State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0728

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ashley Ann Stanley,
Appellant.

Filed January 17, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CR-17-1597

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stephen F. O’Keefe, Goodhue County Attorney, Christopher J. Schrader, Assistant County
Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this probation-revocation appeal, appellant challenges the district court’s decision
to revoke her probation, arguing that the district court made the following two errors:
(1) the district court abused its discretion in determining that the criteria for revocation
were satisfied ; and (2) the district court did not make adequate findings before revoking
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her probation. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion and made the required
findings, we affirm.
FACTS
In June 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Ashley Ann Stanley
with one count of first -degree sale of a controlled substance , one count of conspiracy to
commit first-degree sale of a controlled substance , one count of first -degree possession of
a controlled substance, and one count of fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Stanley pleaded guilty in January 2020 to conspiracy to commit first -
degree sale of a controlled substance . At the plea hearing, Sta nley admitted that she
possessed 329 grams of methamphetamine and conspired with another person to sell it to
a third party . In exchange for the guilty plea, t he state dismissed the remaining charges
and agreed to a downward dispositional departure.
In Ju ne 2020, the district court imposed a 65- month term of imprisonment , but
granted a downward dispositional departure, staying execution of this prison sentence for
10 years. The stated basis for the departure was Stanley’s “amenability to treatment and
probation.” The district court noted that Stanley was remaining sober, was in outpatient
treatment, and was making progress towards regaining custody of her child. The district
court imposed several conditions of probation, including that Stanley follow all rules of
probation, abstain from alcohol and controlled substances, submit to random testing, and
follow all recommendations from a chemical dependency evaluation.
In April 2021, Stanley’s probation officer filed a probation violation report. Stanley
subsequently admitted three violations of the conditions of probation: she had failed to
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contact probation as directed, failed to notify probation of an address change, and failed to
follow a treatment recommendation from an updated chemical dependency evalua tion.
The district court declined to revoke probation as a consequence, allowing Stanley to
remain on probation with additional conditions, including that Stanley complete outpatient
treatment at a facility called River Ridge. The reinstatement was based on the parties’
agreement and updated information from the probation officer regarding Stanley’s
compliance with the terms of her probation since the violation report .
In January 2022, probation filed a second probation violation report , making the
following three allegations: (1) Stanley failed to abstain from controlled substance use and
tested positive for methamphetamine on two separate occasions; (2) Stanley failed to
remain law abiding because she had been charged with aggravated robbery; and (3) Stanley
failed to complete outpatient treatment at River Ridge and was discharged “prior to
completion, with a recommendation for a higher level of care.” The report noted that
Stanley had admitted her substance use to her probation officer and expressed int erest in
starting inpatient treatment; but the report also noted “concerns regarding the chemical and
mental health of Ms. Stanley, and how this is impacting the community.”
At a probation revocation hearing, Stanley admitted the first violation, but did not
admit the second violation. Regarding the third violation, Stanley acknowledged that she
had been discharged from River Ridge, explain ing that she “put [her]self in the hospital
because [she] had a mental breakdown, and [she] missed so many days of that program that
they kicked [her] out.” Stanley explained that she made efforts to “go to detox” and
intended to obtain additional treatment but could not do so while in custody.
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Stanley’s probation officer testified at the evidentiary hearing. The probation
officer could not verify Stanley’s account of attempting to obtain further treatment. The
probation officer also stated that Stanley faced two additional felon y charges—theft of a
motor vehicle and a controlled -substance offense. The officer stated that she “would not
recommend release to a treatment program at this time due to the severity level of the
pending cases” and the fact that Stanley “ had received a dispositional departure on this
case.” The state also recommended revoca tion based on the severity of the underlying
offense and Stanley’s failure to follow recommendations and remain law abiding.
The district court noted that Stanley received a downward dispositional departure
that gave her “an opportunity to right things, primarily through treatment and, obviously,
stay otherwise law abiding.” The district court also observed that this was Stanley’s second
probation violation, with “again, allegations of continued use.” The district court declined
to consider Stanley’s pending criminal charges in its decision but found that her continued
controlled substance use and failure to successfully complete programming were
“intentional and inexcusable.” The district court also found that “there really isn’t anything
more we can do once we give opportunities for people to avoid prison on two occasions
and they fail on both of those occasions .” The district court then revoked Stanley’s
probation and executed the 65- month sentence. Stanley appeals.
DECISION
Stanley argues that the di strict court abused its discretion in concluding that state
established the second and third Austin factors. Stanley also ass erts that the district court
failed to make sufficient factual findings. We are not convinced by these arguments .
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To revoke probation, a district court must identify which specific condition or
conditions were violated , determine that the violation was intentional or inexcusable , and
conclude that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. State v.
Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). “The decision to revoke cannot be a reflexive
reaction to an accumulation of technical violations,” but must instead balance “the
probationer’s interest in freedom [with] the state’s interest in insuring [her ] rehabilitation
and the public safety.” Id. at 250- 51 (quotation omitted). In making the three Austin
findings, courts should “convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence
relied upon.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). “The [district] court
has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation.”
Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249. But this court reviews de novo whether a district court has
made the findings required under Austin . Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 605.
I. Determination that the State Satisfied the Second and Third Austin Factors

Under the second Austin factor, a district court must find that a probation violation
was “intentional or inexcusable .” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Stanley argues that her
failure to abstain and her failure to complete outpatient treatment were excusable because
addiction is a chronic health condition and relapse is “part and parcel of the recovery
process.” We acknowledge that recovery from addicti on presents many challenges and
relapse is common , but we do not agree that addiction excuses a probation violation.
Indeed, Stanley directs us to no legal authority concluding that addiction can excuse a
violation of probation or that addiction renders use of illegal drugs unintentional. Absent
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such authority, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that
the evidence was sufficient to establish the second factor .1
Under the third Austin factor, a district court must “ find that need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. The third Austin
factor involves consideration of whether:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further
criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need
of correctional treatment which can most effectively be
provided if [the offender] is confined; or (iii) it would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not
revoked.

Modtland, 695 N.W .2d at 607 (quotation omitted). Stanley argues that the district court
abused its discretion because the law prefers intermediate sanctions, she made some
progress while on probation, “community treatment options remain available,” and
reinstatement would not unduly depreciate the seriousness of her violation.
We are not persuaded because Stanley’s original conviction was for a controlled
substance offense, and she was granted a downward dispositional departure largely based
on her amenability to treatment. As the district court noted, this was Stanley’s second
treatment-related probation violation. T he probation violation report expressed “concerns
regarding the chemical and mental health of Ms. Stanley, and how this is impacting the

1 Stanley also argues that she was discharged from River Ridge due to her hospitalization
and that no alternative treatment program was available while incarcerated. The probation
officer, however, was unable to verify that information, and the probation condition at issue
required Stanley to complete programming specifically with River Ridge. O n this record,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to excuse Stanley’s discharge .
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community.” Based on this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
II. Adequacy of the Factual Findings

Stanley next argues that the district court failed to make sufficiently specific factual
findings. This argument, however, mischaracterizes the district court’s findings. 2
It is insufficient for a district court to merely recite the Austin factors and “offer[]
general, non- specific reasons for revocation.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608. Instead,
district courts must tie their reasons for revoc ation to particular facts. Id. The findings
should also “convey the substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.”
Id. at 608. In this case, the district court did more than recite the Austin factors. It
emphasized that this was Stanley’s second treatment -related violation and explained why
the treatment -related probation conditions were important : they were the basis for the
initial departure . These find ings, although brief, are specifically tied to the facts of this
case and adequately convey the evidence relied on to support the conclusion that the need
for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
Affirmed.

2 To the extent that portions of Stanley’s brief can be construed as challenging the district
court’s findings regarding the first Austin factor, we conclude that the district court
sufficiently identif ied the violations. The district court stated that Stanley admitted
“additional use” and “fail[ed] to complete successfully drug rehabilitation.” The district
court also clarified that it was not relying on the alleged failure to remain law abiding.