In re the Matter of: E. M. B., DOB February 14, 2014, Sharo’n Lily Isabella Mathison, petitioner, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0779

In re the Matter of:
E. M. B., DOB February 14, 2014,
Sharo’n Lily Isabella Mathison, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jacqueline Nicole Webb,
Appellant,
Andrew Joseph Brown,
Respondent Below.

Filed March 13, 2023
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-21-2247

Kathryn M. Lammers, Angela M. Streit, Heimerl & Lammers, L.L.C., Minnetonka,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael Ortner, Theresa A. Bofferding, Ortner & Bofferding, L.L.C., St. Paul, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.*
SYLLABU S
A grandparent who resided with a grandchild for 12 or more months may petition
for visitation rights under Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 3 (2022), after the child’s parent

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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removes the child from the home the grandparent and child shared even if the grandparent
no longer resided in the home at the time of removal .
OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Jacqueline Nicole Webb (mother) challenges the district court’s order
granting her mother , respondent Sharo’n Lily Isabella Mathison (grandmother),
grandparent visitation with mother’s child, E.M.B. Mother argues the district court
misapplied section 257C.08, subd ivision 3, when it allowed grandmother to petition for
visitation, because the provision does not allow a grandparent to petition if the grandparent
no longer lived with the child at the time the parent removed the child from the home. We
conclude that section 257C.08, subd ivision 3, allows a grandparent otherwise satisfying
that provision to petition the district court for visitation, even if the grandparent no longer
lives with the child at the time the parent removed the child from th e home. Therefore, we
affirm.
FACTS 1
Mother gave birth to E.M .B. in February 2014. At the time, mother was 16 years
old. Before giving birth, mother lived with grandmother in grandmother’s house. And
after E.M.B.’s birth, mother and E.M.B. lived in grandmother’s house with grandmother
for just over two years . Mother and grandmother had a strained relationship. Yet,
according to the district court, “[grandmother] was like a second parent to [E.M.B.] .”

1 The facts in this case are not in dispute.
3

Grandmother moved out of the house in April 2016.2 According to the district court,
grandmother moved out “because of [ mother]’s anger towards [ grandmother] and
[grandmother’s] belief that [ mother] needed time and space to heal from this anger.”
Mother and E.M.B. continued to live in grandmother’s house, while grandmother
continued to pay utilities for the home . In April 2017, grandmother sold the house, and
mother and E.M.B. moved into a new residence. Despite the move, grandmother continued
to see E.M.B. regularly.3 In September 2020, mother cut off E.M.B.’s contact with
grandmother when mother suspected grandmother called child-protection services.
In June 2021, grandmother petitioned the district court for grandparent visitation
with E.M.B. pursuant to section 257C.08, subd ivision 3.4 The district court held a n
evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, mother moved for judgment as a matter of
law, arguing section 257C.08, subdivision 3, does not provide a basis for a grandparent to
petition for visitation when the grandparent leaves the shared home before the parent
removes the child from the home. The district court reserved ruling on this issue, and the
parties submitted written proposed orders.

2 After grandmother moved out of her house, she continued to care for E.M.B.
Grandmother had E.M.B. on weekends from Friday nights to Sunday afternoon.
3 When mother first moved, grandmother still watched E.M.B. on the weekends. Sometime
during 2018, grandmother’s time with E.M.B. was reduced to one overnight on weekends.
After mother had her second child in late 2019, E.M.B. would usua lly spend one weekend
day with grandmother, but E.M.B. would no longer stay overnight.
4 Although grandmother petitioned the district court under the 2020 version of
subdivision 3, we apply the current version of the statute because it has not been amended
since 2002. See 2002 Minn. Laws ch. 304, § 13.
4

The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, granting
grandmother’s petition for grandparent visitation under section 257C.08, subd ivision 3.
The district court acknowledged that section 257C.08, subdivision 3, “does not specifically
address a situation where a grandchild resided with a grandparent for twelve or more
months, but the grandparent then leaves her own home , and the child continues t o live
there.” But the district court reasoned that because grandmother moved to benefit mother
and E.M.B., grandmother “should not be denied her ability to seek grandparent visitation.”
Mother appeals.
ISSUE
Did the district court err when it determined that Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 3,
provides a statutory path for grandmother to petition for visitation rights to her grandchild?
ANALYSIS
Mother challenges the district court’s order granting grandmother visitation rights
to E.M.B. under section 257C.08, subd ivision 3. Mother contends the district court erred
in its interpretation of the statute. Mother’s argument presents a question of law, which we
review de novo. Lee v. Lee , 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009).
The goal of statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the legislature.” State by Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis , 954 N.W.2d
584, 590 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted ). “The first step in statuto ry interpretation is to
determine whether the statute ’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.” Christianson v.
Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). “In determining whether
a statute is ambiguous, we will construe the statute ’s words and phrases according to their
5

plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted). A statute is ambiguous only if its
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Martin v. Dicklich , 823
N.W.2d 336, 342 (Minn. 2012). Multiple parts of a statute may be read together to
ascertain whether the statute is ambiguous. Id. at 344. “If the plain language of a statute
is clear and free from all ambiguity, we will not disregard the letter of the law under the
pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 2012). But
when the language is ambiguous “we will go beyond the plain language of the statute to
determine the intent of the legislature.” Id.
Section 257C.08, subdivision 3, provides that
[i]f an unmarried minor has resided with grandparents . . . for
a period of 12 months or more, and is subsequently removed
from the home by the minor ’s parents , the
grandparents . . . may petition the district court for an order
granting them reasonable visitation rights to the child during
minority.

(Emphasis added.) Mother asserts that section 257C.08, subdivision 3, plainly provides
where the grandparent must live at the time the child “is subsequently removed from the
home.”5 According to mother, the use of the word “home” requires the grandparent to live

5 In her briefing, mother suggests that section 257C.08, subdivision 3, should not apply to
these circumstances because grandmother, not mother, “removed” E.M.B. when
grandmother sold the home where E.M.B. resided. Mother failed to present this argument
to the district court and did not adequately brief the argument in our court. We, therefore,
do not reach this argument because it is forfeited. See In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp,
895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017) (citation omitted ) (“Minnesota appellate courts
decline to reach an issue in the absence of adequate briefing.”), rev. denied (Minn. Jun. 20,
2017); Scheffler v. City of Anoka , 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (citation
omitted) ( “An assignment of error on mere assertion, unsupported by argument or
authority, is forfeited and need not be considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on

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with the child at the time of removal because “home” connotes an existing social unit .
Mother compares the use of “home” in section 257C.08, subdivision 3, and the use of
“household” in Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 4 (2022).6 Citing the general rule that “when
different words are used in the same context, [ this court ] assume[s] that the words have
different meanings,” Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 720 (Minn. 2013) , mother asserts
“household” means a “shared living quarter” while “home” refers to a “social unit.”7
Here, because the statute defines neither the word “home” nor “household,” we may
look to dictionary definitions to determine the common and ordinary meanings. T.G.G. v.
H.E.S., 946 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Minn. 2020). The plain meaning of these words does not
comport with mother’s argument that the word “home” refers to a “social uni t” and,
therefore, the grandparent must reside in the home at the time of removal . In fact,
dictionary definitions provide that the words have the opposite meaning. Compare The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 852 (5th ed. 2018) (defining

mere inspection.”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017); Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580,
582 (Minn. 1988) (noting a party cannot raise a new issue on appeal, “[n] or may a party
obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different
theory”).
6 The relevant portion of section 257C.08, subdivision 4, states, “If an unmarried minor has
resided in a household with a person, other than a foster parent, for two years or more and
no longer resides with the person, the person may petition . . . for . . . reasonable visitation
rights.” (Emphasis added .)
7 The cases cited by mother to establish that “a ‘home’ is something far more than a
household” are unpersuasive. These cases simply state a “home” is not a place of
“industry.” See State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. App. 1994) (holding an
inmate is not entitled to work- release to perform homemaking responsibilities for her
family), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 1994); State v. Cooper, 285 N.W. 903, 904-05 (Minn.
1939) (affirming a disorderly conduct conviction for a private chauffer who picketed
outside the residence of their former employer).
7

“household” as “[a] domestic unit consisting of the members of a family who live together
along with nonrelatives such as servants” or “[t]he living spaces and possessions belonging
to such a unit”), and Black’s Law Dictionary 888 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “household” as
“[a] family living together” or “[a] group of people who dwell under the same roof”) , with
American Heritage , supra, at 8 40 (defining “home” as “[a] place where one lives; a
residence”), and Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 880 (defining “home” as “[a] dwelling
place”). Considering the plain meaning of the words, the legislature intended the word
“home” to mean “a dwelling place” and the word “household” to mean a “domestic unit.”
Thus, we are not persuaded that the legislature’s use of the word “home” in section
257C.08, subdivision 3, plainly provides that a grandparent must reside with the child at
the time of removal.
In contrast, grandmother asserts that section 257C.08, subdivision 3, has only two
requirements: (1) the child residing with the grandparent for 12 months or more and (2) the
child’s subsequent removal from the shared home by a parent. According to grandmother,
neither factor re quires the grandparent to live in the home at the time of removal.
Grandmother also relies on the legislature’s use of the word “subsequently” to support her
interpretation that the grandparent need not live in the home at the time of removal.
Grandmother asserts that the use of “subsequently” means that the statute only requires a
parent to remove the child from the home previously shared with a grandparent at some
time after the 12 -month period. See American Heritage , supra, at 1737- 38 (defining
“subsequent” to mean “[f]ollowing in time or order; succeeding”); Black’s Law Dictionary,
supra, at 1727 (defining “subsequent” as “occurring later; coming after something else ”).
8

Grandmother correctly observes that the statute is silent regarding where the
grandparent must live at the time a parent removes the child from the home. The district
court agreed, determining that the statute “does not specifically address a situation where
a grandchild resided with a grandparent for twelve or more months, but the grandparent
then leaves her own home[,] and the child continues to live there.” Thus, we are faced with
deciding whether that silence renders the statute ambiguous.
The supreme court has held that “silence does not render a statute ambiguous unless
the silence renders the statute susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. ”
Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 590. When a statute is silent, we must “resolve whether the
statutory constr uction issue . . . involves a failure of expression or an ambiguity of
expression.” Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Minn. 2010). We
cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.
Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2001). Therefore, “[w]hen
a question of statutory construction involves a failure of expression rather than an
ambiguity of expression, courts are not free to substitute amendment for construction and
thereby supply the omissions of the legislature.” Id. (quotation omitted ).
Applying that standard, the supreme court has held a small number of statutes were
ambiguous when they were completely silent on a contested issue. See MBNA Am. Bank,
N.A. v. Comm ’r of Revenue , 694 N.W.2d 778, 782- 83 (Minn. 2005); Burkstrand v.
Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 2001). In those few circumstances, the statutes
at i ssue failed to articulate the consequences for failing to comply with a statutory
requirement, creating an ambiguity of expression. See Beardsley v. Garcia , 753 N.W.2d
9

735, 738-39 (Minn. 2008) (describing MBNA and Burkstrand); Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at
590 (same). But in most cases when the statute is silent, the supreme court has held the
statute includes a failure of expression and applies the statute’s plain language. See, e.g.,
Beardsley, 753 N.W.2d at 738- 39; Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 590- 91; STRIB IV, LLC v.
County of Hennepin, 886 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. 2016) (“Ambiguity through statutory
silence is rare.”).
Here, like other cases in which the supreme court concluded silence was the absence
of expression, section 257C.08, subdivision 3, is n ot completely silent on the requirements
for a grandparent to petition for visitation. Instead, as grandmother described, the statute
articulates two elements that must be met: (1) the child residing with the grandparent for
12 months or more and (2) the child’s subsequent removal from the shared home—or
“dwelling place”—by a parent . See Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 3. The statute’s plain
language does not require the grandparent to live with the child at the time the parent
removes the child from the sh ared home.8

8 We observe that even if the silen ce in the statute create d an ambiguity, legislative intent
would require the same result. The supreme court has articulated on numerous occasions
that the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 257C.08 (2022) is “to give grandparents . . . a legal right
to visitation with their grandchildren.” Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 591. This right had to
come via statute because “[h]istorically, grandparents had virtually no legal right to
maintain a relationship with a grandchild independent of the wishes of the child’s parents.”
Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 1995). Although the supreme court has not
considered the legislative intent of subdivision 3 specifically, section 257C.08’s general
purpose is to allow a statutory path for grandparents to obtain visitation rights independent
of the wishes of the child ’s parents. To interpret subdivision 3 to remove visitation right s
in circumstances where the grandparent moved out for the benefit of the parent and
grandchild would be contrary to legislative intent.
10

Applying the plain language, this case is unique in that grandmother, after living
with her grandchild for approximately two years, voluntarily moved from her own home,
then allowed mother and E.M.B. to continue living in the home grandmother still owned.
The district court found grandmother did this “because of [ mother]’s anger towards
[grandmother] and [grandmother’s] belief that [mother] needed time and space to heal from
this anger.” Grandmother continued to pay utilities for the home, until she sold it a year
later. When grandmother sold the home, mother and E.M.B. moved to a new residence
together.
These circumstances satisfy the requirements in section 257C.08, subdivision 3.
E.M.B. resided with grandmother for more than two years —“a period of 12 months or
more.” Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 3; see also Joel v. Wellman , 551 N.W.2d 729, 731
(Minn. App. 1996) (explaining how to calculate “a period of 12 months or more” when a
grandparent peti tions for visitation) , rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996) .9 And after
grandmother and E.M.B. lived together for this period of time, 10 mother removed E.M.B.
from “the home” previously shared with grandmother. Id. Thus, the district court did not
err when it concluded that section 257C.08, subdivision 3, provides a basis for grandmother

9 Since Joel, the legislature renumbered the relevant statute from Minn. Stat. § 257.022,
subd. 2a (1994), to section 257C.08, subd ivision 3. The relevant statutory language has
not been amended since Joel.
10 Consistent with our caselaw, the district court only used the two years grandmother lived
with the child to calculate the “period of 12 months or more.” Joel, 551 N.W.2d at 731
(“[T]he grandchild must live with the grandparents for at least twelve months .”). The
district court did not include the time the child lived in the home, but grandmother no longer
lived there. See id. (concluding the statute “does not require a consecutive time period” so
long as the grandparent and child lived together for 12 months or more).
11

to petition for visitation rights and for the district court to grant a grandparent visitation
rights if the district court finds it is “in the best interests of the child and would not interfere
with the parent and child relationship.”
DECISION
Section 257C.08, subdivision 3, provides a statutory path for grandparents to obtain
visitation rights, even if the grandparent no longer re sides in the shared home at the time
the parent removes the child. Therefore, the district court did not err when it granted
grandmother’s petition for grandparent -visitation rights.
Affirmed.