Ryan Chrz,

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-0792

Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals Hudson, J.

Ryan Chrz,

Relator,

vs. Filed: March 8, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
Mower County, Self-Insured,

and

Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust,

Respondents.

________________________

Jennifer Yackley, Meuser, Yackley & Rowland, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota, for relator.

Timothy P. Jung, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
respondents.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

An employee is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under Minn. Stat.
§ 176.66, subd. 1 (2022) when the employee formerly had, but no longer has, a diagnosis
of post-traumatic stress disorder by a licensed professional using the most recent edition of
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the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, as required by Minn. Stat.
§ 176.011, subd. 15(d) (2022).
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
The issue raised in this appeal is whether an employee demonstrates
“disablement . . . resulting from an occupational disease” under Minn. Stat. § 176.66,
subd. 1 (2022) when he formerly had, but no longer has, a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) by a licensed professional using the most recent edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (presently, the DSM-5), as required by Minn.
Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d) (2022). Relator Ryan Chrz was employed as a Mower County
Deputy Sheriff from November 2007 to March 2020. It is undisputed that from
September 25, 2019, to March 30, 2021, Chrz had a diagnosis of PTSD by a licensed
professional and was therefore eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. It is also
undisputed that after March 30, 2021, Chrz no longer had a diagnosis of PTSD. Chrz
argues that despite the change in the diagnostic label, he is entitled to benefits after
March 30, 2021, because he remains disabled from a mental illness. The compensation
judge agreed and awarded benefits from April 1, 2020, continuing into the present. The
Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed in part, holding that Chrz
was not entitled to benefits after March 30, 2021.
We conclude that Chrz is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits after
March 30, 2021—the date on which Chrz no longer had a diagnosis of PTSD by a licensed
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professional using the DSM- 5. We therefore affirm the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Court of Appeals.
FACTS
Relator Ryan Chrz began serving as a Mower County Deputy Sheriff on
November 5, 2007. During Chrz’s employment with Mower County over the next
12½ years, Chrz experienced many traumatic events involving violence and death.
In February 2019, Chrz was placed on paid administrative leave after using physical
force to subdue a juvenile arrestee. While on paid administrative leave, Chrz had suicidal
ideations. On September 25, 2019, at the request of his attorney, Chrz was evaluated by
Dr. Nicole Slavik, a licensed psychologist.1 Using the DSM-5, Dr. Slavik diagnosed Chrz
with PTSD, major depressive disorder in partial remission, and mild alcohol use disorder
in early remission. Dr. Slavik attributed the PTSD diagnosis to Chrz’s exposure to
traumatic events while performing his duties as a deputy sheriff. On November 13, 2019,
Dr. Slavik submitted a Report of Work Ability, stating that Chrz was unable to work from
September 25, 2019, to an undetermined date.
On March 31, 2020, Chrz retired from the Mower County Sheriff’s Office. On
May 18, 2020, Chrz filed a claim petition, alleging entitlement to workers’ compensation
benefits beginning on April 1, 2020. At Mower County’s request, Chrz was evaluated by

1 Chrz also relies on the opinions of another expert: Dr. Joshua Baruth. But the
record does not reflect that Dr. Baruth ever used the DSM-5 in diagnosing Chrz with PTSD,
as Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d) requires. We therefore cannot rely on Dr. Baruth’s
conclusions in evaluating whether Chrz is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. See
Smith v. Carver County, 931 N.W.2d 390, 396 (Minn. 2019). Accordingly, we do not
describe Dr. Baruth’s conclusions in our opinion.
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Dr. Paul Arbisi, a licensed psychologist, on October 1, 2020. Dr. Arbisi opined that Chrz
did not meet all of the criteria for PTSD under the DSM-5. Instead, Dr. Arbisi diagnosed
Chrz with “Adjustment Disorder, unspecified” and “Alcohol Use Disorder, moderate in
self-reported remission.”
On March 30, 2021, Dr. Slavik reevaluated Chrz at his attorney’s request. This
time, Dr. Slavik concluded that Chrz’s symptoms had improved and that he no longer met
the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD. Specifically, Dr. Slavik opined that Chrz no longer met
DSM-5 Criterion G, which relates to whether Chrz’s illness “causes clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”
Instead, Dr. Slavik diagnosed Chrz with “o ther specified trauma and stressor related
disorder,” major depressive disorder in partial remission, and a mild alcohol use disorder in
remission. Dr. Slavik also opined that Chrz had reached maximum medical improvement
and assigned a 20 percent permanent partial disability (PPD) rating of the whole body.
Dr. Slavik concluded that Chrz “should continue to be restricted from the normal duties of
a police officer (and in law enforcement), due to his continued report of trauma- related
symptoms.”
The compensation judge held a hearing on June 2, 2021, to determine whether Chrz
sustained a compensable injury and whether he was entitled to workers’ compensation
benefits. The compensation judge found the opinion of Dr. Slavik more persuasive than
that of Dr. Arbisi. The compensation judge also found that Chrz “sustained a work-related
occupational disease in the nature of post-traumatic stress disorder arising out of and in the
course of his employment with the employer on April 30, 2019.” The compensation judge
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further found that Chrz was “temporarily totally disabled as a substantial result of his
work-related occupational disease” from April 1, 2020, to the present. The compensation
judge awarded temporary total disability, rehabilitation, PPD, mileage expenses, and
medical care benefits from April 1, 2020, to the present and continuing.
Respondents Mower County and the Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust
appealed, arguing that the compensation judge erred by granting Chrz workers’
compensation benefits after March 30, 2021, the date on which Dr. Slavik concluded that
Chrz no longer had a formal diagnosis of PTSD.
In a split decision, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals reversed in part,
concluding that Chrz was ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits after March 30,
2021. Chrz v. Mower County, No. WC21-6431, 2022 WL 16725795, at *6 (Minn. WCCA
May 9, 2022). The majority noted that as of March 30, 2021, no licensed provider
concluded that Chrz had PTSD as described in the DSM -5. Id. at *5. The majority
explained that only PTSD diagnosed by a licensed provider using the DSM-5 is a
compensable “occupational disease” under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. at *4–5.
As of March 30, 2021, however, Dr. Slavik (the expert relied upon by the compensation
judge) diagnosed Chrz with “other specified trauma and stressor related disorder,” finding
that Chrz did not meet all of the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD. Id. at *5. Because “other
specified trauma and stressor related disorder” is not a compensable occupational disease,
the majority concluded that Chrz’s occupational disease was resolved, and he was no
longer eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. Id. at *5–6.
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Dissenting, Judge Quinn argued that “once an employee has established a
compensable PTSD injury, any subsequent mental health condition, if caused by or
consequential to the PTSD diagnosis, is also compensable.” Id. at *9. While
acknowledging that “no evidence was offered to explicitly assert that [Chrz’s] post-PTSD
condition is consequential to his PTSD,” Judge Quinn argued that evidence in the record
showed that Chrz’s current diagnosis “is still an ongoing manifestation, regardless of label,
of the same work-related mental health injury.” Id.
Judge Quinn also highlighted several public policy concerns with the majority’s
interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act. First, Judge Quinn noted that employees
who no longer meet all DSM-5 criteria for PTSD will likely still need supportive benefits,
and he disagreed that the Legislature “intended to throw such injured employees a lifeline
to get them partway to shore before cutting the lifeline and hoping the employee could
swim the rest of the way.” Id. at *8. Second, Judge Quinn noted that mental health
diagnoses can fluctuate, and thus if an employee like Chrz later deteriorates and is
re-diagnosed with PTSD, “another round of litigation would follow.” Id. Finally, Judge
Quinn feared that employees with PTSD may forgo mental health treatment out of fear that
improvement in their condition would terminate their benefits. Id. at *9.
Chrz sought review of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals decision by
writ of certiorari.
ANALYSIS
The central question here is whether Chrz, who was previously diagnosed with
PTSD but as of March 30, 2021, no longer had a diagnosis of PTSD by a licensed
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professional using the DSM-5, has demonstrated that he has a “disablement . . . resulting
from an occupational disease” continuing after March 30, 2021, into the present. See
Minn. Stat. § 176.66, subd. 1. Answering that question requires interpreting the Minnesota
Workers’ Compensation Act, a task we conduct de novo. Gilbertson v. Williams
Dingmann, LLC, 894 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Minn. 2017).
The Workers’ Compensation Act requires an employer to pay workers’
compensation benefits if the employee can demonstrate “disablement . . . resulting from an
occupational disease.” Minn. Stat. §§ 176.021, subd. 1, 176.66, subd. 1 (2022). Until
2013, employees could not receive workers’ compensation benefits for work-related
mental injuries unless the mental injury caused or arose from a physical injury. See Smith
v. Carver County, 931 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Minn. 2019).
However, in 2013, the Legislature amended the Workers’ Compensation Act by
redefining “occupational disease” to include “mental impairment.” 2013 Minn. Laws 362,
367–68 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(a) ( 2022)). In turn, “mental
impairment” was defined as “a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist.” Id. (codified at Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d)). The
Legislature further defined PTSD as “the condition as described in the most recently
published edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM]
by the American Psychiatric Association.” Id. (codified at Minn. Stat. § 176.011,
subd. 15(d)).
The bottom line is that the only “mental impairment” covered by the Workers’
Compensation Act is PTSD. And we have explained that, under the 2013 amendments, for
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an employee to recover workers’ compensation benefits for PTSD, the employee must
prove that (1) a psychiatrist or psychologist has diagnosed the employee with PTSD, and
(2) the professional based the employee’s diagnosis on the latest version of the DSM.
Smith, 931 N.W.2d at 396.
Chrz argues that under section 176.66, there are three steps to determine
the compensability of an occupational disease: (1) decide whether the employee
has an occupational disease, (2) determine whether the employee experiences
“disablement . . . resulting from” that occupational disease, and (3) determine the benefits
to which the employee is entitled. Chrz argues that the compensation judge cannot
“backtrack” in these steps, in that once an employee has been diagnosed with a
compensable occupational disease, an employee is not required to “demonstrate that he
continues to have the occupational disease.” According to Chrz , after an employee
demonstrates a diagnosis of an occupational disease, the only remaining question is
whether the employee still experiences “disablement.” If an employee still experiences
disablement, even if he no longer has a diagnosis that meets the statutory definition of
“occupational disease,” Chrz asserts that he is still entitled to workers’ compensation
benefits.
Chrz’s reading of the Workers’ Compensation Act runs counter to the plain meaning
of the text of the Act, which we must follow. See Shire v. Rosemount, Inc., 875 N.W.2d
289, 292 (Minn. 2016); see also ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d
412, 419 (Minn. 2005) (“The touchstone for statutory interpretation is the plain meaning
of a statute’s language.”). Eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits arises when there
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is “[t]he disablement of an employee resulting from an occupational disease.” Minn. Stat.
§ 176.66, subd. 1. Chrz attempts to read into the statute a one-way, three-step framework
for determining eligibility for benefits. But the statute says nothing of Chrz’s proposed
framework; rather, the plain language of the statute states that to prove eligibility for
workers’ compensation benefits at any given time, three elements must be simultaneously
met: (1) the employee has an “occupational disease,” (2) the employee experiences
“disablement,” and (3) the disablement “result[s] from” the occupational disease. See id.;
see also Juntunen v. Carlton County, 982 N.W.2d 729, 737 (Minn. 2022) (explaining that
an employee has the burden to prove the “elements” of a workers’ compensation claim ,
including “that the employee has an occupational disease”).
The only mental impairment that is an “occupational disease” eligible for
workers’ compensation benefits is PTSD, and only when that PTSD is diagnosed by a
licensed psychiatrist or psychologist using the most recently published edition of the DSM
(presently, the DSM- 5). Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(a), (d); see also Smith,
931 N.W.2d at 396. It is undisputed that as of March 30, 2021, Chrz no longer had a
diagnosis of PTSD from any licensed professional using the DSM- 5. As of March 30,
2021, Chrz no longer met the “occupational disease” element of section 176.66, and
therefore could no longer establish a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
2

2 In dissent, Judge Quinn posited another theory of respondents’ liability: if an
employee establishes a compensable PTSD injury at some point in time, “any subsequent
mental health condition, if caused by or consequential to the PTSD diagnosis, is also
compensable.” Chrz, 2022 WL 16725795, at *9 (Quinn, J., dissenting) (citing Eide v.
Whirlpool Seeger Corp., 109 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1961) (establishing consequential
injuries as compensable)). But Chrz does not advance that theory before us, and his counsel
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Holding otherwise would allow an employee’s diagnosis of PTSD to remain
effectively perpetual. Indeed, Chrz subtly acknowledges this point, arguing that he is
entitled to benefits while he is disabled, “irrespective of the change in the diagnostic label.”
But under the statute, the diagnostic label is important —indeed, dispositive— in
determining whether an employee is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. That is
because only one specific diagnosis of mental impairment —a diagnosis of PTSD by a
licensed professional using the DSM-5— qualifies as an “occupational disease.” See Minn.
Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(a), (d). While Chrz may disagree with the Legislature’s
line-drawing, the Legislature has plainly decided that an employee is only eligible for
workers’ compensation benefits so long as they meet the precise definition of PTSD in
Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d). As of March 30, 2021, Chrz does not meet that
definition.
Chrz’s suggestion that eligibility for benefits extends past the time he has a
diagnosis of PTSD is also incompatible with the interpretative canon expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, which means that “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another.” In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. 2010). This canon generally
raises a presumption that “any omissions in a statute are intentional.” State v. Caldwell,
803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011). The presumption is “particularly strong when . . . a

expressly disclaimed any reliance on a consequential injury theory during oral argument.
We therefore do not address how this case would turn out under a consequential injury
theory.
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statute is uncommonly detailed and specific.” State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120, 123–24
(Minn. 2017).
Applied here, the Legislature’s plain expression of PTSD as the only mental
impairment to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits suggests that other mental
impairments, such as Chrz’s “other specified trauma and stressor related disorder” are
intentionally excluded from coverage. See Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 383. This
presumption is particularly strong because the definition of PTSD in the statute is
“uncommonly detailed and specific.” Smith, 899 N.W.2d at 123–24. The statute not only
defines PTSD as the sole compensable mental impairment, but it also details who must
diagnose the disorder (a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist) and the way that the disorder
must be diagnosed (using the most recent edition of the DSM). See Minn. Stat. § 176.011,
subd. 15(d). This detailed statutory framework cements the conclusion that an employee
who formerly had, but no longer has, a diagnosis of PTSD by a licensed professional using
the DSM-5 does not qualify for workers’ compensation benefits under section 176.66.
Chrz’s position also cannot be squared with our precedent. We have explained that
an employer’s liability for workers’ compensation benefits “ends when an employee is no
longer disabled by the work-related injury.” Ewing v. Print Craft, Inc., 936 N.W.2d 886,
891 (Minn. 2020); see Kautz v. Setterlin Co., 410 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Minn. 1987). Or, as
we have put it more precisely, an employer does not “remain under a continuing liability
to pay compensation to an employee who is found to be no longer disabled or to be no
longer disabled because of his work injury.” Woelfel v. Plastics, Inc., 371 N.W.2d 215,
218 (Minn. 1985) (emphasis added).
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Chrz argues that these cases stand for the proposition that an employer’s liability
for compensation ends only when the employee is no longer disabled. In Chrz’s view,
although he no longer has a formal diagnosis of PTSD, because he still experiences
“disablement,” these cases do not foreclose his entitlement to workers’ compensation
benefits.
It is true that the factual postures of these cases involve an employee who no longer
experienced disablement at all, rather than an employee who continues to experience
disablement, but from a noncompensable disease. See Ewing, 936 N.W.2d at 892 (noting
that the employee’s injury had resolved); Kautz, 410 N.W.2d at 845 (noting that the
employee was “medically able to return to work without restrictions”). But Woelfel
recognizes that eligibility for benefits ends when an employee is no longer disabled or
when an employee continues t o be disabled, but no longer due to a compensable work
injury. Here, Chrz’s case falls into the latter category: although Chrz arguably continues
to be disabled, the work injury for which he was entitled to compensation resolved on
March 30, 2021, when he was no longer diagnosed with PTSD by a licensed professional
using the DSM-5. Respondents are therefore no longer under a “continuing liability” to
pay Chrz workers’ compensation benefits. Woelfel, 371 N.W.2d at 218.
Bolstered by Judge Quinn’s dissent, Chrz finally raises a variety of public policy
concerns about our interpretation of section 176.66, subdivision 1. While we are sensitive
to these concerns and to the well-being of Minnesota workers experiencing mental illness,
these public policy concerns “should be directed to the Legislature,” for we “must read this
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state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they should be.” State v. Carson, 902 N.W.2d
441, 446 (Minn. 2017) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.