State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0747

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Saldana,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2023
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Cottonwood County District Court
File No. 17-CR-20-390

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin Peralta, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Nicholas A. Anderson, Cottonwood County Attorney, Windom, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Barry S. Edwards, Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct
involving penetration or sexual contact with a person under 13 in violation of Minn. Stat.
2
§ 609.342, subd. 1(a) (Supp. 2019). Appellant argues he is entitled to a new trial because
the district court abused its discretion by admitting expert-witness testimony and receiving
a video recording of the complainant’s forensic interview (recorded interview) into
evidence. Appellant also contends the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct
affecting his substantial rights. Because we conclude that the district court did not err by
admitting expert testimony or receiving the recorded interview, and there was no
prosecutorial misconduct, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the evidence received during the jury trial. The
complainant, K.B., was born September 27, 2012, to parents J.M. (mother) and R.B.
(father). K.B. has a brother, D.B., who is two years older. Mother and father divorced in
2014, and K.B. and D.B. divided their time between their parents’ two households.
Father married E.B. (stepmother) in 2020. Father and stepmother live in Mountain
Lake with stepmother’s son, K.B., and D.B. Appellant Daniel Saldana, stepmother’s
brother, also lived in Mountain Lake in 2020. Saldana lived with father and stepmother and
then moved to a condominium with his girlfriend.
In February 2020, K.B. reported that D.B. had initiated sexual contact with her.
Child-protection specialist Rachael Pudenz reviewed K.B.’s report of sexual contact with
D.B. and later testified during Saldana’s trial about K.B.’s forensic interview discussing
the disclosure. Father testified that, after K.B.’s report, D.B. and K.B. alternated schedules
with mother and father so that they no longer stayed together at the same house at the same
time.
3
Relevant to the issues on appeal, Saldana babysat K.B. and stepmother’s son “a
couple times a week” when father and stepmother were at work. On August 12, 2020, K.B.
told father that she “need[ed] to talk to [him] about what Uncle Dan is doing” and then said
that Saldana was touc hing “her private area.” K.B. also told father that Saldana sexually
touched her while they were watching a movie in his bedroom.
K.B. repeated her statements about Saldana to stepmother, who testified that K.B.
said Saldana “had been touching her . . . on top [of and] under her clothes.” When
stepmother asked K.B. where Saldana had touched her , K.B. “pointed to her vagina.”
K.B.’s statements about Saldana were reported to law enforcement and child protection,
which referred K.B. for a forensic interview.
On August 18, 2020, K.B. participated in a recorded interview at Child’s Voice
conducted by Amanda Liebl, who had been trained in the CornerHouse method. 1 During
the interview, K.B. stated that while she and Saldana were watching television on Saldana’s
bed, Saldana put his hand “in” her underwear and “tried to put his finger up [her] private,”
by “put[ting his finger] at a point and sticking it . . . where the hole is” so that his finger
went “up in” her vagina. K.B. also described Saldana squeezing her butt.
On August 24, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Saldana with criminal
sexual conduct involving penetration or sexual contact with a person under 13 in violation

1 CornerHouse is a training and evaluation center focused on child-abuse issues that,
among other things, trains other professionals in forensic interviewing. During trial,
testimony established that the “CornerHouse method” of forensic interview includes four
phases, specific protocols for the interview, and that a professional using the CornerHouse
method must participate in ongoing training.
4
of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a). The state notified Saldana of its intent to introduce
K.B.’s recorded interview and to offer the expert testimony of Rachel Johnson about the
typical behavioral characteristics of children who have been victims of sexual abuse.
Saldana moved in limine, seeking to exclude the recorded interview and objecting to the
admission of Johnson’s testimony.
After a hearing, the district court issued a written order that included detailed
findings about the reliability of K.B.’s forensic interview and concluded the interview had
sufficient indicia of reliability to be received as evidence under Minn. Stat. § 595.02,
subd. 3 (2022). The district court preliminarily granted the state’s motion to admit the
recorded interview with some redactions and denied Saldana’s motion to exclude the
interview. The district court also preliminarily granted the state’s motion to admit the
proposed expert testimony from Johnson, stating that the expert may opine about “common
myths and perceptions regarding child sexual abuse victims, including but not limited to
delayed reporting.”
The jury trial began March 8, 2022. Before opening statements, Saldana renewed
his objection to Johnson’s expert testimony about “the dynamics of child abuse.” The
district court ruled it would not revisit its preliminary ruling. The state called K.B., father,
stepmother, Saldana’s brother, and Saldana’s girlfriend. Father and stepmother testified to,
among other things, K.B.’s statements about Saldana’s sexual abuse. The state also called
Pudenz, Liebl, and Johnson. The district court received K.B.’s redacted recorded interview
into evidence, and the recorded interview was played for the jury. Saldana testified and
denied any sexual contact with K.B.
5
The jury found Saldana guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district
court imposed a sentence of 156 months in prison. Saldana appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not plainly err by admitting the challenged testimony.
Saldana challenges the testimony of Liebl, Johnson, and Pudenz on three grounds:
(1) the witnesses lacked expert credentials; (2) their opinions lacked foundational
reliability; and (3) their testimony amounted to vouching for K.B.’s credibility.
Saldana did not object during trial to the testimony of Liebl, Johnson, or Pudenz on
any of the three grounds raised in his brief to this court. “Appellate review of an evidentiary
issue is forfeited when a defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence.” State v.
Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018). Appellate courts review unobjected-to error
under the “plain error test.”2 State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016). “In order
to meet the plain error standard, a criminal defendant must show that (1) there was an error,
(2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id.
(citing State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). We consider the testimony of
each witness in turn, discussing appellant’s three challenges.

2 Saldana’s brief to this court does not request plain-error review. Rather, Saldana frames
the issue as an abuse of discretion. Because Saldana did not object to the admission of the
testimony he now challenges on appeal, we review this issue for plain error.
6
Liebl
Liebl testified about her credentials to conduct forensic interviews using the
CornerHouse method and the video-recording process. She also testified about K.B.’s
recorded interview.
Saldana first challenges Liebl’s qualifications and argues that the district court erred
in receiving Liebl’s testimony because she should not “have been qualified as an expert
and allowed to give expert testimony.” The district court, however, was not asked to qualify
Liebl as an expert and did not do so. On appeal, Saldana identifies none of Liebl’s
testimony as opinion testimony. 3 In reviewing the transcript, we discern no improper
opinion testimony by Liebl. Indeed, Liebl testified that she does not substantiate claims of
child abuse. We find no merit to Saldana’s argument that the district court plainly erred by
admitting Liebl’s testimony as an expert opinion.
Saldana next challenges the “foundational reliability” of Liebl’s testimony about
K.B.’s forensic interview, specifically arguing that the CornerHouse method’s “only
foundational reliability was its repeated use.” We understand Saldana’s brief to argue that
the district court plainly erred by receiving Liebl’s testimony about K.B.’s forensic
interview because, according to Saldana, the CornerHouse method is not reliable.

3 The Minnesota Rules of Evidence provide for the admission of two types of opinion
testimony—lay-witness opinion in rule 701 and expert- witness opinion in rules 702-706.
Although Saldana’s brief to this court challenges the admission of Liebl’s testimony as
“expert opinion,” he does not identify any opinion testimony by Liebl either as an expert
or lay witness.
7
Our review of the foundational reliability of K.B.’s CornerHouse interview
implicates a statute and caselaw. The statute allows the admission of a recorded interview
of a child witness when reliability is established. Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3.4 Similarly,
admission of a recording requires foundation. Turnage v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 542
(Minn. 2006). Although a forensic interview is not a “test,” caselaw offers some guidance.
“Foundational reliability requires the proponent of a test to establish that the test itself is
reliable and that its administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure
necessary to ensure reliability.” Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000)
(quotations omitted).
The record on the foundational reliability of K.B.’s forensic interview unfolded at
several stages. After a pretrial hearing, the district court found that K.B.’s recorded
interview was conducted under circumstances with sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy
Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3. During trial, Liebl testified that she was trained in the
CornerHouse method, receives ongoing training in the CornerHouse method, and used the
CornerHouse method when she interviewed K.B. The trial testimony of Johnson, who was
qualified as an expert, also described the CornerHouse method in some detail.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court had ample
support for its determination that Liebl’s forensic interview of K.B. used the CornerHouse
method and conformed with established procedure. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 814. Thus,

4 Minn. R. Evid. 702 requires an expert opinion to have foundational reliability. As
discussed above, however, Liebl did not offer expert-opinion testimony.
8
we conclude that the district court did not plainly err by admitting Liebl’s testimony about
her forensic interview of K.B.
Lastly, Saldana argues that Liebl’s testimony was improper vouching because she
“testified at length about the emotions experienced by a victim of sexual abuse and that
K.B.’s feelings were consistent with the emotions experienced by a victim.” When Liebl
was asked to “describe some of the emotions” that she sees during forensic interviews of
children reporting child abuse, Saldana objected, and the district court sustained the
objection. Liebl did not offer any opinion about the emotions of an abuse victim or the
veracity of K.B.’s allegations.
Saldana is correct that generally, a witness may not vouch for the credibility of
another witness. “[O]ne witness may not vouch for or against the credibility of another
witness.” State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 689 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). Saldana’s
brief to this court does not clearly identify at what point he believes Liebl’s testimony
crossed over into improper vouching. Based on our review of Liebl’s testimony, we discern
no testimony that vouched for K.B.’s credibility.
Liebl’s testimony provided context about K.B.’s forensic interview. Liebl described
K.B.’s ability to talk about body positions, stated that K.B. corrected Liebl if she “got
information wrong,” and provided other details about the forensic interview. Importantly,
Liebl did not testify that K.B.’s behavior or feelings, as seen or described during the
interview, conformed with the behavior of a child who had been sexually abused. We
conclude that the district court did not plainly err by admitting Liebl’s testimony about
K.B.’s forensic interview.
9
Johnson
Johnson testified about her education and experience using and teaching the
CornerHouse method and understanding the behaviors of children who experience abuse
of many different types. Johnson also testified about the purpose of forensic interviews.
During trial, Saldana took “no position” on Johnson’s qualifications, and the district court
found that she was qualified to testify as an expert. On appeal, Saldana first challenges
Johnson’s credentials as an expert. Based on Johnson’s extensive experience performing
and teaching forensic interviewing and her knowledge of child abuse, we discern no plain
error in qualifying Johnson as an expert about the common behaviors of sexual abuse.
Saldana’s second challenge relates to the foundational reliability of the
CornerHouse method, which we have addressed above.
Third, Saldana argues that “[t] he entire point of . . . Johnson’s testimony was
vouching.” Caselaw does not support Saldana’s premise. An expert may opine about the
common behaviors of child victims of sexual abuse without crossing the line into
impermissible vouching. See, e.g., Vick, 632 N.W.2d at 689 (“[T]he therapist’s statement
in this case was a comment on the general characteristics of abused children and therefore
not vouching.”).
Johnson testified that she had not met K.B. and offered no opinion related to K.B.
Johnson testified that it is “very common” that a victim will disclose sexual abuse and then
recant and that “delayed disclosure” is “very, very common” among child victims of sexual
abuse. Because Johnson’s testimony only described typical behaviors of child victims of
10
sexual abuse, and Johnson offered no testimony about K.B. or the truthfulness of K.B.’s
forensic interview, the district court did not plainly err by admitting Johnson’s testimony.
Pudenz
On appeal, Saldana’s challenge to Pudenz’s testimony is limited to her expert
credentials and the foundational reliability of her testimony. Pudenz testified that she was
trained in the CornerHouse method of forensic interviewing and about K.B.’s disclosure,
during a forensic interview, of sexual contact with her older brother, D.B., in February
2020.
As with Liebl’s testimony, the district court was not asked to receive Pudenz’s
testimony as expert testimony and Saldana’s brief to this court identifies no opinion
testimony from Pudenz. Because we discern no opinion testimony from Pudenz, we
conclude the district court did not plainly err in relation to Pudenz’s credentials when it
admitted her testimony. We addressed Saldana’s challenge to the foundational reliability
of the CornerHouse method above.
In sum, the district court did not plainly err in receiving the testimony of Liebl,
Johnson, or Pudenz on any of the three grounds raised by Saldana in this appeal.
II. The district court did not err by admitting the recorded interview.
Saldana raises two challenges to the admissibility of Liebl’s recorded interview of
K.B. at Child’s Voice. First, Saldana argues that the recorded interview was not admissible
as a prior consistent statement under the hearsay evidence rule. Second, Saldana contends
that “[a]dmission of the video record ing of K.B.’s testimony violated . . . Mr. Saldana’s
right to confrontation.” Each argument is addressed in turn.
11
Hearsay and Admission Under Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3
Saldana challenges the admission of the recorded interview as “inadmissible
hearsay,” arguing on appeal that the district court erred in determining that the recorded
interview was admissible as a prior consistent statement under Minn. R. Evid. 801.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and [an appellate
court] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali,
855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). We only need to conclude that evidence was
admissible on one ground to conclude there was no abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare
of L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d 163, 169 (Minn. 1999) (declining to address alternative grounds
when concluding evidence was admissible on one ground).
Here, K.B.’s recorded interview was admitted on more than one ground. In a pretrial
ruling, the district court preliminarily determined that the recorded interview was
admissible under Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3, and Minn. R. Evid. 807, the residual
hearsay exception. The district court reserved ruling on whether the recorded interview was
also admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) as a prior consistent statement of a
witness. During trial, Saldana repeated his hearsay objection to the recorded interview’s
admission, and the district court repeated its ruling that the recorded interview was
admissible under Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3, and also determined it was admissible
under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
We begin by reviewing the admissibility of K.B.’s recorded interview under Minn.
Stat. § 595.02. Section 595.02, subdivision 3, allows evidence of “[a]n out-of-court
statement made by a child under the age of ten years . . . describing any act of sexual
12
contact or penetration” if the district court determines the statement is reliable, the child
testifies at trial, and there is sufficient notice of the intent to introduce the evidence. See,
e.g., L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d at 171 (reversing a district court’s finding that a seven-year-old’s
consistent statements were not reliable under Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3); State v.
Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 1990) (affirming a district court’s finding that
statements made by a three-year-old to a daycare provider were reliable under Minn. Stat.
§ 595.02, subd. 3).
The district court determined that the recorded interview of K.B. satisfied all the
statutory criteria. In a pretrial order, the district court outlined the factors it considered,
which followed the statutory requirements and included “the time, content and
circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the statement is
made.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd 3(a). The district court determined that the recorded
interview was “made under circumstances with sufficient indicia of reliability” and
identified these circumstances: K.B. “demonstrated she knew the difference between the
truth and a lie,” the interview was conducted “by a trained forensic interviewer,” and the
questions asked were not leading. When Saldana renewed his objection to the recorded
interview during trial, the district court noted that “none of th[e] analysis has changed.”
Although Saldana’s brief to this court mentions this statement, he does not challenge the
district court’s analysis under the statute. We discern no error in the district court’s
admission of the recorded interview under Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3.
Saldana’s brief to this court limits his argument to attack the admissibility of the
recorded interview as a prior consistent statement of a witness under Minn. R. Evid.
13
801(d)(1)(B). Saldana contends that K.B.’s testimony was more limited in scope than the
content of the recorded interview. Because the recorded inter view was admissible under
Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3, we need not consider the district court’s alternative grounds
for receiving the recorded statement. See L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d at 169. Even so, though we
agree with Saldana that K.B.’s trial testimony was not as detailed as her statements in the
recorded interview , K.B.’s testimony largely tracked her statements in the recorded
interview.
Finally, any error in receiving the recorded interview was harmless because the
record includes cumulative evidence of K.B.’s statements to her father and stepmother.
State v. McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2013) (“I mproperly admitted
evidence is harmless, however, when the evidence is cumulative” of other admissible
evidence).
For all the reasons mentioned, the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion
by admitting the recorded interview under Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3, and any error in
the interview’s admission was harmless.
Confrontation Rights
Saldana objected to the admission of the recorded interview as a “violation of the
Confrontation Clause.” We recognize that the admission of a child’s recorded interview
under Minn. Stat. § 595.02 does not address Saldana’s right to confrontation under the U.S.
or Minnesota constitutions. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). The
Confrontation Clause ensures that a criminal defendant “shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const.
14
art. I, § 6. Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. State v. Caulfield,
722 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Minn. 2006).
Saldana argues that the admissibility of the recorded interview “relies on the
opportunity for effective cross examination. That did not happen here.” Caselaw guides
our analysis of this issue. “The Confrontation Clause is satisfied by a declarant’s
appearance at trial for cross-examination . . . .” State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 568
(Minn. 2008). In Holliday, the supreme court concluded that the admission of a declarant’s
prior statement did not violate a defendant’s right to confrontation, despite the declarant’s
memory loss, because the declarant was subject to cross-examination at trial. Id. at 564-68.
K.B. testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Saldana argues the scope
of cross-examination was limited by K.B.’s direct testimony. K.B.’s direct testimony
answered questions about Saldana’s sexual abuse and K.B.’s statements to her parents and
Liebl about the abuse. On cross-examination, K.B. answered two questions. First, she
agreed that she had talked with the prosecuting attorney before testifying. Second, K.B.
described her contact as occurring “a few days ago” at the prosecuting “attorney’s office.”
Because K.B. was subject to cross-examination, the district court did not violate
Saldana’s right to confrontation by admitting the recorded interview.
III. We need not consider Saldana’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument.
Saldana contends that, without K.B.’s recorded interview, his conviction cannot be
sustained because no other evidence establishes the element of penetration, and we should
therefore reverse. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting the
15
recorded interview, we need not reach Saldana’s sufficiency-of-the -evidence argument,
which hinges on the inadmissibility of the recorded interview. See State v. Webb,
440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989) (describing a review for sufficiency of the evidence as
a “painstaking analysis” of the entire record).
IV. There was no prosecutorial misconduct.
Saldana argues that there were three instances of prosecutorial misconduct during
opening statements. Following opening statements, Saldana moved for a mistrial based on
“inappropriate argument.” Saldana later withdrew the motion without receiving a ruling.
Thus, any prosecutorial error was not preserved during trial. In reviewing claims of
unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, an appellate court applies the modified plain-error
test. State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 422-23 (Minn. 2021). If an appellant establishes that
a prosecuting attorney’s statements were plain error, then the burden shifts to the state to
prove that the appellant’s substantial rights were not affected. Id. at 423.
First, Saldana argues that because the state never intended to prove that K.B. was
“smart” and “funny,” “has a bunch of hobbies,” “loves art,” and likes to “go swimming in
the summer,” it was misconduct and “inflammatory” for the prosecuting attorney to make
these statements during opening statements.
“A prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the
defendant.” State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 236 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Saldana argues that the prosecuting attorney’s descriptions of K.B. as “smart” and “funny”
were misconduct because “they are images to create sympathy and pity in the jury” and
16
were therefore inflammatory. Saldana cites no caselaw suggesting that a prosecuting
attorney’s sympathetic descriptions of a witness amount to inflaming the jury’s passions.
Saldana relies on State v. Montgomery, in which this court held that it was
prosecutorial misconduct to begin an opening statement by asking the jury to imagine a
“newspaper headline announcing that a Twin Cities drug dealer was caught in a small-town
sting.” 707 N.W.2d 392, 400 (Minn. App. 2005). This court determined that this was
language intended to inflame the passions of the jurors because the language “could have
little effect other than to arouse jurors’ negative emotions toward Montgomery.” Id.
Saldana’s comparison is unpersuasive. Though the prosecuting attorney’s statements about
K.B.’s personality and hobbies likely made her sympathetic, we conclude that the
statements did not inflame the jury’s passions and are therefore materially different from
the statements criticized in Montgomery.
Second, Saldana argues that it was misconduct during opening statements for the
prosecuting attorney to ask the jury to “carefully consider all of the evidence” and to say
that if it did, the attorney was “confident that [the jury] w[ould] do justice in this case.”
Saldana argues that the prosecuting attorney, in essence, implied that “the only way [the
jury could] do justice is to convict” Saldana.
We disagree. In determining whether there was plain error, appellate courts review
the statements as a whole rather than just selective phrases. State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d
720, 727- 28 (Minn. 2000). The prosecuting attorney did not conflate justice with
conviction and separated the two ideas into two sentences. The prosecuting attorney asked
the jury to “carefully consider all of the evidence” and stated that if it did, the attorney was
17
“confident that [the jury] w[ould] do justice in this case.” Saldana ignores that the
prosecuting attorney also stated she would “come back before [the jury], and . . . ask that
[the jury]” find Saldana guilty. The prosecuting attorney’s use of “justice,” when
understood in context, asked the jury to consider the evidence when reaching the verdict.
We therefore discern no plain error.
Third, Saldana argues that it was prosecutorial misconduct during opening
statements for the prosecuting attorney to say that she “hope[s] that when [K.B.] comes in
[to testify], she’ll be able to tell you about the horrible things that the defendant did to her.”
Saldana contends that the prosecuting attorney’s use of “horrible things” to describe the
sexual abuse was plainly erroneous. Saldana relies on caselaw stating that it is
unprofessional conduct for an attorney to express their personal beliefs. See State v.
Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Minn. 1993). But the prosecuting attorney did not refer to
her beliefs when making this statement. And an attorney’s statements need not lack
adjectives to avoid plain error. In State v. Davis, the supreme court determined that the
prosecuting attorney’s use of “preposterous” to describe a defendant’s self-defense
testimony was “colorful” and “did not constitute error.” 735 N.W.2d 674, 682-83 (Minn.
2007). Si milarly, the prosecuting attorney’s use of “horrible things” to describe K.B.’s
testimony avoids summarizing her anticipated testimony in detail and does not rise to the
level of plain error.
Lastly, Saldana argues that “the cumulative effect of all the errors warrants reversal
of [Saldana’s] conviction.” Because we discern no plain error in any of the prosecuting
18
attorney’s statements identified in Saldana’s brief to this court, we need not consider the
cumulative effect.
Affirmed.