State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0774

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terry Lee Banks,
Defendant,

Bail Bonds Doctor, Inc.,
Appellant.

Filed December 12, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-3005

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristyn Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Michelle E. Johnson, Adam E. Szymanski,
Assistant City Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Eric A. Rice, Law Office of Eric A. Rice, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Bail Bonds Doctor, Inc. (BBD) appeals from the district court’s order
denying its petition to reinstate a forfeited bail bond, arguing that the district court (1) erred
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by assigning a judge other than the forfeiting judge or the judicial district’s chief judge to
hear BBD’s petition for reinstatement and (2) abused its discretion by denying
reinstatement of the bond. Because any error in judicial assignment constituted harmless
error and because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying reinstatement,
we affirm.
FACTS
On February 16, 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged defendant Terry Lee
Banks with three gross misdemeanors— second-degree driving while impaired, second-
degree refusal to submit to a chemical test, and driving after cancellation (inimical to public
safety)—based on conduct that occurred two days earlier. The day that Banks was charged,
BBD posted a $12,000 bond allowing Banks to be released from jail.
On March 9, 2022, Banks failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. A senior judge
of district court, sitting by assignment in the Fourth Judicial District, issued a gross-
misdemeanor bench warrant and ordered the bail forfeited. A notice of bond forfeiture was
filed on March 15, 2022. On March 24, 2022, the sheriff’s department located and
apprehended Banks without help from BBD.
A few days later, BBD petitioned for reinstatement and discharge of the forfeited
bail bond. BBD provided an accompanying affidavit from its president describing the
efforts that BBD took to locate Banks after receiving the notice of bond forfeiture.
The district court issued a notice to the state, BBD, and Banks, identifying the judge
assigned to consider the petition for bond reinstatement. The assigned judge was not the
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bail-forfeiting judge. The following day, the district court issued an order requiring the
parties to make written submissions.
BBD filed a one-paragraph written submission, which stated, in its entirety, as
follows:
In response to the Order for Written Submissions, Bail Bonds
Doctor objects to [the district court judge] hearing the petition
and requests that the forfeiting judge . . . or the chief judge hear
it pursuant to Minnesota General Rules of Practice 702(f).
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

The state filed its written submission, arguing that denial of the petition to reinstate the
bond was appropriate under the Shetsky factors. See In re Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn.
1953) (establishing a four-factor test for evaluating petitions for bond reinstatement).
The district court, in an order by the district court judge, denied BBD’s petition. The
district court first determined that it was proper for the assigned judge to hear and decide
the petition. In doing so, it cited (1) a 2018 standing order issued by the then-chief judge
of the Fourth Judicial District stating that bond-reinstatement petitions shall be assigned to
judges in accordance with applicable Fourth Judicial District bench policy; (2) a 2021
Fourth Judicial District bench policy outlining the procedures for bond-reinstatement
procedures, including judicial assignment; (3) Minnesota Statutes section 484.69,
subdivision 3 (2020), addressing the administrative authority of chief judges; and
(4) BBD’s failure to file for removal of the district court judge within the seven-day
window under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 14(4)(a)-(c).
According to the district court, the standing order and bench policy allowed for the district
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court judge to be assigned and decide the petition. The district court also determined that
denial of the reinstatement petition was appropriate under the Shetsky factors.
BBD appeals.
DECISION
BBD challenges the assignment of its bond- reinstatement petition to the district
court judge, arguing that, pursuant to Minnesota General Rule of Practice 702(f), the case
must be remanded to be heard by either the forfeiting judge or the chief judge. In the
alternative, BBD argues that the district court’s decision on the merits was an abuse of
discretion and that we must reverse the decision and direct reinstatement of the bond. We
address each argument in turn.
I. BBD has failed to establish that any error in the judicial assignment was not
harmless.

BBD argues that the district court committed reversible error because the
assignment of the district court judge to this bond-reinstatement matter violated Minnesota
General Rule of Practice 702(f).
We review a district court’s denial of a petition to reinstate a forfeited bail bond for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Askland, 784 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn. 2010). “A district court
abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971
N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)). When review of a bond-reinstatement denial requires
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construction of a court rule, it presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v.
Nelson, 773 N.W.2d 330, 332 (Minn. App. 2009).
Rule 702(f) provides that “[a] petition for reinstatement filed within 90 days of the
date of the order of forfeiture shall be heard and determined by the judge who ordered the
forfeiture, or the chief judge.” The district court judge was not the forfeiting judge or the
chief judge. But the district court determined that the district court judge’s assignment was
permitted by the 2018 standing order issued by the then-chief judge of the Fourth Judicial
District and an associated bench policy.
The standing order acknowledges rule 702(f) but states that assignment pursuant to
that rule “would be impractical and result in undue delay, due to the high volume of cases
and the criminal case assignment practices in the Fourth Judicial District.” The standing
order also recognizes that the executive committee of the Fourth Judicial District has
approved a bench policy regarding judicial assignment of bond -reinstatement petitions,
“which takes into account blocking practices and judicial case assignments to ensure
efficient, consistent, and practicable assignment of bond petitions.” Invoking the chief
judge’s statutory authority under Minnesota Statutes section 484.69, subdivision 3, to
“assign any judge of any court within the judicial district to hear any matter in any court of
the judicial district,” the standing order directs that bond-reinstatement petitions filed in
the Fourth Judicial District be assigned in accordance with the applicable bench policy.
The bench policy, in turn, provides that the “block judge” will handle a bond-reinstatement
petition if the judge is handling a criminal caseload, otherwise the clerk’s office will notify
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the designated “Downtown Team” judge of the filing. The district court judge was assigned
the petition here because he was lead judge of the downtown criminal team.
BBD argues that the Fourth Judicial District’s standing order and bench policy
violate rule 702(f) and that the chief judge lacked authority to issue a standing order
regarding judicial assignment in violation of the rule. In addition, BBD asserts that the
2018 standing order is no longer effective because there is a new chief judge and that BBD
was unfairly deprived of the opportunity to address the standing order because it was first
raised by the district court in its order denying reinstatement. The state, for its part,
contends that the chief judge’s standing order was a valid exercise of the statutory authority
granted to chief judges by Minnesota Statutes section 484.69, subdivision 3, and that, in
any event, the standing order is justified under Minnesota General Rule of Practice 1.02,
which provides that “[a] judge may modify the application of [the general rules of practice]
in any case to prevent manifest injustice.” The state also argues that the standing order
remains in effect and that BBD was given fair process.
Although the parties dispute whether error occurred in assigning the district court
judge, w e need not resolve the issue if the asserted error was harmless. In a civil
proceeding, the mere existence of an error is insufficient to require a grant of relief; rather,
the complaining party must also show that the error prejudiced the complaining party. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (directing courts to “disregard any error” that does not affect a party’s
substantial rights); see also Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008)
(citing this aspect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 61); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98
(Minn. 1987) (stating that, “[a]lthough error may exist, unless the error is prejudicial, no
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grounds exist for reversal”). Bond-forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature ; therefore,
BBD bears the burden of showing both error and prejudice. See Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 46;
Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Mortg. Loan Tr., 775 N.W.2d 168, 178 (Minn. App.
2009), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 2010).
On this record, BBD has not demonstrated prejudice. BBD had a full and fair
opportunity to submit a petition for bond reinstatement with a supporting affidavit and an
additional written submission for the district court’s review. In addition, BBD has made no
showing that assignment of the bond-forfeiting judge or the chief judge would have
changed the outcome of its petition for bond reinstatement. While BBD argues that
prejudice is established by the district court judge’s decision on the merits, we are not
persuaded. Disagreement with the ruling of a judge does not, by itself, constitute judicial
bias. State v. Sailee, 792 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15,
2011). Moreover, as we conclude in Section II below, the district court’s decision on the
merits was not an abuse of discretion. BBD thus has failed to carry its burden to
demonstrate prejudice, and any error in assigning the district court judge to this matter
constituted harmless, and not reversible, error.1

1 BBD argues that, if the record is insufficient to establish prejudice, the case should be
remanded to permit BBD to further develop the record. It complains that it did not have
the opportunity to develop a record because, following its objection to the district court
judge’s assignment, there “was no response or further discussion of that issue” until the
district court’s final order on the petition. But BBD had the opportunity to make a written
submission beyond its mere objection and it chose not to. Moreover, BBD has not
identified what evidentiary gaps it thinks it could fill on remand to demonstrate prejudice
in this case.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying reinstatement.
We turn to BBD’s challenge to the merits of the district court’s denial of the
reinstatement petition. Again, we review a district court’s denial of a petition to reinstate a
forfeited bail bond for an abuse of discretion. Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62.
“State statute and court rule address the question of reinstatement of a forfeited bail
bond.” Id. When a bail bond is forfeited, a district court “may forgive or reduce the penalty
according to the circumstances of the case and the situation of the party on any terms and
conditions it considers just and reasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 629.59 (2020). A district court’s
decision is guided by four factors identified in Shetsky. 60 N.W.2d at 46. Those factors are:
(1) the purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and
the cause, purpose and length of a defendant’s absence; (2) the
good faith of the bond company as measured by the fault or
willfulness of the defendant; (3) the good-faith efforts of the
bond company to apprehend and produce the defendant; and
(4) any prejudice to the State in its administration of justice.

Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. As the petitioner, BBD bears the burden of showing that the
first three factors weigh in favor of reinstatement, and the state bears the burden of proving
any claimed prejudice. See id.
In its order denying BBD’s petition for reinstatement, the district court concluded
that the first three Shetsky factors weighed against reinstatement and that the fourth factor
was “neutral.” We address each factor in turn.
A. The Purpose of Bail

The first factor addresses the purpose of bail. Bail bonds serve multiple purposes,
including “encourag[ing] a surety to voluntarily pay the penalty for the failure to ensure
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the presence of the accused without requiring the state to undergo the expense of litigation
to recover the defaulted amount” and “ encourag[ing] sureties to locate, arrest, and return
defaulting defendants to the authorities to facilitate the timely administration of justice.”
State v. Vang, 763 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn. App. 2009).
The district court determined that BBD failed to fulfill these purposes. It observed
that Banks failed to appear in court and that he was located and apprehended by the sheriff’s
department, without BBD’s assistance, a few weeks later. The district court acknowledged
that Banks’s “absence was short and may likely have a minimal impact on this case” but
found that this first Shetsky factor nevertheless weighed against reinstatement.
BBD argues this fact or weighs in its favor primarily for one reason: the short
duration of Banks’s absence. BBD emphasizes that, when it learned that Banks had failed
to appear, it began “investigative efforts to locate the defendant” and, approximately two
weeks after Banks failed to appear, he was located and apprehended. BBD notes that
reinstatement has been ordered in cases involving absences far longer than approximately
two weeks, pointing to Askland, where the Minnesota Supreme Court directed the district
court to reinstate a bond after an absence of 177 days when the district court erroneously
denied reinstatement based on error in applying the fourth Shetsky factor. Askland, 784
N.W.2d at 61-64.
But, while the length of a defendant’s absence may be relevant to a district court’s
analysis, Askland does not preclude a district court from finding that the purpose of bail
was not served when the defendant’s absence was shorter than in that case. Here, the district
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court noted that Banks’s absence was brief but still concluded that BBD failed to effectuate
the purpose of the bail. This determination was within the district court’s discretion.
B. The Good Faith of the Bond Company as Measured by the Fault or
Willfulness of the Defendant

Under the second factor, which measures the good faith of the bond company, the
“[d]efendant’s willfulness or bad faith is attributable to the surety.” Vang, 763 N.W.2d at
358. The district court found that “[Banks’s] absence was willful.” BBD does not challenge
this finding and concedes that this factor weighs against reinstatement. However, BBD
argues that this factor alone cannot support forfeiture because the remaining factors do not.
BBD’s argument is unavailing because, as we explain in this opinion, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that this and other Shetsky factors support forfeiture.
C. The Good-Faith Efforts of the Bond Company to Apprehend and
Produce the Defendant

The district court concluded that the third factor, the bond company’s efforts to
apprehend and produce the defendant, did not favor reinstatement because BBD took only
“minimal steps to apprehend and produce” Banks. BBD contends that, given the short
duration of Banks’s absence, its efforts must be found sufficient to justify reinstatement.
BBD also argues that a contrary ruling will “encourage sureties to race against law
enforcement rather than work with them” in trying to locate defendants because sureties
will want to themselves find the defendants in order avoid bond forfeiture.
We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by finding that
BBD failed to establish sufficient efforts under this factor . In the affidavit supporting
BBD’s reinstatement petition, BBD’s president described the surety’s efforts as follows:
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6. Upon receipt of the bond forfeiture notice on
March 15, 2022, [BBD] began to inquire as to the Defendant’s
whereabouts. [BBD’s] agent left messages for both the
Defendant and the cosigner of the bond indemnity agreement
instructing the Defendant to turn himself in to the custody of
the Hennepin County Jail.

7. When this effort was not immediately successful
[BBD] referred the file to its primary recovery agent. [BBD’s]
investigator conducted a thorough investigation involving field
interviews, phone interviews, social media investigation,
comprehensive individual reports, and surveillance.

As the district court observed, the affidavit did not include itemized expenses and did not
“elaborate on what information was received, how much time was spent on these matters,
or how much [BBD] invested in attempting to locate the defendant.” Moreover, as the
district court observed, the sheriff’s department located and apprehended Banks at public
expense. On this record, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination
that BBD failed to demonstrate that its efforts weighed in favor of reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are unconvinced by BBD’s argument that this ruling will
encourage sureties to work against law enforcement in trying to locate defendants. Rather,
as the state persuasively argues, the ruling may simply encourage sureties to supply more
complete information about their efforts when they are seeking reinstatement.
D. The Prejudice to the State in its Administration of Justice
The fourth factor addresses the prejudice to the state in administering justice. The
district court concluded that this Shetsky factor was neutral. The district court noted that
the state and the courts spent time preparing for and awaiting Banks’s appearance but also
recognized that scheduling of the case resumed after Banks’s short absence. It concluded,
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“While there is no evidence showing specific prejudice to the State’s case, this is a serious
DWI case and critically a targeted misdemeanor by statute, which is public policy in the
State of Minnesota. As a result, it is likely that the State would be able to proceed with its
case despite the Defendant’s brief absence, but the absence was not trivial or negligible.”
BBD argues that, because the state did not present evidence of specific prejudice to
the state’s case, this factor must weigh in favor of reinstatement. BBD cites Askland in
support of its argument. In that case, the supreme court reversed a district court’s denial of
a reinstatement petition based primarily on the fourth Shetsky factor when the state
presented no evidence of prejudice to the administration of justice but instead asserted
prejudice only because the proceeds of the forfeited bond had already been disbursed and
were not recoverable. Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62-63. Here, the district court did not find
that the fourth factor weighed against reinstatement based on an erroneous understanding
of prejudice. Rather, it determined that, in these circumstances, the fourth factor was
neutral. Then, weighing the Shetsky factors as a whole, it decided that they favored denial
of reinstatement. We see no abuse of discretion in that determination.
In sum, we conclude that any judicial assignment error was harmless and that the
district court acted within its discretion by denying BBD’s petition for bond reinstatement.
Affirmed.