State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0697

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Benjamin Jacob Hunt,
Appellant.

Filed April 10, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-20-770

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Daniel A. McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Julia A. Forbes, Assistant County Attorney,
Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles F. Clippert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal after conviction of conspiracy to commit second-degree
possession of a controlled substance , appellant argues that the district court abused its
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discretion when it denied his motion for a downward durational sentencing departure. We
affirm.
FACTS
On May 11, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Benjamin Jacob
Hunt with one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree possession of a controlled
substance, one count of aiding and abetting first -degree possession of a controlled
substance, and one count of conspiracy to import a controlled substance across state
borders. The complaint allege d that Hunt acquired money for codefendants to travel to
Colorado to obtain methamphetamine. When the co defendants were apprehended ,
arresting officers recovered four bags of methamphetamine . The Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension analyzed one of the bags and determined that it contained
approximately one quarter pound of methamphetamine. The complaint d id not specify the
total amount of methamphetamine recovered by the arresting officers. According to the
complaint, Hunt provided a state ment to law enforcement officers in which he admitted
funding the trip to Colorado because it would be cheaper to purchase methamphetamine in
Colorado than in Minnesota. Hunt also told officers that he and the other individuals
involved intended to pay for half of the methamphetamine and for the methamphetamine
dealer in Colorado to “front” the remaining half.
On November 4, 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hunt pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to commit second-degree possession of a controlled substance, and t he state
dismissed the remaining charges. The state agreed to recommend that Hunt be sentenced
in accordance with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. At the plea hearing, Hunt
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admitted the necessary elements of the possession offense, st ated he funded the trip to
Colorado, and acknowledged his understanding that the transaction in Colorado involved
at least twenty -five grams of methamphetamine.
A sentencing guidelines worksheet and a presentence investigation report were both
filed with t he district court before the sentencing hearing. The worksheet showed Hunt
had a criminal history score of fifteen and indicated a presumptive commitment to prison
for 111 months. Hunt moved for both a downward dispositional and downward durational
departure. In support of the durational departure request, Hunt argued that his offense was
significantly less serious tha n the typical offense because he merely provided financial
assistance and the transaction did not involve guns or gangs. Hunt also submitted letters
of support with the district court that discussed his character.
The district court considered the arguments and submissions and determined that
Hunt did not establish a sufficiently compelling basis for a downward durational departure.
The district court noted that , although Hunt characterized his conduct as merely financial,
the offense involved “about a half pound or so of methamphetamine” and “[p]eople don’t
fund that type of a drug expedition for personal use so it is reas onable to infer that there
was the expectation of an economic benefit from this arrangement.” The district court
stated that it was “clear from the record that but for Mr. Hunt putting up the funding here,
this crime wouldn ’t have happened.” In addition, the district court reasoned that had the
offense involved firearms or gangs , other “statutes and sentencing provisions” could have
applied that “carry additional sanctions.” Thus, the district court rejected that argument.
Finally, the district court considered the letters, but did not conclude that the opinions
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offered in the them supported departure because “at least two of [the letters] look like they
were actually written for a different case ,” “[i]t wasn’t always clear whether the author of
each letter actually knew Mr. Hunt ,” and the authors merely offered an “opinion based on
other people’s opinion” without “any first-hand knowledge of Mr. Hunt whatsoever.”
The district court denied the dispositional departure request based on its finding that
Hunt was not particularly amenable to probation. The district court denied the durational
departure motion because the offense was not significantly less serious than a typical
offense. The district court imposed the presumptive sentence, committing Hunt to prison
for 111 months. Hunt appeals the denial of his durational departure request.
DECISION
Hunt contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
downward durational departure motion, arguing that the offense wa s significantly less
serious than the typical offense because his role was merely financial.1 Because the district
court’s decision was not against logic or the facts in the record, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied Hunt’s durational departure motion.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
offenses and seek to “maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predi ctabilit y

1 Hunt also argues that the district court erred in denying his durational departure request
because the district court failed to adequately consider the letters of support that he filed .
These letters, however, addressed Hunt’s character ; they did not concern any offense-
related characteristics. It is well -established that only offense -related characteristics can
support durational departures. E.g., State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).
For this reason, the district court could not have er red by giving inadequate weight to the
comments in these letters when denying the durational departure request .
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in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2018). A district court must pronounce a
sentence within the presumptive sentencing range “unless there exist identifiable,
substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.1 (2018) ; see also State v. Walker , 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App.
2018). But even if substantial and compelling circumstances exist, a district court is not
required to depart from the guidelines. State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981) .
In determining whether to grant a downward durational departure, a district court must
consider whether the defendant ’s conduct was “significantly less serious than that typically
involved in the commission of the offense.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 624 (quotation
omitted). When a defendant’s actions fit squarely within the conduct prohibited by the
statute, the offense is not significantly less serious than a typical offense. State v. Rund,
896 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2017) .
We review a district court’s decision on a departure motion for an abuse of
discretion. E.g., Dillon v. State , 781 N.W.2d 588, 595 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied
(Minn. July 20, 2010) (concluding that if “the district court has identified proper grounds
justifying a challenged departure, we review its decision whether to depart for an abuse of
discretion” (emphasis omitted)). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is
against logic or the facts in the record. State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn.
2017). We are “extremely deferential” to a district court ’s decision whether to impose a
departure, Dillon, 781 N.W.2d at 595- 96, and “we cannot simply substitute our judgment
for that of the [district] court,” State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. 1999); see also
Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7 (stating that appellate court will reverse departure decisions only
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in “a rare case”). When a district court imposes a presumptive sentence, this court “may
not interfere with the [district] court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows
the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before
making a determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80- 81 (Minn. App. 1985) .
In this case, Hunt admitted that he paid for codefendant s2 to travel to Colorado to
obtain methamphetamine. The district court reasoned that Hunt played an important role,
standing to gain economically from the anticipated sale of the methamphetamine obtained .
The district court, therefore, concluded that Hunt’s financial assistance was the but -for
cause of the offense. Hunt argues that the district court abused its discretion based on the
more lenient sentences that his codefendants received. We are not persuaded. The
guidelines depend on a person’s criminal history, e.g., Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.A.3 (2019)
(“[t]he severity of the sanction should increase in direct proportion to an increase in offense
severity or the convicted felon’s criminal history, or both”), and Hunt had a criminal history
score of fif teen, which was higher than his codefendant s’ criminal history scores. More
importantly, Hunt’s brief points out that the codefendants received more lenient sentences
because the district court granted dispositional departures to those individuals. There fore,
a comparison to Hunt’s codefendants does not support reversing the denial of his durational

2 To the extent that portions of Hunt’s brief can be construed to argue that the district court
abused its discretion because the offense did not involve firearms or gangs, we remain
unconvinced. Hunt does not explain to this court and did not explain to the district court
the basis for his assumption that a typical second-degree possession offense involves gangs
or guns, which could constitute an aggravating factor rather than a typical characteristic of
the offense. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b(5) ( 2019) (listing aggravating factors for
drug offenses). Given the argument as presented, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s decision not to depart on this basis.
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departure motion. We conclude that the denial of Hunt’s departure request was not against
logic or the uncontested facts in the record. Based on the record before this court, Hunt
has not shown that this is one of those rare instances in which the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.
Affirmed.