In re the Marriage of: Christine Marie Salvosa, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0731

In re the Marriage of:
Christine Marie Salvosa, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Alan Douglas Salvosa,
Respondent.

Filed April 3, 2023
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-7242

Scott M. Rodman, Alyssha K. Duncan, Arnold & Rodman, P.A., Bloomington, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Johanna P. Clyborne, Brekke, Clyborne & Ribich, L.L.C., Shakopee, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
In this dissolution action, Christine Marie Salvosa and Alan Douglas Salvosa
stipulated to the resolution of all issues except child custody and parenting time. In lieu of
a trial on those two issues, they agreed to submit them to a parenting consultant, who would
2
have authority to conduct an evaluation and then make a recommendat ion to the district
court concerning custody and a binding decision concerning parenting time, subject to
either party’s right to seek review by the district court. N either party asked the district
court to review the parenting consultant’s decisions. Nonetheless, the parties disagreed
about the language of a stipulated decree incorporating the parenting consultant’s
decisions. The parties submitted separate proposed documents. The district court signed
and filed Alan’s proposed document. We conclude that the district court did not err by
adopting Alan’s proposed document instead of Christine’s proposed document. Therefore,
we affirm.
FACTS
Christine and Alan were married in 2004. They have one joint child, who was born
in 2014. Christine petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in October 2019.
In February 2020, the parties attended a mediation session at which they agreed to
a form of alternative dispute resolution involving a parenting consultant (PC). In a three-
page stipulation, the parties agreed that, for a two-year period, Michael Goldfarb, a licensed
social worker, would resolve child-related disputes that the parties presented to him. The
parties also agreed that permanent custody determinations would be resolved after
Goldfarb set a parenting-time schedule and made custody recommendations. The parties
also signed an 11-page stipulation stating that Goldfarb would have authority to make a
recommendation to the district court concerning custody and authority to make a binding
decision concerning parenting time, subject to either party’s right to seek review of his
3
decisions by the district court. Both stipulations were approved and ordered by the district
court.
The district court initially scheduled trial for a date in June 2020, which was
continued to a date in September 2020. One day before the rescheduled trial date, the
parties jointly informed the district court that they had agreed to voluntarily resolve “the
financial issues” and to submit a partial stipulated decree on those issues. The parties
further informed the district court that Goldfarb needed additional time to complete his
evaluation and report concerning custody and parenting time. The parties jointly requested
that the trial be continued again, and the district court agreed.
In November 2020, the district court approved and filed the jointly submitted partial
stipulated decree, which resolved all issues except custody and parenting time. The partial
stipulated decree reiterates that Goldfarb would “perform a custody evaluation and upon
the conclusion of this custody evaluation . . . render a decision on the issues of physical
custody, legal custody, and parenting time.” The partial stipulated decree provides that
Goldfarb’s decision “shall become permanent” unless either party serves and files, within
30 days, a motion for review by the district court. The partial stipulated decree further
provides that, if neither party seeks such review, the district court “shall adopt the [PC’s]
decision as the order of the court.” The partial stipulated decree specifies detailed
procedures by which the parties will facilitate the district court’s adoption of Goldfarb’s
decisions into a final stipulated decree.
Goldfarb issued a 66-page report in February 2021. With respect to parenting time,
Goldfarb determined a weekly schedule and steps to implement the schedule. With respect
4
to custody, Goldfarb acknowledged the statutory presumption of sole custody in cases of
domestic abuse but recommended that “the parties share joint legal custody contingent on
their continued commitment to a parenting consultant” and further recommended that
“Christine be granted sole physical custody.” In the penultimate paragraph of the report ,
Goldfarb wrote, “While not specifically part of the order, I further recommend” four things,
including a “long-term parenting consultant.” In the final paragraph of the report, Goldfarb
stated that he would withdraw as PC but was willing to remain in that role until a new PC
was appointed. Neither party filed a motion for review of Goldfarb’s decision by the
district court.
In April 2021, the parties agreed that Jennifer A. Jameson would serve as PC for a
two-year period. On April 6, 2021, the district court signed and filed a stipulated order of
appointment, effective immediately and expiring April 5, 2023.
In subsequent months, counsel for the parties discussed the preparation of an
amended stipulated decree to reflect Goldfarb’s decision, but they were unable to agree on
its terms. Their disagreement concerned the duration of the time period in which the parties
are required to use a PC. Christine interpreted Goldfarb’s report to require a “long-term”
commitment to a PC until the parties’ minor child reaches the age of majority; Alan
interpreted Goldfarb’s report to not require the use of a PC for a period longer than the
period to which the parties had agreed.
In October 2021, Alan requested a hearing to determine a means of resolving the
parties’ disagreement. After a status conference in early November 2021, the district court
ordered the parties to submit a single, agreed-upon amended stipulated decree or, if they
5
were unable to agree, to submit their respective proposed amended decrees along with letter
briefs. The parties did not agree on an amended stipulated decree. In December 2021,
approximately one year after Goldfarb’s decision, each party submitted a proposed
amended stipulated decree and a letter brief. Christine’s proposed document included a
provision that “if either party refuses to continue working with a [PC] in the future . . . ,
either party may bring a motion in district court to establish an award of legal custody,
which shall be determined de novo by the Court . . . according to an analysis of Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17.” Alan objected to that part of Christine’s proposal.
In January 2022, the district court signed and filed an amended stipulated decree in
the form proposed by Alan. On the same date, the district court filed a three-page order in
which it explained its reasons for selecting Alan’s proposed document. The district court
reasoned that the use of a PC is a contractual matter and that the parties should not be
required to use a PC after the agreed-upon period and, furthermore, that no party should be
forced to enter into an agreement for a longer period. Because the parties had agreed in
April 2021 to a two-year appointment of Jameson, the district court approved of Alan’ s
proposed document, which limited the authority of the PC to that two-year period, without
any provisions allowing a custody motion if the parties ceased using a PC after April 2023.
In February 2022, Christine moved alternatively for amended findings, a new trial,
or a reopening of the judgment. In March 2022, the district court denied each of the
motions. Christine appeals.

6
DECISION
I.
Christine’s first and primary argument is that the district court erred by approving
and filing Alan’s proposed amended stipulated decree instead of her own, thereby deciding
that the parties are not required to use a PC after the expiration of Jameson’s two-year
appointment.
The statutes governing dissolution and child custody do not expressly provide for a
“parenting consultant.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 518.002-.68 (2022); see also Szarzynski v.
Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn. App. 2007). But parties are not precluded “from
voluntarily agreeing to submit their parenting time dispute to a neutral third party or . . .
otherwise resolving parenting time disputes on a voluntary basis.” Minn. Stat. § 518.1751,
subd. 4. The rules governing family court refer to “parenting consulting” as one of several
forms of alternative dispute resolution and describe the concept as follows: “Parenting
Consulting is a process defined by the agreement of the parties in which the Parenting
Consultant (PC) incorporates neutral facilitation, coaching, and decision making. Terms
of the process are defined by the agreement of the parties and incorporated into a court
order.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 310.03(c)(2). This court’s caselaw describes the use of a PC
as “a creature of contract.” Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d at 293.
In this case, Christine and Alan agreed—and the district court ordered —that custody
and parenting time would not be tried to the district court but, rather, would be decided by
the PC. Christine and Alan also agreed that the PC’s decisions would be binding if neither
party sought review by the district court. Goldfarb recommended that the parties share
7
joint legal custody “contingent on their continued commitment to a parenting consultant.”
Neither party sought review of Goldfarb’s custody recommendation. Accordingly, the
district court signed and filed Alan’s proposed amended stipulated decree, which
incorporates Goldfarb’s recommendation of joint legal custody and notes that the parties
had appointed a new PC, Jameson, for a two-year period and that she remained active,
thereby demonstrating the parties’ continued commitment to a PC. The amended stipulated
decree expressly orders joint legal custody.
Christine contends that the district court erred by not incorporating Goldfarb’s
recommendation that the parties retain a “long-term parenting consultant.” Alan contends
in response that Goldfarb’s report does not require the parties to use a PC for a “long-term”
period of time. Alan is correct. Goldfarb’s statement concerning a “long-term parenting
consultant” was not included in either paragraph of his report in which he made his court-
authorized recommendations concerning custody. Goldfarb emphasized the court-
authorized nature of his custody recommendations by using bold type, capital letters, and
underlining. For example, he wrote, “I . . . RECOMMEND that the parties share joint
legal custody contingent on their continued commitment to a parenting consultant.” In the
following paragraph, he used a similar style by writing, “I RECOMMEND that Christine
be granted sole physical custody.” In contrast, Goldfarb’ s reference to a “long-term
parenting consultant” was contained in a subsequent paragraph, which does not use bold
type, capital letters, and underlining and begins with a conspicuous disclaimer: “While not
specifically part of the order, I further recommend . . . [a] long-term parenting consultant.”
8
The structure and language of these paragraphs indicate that Goldfarb’s
“recommendation” of a “long-term parenting consultant” was not made pursuant to the
authority conferred on him by the court’s stipulated order of appointment but, rather, was
a suggestion that the parties are not bound to accept . If Goldfarb had intended that the
parties should be required to use a PC for the long term, he would have inserted the word
“long-term” into the express contingency of his recommendation of joint legal custody,
which is “contingent on their continued commitment to a parenting consultant.” But he
did not do so.
Alan also contends that it would have been improper for the district court to require
the parties to use a PC beyond the April 5, 2023 expiration of Jameson’s appointment.
Again, Alan is correct. The use of a PC is a matter of contract. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac.
310.03(c)(2); Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d at 293 . The parties agreed that Goldfarb would
make decisions concerning child custody and parenting time; they did not agree that
Goldfarb would make decisions concerning the length of time in which the parties would
be required to use a PC. A district court does not have any authority by statute or rule to
order parties to use a PC for a longer period than that to which they have agreed. See
Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 n.1 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that district court
may not “impose conditions on the parties to which they did not stipulate ”); see also
McGraw v. McGraw, No. A13-0825, 2014 WL 1875788, at *3 (Minn. App. May 12, 2014)
(concluding that district court erred by interpreting stipulated decree as requiring parties to
renew PC contract until child is emancipated).
9
Thus, the district court did not err by signing and filing Alan’s proposed amended
stipulated decree, which incorporates the PC’s recommendation concerning custody by
requiring the parties to have a continued commitment to a PC but not a “long-term”
commitment.
II.
Christine next argues that the district court erred by approving and filing Alan’s
proposed amended stipulated decree without giving her an opportunity to be heard.
To the extent that Christine argues that the district court did not give her an
opportunity to be heard on the question of which proposed amended stipulated decree
should be approved and filed, her argument is contrary to the partial stipulated decree. That
document specified in detail the procedures that would be followed if the parties were
unable to agree on an amended stipulated decree. The district court and the parties followed
those procedures. Christine’s attorney submitted a proposed amended stipulated decree
along with a three-page letter brief. That letter brief was an opportunity for Christine to be
heard; it was an opportunity to persuade the district court that her proposed document was
a better reflection of the PC ’s court-authorized custody recommendation than Alan’s
proposed document. Christine did not ask the district court for any additional opportunity
to be heard. Indeed, the district court had just held a hearing, to discuss the parties’
disagreement concerning how to implement Goldfarb’s custody recommendation.
To the extent that Christine argues that she did not have “an opportunity to be heard
on the merits of the underlying issue” of legal custody, her argument again is contrary to
the partial stipulated decree. That document reflects that the parties bargained for and
10
agreed on a form of alternative dispute resolution that was designed to avoid a trial on the
merits of the custody issue and to rely on a PC’s evaluation and recommendation. Goldfarb
completed the tasks that were contemplated, and the district court adopted his decisions, as
intended. Christine was not denied an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the custody
issue because she agreed that she would not have such an opportunity.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Christine an opportunity to be heard
when approving and filing Alan’s proposed amended stipulated decree.
III.
Christine last argues that the district court erred by denying her alternative motions
for amended findings, a new trial, or a reopening of the judgment.
A. Motion for Amended Findings
Christine first argues that the district court erred by denying her motion for amended
findings of fact. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02.
Christine urged the district court to amend the amended stipulated dissolution decree
by, in essence, adopting the language that she previously had proposed. The district court
rejected her argument on the ground that she was “making the same arguments” that she
previously had made, “that her version of the proposed findings is the one the Court should
adopt.” The district court is correct. Christine re-asserted the arguments she previously
had made without “identify[ing] the alleged defect in the challenged findings and
explain[ing] why the challenged findings are defective.” See State ex rel. Fort Snelling
State Park Ass’n v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation Bd., 673 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Minn. App.
2003), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 2004).
11
The district court also rejected her argument on the ground that she was relying on
“facts not in evidence, namely, purported conversations she had with the custody evaluator
and the respondent about what the terms of the agreement were.” When filing her post-
judgment motions, Christine submitted an affidavit in which she stated that she had spoken
with the PC and, based on that conversation, understood the word “long-term” to mean that
she and Alan “would share joint legal custody through [the child ’s] age of majority with
the help of a long-term” PC and that, but for the PC, she “would have received an award
of sole legal custody.” “A motion to amend findings must be based on the files, exhibits,
and minutes of the court, not on evidence that is not a part of the record.” Zander v. Zander,
720 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2006). Because
Christine’s affidavit was not part of the record before the district court filed the amended
stipulated dissolution decree, the district court appropriately declined to consider it.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Christine’s motion for amended
findings.
B. Motion for New Trial
Christine next argues that the district court erred by denying her alternative motion
for a new trial. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01. The district court denied the motion for a new
trial on the ground that there was no trial before the filing of the amended stipulated
dissolution decree. The district court’s reasoning is consistent with this court ’s caselaw.
See Parson v. Argue, 344 N.W.2d 431, 431 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that if “there never
was a trial . . . , a motion for a new trial is an anomaly” (quotation omitted)). Thus, the
district court did not err by denying Christine’s motion for a new trial.
12
C. Motion to Reopen
Christine last argues that the district court erred by denying her alternative motion
to reopen the judgment.
“Once a stipulation is merged into a judgment, the ‘sole relief’ lies in meeting the
requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 761
(Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001); see also Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d
519, 522 (Minn. 1997). Under section 518.145, subdivision 2, a district court may reopen
a dissolution decree only if the moving party establishes one of the predicates identified in
the statute, such as mistake, inadvertence, newly discovered evidence, or fraud. See, e.g.,
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1)-(3). “The moving party bears the burden of establishing
a basis to reopen the judgment and decree.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424,
428 (Minn. App. 2007). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a
district court’s decision not to reopen a judgment and decree. Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542
N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996).
The district court denied Christine’s alternative motion to reopen for the following
reasons:
The Court finds there i s no basis to reopen the matter.
The parties agreed to the decision of the PC. Neither brought
a motion per their agreed upon process. The PC states he
recommends that the parties share joint legal custody
contingent upon their continued commitment to a PC. There is
nothing in the PC decision that states that he believes a PC has
to be in place until emancipation of the children. As noted in
the Court’s December 5, 2022, order, the parties entered into a
contract with the PC for two years demonstrating a
commitment to continued use of a PC.

13
Christine contends that the amended stipulated decree should have been reopened
due to mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. She contends that the district
court “mistakenly concluded that the [PC’s] recommendations were not based on an
agreement between the parties to utilize the services of a [PC] long-term.” We have already
concluded that the district court did not err by adopting and filing Alan’s proposed
amended stipulated decree. See supra part I.
Christine also contends that she was mistaken in believing that the PC’s
recommendation of joint legal custody was contingent on the parties’ long-term
commitment to a PC. A unilateral misunderstanding is insufficient to justify reopening a
judgment; instead, Christine must show that there was mutual mistake when entering into
the judgment and decree. See Kubiszewski v. St. John, 518 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1994)
(applying Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02); see also Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522 n.3 (noting that
section 518.145 mimics rule 60.02). Consequently, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by ruling that Christine’s misinterpretation does not justify reopening the
judgment. See Hestekin v. Hestekin, 587 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. App. 1998) (stating that
vacatur of judgment and decree “is not an appropriate remedy to deal with unanticipated
consequences of a settlement or inexcusable mistake”).
Christine also contends that the judgment should be reopened because it is no longer
equitable. “[T]o reopen a judgment and decree because prospective application is no
longer equitable, the inequity must result from the development of circumstances
substantially altering the information known when the dissolution judgment and decree
was entered.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430 (quotation omitted). “The moving party
14
must present more than merely a new set of circumstances or an unforeseen change of a
known circumstance to reopen a judgment and decree.” Id. at 430-31.
Christine asserts that the judgment no longer is equitable because it “fundamentally
altered the terms to which appellant had agreed.” The parties agreed to a process by which
the PC would make a recommendation concerning custody, which could be reviewed by
the district court at either party’s request. Christine simply disagrees with the district
court’s interpretation of the PC’s recommendation. That is not a basis for reopening a
judgment on the ground that it is inequitable.
Christine further asserts that the judgment no longer is equitable because the district
court “failed to determine whether joint legal custody was in the minor child’s best
interests.” Again, the parties agreed to a process by which the PC would make a
recommendation concerning custody. The PC engaged in a thorough analysis of the best-
interest factors. Christine could have requested that the district court review the merits of
the PC’s analysis of the best-interest factors, but she did not do so. Hence, the district court
did not fail to consider the child’s best interests.
1

1In general, a district court is required to make detailed best-interests findings.
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)-(b); Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn.
2019). In this case, the district court did not make such findings. Rather, the stipulated
decree states that the PC recommended joint legal custody and, accordingly, orders joint
legal custody. The district court did not err because the parties stipulated that the PC would
conduct a custody evaluation and make a custody recommendation, and neither party asked
the district court to review that recommendation. Nonetheless, it may be a good practice,
in the circumstances of this case, for a district court to either make best-interests findings
or adopt the PC’s best-interests findings. Doing so might be helpful in the event of a later
motion to modify custody, which would raise the question of whether facts “have arisen
since the prior order or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order” to
indicate that “a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties.” See
15
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Christine’s motion to reopen the
judgment.
Affirmed.

Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2022). Regardless of the asserted reason for a modification, see
id., § 518.18(d)(i)-(v), best-interests findings might assist the district court in determining
whether the requisite change has occurred. See, e.g., Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d
502, 506-10 (Minn. 2022); Gunderson v. Preuss, 336 N.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Minn. 1983);
Spanier v. Spanier, 852 N.W.2d 284, 287-90 (Minn. App. 2014).