In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. R. J. and B. J. J., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0708

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. R. J. and B. J. J., Parents.

Filed October 31, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-JV-17-357

Miles John Ringsred, Duluth Minnesota (for appellant mother A.R.J.)

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Benjamin M. Stromberg, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health & Human
Services Department)

Tess V. Jacobson, Duluth, Minnesota (for child L.J.J.)

Joan Mahle, Duluth, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant-mother A.R.J. challenges the district court’s order summarily denying her
petition to reestablish parental rights to one of her children following the voluntary

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
termination of her parental rights. She argues that the district court erred because (1) certain
provisions of the reestablishment -of-parental-rights statute , Minnesota Statutes section
260C.329 (2020), do not apply in the context of a voluntary termination of parental rights
and (2) even if those provisions are applied, she established grounds to reestablish her
parental rights, or at least a prima facie case, entitling her to an evidentiary hearing. A.R.J.
also argues that the district court erred by denying her req uest for visitation and that this
court should order visitation and contact. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2016, respondent St. Louis County Public Health & Human Services
Department petitioned the district court to adjudicate as children in need of protection or
services (CHIPS) the two children of A.R.J. and father B.J.J. The children, L.J. (born in
2010) and N.J. (born in 2012), were removed from the home, placed in foster care, and
later adjudicated CHIPS. After efforts to reunify the family failed, the county petitioned
the district court to involuntarily terminate the parental rights (TPR) of both parents. On
the first day of trial on January 16, 2018, both parents agreed to voluntarily terminate their
parental rights to both children. The parents executed affidavits of consent, which were
accepted by the court that day, and the county dismissed its petition for an involuntary
TPR.
On January 26, before the district court filed a final TPR order, the parents moved
to vacate their consents to the termination. In an affidavit, A.R.J. stated that she and B.J.J.
felt “unfairly pressed” into signing the agreement to terminate their parent rights. She said
that they were told by their counsel that they did not foresee the trial ending in their favor
3
and that signing a consent to a voluntary TPR “was the only way to have guaranteed
contact” with their minor children.
Following a hearing, the district court filed an order denying the parents’ motion s
to vacate their consents to a voluntary TPR. The memorandum accompanying that order
stated that (a) the parents’ “extremely difficult, painful decision” agreeing to a voluntary
TPR “does not rise to the level of duress or coercion, and the Court declines to allow a
withdrawal of consent in this case”; (b) the parents’ attorneys were “doing their job” when
they informed their clients that an involuntary TPR would mean that they had no right to
have contact with their minor children but that “a consent to termination” might allow the
parents “to set up visits and continue contact”; and (c) the best interests of the children
would not be served by permitting withdrawal of the parents’ consent.
Soon after denying the motions to vacate, the district court filed orders voluntarily
terminating each parent’s parental rights to each child. Neither parent appealed.1
In March 2022, A.R.J. filed a petition to reestablish parental rights pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.329. Additionally, A.R.J. filed a motion to vacate the TPR
order and to compel the county to grant visitation with the children. Following a hearing,
the district court concluded that, on its face, the petition to establish parental rights did not
satisfy the requirements of section 260C.329 and denied the petition without an evidentiary

1 Over the next several years, the parents brought various unsuccessful actions in state and
federal courts seeking to vacate the voluntary TPR and to reestablish parental rights.

4
hearing. In the same order, the district court also denied the motion to vacate or to order
visitation.
A.R.J. appealed. A special term panel of this court ruled that we lack jurisdiction
over A.R.J.’s challenge to the denial of the motion to vacate and dismissed that portion of
the appeal.
DECISION
A.R.J. challenges the denial of her petition to reestablish parental rights, arguing
that the district court erred in applying certain provisions of the reestablishment-of -
parental-rights statute and erred by denying her petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant also challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to order visitation. We
address each of A.R.J.’s arguments in turn.
I. Petition to Reestablish Parental Rights

A. Application of Section 260C.329

A.R.J. contends that that the district court erred by applying certain provisions of
section 260C.329 for two reasons. First, she argues that those provisions do not apply in
the context of a voluntary TPR because doing so would wrongly presume—in conflict with
other law—that a parent who voluntarily terminated parental rights is an unfit parent.
Second, she argues that applying the provisions specifically in her case violates her due-
process rights because there was no factual adjudication on the question of “good cause”
to voluntarily terminate parental rights to her children when the TPR order was filed. We
address both arguments in turn, but first we describe the relevant statutory framework.
5
A court may voluntarily or involuntarily terminate parental rights “[i]f, after a
hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the conditions
set out in section 260C.301 [(2020)] exist.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1 (2020). One
of the conditions in section 260C.301 is that the parent has provided written consent that
the parent “for good cause desires to terminate parental rights.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). Good cause exists under “a variety of circumstances” and
does not require a fitness analysis. In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 485- 86
(Minn. 1997); In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 135-36 (Minn. 2014). A
TPR with a parent’s consent is a voluntary TPR. Id. The remaining conditions set out in
section 260C.301 provide statutory grounds for an involuntary TPR. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b).
After parental rights have been voluntarily or involuntarily terminated, section
260C.329 provides a route for parents to petition to reestablish parental rights. That statute
lays out the conditions that must be met to petition for reestablishment of parental rights.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.329, subd. 3 . One condition is that “the parent has corrected the
conditions that led to an order terminating parental rights.” Id., subd. 3(2). Section
260C.329 also dictates the contents of a parent’s petition to reestablish parental rights. Id.,
subd. 3a. Among other things, the parent must state “what steps the petitioner has taken
toward personal rehabilitation since the order terminating parental rights, including
treatment, work, or other personal history that demonstrates rehabilitation,” id.,
subd. 3a(a)(6), and “how the petitioner has corrected the conditions that led to the order
terminating parental rights for which reunification is sought,” id., subd. 3a(a)(7).
6
1. Unfitness
A.R.J. asserts that she is a presumptively fit parent following her voluntary TPR.
She then relies on that presumption to argue that sections 260C.301 and 260C.329 are in
conflict because a voluntary TPR under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(a), carries no
presumption of unfitness but section 260C.329, subdivision 3a(a), presumes unfitness by
requiring parents to rehabilitate or to correct conditions that led to the TPR . She argues
that, to avoid violating her due-process rights, those provisions of section 260C.329 must
be interpreted to not apply to her petition because she voluntarily terminated her parental
rights.
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de
novo.” Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing a
district court’s reading of a statute, the reviewing court first determines whether the
statute’s language is ambiguous. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn.
2017); In re Welfare of Children of A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn. App. 2019). A
statute is ambiguous if “its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015); A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122. When
addressing whether a statute’s language is ambiguous, “words and phrases are construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020 ); see In re Welfare of Children of S.R.K., 911 N.W.2d 821, 827
(Minn. 2018) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2016) in a TPR appeal). If the court
determines that statutory language is unambiguous, the language’s plain meaning controls.
Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 2015); see A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122.
7
A.R.J. seeks to create a conflict between sections 260C.301 and 260C.329 by
reading a presumption of unfitness into section 260C.329. A.R.J. infers this presumption
from the requirement in section 260C.329 that a petitioner demonstrate personal
rehabilitation and correction of the conditions that led to the order terminating parental
rights. In essence, A.R.J. argues that requiring her to “rehabilitate” or “correct the
condition[]” leading to her voluntary TPR requires her to admit that she is unfit to parent,
which violates her due-process rights. Her argument is unavailing.
A.R.J. contends that she must be considered a presumptively fit parent because she
is a natural parent to L.J. and she voluntarily terminated her parental rights. It is true that a
natural parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children
and “is presumed to be suitable to be entrusted with the care of [their] child.” See R.D.L.,
853 N.W.2d at 133, 136 (quotation omitted). But, though A.R.J. is L.J.’s natural parent,
she no longer stands in the role of parent to L.J. because her parental rights to L.J. were
severed by the TPR.
A.R.J. appears to extrapolate a larger presumption of fitness following a voluntary
TPR from the presumption of unfitness following an involuntary TPR. Following an
involuntary TPR, a parent is presumed “palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship upon a showing that the parent’s parental rights to one or more other children
were voluntarily terminated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 subd. 1(b)(4) (emphasis added).
A.R.J. is correct that she is not presumed unfit following her voluntary TPR, unlike in the
case of an involuntary TPR. See In re Welfare of Child J.D.T., 946 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn.
2020) (“[A] parent whose parental rights have been voluntarily terminated by a district
8
court is not presumed to be unfit in subsequent proceedings.”). But recognizing that A.R.J.
will not be presumed to be unfit with respect to other children does not mean that she is
presumed to be fit for purposes of reestablishing parental rights to a child to whom her
parental rights have been terminated.
Moreover, contrary to A.R.J.’s argument, the plain language of s ection 260C.329
does not require a parent to admit that they were an unfit parent. That statute requires a
petitioner to describe the “steps the petitioner has taken toward personal rehabilitation since
the time of the order terminating parental rights” and how the petitioner has “corrected the
conditions that led to the order terminating parental rights.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.329,
subd. 3a(a)(6), (7). While these requirements apply with respect to conditions leading to
an involuntary TPR, there is nothing in the statute limiting their application to involuntary
TPRs. Under a plain reading of section 260C.329, a petitioner seeking to reestablish
parental rights following a voluntary TPR must establish personal rehabilitation and
correction of the condition of “good cause” that led to the voluntary termination of parental
rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a). Thus, the petitioner does not need to admit
prior unfitness to parent.
In sum, we discern no conflict between the statute creating a presumption of
unfitness in the case of an involuntary TPR and the statute requiring that rehabilitation and
correction of conditions be alleged in a petition to reestablish parental rights.
2. “Good Cause” for Voluntary TPR
A.R.J. also argues that her right to due process of law was violated because the TPR
order did not identify the “good cause” supporting her voluntary TPR with sufficient
9
specificity to allow her to show that she had corrected the conditions prompting the TPR.
She also asserts that the “condition” prompting her TPR was that she was fraudulently
induced to consent to the TPR by the representation that she would be able to continue to
have contact with her children after a voluntary TPR. Therefore, A.R.J. contends, the
district court should have reestablished her parental rights.
We are not persuaded. A TPR court must specify the good cause for a voluntary
TPR. In re Welfare of J.M.S., 268 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1978). A.R.J. had multiple
remedies available for any alleged insufficiently specific articulation by the TPR court of
the good cause supporting her voluntary TPR. A.R.J. could have moved the TPR court to
amend the findings in its TPR order. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 21.03. Or she could have
appealed the TPR order. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 23.02. Or she could have done both.
She did neither. Thus, regarding of any alleged lack of specificity in the TPR order, the
order is now final and is not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. See Dieseth v.
Calder Mfg. Co., 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. 1966) (stating, in a civil case, that “[e]ven
though the decision of the trial court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an
appealable order it is still final after the time for appeal has expired”); Nussbaumer v.
Fetrow, 556 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Minn. App. 1996) (stating both that public policy favors
the finality of rulings and the ability of parties to rely on those rulings and that Minnesota
does not permit collateral attacks on facially valid rulings), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26,
1997); cf. Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 743-44 & n.1 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that
preclusive effect must be given to a matter decided in a final spousal-maintenance order
10
when a later motion to modify spousal maintenance seeks to relitigate an issue decided in
the previous order).
Moreover, in juvenile-protection matters, the time to appeal expires 20 days after
service by the district court administrator of notice of filing of the ruling in question. Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 23.02, subd. 2; see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 23.01 (noting that, with certain
exceptions, the rules of civil appellate procedure govern appeals in juvenile-protection
matters). Thus, reviewing any aspect of the 2018 TPR order in this appeal would
improperly extend the time to appeal that order. Doing so would also be contrary to the
well-established principle that juvenile-protection cases should be resolved quickly and
with finality. See R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 134-35; In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1,
5 (Minn. 2003). In short, any alleged defect in the 2018 TPR order is not a basis for relief
from the order denying A.R.J.’s petition to reestablish parental rights.2
B. Prima Facie Case to Reestablish Parental Rights

Having concluded that the district court did not err by applying the provisions of
section 260C.329 to A.R.J.’s petition, we turn to A.R.J.’s argument that the district court
erred by summarily denying her petition to reestablish parental rights.
The parties note that the appellate courts have not yet identified a standard for
reviewing a district court’s denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of a petition to

2 The same analysis also addresses A.R.J.’s assertion that the 2018 TPR order did not
adequately address the children’s best interests.

11
reestablish parental rights, and they suggest various possibilities.3 The standard of review
under which it is easiest for an appellant to get relief on appeal is the de novo standard
because, under that standard, an appellate court need not defer to the district court’s ruling.
See State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. 2021) (stating that under the de novo
standard of review, appellate courts “do not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but
instead . . . exercise independent review” (quoting Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563
(Minn. 2018))). As set out below, even if we do not defer to the district court’s decision,
we conclude that the petition does not satisfy section 260C.329, subdivision 3(a). Thus, in
this appeal, we need not definitively identify the standard for reviewing a district court’s
denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of a petition to reestablish parental rights under
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.329. For purposes of this appeal, we assume, without
deciding, that the appropriate standard of review is de novo.

3 Focusing on the fact that her petition was denied without an evidentiary hearing, A.R.J.
suggests that we apply the three- part standard for reviewing an order denying, without an
evidentiary hearing, motions for adoptive placement. See In re Welfare of L.L.P., 8 36
N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013) (identifying the standard set out in in Boland v.
Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Minn. App. 2011) as the one for reviewing the denial,
without an evidentiary hearing, of a motion for an adoptive placement). Alternatively, she
suggests that we apply the de novo standard used to review a judgment on the pleadings
under rule 12.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, see D.L.H., Inc. v. Russ, 566
N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997), or, if matters outside the pleadings are considered, the de
novo standard used to review a summary judgment, see Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 2010). The county asserts that we should apply the
standard applicable in TPR appeals: Clear-error for review of findings of historical facts
and abuse-of-discretion for review of a statutory basis for relief. See In re Welfare of Child.
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011) (detailing this standard), rev. denied
(Jan. 6, 2012). Alternatively, the county suggests that we apply the adoptive-placement
framework and standard of review suggested by A.R.J.
12
A petition to reestablish parental rights must allege, among other things, the “steps
the petitioner has taken toward personal rehabilitation since the time of the order
terminating parental rights.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.329, subd. 3a(a)(6) (emphasis added). The
only personal rehabilitation mentioned in A.R.J.’s petition is alleged to have taken place in
2016 and 2017, which is before A.R.J.’s 2018 voluntary TPR. 4 Because A.R.J. needed to
demonstrate rehabilitation “since the time of the order terminating parental rights,” id., the
2016 to 2017 rehabilitation efforts alleged by A.R.J. do not satisfy that requirement.
Further, because “good cause” existed to terminate A.R.J.’s parental rights despite her pre-
termination efforts to improve her parenting, the petition’s failure to allege that A.R.J.
made post-TPR efforts to improve her parenting can be ignored as harmless error. See In
re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (declining to reverse TPR
for harmless error); In re Welfare of Child. of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 98 (Minn. App. 2008)
(applying D.J.N. in TPR appeal).
Because A.R.J.’s petition fails to satisfy the statutory requirement that it allege the
post-TPR steps that A.R.J. took toward personal rehabilitation, her petition does not satisfy
section 260C.329, subdivision 3a(a)(6). The district court did not err by denying, without
an evidentiary hearing, a petition that does not satisfy the statute.5

4 For example, A.R.J.’s petition and related submissions assert that she completed
counseling and treatment for gambling in 2016 to 2017, secured permanent housing in
2016, attended individual and family counseling in 2017, and attended parenting classes in
2017.

5 A.R.J. also argues that the district court erred by failing adequately address whether
reestablishment of her parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. Because A.R.J.
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II. Visitation
Upon denying A.R.J.’s petition to reestablish parental rights, the district court also
denied A.R.J.’s motion to compel the county to begin visitations with her children. The
district court cited Minnesota Statutes section 260C.317, subdivision 1, which provides
that, “[u]pon the termination of parental rights[,] all rights . . . including any rights to
custody, control, visitation, or support existing between the child and parent shall be
severed and terminated and the parent shall have no standing to appear at any further legal
proceeding concerning the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1. A.R.J. advances two
arguments why, despite this statute, her request for an order compelling visitation should
be granted.
First, A.R.J. argues that, even though section 260C.317, subdivision 1, deprives a
parent of standing to appear at further legal proceedings once their parent rights have been
terminated, this effect is abrogated by section 260C.329, which allows parents to petition
to reestablish parental rights. The argument is unpersuasive. Section 260C.329 nowhere
mentions or confers a right to visitation for parents whose petition to reestablish parental
rights has been denied, and A.R.J. cites no case law to support this reading.
Second, A.R.J. argues that visitation is in L.J.’s best interests and that courts,
including this court, have the authority to order visitation either under Minnesota Statutes
section 260C.001, subdivision 2(a) (2020), which generically requires courts to act in a
child’s best interests, or under the judicial branch’s inherent authority. This argument, too,

failed to submit a petition satisfying a critical provision of section 260C.328, we need not
address A.R.J.’s best-interest argument.
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is unpersuasive. Because section 260C.317 deprived A.R.J. of standing to participate in
proceedings involving the child, how A.R.J. could even make a best-interests or an
inherent-authority argument to a court is unclear. Nor does A .R.J. cite authority or
otherwise identify how she could make this argument to a court. Further, regardless of any
inability to make this argument to a court, A.R.J. cites no authority for the idea that a child’s
best interests are an independently sufficient basis for a court to compel visitation between
a natural parent and a child to whom that parent’s parental rights are terminated. See
Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971); In re
Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 602 n.7 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Dec. 6,
2021); see also State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. By the Special Comp. Fund v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); In re P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1
(Minn. App. 2003). Finally, even if the district court had denied A.R.J. visitation on the
merits, on this record, we would see no reversible erroring the district court’s denial. Cf.
Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2014) (noting, in the context of a parent
whose parental rights had not been terminated, that “[a]ppellate courts recognize that a
district court has broad discretion to decide parenting-time questions”).
In sum, the district court did not misconstrue Minnesota Statutes section 260C.329,
did not error in denying A.R.J.’s petition to reestablish parental rights, and did not err or
abuse its discretion in denying A.R.J.’s motion to compel the county to initiate visitation.
Affirmed.