Rachel Royer, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0806

Rachel Royer,
Relator,

vs.

Inventiv Health, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed April 24, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 48519514-3

Thomas H. Boyd, Steven Vogel ( certified student attorney), Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator)

Keri A. Phillips, Lossom Allen, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Inventiv Health, Inc., Morrisville, North Carolina (re spondent employer)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan ,
Judge.
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NONPRECEDENT IAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Relator challenges the denial of her request to receive unemployment benefits after
being discharged for violating her employer’s COVID-19 vaccine policy. Relator argues
that the unemployment law judge (ULJ) erred by independently reviewing whether relator
espoused a sincerely held religious objection to the employer’s vaccine policy. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Rachel Roye r applied for unemployment benefits , but respondent
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) determined
she was ineligible. Royer appealed this determination to a ULJ for review and the ULJ
conducted an evidentiary hearing in March 2022. The ULJ admitted testimony from Royer
and K.C. (Royer’s former colleague), as well as documentary exhibits.
According to this evidence, from June 2021 to January 31, 2022, Royer was
employed by respondent Inventiv Health, Inc., d/b/a Syneos Health (Syneos) . Royer’s
duties involved sales of oncology medication and required face-to-face contact with others.
On September 2, 2021, Syneos adopted a policy requiring employees to be fully vaccinated
against COVID -19 if their work involved face -to-face contact. Royer requested an
exemption, claiming that her religious beliefs prevented her from getting the vaccine.
Syneos responded to her request , stating that “we have concluded you have a sincerely -
held religious belief” and that Syneos “will communicate with [Royer] once the review has
been completed and a determination is made” as to whether Syneos “can provide an
accommodation” to Royer for the vaccination policy. Syneos ultimately determined that
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it could not accommodate Royer’s request to remain unvaccinated and informed her that if
she did not get the vaccine by January 31, 2022, she would be discharged. Royer did not
get the vaccine by that date and Syneos discharged Royer on January 31, 2022, for violating
its vaccine policy.
Following the hearing, the ULJ found that Royer’s refusal to comply with the
COVID- 19 policy was due to “concerns about the safety of the COVID -19 vaccines” and
not the result of a religious objection. The ULJ also determined that “[Royer’s] refusal to
get vaccinated despite the employer’s clear policy was a serious violation of the standards
of behavior the employer had the right to reasonably expect of her.” According to the ULJ,
“Royer’s conduct was intentional ,” “ Royer was discharged bec ause of employment
misconduct,” and, as a result, Royer was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.
Royer requested reconsideration, arguing that the ULJ erred by independently
considering whether Royer had a sincerely held religious belief: “[t]he decision on [her]
sincerely held religious belief was ALREADY established and APPROVED by Syneos”;
she had a constitutional right to her religious beliefs; “Title VII protects people . . . who
have sincerely held spiritual beliefs”; and the “full scientific info on any of the [COVID-
19] vaccine ingredients, efficacy and safety has not been released to the public .” Royer
did not argue that the evidence presented failed to establish that permitting her to remain
unvaccinated would cause undue hardship to Syneos.
The ULJ affirmed, stating that “the [ULJ] is not obligated to adopt Syneos’s factual
determination about the sincerity of Royer ’s religious beliefs ” and “must make her own
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findings of fact based upon the evidence obtained at the hearing.” Royer petitioned for
certiorari review.
DECISION
Royer argues that in deciding whether she engaged in misconduct, the ULJ was
bound by Syneos’s conclusion that Royer’s refusal to comply with the vaccine policy was
due to a sincerely held religious belief .1 We do not agree with Royer’s argument for the
following two reasons: (1) the determination of an employer’s reasonable expectations is
an objective inquiry, not a subjective one; and (2) Royer’s argument relies on a legal
proposition that is inconsistent with the governing statutes and rules.
Under Minnesota law, “workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own”
may receive “a temporary partial wage replacement.” Minn. Stat. § 268.03, subd. 1 (2022).
When an employer discharges an employee for employment misconduct, however, the
employee is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits . Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4
(2022). “Employment misconduct” is defined to mean “any intentional, negligent, or
indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of
behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a)
(2022). The determination o f employment misconduct presents a mixed question of law
and fact. Wichmann v. Travalia & U.S. Directives, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Minn. App.
2007). We view the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision, defer
to the ULJ’s credibility determinations , do not reweigh conflicting evidence , and uphold

1 Royer makes no challenge to the reasonableness of Syneos’s vaccine policy or to the
ULJ’s factual determinations regarding Royer’s conduct .
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factual findings if substantial evidence in the record supports them. Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d) (2022); Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016);
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006). However, we review
questions of law regarding employment misconduct de novo. Marn v. Fairview Pharm .
Servs. LLC, 756 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2008).
After an initial determination regarding eligibility by DEED, Minn. Stat. § 268.101,
subd. 2 (2022), a party may request an evidentiary hearing in front of a ULJ, Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 1(a) (2022). The ULJ’s decision is final unless a request for
reconsideration is filed. Id., subd. 1a(a) (2022). A relator may obtain appellate review of
the ULJ’s decision on reconsideration, Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7 (2022), but issues
not raised at the evidentiary hearing or in the reconsideration request ar e outside the scope
of certiorari review. Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that a
party cannot raise a new issue on appeal); Peterson v. Ne. Bank–Minneapolis, 805 N.W.2d
878, 883 (Minn. App. 2011) (applying Thiele in an unemployment benefits appeal). Royer
argues that , as a legal matter, the ULJ was bound by Syneos’s determination regarding
whether Royer’s objection to the vaccine policy was based on a sincere ly held religious
belief.2 We are not persuaded by this argument for two reasons.

2 Royer also argues that the evidence presented does not establish Syneos would experience
an undue hardship if Royer remained unvaccinated. However, Royer did not make this
argument to the ULJ and we decline to address it. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. In addition,
while an employer may need to establish undue hardship in response to an employment-
discrimination claim, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2(a), 2000e(j) (2018), the determination of
employee misconduct for purposes of denying or awarding unemployment benefits does
not include any such requirement, see generally Minn. Stat. § 268.095 (2022). For th ese
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First, a determination of misconduct includes consideration of whether an
employer’s expectations are reasonable, which is an objective inquiry, not a subjective one.
The statutory definition of employment misconduct focuses on whether the employee’s
conduct constitutes a serious violation of the employer’s reasonable expectations. It is well
established that a n objective test applies t o the determination of whether an employer’s
standard of behavior is a reasonable one. Wilson, 888 N.W.2d at 459 (citing Jenkins v. Am.
Express Fin. Corp., 721 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn. 2006) ). The parties agree that the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Am endment precludes denial of unemployment benefits if the
employee’s conduct was based on a sincerely held religious belief.3 Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of
Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989). Thus, the misconduct determination depends
on whether a reasonable employer would find the existence of a sincerely held religious
belief. Because the ULJ was required to apply an objective standard to that question, the
ULJ was not precluded from making a n independent determination that differ ed from
Syneos’s conclusion that Royer was unvaccinated due to a sincerely held religious belief.
Second, Royer’s argument conflicts with provisions from the unemployment
benefits statutes and rules, which indicate that the ULJ’s role is to independently review
and determ ine the facts regarding eligibility. For instance, the statute establishes that

reasons, we als o decline Royer’s alternative request to remand for further proceedings or
findings regarding undue hardship.
3 Although portions of Royer’s brief could be construed as critical of the ULJ’s
determination regarding the sincerity of Royer’s beliefs, Royer expressly stated that she
was not arguing that the denial of benefits violated her rights under the Free Exercise
Clause. Instead, Royer clarified that her challenge was limited to whether the ULJ was
bound by Syneos’s conclusion regarding the sincerity of Royer’s religious objection.
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DEED is responsible for proper payment of unemployment benefits from the state funds ,
the employer’s position is not binding on DEED’s position, and there is no presumption in
favor of eligibility—even if the employee and employer agree on certain matters :
Unemployment benefits are paid from state funds and are not
considered paid from any special insurance plan, nor as paid
by an employer. An application for unemployment bene fits is
not considered a claim against an employer but is considered a
request for unemployment benefits from the trust fund. The
commissioner has the responsibility for the proper payment of
unemployment benefits regardless of the level of interest or
participation by an applicant or an employer in any
determination or appeal . An applicant ’s entitlement to
unemployment benefits must be determined based upon that
information available without regard to a burden of proof. Any
agreement between an applican t and an employer is not
binding on the commissioner in determining an applicant ’s
entitlement. There is no presumption of entitlement or
nonentitlement to unemployment benefits.

Minn. Stat. § 268.069, subd. 2 (2022). In addition, section 268.105, subdivision 1(a), refers
to the evidentiary hearing as a “de novo” hearing, and subdivision 1a(a) mandates the ULJ
to determine eligibility based “upon the evidence obtained .” In sum, the statute requires
the ULJ to determine eligibility and employment misconduct without regard for whether
the employer made conclusions regarding eligibility.
The rules governing the evidentiary hearing also conflict with Royer’s proposed
point of law. The rules state that the ULJ “must ensure that all rel evant facts are clearly
and fully developed,” “ may obtain testimony from any “person the judge believes will
assist the judge in reaching a proper result,” and must conduct the hearing “as an evidence-
gathering inquiry.” Minn. R. 3310.2921 (2021). The rules, therefore, require the ULJ to
make independent determinations; they do not contemplate deference to the employer, the
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employee, or DEED. We acknowledge that many times factfinding is a simple and
straightforward exercise, especially when an employe e and employer do not dispute a
particular fact. However, DEED is also a party to the unemployment benefits proceedings
and, given the language of the statute and rules, we cannot agree with Royer that the ULJ
is foreclosed from making findings contrary t o an employer’s statements, assuming that
those findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Noticeably, Royer does not cite any authority to support her legal proposition that
the ULJ is bound by the employer’s statements or agreements regarding eligibility. Nor
does Royer attempt to reconcile her argument on appeal with the authorities noted above.
In the absence of citation to binding authority and without an explanation of how her
argument can be reconciled with the authorities requiring an independent review of the
facts, we are not persuad ed to adopt Royer’s legal proposition.
Affirmed.