State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0740

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lance George Iwen,
Appellant.

Filed April 17, 2023
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-21-5809

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin Peralta, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction following a jury trial for one count of
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, arguing that the evidence was insufficient
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to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed 3.873 grams of
methamphetamine in his vehicle. Because the circumstances proved are consistent with
the inference that appellant constructively possessed the methamphetamine and
inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2021, a police officer stopped a Chevy Tahoe for a traffic violation
near a highway entrance ramp in Clearwater. The officer identified the driver of the Tahoe
as appellant Lance George Iwen. Police later identified the Tahoe’s passenger as J.B. The
officer saw a marijuana joint sitting atop a beverage can in a cupholder near the passenger
seat and asked both Iwen and J.B. to exit the vehicle.
The officer searched the vehicle and found a black backpack in the middle of the
rear bench seat with a wooden box containing what appeared to be marijuana, marijuana
wax, pills, and hypodermic needles. The officer informed Iwen and J.B. that they were
being detained while law enforcement continued to search the vehicle, at which point J.B.
attempted to flee on foot but was apprehended with the assistance of additional officers.
During the search, the officer found a small purse-like satchel with an insignia of the letter
G (the G bag) sitting next to the backpack , toward the driver’s side of the vehicle. The G
bag contained a large amount of cash and a substance consistent with methamphetamine.
The officers found cash totaling more than $3,000, as well as a scale and three cell phones.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Iwen with one count of fifth-degree
controlled-substance possession pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2020). The
district court held a jury trial over three days in March 2022. At trial, the state called the
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officers who responded to the traffic stop. The first officer testified that the Tahoe attracted
his attention because it was parked with the occupants inside it at multiple gas stations in
the same area over the course of a few hours overnight, and because it had no front or rear
license plates and no visible temporary license tag. He stated that after he drove past the
parked Tahoe, it moved “deeper into the travel plaza lot where there is no exit, and where
most of your general motoring public wouldn’t travel,” which he found suspicious. The
officer testified that he pulled the vehicle over after it failed to come to a complete stop at
a stop sign.
The officer testified about the contents of the black backpack found during the
search of the vehicle, including the wooden box and a zippered container that appeared to
contain THC oils and smoking paraphernalia. He stated that based on their size, the clothes
in the backpack appeared to be J.B.’s. He determined that the backpack belonged to J.B.
The officer also testified about the G bag, describing it as being situated on the back bench
seat next to the backpack, but closer to the driver’s side and within Iwen’s reach. He
testified that the G bag contained a small silicone container with what he believed to be
methamphetamine inside, a smoking device he could not identify, and “a large wad” of
cash, among other items. The officer testified that he searched the rear cargo area of the
Tahoe as well as a toolbox and a suitcase believed to be Iwen’s and found no other
contraband items. The jury viewed the state’s exhibits, including photographs the officer
took of the Tahoe’s interior and the contents of the G bag and the zippered case from the
backpack.
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At trial, the state introduced excerpts of the officer’s conversation with Iwen
recorded by the officer’s squad-car camera and an audio recording of Iwen’s
post-Miranda-warning statement to the officer. In the recordings, Iwen confirmed that the
backpack was J.B.’s but could not describe it. He stated that J.B. “might have a jacket,
clothes . . . stuff like that back there too.” Iwen stated that a brown backpack, a black mesh
bag, and a toolbox in the backseat were his. He gave vague answers about his travels in
the area with J.B. and his activities at the gas stations. The officer testified that while he
initially believed Iwen to be credible, his opinion changed over the course of their
interaction.
Another officer who assisted at the scene of the traffic stop testified that he observed
a butane torch lighter fall to the ground when Iwen exited the vehicle and that the lighter
was of a type commonly associated with methamphetamine use. The officer stated he
asked Iwen at the scene if he used the lighter to smoke the marijuana joint found in the
vehicle, and Iwen affirmed that he did. The state also presented testimony from a third
officer who assisted in counting out the cash found in the vehicle and a forensic scientist.
The forensic scientist testified to the weight of the substance found in the silicone container
in the G bag and determined that the substance was methamphetamine.
The state also presented evidence of a conciliation court claim Iwen filed, claiming
that he was the owner of the Chevy Tahoe and $3,498.91 in currency. The notarized claim
statement, signed by Iwen, listed his criminal case as a “related file” and contained the
statement, “I have not been convicted of said crime. The money was what I have left from
my savings to use for first month and last month to get an [apartment] in this area.”
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Iwen did not testify, and the defense called no witnesses. Iwen moved for a
judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence of Iwen’s possession of the
methamphetamine, and the district court denied the motion. The jury found Iwen guilty of
fifth-degree controlled-substance possession.
Iwen appeals.
DECISION
Iwen argues that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in his Chevy Tahoe after a traffic
stop. He claims that the circumstantial evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to
support his conviction because the evidence supports a reasonable hypothesis other than
Iwen’s guilt—that Iwen’s passenger, J.B., possessed the methamphetamine—and Iwen did
not knowingly or consciously exercise dominion or control over the methamphetamine.
For the jury to find Iwen guilty of possession of a controlled substance, the state had
to prove Iwen unlawfully possessed a classified controlled substance, in this case,
methamphetamine. Minn. Stat. §§ 152.025, subd. 2(1); 152.02, subd. 3(d)(2) (20 20).
“Possession may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.” State
v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Constructive possession exists “where the
inference is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed” an item and
“continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to the time of the arrest.” State v.
Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609,
610 (Minn. 1975)). To establish constructive possession, the state must show that law
enforcement found the item either (1) “in a place under the defendant’s exclusive control
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to which other people normally did not have access” or (2) in a place to which others had
access, but other evidence allows the inference of “a strong probability . . . that at the time
the defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control over” the
item.1 Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
In contrast with direct evidence, which is “based on personal knowledge or
observation and . . . if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption,” the supreme
court has defined circumstantial evidence as evidence from which the jury “can infer
whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. at 599 (quotations omitted).
“Thus, circumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 604 (Minn.
2013)). Although the parties differ in their assessment of the circumstances proved by the
facts in the trial record, they agree that the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove
Iwen’s constructive possession of the methamphetamine found in his vehicle.
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court
generally will not overturn a guilty verdict if the jury, applying the presumption of
innocence and the state’s burden to prove an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, “could
reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Griffin,
887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). Our review therefore consists of “a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most

1 “[C]onstructive possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared.” State v. Sam,
859 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted). Because the state does not
raise the issue of joint possession on appeal, we review the sufficiency of the evidence on
the basis of nonjoint possession.
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favorable to the conviction, was sufficient” to support the verdict. State v. Ortega,
813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). This standard of review applies
when direct evidence alone is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Loving v. State,
891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). But when the state relies on circumstantial evidence
to prove an element of an offense, we apply a heightened standard of review. Id.
Under the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard, we conduct a two-step
analysis. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d at 598. The first step is to identify the circumstances
proved by the state. Id. To identify the circumstances proved, we defer to the jury’s
acceptance of the state’s evidence, “construe conflicting evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and
disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). We consider “only
those circumstances that are consistent with the verdict . . . because the jury is in the best
position to evaluate the credibility of the evidence even in cases based on circumstantial
evidence.” Id. at 599 (citation omitted).
The second step requires us to determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Id. In
making this determination, we review the circumstances proved “not as isolated facts, but
as a whole,” and independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences instead of
deferring to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id. Even so, “inconsistencies
in the state’s case or possibilities of innocence” do not require reversal so long as the
evidence as a whole “makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Tscheu,
758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). Therefore, rather than relying on “mere conjecture,”
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a defendant challenging the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence must point to evidence
in the record “consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.” Id.
Applying the first step in the circumstantial-evidence analysis, we identify the
circumstances proved by the state. See Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. Construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, our independent review of the
evidence presented at trial shows that the state proved the following circumstances:
• Iwen was the owner and driver of the Chevy Tahoe when
officers conducted the traffic stop.
• The Tahoe attracted the attention of a police officer because
the vehicle, with the occupants inside, was moving between
and parking at multiple gas stations in the same area over a few
hours between late evening and early morning and did not have
license plates or a visible temporary license tag.
• Iwen attempted to evade the officer after the officer drove by
the parked Tahoe.
• A butane torch lighter of a type law enforcement associated
with methamphetamine use fell to the ground when Iwen
exited the vehicle from the driver’s seat, and Iwen stated that
it was his.
• The officer searched a backpack located on the back seat and
found a wooden box containing pills, hypodermic needles, and
what appeared to be marijuana wax. The backpack also
contained a zippered case with smoking devices for THC oils.
• The backpack contained XXXL-size clothing consistent with
J.B.’s stature and inconsistent with Iwen’s stature.
• Iwen’s responses to the officer’s questions about the timeline
for his and J.B.’s travels from the Moorhead area were unclear
and inconsistent, including the time they left Moorhead, the
time they arrived in Clearwater, and whether Iwen was putting
fuel, transmission fluid, or oil into the Tahoe at the various gas
stations.
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• The G bag was found on the back seat next to the backpack,
closer to the driver’s side and within Iwen’s reach.
• The G bag contained a “large wad” of approximately $3,000
cash and a silicone container with a substance later determined
to be 3.873 grams of methamphetamine.
• The G bag also contained an automobile title for an Audi
vehicle naming neither Iwen nor J.B. as the owner, a smoking
device, and a few stray dollar bills.
• In addition to the currency in the G bag that amounted to
$3002, a separate stack of currency was recovered from the
Tahoe amounting to approximately $400.
• Iwen filed a notarized conciliation court claim statement
seeking to reclaim the Chevy Tahoe and $3,498.91 in cash,
identifying himself as the owner of that property and stating
that he had not been convicted of the crime of
controlled-substance possession and the cash was from his
savings.
• The officer’s search of the Tahoe revealed personal items
including a toolbox and suitcase that were also searched, but
no other contraband was found.
Next, we turn to the second step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, in which
we determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. See id. at 599. The circumstances proved by
the state are consistent with the jury’s guilty verdict. Thus, we move on to determine
whether the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than
guilt.
Iwen argues that “the evidence in this case is strongly suggestive” of the rational
hypothesis that Iwen “did not know the methamphetamine was in the vehicle” and that
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therefore, the methamphetamine in the G bag must have been J.B.’s. Iwen identifies the
circumstances proved that he asserts support his argument. We address these in turn.
Iwen first addresses the G bag’s placement on the back seat, suggesting that because
it was next to J.B.’s backpack, the G bag was more likely J.B.’s than Iwen’s. Iwen
compares this fact to those in State v. Cusick , in which the proximity of cocaine to the
defendant’s wallet on the ground when other belongings were scattered elsewhere after a
car accident was sufficient to establish that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine
even though the car was not the defendant’s and the owner of the car was a cocaine user.
387 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn. 1986). We are not persuaded that the G bag’s proximity to
J.B.’s backpack suggests that J.B. also owned the G bag, for two reasons: (1) of the two
bags, the G bag was closest to Iwen’s position in the driver’s seat; and (2) J.B.’s backpack
already contained both a box and a zippered pouch with drugs and paraphernalia. It is
unlikely that J.B. would stow two of his containers of drugs in his backpack and leave a
third container holding not only drugs, but a significant amount of cash, elsewhere. In this
instance, the presence of the drugs in a separate container in the G bag, although proximate
to J.B.’s backpack, supports ownership by someone other than J.B.
Iwen next argues that his attempt to claim $3,498.91 through conciliation court,
when $3,002 was recovered from the G bag with the methamphetamine and approximately
$400 was found elsewhere in the Tahoe, does not support a reasonable inference that Iwen
constructively possessed the methamphetamine in the G bag. Iwen’s argument relies on
two contentions: first, that the cash Iwen claimed may have been a different $3,498.91 from
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elsewhere in the Tahoe and did not include the $3,002 from the G bag; and second, that the
cash in the G bag could as easily have been J.B.’s.
At trial, the officer who searched the vehicle testified that he found $3,000 “kind of
balled up” in the G bag along with “a couple dollar bills.”2 The officer further testified to
searching the rest of the vehicle, including a toolbox and suitcase he believed to be Iwen’s,
and not finding any contraband. If the officer had found other cash in the Tahoe,
particularly an additional $3,498.91, outside of the G bag, it would have been noted in his
testimony or elsewhere in the record.
Given the lack of evidence of any other cash located in the vehicle, Iwen’s argument
that his conciliation claim for $3,498.91 represented cash other than that from the G bag
containing methamphetamine is unconvincing, as is his argument that the cash in the G bag
may have been J.B.’s. Rather than relying on “mere conjecture” to successfully challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence presented, Iwen must instead point to evidence in the trial
record based on the circumstances proved and consistent with a rational theory other than
guilt. See Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858; State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn. 1995).
Iwen further argues that the presence of the car title, for a car other than the Chevy
Tahoe, in the G bag “makes it more likely that the G bag belonged” to J.B. Iwen bases his
argument on the lack of evidence connecting Iwen to the vehicle listed on the title.
However, the trial record contains no evidence connecting J.B. to that vehicle, either. Thus,

2 A second officer testified to assisting with counting the cash found in the Tahoe and stated
that there were two piles—one in the amount of $3,002 and another in the amount of
approximately $400. He testified that he did not remember whether both piles of money
were originally located in the G bag.
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the presence of the car title in the G bag neither supports nor undermines Iwen’s hypothesis
that the G bag, and therefore the methamphetamine, belonged to J.B.
Iwen encourages us to compare the facts in Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 828, and Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 597, to the facts here and conclude that J.B.’s attempt to flee the scene was
a “suspicious movement” that makes J.B.’s ownership of the G bag a rational theory. He
argues that those constructive-possession cases support his theory because they involved
officers observing passengers who made suspicious movements. However, the courts in
those cases did not rely on a passenger’s suspicious or furtive behavior to determine that
the circumstantial evidence did not support the defendant- driver’s conviction for
constructive possession. Rather, this court overturned the defendant’s conviction in Sam
because, “without more,” the defendant’s evasiveness and driving a vehicle with
contraband inside was insufficient to eliminate all rational inferences inconsistent with the
defendant’s guilt on the basis that “no direct evidence tied appellant to possession of the
contraband.” 859 N.W.2d at 835-36. In contrast, Iwen claimed ownership of the cash in
the G bag, which is evidence that ties him to ownership of the contents of the G bag,
including the methamphetamine.
We recognize that some isolated circumstances proved in the state’s evidence could
support theories other than Iwen’s knowing exercise of dominion and control over the
methamphetamine. For example, although Iwen appeared to the officer to be driving
evasively after the officer passed near the parked Tahoe in his squad car, this could have
been because Iwen was smoking marijuana in the Tahoe. Similarly, although Iwen
admitted that the butane lighter that fell from his lap—a type of lighter police testified to
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associating with methamphetamine use—was his, he asserted that he was using the lighter
to smoke marijuana, and there was a marijuana joint in plain view.
We do not review the circumstances proved in a piecemeal manner, however; we
review the evidence as a whole. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858. And the theories Iwen offers
are unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances, particularly the conciliation
court claim for $3,498 when $3,002 was found in the G bag with the methamphetamine,
approximately $400 was found elsewhere in Iwen’s Tahoe, and the record reveals no other
similar amount of money having been found among Iwen’s possessions. Because the
circumstances proved by the state are consistent with the inference that Iwen constructively
possessed the methamphetamine found in the G bag and are inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis of innocence, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s verdict.
Affirmed.