State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0795

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Almanzo Ousley Cotton,
Appellant.

Filed May 30, 2023
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-1721

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his second-degree murder convictions, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings. We affirm.
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FACTS
At 9:21 a.m. on November 17, 2020, a phone number registered to Kim Theng called
911. The caller reported that someone broke into a home . The call quickly ended. At
9:24 a.m., a phone number registered to appellant Almanzo Ousley Cotton called 911. The
caller reported coming home to the same address and seeing Theng “on the floor” injured
and not speaking.
Police arrived at the address—Theng’s house —and found no signs of forced entry
or obvious damage to the house. Police found valuables apparently undisturbed in the
house. Police found Theng on the floor, evidently unconscious with a black eye and other
bruises around her body and a jacket under her head. There was no one else in the house.
Paramedics revived Theng’s pulse before losing it on the way to the emergency
department, where she was pronounced dead.
The same day, an investigator sent Cotton’s phone a text message asking to speak
with him. Cotton voluntarily came to the police department for an interview later that day.
During the interview, Cotton told investigators that he lived at Theng’s address. According
to Cotton, he came home alone that morning, used his key to enter the back door, and saw
the front door open and Theng on the floor “gasping for air.” Cotton stated that he closed
the front door, put his jacket under Then g’s head, called 911, then left because he was
“scared.” When asked why he was scared, Cotton stated that he and Theng had an
argument on Friday, November 13, 2020. Cotton stated that he had “been gone” since the
argument but came home and found Theng on the floor. Cotton also stated that Theng
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went to an unknown hotel after the argument . Cotton stated that he did not know when
Theng came home because he was not home.
At trial, cell- site data from Cotton’s phone undermined his account of his
whereabouts. The data indicated that Cotton’s phone was at or near Theng’s address for
all but a few hours from November 13 to 17, 2020. Respondent State of Minnesota
theorized that Cotton fatally beat Theng, left her on the floor dying for an extended period,
then called 911.
Theng’s employer confirmed that she began working on Friday, November 13,
though her typical shift was from 4:30 p.m. until midnight. At 2:50 p.m., Theng’s phone
exchanged text messages with her daughter, S.T. At trial, S.T. testified that she lived at
Theng’s house with Theng and Cotton (Theng’s boyfriend) for around five years before
moving out in August 2020 as arguments between the couple intensified, often over money.
In the text exchange, Theng’s phone messaged S.T. asking to stay with her after midnight.
The user of Theng’s phone stated, “I just got a flight with zo”— which S.T. understood to
mean “I just got in a fight with Almanzo”—and offered S.T. money. S.T. replied, “No,”
and urged Theng to “[m]ove out.” Theng’s phone replied, “Yes I will thank you,” and,
“Ok I[’ll] go to a motel th[e]n bye.”
Phone records showed that Cotton’s phone called Theng’s phone dozens of times
from 3:22 p.m. through the rest of November 13. At 10:48 p.m., Theng’s phone was used
to take a photo of her face with apparent discoloration and swelling around her mouth and
the side of her face.
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On Saturday, November 14, records indicated that Theng checked herself into a
hotel. Cotton’s phone again called Theng’s phone dozens of times that day.
On Sunday, November 15, around 5:30 p.m., Theng’s phone was within blocks of
her house after receiving several dozen more calls from Cotton’s phone that day. Theng’s
phone records showed that, shortly after 10:00 p.m., her phone called that of the realtor
who sold her the house , and the realtor’s phone called back. But the realtor never spoke
with Theng that night and recalled no contact with Theng since selling her the house.
Theng’s phone remained at or near her house for all of Monday and Tuesday,
November 16 and 17. Theng’s phone placed a short call to Cotton’s phone at 8:13 p.m. on
November 16—the last documented call between the phones. But Theng’s phone records
showed missed calls and text messages from work colleagues after she did not show up for
work. Theng’s manager testified that he never reached Theng and had never known her to
miss a shift without reaching out.
After Theng’s death, S.T. began receiving harassing voicemails and text messages
from Cotton. S.T. obtained a harassment restraining order (HRO) against Cotton.
Cotton was served with the HRO on January 17, 2021. That day, Cotton left S.T.
22 voicemails. At trial, the state offered six of those voicemails, five of which Cotton sent
after being served with the HRO. In the seemingly distraught, angry, and largely
incoherent voicemails, Cotton repeatedly asked S.T. what she wanted . Cotton threatened
S.T. against selling or removing him from the house, asserting that the house was his.
Cotton stated that S.T. would “lose” if she “f-ck[ed] with” him and that she should “let it
go.” Cotton went on to state, “You’re not smarter than me,” and, “Your mother wasn’t . . .
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smarter than me.” Cotton threatened that he was going to find S.T. and asked if she wanted
to “go to war.”
Cotton’s phone records indicated that he spoke with A.E. for around half an hour on
both November 13 and 14, 2020, and during several periods, including from 8:00 to
8:45 a.m., on November 17, 2020. A.E.’s driver’s license also indicated that he lived at
Theng’s address.
An investigator called A.E. on January 19, 2021. During a recorded phone
interview, A.E. stated that he and Cotton were friends and talked “all the time,” but that he
did not live at Theng’s address. A.E. stated that he knew Cotton “lost his girl.” When
asked how “that all [went] down,” A.E. said that Cotton told him that he caught Theng and
a man “naked” and “sleeping together.” A.E. did not specify when Cotton said this
occurred. A.E. claimed that Cotton wondered if this man was involved in Theng’s death.
At the end of the interview, A.E. said that he would have Cotton call the investigator.
Cotton called the investigator within an hour. Cotton stated that he stayed at a
friend’s house on Friday, November 13, until next seeing Theng at home on Sunday,
November 15. Cotton claimed that on November 15, he and Theng were “calm and cool,”
“dancing,” and “talking.” Cotton stated that he “left for a couple hours” before coming
home to Theng “shaking and foaming at the mouth on the floor.” When asked about the
argument with Theng on November 13, Cotton repeatedly denied that the argument
occurred. Cotton then stated that he and Theng were at her house on Sunday and that he
left Monday before coming home at some point to find Theng on the floor, at which point
he immediately called 911. T he investigator asked Cotton what he told A.E. about
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“catching [Theng] with some other guy in bed.” Cotton stated: “I caught [Theng] in bed
with another man, and that was nothing. He walked out [of] the house, and that was it. I’m
like, okay I’m moving out, that was no big thing.” Cotton said this occurred on Friday
before Theng’s death.
The state charged Cotton with second-degree intentional murder and second-degree
felony murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subds. 1(1), 2(1) (2020).
At trial, S.T. testified about witnessing Cotton approach Theng “from behind[,] . . .
put both of his hands around her neck[,] and start[] squeezing.” The district court admitted
this testimony over Cotton’s objection.
Cotton also argued that the state could not sufficiently authenticate the
November 13, 2020 photo from Theng’s phone or another nearly identical photo taken on
November 6, 2020, appearing to show Theng’s face without injury. The district court
admitted the photos.
Additionally, the medical examiner testified about Theng’s autopsy. The medical
examiner concluded that Theng’s death was a homicide caused by blunt head trauma. The
state presented a slideshow of autopsy photos to aid the medical examiner’s testimony.
Cotton objected to a photo showing Theng’s blood-filled skull cavity after the medical
examiner had removed the top of the skull. The district court admitted the photo.
The state also called A.E. as a witness. A.E. admitted that his driver’s license listed
Theng’s address as his own but claimed that he never actually lived there. He also admitted
that he spoke with Cotton “right before and after . . . Theng died,” claiming that they talked
about “how to get a job.” But when asked further about his phone interview with the
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investigator on January 19, 2021, and his conversations with Cotton, A.E. claimed to
remember almost no details because he had been “drinking heavily” when those
conversations occurred. The state unsuccessfully tried refreshing A.E.’s recollection with
the recorded phone call. A.E. testified that he “believe[d] [he] told the truth” to the
investigator. A.E. also admitted during voir dire that he remembered Cotton telling him
that “they’d been cheating.” Over Cotton’s hearsay objection, the district court admitted
the entire recording of A.E.’s phone call with the investigator.
The jury found Cotton guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Cotton to 306
months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Cotton appeals five evidentiary issues. We review evidentiary issues for “a clear
abuse of discretion.” State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015). The district
court abuses its discretion when its “ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). Cotton bears the burden
of showing that the district court abused its discretion and that admitting the evidence
prejudiced his defense. See State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016).
Relationship evidence
Cotton first argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting, pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2022), S.T.’s testimony about the choking incident and the six
voicemails that Cotton sent to S.T. Evidence admitted under section 634.20 is often called
“relationship evidence.” See State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010),
rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). Under that statute, “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by
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the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other . . . household
members, is admissible unless [its] probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, . . . misleading the jury,” or other considerations. Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20.1
Choking incident
Cotton claims that S.T.’s testimony about the choking incident was misleading in
light of the medical examiner’s testimony that Theng had a “possible healed fracture” in
her neck. Cotton argues that this testimony “made it seem that Cotton was responsible for
the injury, despite the absence of evidence proving this point.” Cotton does not explain
how such an inference was misleading. The testimony tended to show that Cotton caused
the healed fracture . Likewise, the healed fracture tended to show that the choking
testimony was true. Indeed, the medical examiner testified that the healed fracture had
“been there for a while.” And S.T. testified that the choking incident occurred about a year
before Theng’s death. Cotton fails to show an abuse of discretion in admitting the choking
testimony as relationship evidence.
Voicemails
Cotton argues that the voicemails were unduly prejudicial because he and S.T. were
not in a romantic relationship and had not resided in the same household for months. But
“household members” include “persons . . . who have resided together in the past.” Minn.
Stat. §§ 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(4) (2022) (defining “household members”), 634.20 (stating

1 Cotton does not dispute, and we assume, that the choking incident and voicemails are
“[e]vidence of domestic conduct.”
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that “household members” is defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2). Cotton and S.T.
resided together around just four months before Cotton sent the voicemails at issue. S.T.
was therefore a “household member” of Cotton.
Cotton also claims that the voicemails impermissibly painted him as likely to kill
Theng “in a bout of similar reactionary behavior.” But “how a defendant treats his . . .
household members” permissibly “sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those
close to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant may interact with the victim.”
Valentine, 787 N.W.2 d at 637. Relationship evidence is also admissible to “provide[]
context for the crime charged,” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 553 (Minn. 2010),
which may “assist[] the jury” in “judg[ing] the credibility of the principals in the
relationship.” State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004).
Here, the voicemails suggested that Cotton would react violently and persistently to
a household member defying his control and to the prospect of losing Theng’s house. That
is significant given S.T.’s testimony about the choking incident and the deterioration of
Cotton’s and Theng’s relationship, often over money. It is also significant in light of the
text conversation between Theng’s phone and S.T., the photo showing Theng’s injured
face, the continuous calls from Cotton’s phone to Theng’s, and the calls from Theng’s
phone to her realtor. The evidence tended to show that Theng was going to sell the house
and move away while Cotton tried to prevent her from doing so, including with violence,
just before her death. Considering all the evidence, the voicemails were highly probative
of why Cotton would beat and kill Theng in a rage escalating over days as Theng attempted
to sell the house and move in defiance of Cotton’s wishes. In concert with other evidence—
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including the cell -site data and evidence that no one broke into Theng’s house—the
voicemails also helped discredit Cotton’s shifting explanations regarding Theng’s death
and explain his statements and behavior in relation to it.
The district court moreover mitigated any unfair prejudice by giving the jury a
cautionary instruction. See State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 317 (Minn. 2009) (stating
that juries presumably follow instructions); State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Minn.
1998) (stating that cautionary instructions reduce risk of unfair prejudice). The district
court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence “for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the nature and extent of the re lationship between the [d]efendant and the
alleged victim and other household members . . . to assist . . . in determining whether the
[d]efendant committed” the charged acts. The prosecutor similarly instructed the jury
during closing argument.
Given the above considerations, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the voicemails.
Authentication of photos
Cotton next argues that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that the
photos of Theng’s face from her phone were sufficiently authenticated. Authentication is
“a condition precedent to admissibility . . . satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a).
Rule 901(b) illustrates ways to authenticate evidence but requires no specific authentication
method. In re Welfare of S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Minn. App. 1997). The district
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court has “considerable discretion . . . in deciding whether evidence has been adequately
authenticated.” State v. Dulak, 348 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn. 1984).
Here, law enforcement collected a phone found at the crime scene. The officer who
extracted the photos at issue testified that he received the phone from an investigator as
part of a cellphone-data -extraction request. The officer discerned the phone’s number,
which was registered to Theng. The officer testified that he compared the photo exhibits
at trial with those he extracted, verifying that the exhibits were accurate compared to the
extracted photos. Thus, there was at least “some evidence on the chain of custody” for the
photos. S.A.M., 570 N .W.2d at 166-67 (ruling evidence sufficiently authenticated in part
by chain-of-custody evidence).
Other evidence supported that the photos were accurate representations of the
matters depicted. Specifically, the officer found no sign of damage to the phone or that its
camera was not functioning. He also testified that the metadata extracted from the phone
were consistent with the photos coming directly from the phone’s camera.
Circumstantial evidence also “partially authenticated” the photos. See id. at 166
(stating that witness partially authenticated videotape by testifying that tape accurately
depicted events witnessed near time of assault at issue despite not seeing assault). The
angle of the photos suggested that Theng took them herself. The metadata from the photos
showed that they were taken in the neighborhood where Theng worked, and Theng’s
employer confirmed she was working on November 13. Both photos appeared to show
Theng in her work uniform in front of a sign for the business where she worked. The
metadata also showed that the photos were respectively taken at 11:29 p.m. on
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November 6, 2020, and at 10:48 p.m. on November 13, 2020. These times were consistent
with Theng’s typical shift and the November 13 text message to S.T. asking to stay with
S.T. after midnight. In the same text conversation, Theng evidently indicated that she and
Cotton had a fight, which Theng’s early arrival to work and offer of money to S.T.
supported. S.T.’s choking testimony showed prior domestic violence, further supporting
that the November 13 photo accurately depicted injury to Theng’s face from the fight. The
circumstances substantially supported the photos’ authenticity.
Cotton emphasizes that the officer who extracted the photos had never repaired or
installed a cellphone camera, did not know if the camera for Theng’s phone was internally
damaged, did not know the settings on the phone or the name of the camera application,
and did not know if the photos could have been “manipulated.” But in the context of
suspect chain-of-custody foundation, our supreme court has held foundation sufficient
“when there is a ‘reasonabl[e] probab[ility] that tampering or substitution did not
occur,’ and the evidence is what the proponent claims.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d
281, 303 (Minn. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Hager, 325 N.W.2d 43, 44
(Minn. 1982)). “Any speculation about tampering may well affect the weight of the
evidence . . . but does not affect its admissibility.” Id. (quotation omitted).
That is pertinent here. Cotton speculates that the photos could have been altered
without any evidence that they were. This speculation might have affected the evidentiary
weight of the photos but not their admissibility. And there was a reasonable probability
that the photos were authentic. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
them.
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Autopsy photo
Cotton also argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
autopsy photo of Theng’s blood -filled skull cavity because it was needlessly shocking.
Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). The district court
has “discretion to admit photographs, even ghastly ones, so long as they show something
that a witness could describe and are material to some relevant issue.” State v. Friend, 493
N.W.2d 540, 544 (Minn. 1992) (quotation omitted).
Here, the prosecutor argued that the autopsy photo would aid the medical
examiner’s description of Theng’s injuries and relate to the element of intent. The medical
examiner used the photo to illustrate how the blood filling Theng’s skull pushed down on
her brain, causing pneumonia and eventually death, likely over the course of “hours.” The
prosecutor noted the photo during closing argument, asserting that “[t]his was a severe”
and “intentional injury” caused by Cotton re peatedly punching or kicking Theng in the
head or banging her head on the floor. The prosecutor also argued that Cotton left Theng
on the floor “for so long . . . that she develop[ed] pneumonia.”
Thus, the photo was material to the time of death. It was therefore relevant to a
special interrogatory in which the jury found that Cotton permitted Theng to lay injured for
an extended period. See State v. Hurd, 763 N.W.2d 17, 30 (Minn. 2009) (citing State v.
DeZeler, 41 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 1950)) (noting that “time of death” may be relevant
issue on which to admit “gruesome pictures of the victim’s body”). The photo was also
likely material to intent. That made the photo relevant to another special interrogatory in
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which the jury found that Cotton inflicted multiple injuries causing Theng’s death. The
district court “reviewed [the] photograph before admitting it,” received “an explanation as
to [its] probative value,” “and explicitly balanced [its] probative value against [its] potential
for creating unfair prejudice.” See Friend, 493 N.W.2d at 544 (observing no abuse of
discretion when district court “engaged in the required balancing test under [r]ule 403”).
As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the autopsy photo.
A.E.’s phone call with investigator
Cotton argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting A.E.’s
recorded phone call because it was inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is a “statement” not
made by the declarant while testifying at trial that is offered “to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible. Minn. R. Evid. 802.
Many of A.E.’s recorded statements were offered to show only that he made them
rather than for their truth. Those statements were not hearsay. Cotton appears to
specifically take issue with admitting A.E.’s statements asserting that he and Cotton were
friends, that they talked often, and that they had various discussions about Theng’s death.
The district court admitted these statements to show Cotton’s “own words as to the
occurrences prior to [Theng]’s death.” The state argued that the statements showed that
A.E., “either in collaboration with . . . Cotton or just based on the assurances of his good
friend,” gave a story about a nonexistent man to “take[] the blame off of . . . Cotton.”
Thus, the state offered the statements for their truth, except for A.E.’s statement that
Cotton told him about catching Theng and another man “naked” and “sleeping together.”
The district court admitted that statement under “the residual exception” in Minn. R. Evid.
15
807. But the statement was admissible as nonhearsay to explain why the investigator asked
Cotton what he told A.E. about “catching [Theng] with some other guy in bed.” See State
v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Minn. App. 2012) (“We may affirm the district court on
any ground, including one not relied on by the district court.”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16,
2012); State v. Stillday, 646 N.W.2d 557, 563-64 (Minn. App. 2002) (affirming admission
of witness’s testimony that he heard victim shout for help in part because shout was not
hearsay but “was offered to show why [witness] contacted the police”), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 20, 2002).
We conclude that the rest of A.E.’s recorded statements at issue were admissible
hearsay under rule 807. “A statement not specifically covered by [r]ule[s] 803 or 804 but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” is admissible under rule
807 if
the [district] court determines that (A) the statement is offered
as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of the[] [Minnesota Rules
of Evidence] and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.

Minn. R. Evid. 807. Cotton does not dispute that requirement (A) was met. Cotton argues
that A.E.’s hearsay statements lacked sufficient circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness and did not meet requirements (B) and (C) of rule 807. We address these
contentions in turn.
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Circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
Whether a statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness depends on
the totality of the circumstances. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 292. Potentially relevant
circumstances include: (1) whether the declarant volunteered the statement without
suggestion or leading; (2) whether the declarant based the statement on personal
knowledge, especially when other evidence corroborates or is consistent with the
statement; (3) whether “the statement is recorded, removing any real dispute about what
the declarant said”; (4) the declarant’s motive for making the statement, including their
relationship to the parties; (5) the time between an event and a hearsay statement about the
event; and (6) whether the declarant recanted the statement. Id. at 292-93.
Here, A.E. volunteered his statements to police in a noncoercive telephonic setting.
Second, A.E. had personal knowledge of his and Cotton’s relationship and discussions.
A.E. did not require personal knowledge of the matters about which Cotton allegedly told
him to reliably prove Cotton’s own words and their falsity. The address on A.E.’s driver’s
license, Cotton’s phone calls with A.E. near the time of Theng’s death, and Cotton’s quick
phone call to the investigator after A.E.’s interview further supported A.E.’s assertions that
he and Cotton were close and that they talked often—including near the time of Theng’s
death about real or fabricated circumstances relating thereto. Third, there is no dispute that
A.E. made the recorded statements in question. And fourth, as the district court found, it
appears that A.E. made the statements to “help[] his friend.”
The record is unclear on when A.E.’s and Cotton’s relevant conversations occurred.
We assume that they occurred near the time of Theng’s death, creating an “extended” time
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gap between the conversations and A.E.’s hearsay statements around two months later. See
id. at 293. This would diminish the trustworthiness of A.E.’s statements. State v. Hansen,
312 N.W.2d 96, 98, 102 (Minn. 1981) (noting that two-week gap between event and
statement about it diminished trustworthiness). And Cotton points out that A.E. repeatedly
claimed to be drinking heavily during the relevant period. Nonetheless, the factors
diminishing trustworthiness are insignificant against the factors supporting
trustworthiness, particularly when the crux of A.E.’s hearsay statements was simple,
undetailed, and likely easy to remember.
Cotton also argues unpersuasively that A.E.’s alleged failure to recall due to
drinking raised “the same issues . . . found in a recanted statement.” The district court
found no “clear recantation,” that A.E. “was trying very hard to not have to say anything,”
and that he “wanted [the prosecutor] to say the words.” We defer to this credibility finding.
See State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 870 (Minn. 2008). In any event, A.E. admitted that
he believed that he told the investigator the truth and that someone had been “cheating.”
Weighing the above considerations, we conclude that A.E.’s hearsay statements
possessed sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness for admission under rule
807.
Most probative evidence
The most-probative-evidence prong creates a preference for reasonably available
evidence showing “the same thing” as the hearsay at issue. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 297
(citing DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d at 106). Here, A.E.’s hearsay statements were the only
evidence of his and Cotton’s close relationship and the most probative evidence on the
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extent to which they talked. A.E.’s hearsay statements were also the only evidence that
Cotton claimed to wonder if the “other guy” was responsible for Theng’s death. In context
with all the evidence, A.E.’s hearsay statements were ultimately relevant to discrediting
Cotton’s accounts of Theng’s death, including on whether Cotton fabricated a story about
Theng’s death to or in collaboration with A.E. We conclude that A.E.’s hearsay statements
sufficiently met the most-probative-evidence prong.
General purposes of the rules and interests of justice
To meet prong (C) of rule 807, admitting the hearsay must “promote the growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.” Id. at 294 (quotation omitted). Here, there is no
substantial doubt about the trustworthiness prong with respect to what the state offered
A.E.’s hearsay statements to prove. And the state offered these statements only because—
based on the district court’s credibility finding—A.E. tried avoiding the ascertainment of
truth. We therefore conclude that admitting A.E.’s hearsay statements sufficiently
furthered the general purposes of the Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting A.E.’s recorded phone call with the
investigator.
Affirmed.