In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: K. W. and N. M., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0725

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
K. W. and N. M., Parents.

Filed December 5, 2022
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-19-587

Nicole S. Gronneberg, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant N.M.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, L. Michelle Thompson, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Social Services
Department)

Alex Brusilovsky, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
On appeal from the district court’s termination of parental rights to his two children,
father argues that the district court erred in concluding that statutory grounds for
termination were proven and that termination is in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant-father N.M. and mother K.W. are the parents of two children: J.M., born
in 2013, and C.M., born in 2017. Respondent Ramsey County Social Services Department
(the county) became involved with the family in October 2017 when mother was
hospitalized for an intentional drug overdose. While hospitalized, mother admitted that
she had been physically abusing J.M. since the birth of C.M. four months earlier.
Specifically, mother stated that she “felt no love for” J.M.; hit J.M. “as many as 10-12
times [with a spatula] while [J.M.] was crying and pleading for her to stop”; and tried “to
stuff [J.M.] into the freezer, garbage can and refrigerator.”
At the time the county began its investigation, father had been living with mother
and the children in mother’s apartment for approximately one year following several years
of housing instability. The investigating social worker interviewed mother and father and
did not recommend that a petition for a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) be
filed at that time “because the family is cooperative, dad took time off from work to be
home to care for the children, [they] have a Safety Plan in place and dad is a protective
factor.” But the social worker noted that “[i]f the family fails to cooperate, follow through
with services, or if there [are] any concerns of abuse/safety, CHIPS is highly
recommended.”
The family’s safety plan required that father supervise all contact between mother
and the children. The social worker referred the parents and children to services, including
intensive in-home parenting support, and the case was assigned to a case manager. The
next month, parenting services and the case manager expressed concern that father would
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leave the children alone with mother and that the parents were not engaged in following
the safety plan. The county filed a CHIPS petition and the children were removed from
the home in January 2018. Neither father nor mother appeared at the CHIPS hearing and
the district court adjudicated J.M. and C.M. as CHIPS.
The county placed the children with their maternal grandmother and instructed the
grandmother to supervise the parents’ visits with the children. The children were removed
from that placement later in 2018 after father reported to the case manager that he and
mother had been caring for the children unsupervised for the last several months.
For most of 2018 and 2019, father did not comply with his case-plan requirements .
He failed to consistently attend scheduled visitations with J.M. and C.M., communicate
with the case manager and guardian ad litem (GAL), or appear at hearings in the CHIPS
case.
In November 2018, police pulled father over for speeding and father reported that
he was suicidal and that he had previously sexually abused a 12-year-old.
1 The child had
been staying with father and taking care of J.M. and C.M. while father was at work. Father
also reported, during a subsequent hospitalization for suicidal ideation, that the 12-year -
old was sexually provocative and encouraged him to engage in sexual contact with her;
that he had “sexual contact with her and on several occasions groped her and touched her
genitalia”; that he maintained contact with her via Facebook over the six months since she
left his home, which included “sending pictures of himself [to her] in his boxers with an

1 At trial, father testified that the sexual abuse occurred in 2017.
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erect penis”; and that he confessed because her parents were blackmailing him. Father was
charged a couple of months later with two counts of second-degree cri minal sexual
conduct.
In December 2018, the GAL recommended termination of parental rights (TPR) for
both mother and father. She further recommended that father not be allowed visits due to
his statement to police that he had sexually abused a 12-year-old. The county filed a TPR
petition in April 2019. The district court issued an order relieving the county of providing
reasonable efforts at reunifying the children with father because father’s sexual assault of
the 12-year-old constituted egregious harm against a child in his care.
Following another period of intermittent homelessness, hospitalization, and severe
drug use, father completed six weeks of inpatient chemical-dependency treatment at
Vinland National Center between mid-August and October 2019. Father also completed a
psychosexual assessment at Skipped Parts LLC upon referral from his public defender.
In December 2019, father pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. The sentencing court stayed imposition of his sentence and placed him on
probation for ten years. The conditions of father’s probation required that he complete
psychosexual programming and random drug testing. Father was also prohibited from
having contact with minors until approved by probation and treatment providers.
In February 2020, father began sex-offender treatment at Skipped Parts, though his
attendance throughout 2020 was “poor.” In 2020, father also completed outpatient
chemical-dependency treatment and obtained employment. Throughout this time, father’s
treatment providers, the county case manager, and the GAL agreed that father should not
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have contact with his children. During this period, however, mother had the children for
several months on a trial home visit and the case manager believed father may have seen
the children while in mother’s care.
In February 2021, the district court ordered emergency protection of the children
and they were removed from mother’s care due to mother’s drug relapse and mental-health
decline. Prior to this removal, the county had stayed its TPR petition based on efforts to
reunify the children with mother and because father had been more engaged in services. In
June 2021, the county filed a notice of intent to proceed with the TPR, and the district court
scheduled the trial for September 2021. The court also granted father’s request for
supervised visits, though no visits occurred at least in part because the children’s therapist
stated that the visits would not be in the children’s best interests at that time.
Near the start of trial, mother stated that she intended to voluntarily terminate her
parental rights and would consent to adoption. The trial thus proceeded only as to father.
The district court held the hearing on the county’s TPR petition over ten days
between December 2021 and February 2022. The court heard testimony from father, his
probation officer, the children’s foster parents, and various county social workers and
treatment providers involved in the case.
2 These witnesses generally testified that father
had made improvements with sobriety and participation in sex-offender treatment, but the

2 The district court heard extensive testimony from the owner and evaluating psychologist
at Treehouse Psychology, where father was evaluated in September 2021. There was also
significant argument from the parties regarding this testimony and the related
psychological report. However, the court stated in its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and order terminating parental rights that it did not consider this testimony or the report in
its decision.
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only witness who advocated for father to reunite full-time with the children was father
himself.
Father’s probation officer testified as to father’s probation conditions, which
required father to complete sex-offender programming and prohibit ed him from having
contact with minors until approved by his sex-offender treatment providers and probation.
The probation officer noted that father was initially inconsistent in submitting to random
urinalyses (UAs) and expressed concern that father had not sought psychiatric care despite
this being recommended to him. However, she also testified that father had become more
consistent with his UAs, had been compliant with probation, and had stable housing in an
apartment.
The co-owner of Skipped Parts, where father attended sex-offender treatment,
testified that father had been taking therapy more seriously, and that his assessed risk level
had decreased since he started treatment. But she also highlighted that father continued to
see mother, who had relapsed and with whom father has had a historically unhealthy
relationship. She further noted that, after two years in treatment, father was still in part one
of a three-part program and had not yet addressed his risk factors in therapy. The Skipped
Parts co-owner and the probation officer testified that they supported working toward
supervised visits with the children but would not approve unsupervised contact between
father and the children at that time.
The county case manager at the time of trial and the GAL agreed that they did not
believe father could parent full-time currently or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The
case manager and GAL also emphasized that father is not aware of his children’s academic
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and behavioral needs and would not be able to go to J.M.’s school to assist J.M. J.M. had
an individualized education program (IEP) and academic challenges. The case manager
testified that J.M.’s caregiver might be needed to assist J.M. at school to meet J.M.’s
academic needs. The case manager also testified that she did not believe that the safety
concerns that necessitated removal of the children had been sufficiently addressed because
she did not think father had gained the protective capacity to keep the children safe from
mother. The GAL opined that she believed that termination of father’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests.
Following trial, the district court issued an order terminating father’s parental rights.
The court determined that the county had established five statutory grounds for termination
by clear and convincing evidence and that the county had established by clear and
convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the children for father’s parental rights
to be terminated.
Father moved for amended findings and a new trial. The district court granted
several amended findings, none of which altered the district court’s conclusions of law,
and denied father’s motion for a new trial.
DECISION
Father asserts two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the district court
abused its discretion in determining that the county proved a statutory ground for
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termination. Second, he challenges the district court’s determination that termination is in
the children’s best interests.3
On appeal from a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we review a
district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we review for abuse of discretion a
district court’s conclusions that a statutory basis for termination of parental rights is present
and that termination is in the children’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “[W]e will not
conclude that a district court has abused its discretion absent a resolution of the question
that is against logic and the facts of record.” In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d
648, 660 (Minn. App. 2018). “Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty
reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). “The child’s best
interests, however, remain the paramount consideration in every termination case.” Id.
A. Statutory Ground for Termination
The district court in this case determined that the county established five statutory
grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence: a child experienced egregious
harm in father’s care , father neglected his parental duties, father was palpably unfit to
parent, the children were neglected and in foster care, and reasonable efforts failed to

3 In his brief, father also includes, as an issue in his statement of issues, a claim that “the
district court abuse[d] its discretion in concluding that [the county] made reasonable efforts
in this case.” This issue, however, was not otherwise mentioned or argued in the brief. See
Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1981) (applying the rule that arguments not
argued in brief are waived). Moreover, the county was relieved of providing reasonable
efforts in this case because father subjected a child to egregious harm as defined by statute
when he committed criminal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(1) (2020). We
therefore do not address reasonable efforts in our opinion.
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correct the conditions that led to out -of-home placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 ,
subd. 1(b)(2), (4)-(6), (8) (2020). We will affirm a district court’s termination of parental
rights if at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by the record. In re
Welfare of Child. of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). Because we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a child experienced egregious
harm in father’s care, we need not address the other four statutory grounds.
A district court may terminate parental rights if
a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent’s care
which is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack
of regard for the child’s well- being, such that a reasonable
person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child
or of any child to be in the parent’s care.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6).
Minnesota law defines “egregious harm” as “the infliction of bodily harm to a child
or neglect of a child which demonstrates a grossly inadequate ability to provide minimally
adequate parental care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14 (2020). Egregious harm
includes “conduct toward a child that constitutes criminal sexual conduct under sections
609.342 to 609.345.” Id., subd. 14(10). To meet the grounds for termination of parental
rights based on egregious harm, the parent need not have inflicted the harm on their own
child—it is sufficient that the parent inflicted harm on a child in their care. In re Welfare
of A.L.F., 579 N.W.2d 152, 155-56 (Minn. App. 1998).
The district court concluded that egregious harm was established because father
pleaded guilty to criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.343 (2016), one of the
listed offenses in the definition of egregious harm in Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14(10).
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The court also found, and father himself testified, that the 12-year-old victim of that offense
was in his care while she lived with him. The district court determined the offense is “of a
nature and duration that demonstrates a grossly inadequate ability to provide minimally
adequate parental care, such that a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best
interest of the children or any child to be in [father’s] care.”
Father acknowledges that his offense constitutes egregious harm as defined in the
child welfare statutes but argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
demonstrate that this harm was “of a nature, duration or chronicity that would cause a
reasonable person to believe that [father] could never appropriately care for a child.”
Father contends that the district court’s conclusion is undermined by the county’s decision
earlier in the case to stay the TPR proceeding against father, the court’s order granting
father supervised visits approximately six months earlier, and the decision of father’s sex-
offender treatment providers to develop a safety plan for supervised visits. We are not
persuaded.
First, the statute states that the harm must cause a “reasonable person [to] believe it
contrary to the best interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6) (emphasis added). Here, none of the witnesses at trial,
aside from father, testified that they believed father should be a primary caregiver for his
children, or any child. Instead, they emphasized that f ather’s sex offense required that
there be a safety plan and professional supervision for father to have contact with his
children. And, even though the evidence supports that father demonstrated some progress,
there is no evidence that father could have unsupervised contact with the children, let alone
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custody, at any point in the determinate future. Witnesses also noted that father was not
permitted to interact with other children because of his conviction and that this would, of
itself, be a significant barrier to father’s ability to provide adequate care for J.M. and C.M.
Second, the record supports the district court’s determination that father’s “harm of
the child was not isolated, and it was of a duration that reflects an inability to provide
minimally adequate parental care.” Father informed clinicians, while hospitalized
following his confession, that he had “sexual contact with [the 12-year-old]” on multiple
occasions and that he maintained contact with her over Facebook for six months following
her departure from his home. The Facebook contact included “sending pictures of himself
[to her] in his boxers with an erect penis.”
Finally, while the district court credited father’s acknowledgment of his culpability
for the offense, the court also underlined that father “had not begun the phase of sex offense
therapy where he begins to study and understand what led to the offense.” The court stated
that it lacked confidence, based on father’s testimony, that father can self-assess the risk
he poses to others.
Considering the deference given to credibility findings and the substantial support
in the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the egregious-
harm statutory basis for termination of parental rights was established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996)
(“Considerable deference is due to the district court’s decision because a district court is in
a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.”). Because at least one statutory
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ground for termination is supported by the record, we proceed to father’s argument that
termination is not in the children’s best interests.
B. Best Interests
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that
termination is in the children’s best interests . He specifically contends that, because the
children’s foster placement was disrupted shortly after trial, the children were “once again
in non-relative foster care with no prospects for permanency after over four years of foster
care placement,” thus “[p]reserving [the children’s] relationship with their father would
present an opportunity for the siblings to stay together and be placed permanently with a
loving parent.”
But a district court’s best-interests and TPR decision does not require an imminent
permanent placement or adoption. In re Welfare of P.J.K., 369 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.
1985). The district court instead determines whether it is in the child’s best interests at the
time of the hearing to be placed with the parent facing TPR, balancing (1) the child’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, (2) the parent’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship, and (3) any competing interest of the child. In re Welfare of
Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980); In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d
76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012). “ Competing interests include health considerations, a stable
environment, and the child’s preference.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92.
The district court determined that father “credibly testified that he loves [J.M. and
C.M.]” and that he has an interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship. However,
the court determined that, given the length of the separation and father’s inability to assume
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parenting responsibility at any reasonably foreseeable time, J.M. and C.M. do not have an
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship and that their competing interests
outweigh father’s. The record supports the district court’s determinations.
The district court determined here that J.M. and C.M. do not have an interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship because they have not been in father’s care since
2018. The first county case manager testified that father’s visitation with the children was
inconsistent in 2018 and 2019 due to his drug use, hospitalizations, and homelessness. For
the subsequent two years, father was not approved for supervised visits because of
restrictions imposed as a result of his sex offense. Even after supervised visits were
approved by the district court, the children’s therapist advised that it would not be healthy
for the children to have such visits with father, let alone to be returned to father’s custody.
Moreover, the children are still unable to have unsupervised visits with father due to his
probation conditions. Thus, the record supports the district court’s determination that the
children do not have an interest in preserving their relationship with father based on this
lengthy separation caused by father’s instability and criminal offense.
The district court also determined that the children’s competing interests outweigh
father’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship. The court cited J.M.’s
behavioral issues, IEP, and other educational needs, which the children’s foster parents and
the second county case manager testified require regular contact with school. The court
highlighted that “both children are in therapy and require support at home to address the
trauma they have suffered and their ongoing behavioral issues as a result of this trauma.”
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Testimony of the foster parents and case manager, along with that of the children’s
therapist, further supports the determination.
The district court’s determination that father has not demonstrated that he can meet
the children’s behavioral and health needs or their need for a stable environment is
grounded in the record as well. In addition to father’s inability to go to J.M.’s school for
IEP and other meetings due to his sex offense and probation terms, multiple witnesses
expressed concern regarding father’s ongoing relationship with the children’s mother—
they worried that father would not protect the children from their mother, who is a
significant source of their trauma.
The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in finding that clear and
convincing evidence established that termination of father’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interests.
Affirmed.