaefer -Bonovsky and H.W. from March 22,
2021. In the text messages, H.W. said, “I’m not gonna be abused anymore,” and “I’ve been
begging and asking you to stop.” As a result, even if the district court erred in admitting
relationship evidence, any error was harmless. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“ Any error
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
In sum, for the reasons discussed, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting relationship evidence against Schaefer -Bonovsky. Alternatively,
we conclude that any error in admitting the relationship evidence was harmless.
Affirmed.