State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0730

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Allison Wesley,
Appellant.

Filed February 21, 2023
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-21-241

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
for a downward dispositional departure from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines because
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substantial and compelling reasons exist to justify a departure. Because the district court
acted within its discretion in imposing a guidelines sentence, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Allison Wesley
with attempted first- and second-degree murder after she broke into the apartment of her
ex-partner’s current girlfriend and stabbed her multiple times. Wesley subsequently
reached an agreement with the state whereby she agreed t o plead guilty to attempted
second-degree murder and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charge. The parties
agreed that Wesley would enter a treatment program following the plea hearing and that
she would comply with the terms of the program. Wesley entered treatment in January
2022.
In February 2022, the state learned that Wesley had been discharged from the
treatment program for failing to submit urine samples and for other program infractions.
The probation department notified the district court of the same. The district court issued
a warrant for Wesley’s arrest. The district court recalle d the warrant after Wesley
voluntarily appeared before the district court and explained the circumstances, including
her ability to reenter treatment the next day. Wesley then reentered treatment. Before her
sentencing hearing, Wesley submitted a motion for a dispositional departure, arguing that
a departure was warranted based on her success in addressing her mental-health and related
chemical-dependency issues in treatment.
In March 2022, at sentencing, Wesley reiterated the same arguments set forth in her
written submissions. The state opposed any sentencing departure given the severity of the
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crime and because Wesley’s discharge from the treatment program demonstrated that she
was not particularly amenable to probation. The district court stated that it had two options:
impose the presumptive guidelines prison sentence or grant a departure if it found “that
there [were] substantial and compelling factors that exist[ed] that would justify the Court
not sending Ms. Wesley to prison.” It acknowledged that Wesley presented some reasons
that could justify a departure, but the district court determined that those reasons were not
“substantial and compelling.” The district court credited Wesley’s efforts to attend
treatment, but it did not find that her participation in treatment was sufficient to justify a
departure and concluded that no other factors support ed a departure. The district court
imposed a guidelines sentence of 153 months’ imprisonment.
Wesley appeals.
DECISION
Wesley argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion for
a dispositional departure from the presumptive sentence. The district court has great
discretion when making sentencing decisions, and we will reverse those decisions only for
an abuse of that discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). A district
court may depart from the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines “when substantial and compelling circumstances are present.” State v. Kindem,
313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). A district
court generally does not abuse its discretion when imposing a sentence within the
presumptive sentencing guidelines range. See State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428-29
(Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).
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In considering whether to grant a dispositional departure from the presumptive
sentence, a district court may focus on the defendant’s “particular amenability to
individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31
(Minn. 1982). But “merely bei ng amenable to probation” is insufficient; “requiring a
defendant to be particularly amenable to probation . . . distinguishes the defendant from
most others and . . . presents the substantial and compelling circumstances that are
necessary to justify a departure.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309 (quotation omitted). A district
court may consider the following factors in evaluating a defendant’s “particular
amenability” to probation: “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his
cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” Trog,
323 N.W.2d at 31. A district court should deliberately consider the reasons in support of a
departure request. State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. App. 1984). But even if
a district court determines that some factors might support a sentencing departure, a district
court may properly exercise its discretion and choose not to depart. State v. Walker ,
913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) (citing Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7). “We will
affirm the imposition of a presumptive guidelines sentence when the record shows that the
sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before
making a determination.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). And we reverse a district court’s
refusal to depart only in “rare” cases. Walker, 913 N.W.2d at 468 (quoting Kindem,
313 N.W.2d at 7).
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Wesley argues that the district court did not properly consider the Trog factors when
it determined that no substantial or compelling reasons justified her request for a
dispositional sentencing departure. We emphasize that a district court is not required to
grant such a departure even if presented with substantial and compelling reasons to do so.
Id. Even so, Wesley argues that she was entitled to a departure because the district court
overlooked the steps she had taken to rectify her mental-health and chemical-depen dency
challenges and her demonstrated success in treatment. We disagree. The district court
deliberately considered Wesley’s arguments but determined, in its discretion, that the
proffered reasons in support of a departure were both not compelling and insufficient to
ensure public safety. The district court made this decision after Wesley had been
discharged from her treatment program two months prior to sentencing.
This is not the rare case that justifies us reversing the district court’s decision not to
grant a sentencing departure. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7. Rather, the record reveals that
the district court “carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented” before
making its decision. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925 (quotation omitted). Thus, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wesley’s motion for a
dispositional departure and affirm her sentence.
Affirmed.