State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0813

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Julian Leon Hooks,
Appellant.

Filed March 6, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-CR-20-1027

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Charles W. Hanson, Brown County Attorney, Daniel D. Kalk, Assistant County Attorney,
New Ulm, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction for felony
driving-while-impaired, appellant claims the district court violated his plea agreement by
imposing a statutory five-year conditional-release term. Additionally, he claims his guilty
2
plea was unintelligent because the district court did not adequately explore whether his
mental health affected his ability to understand the proceedings. Appellant also argues that
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional
departure.
Appellant was provided notice of the conditional-release term and his guilty plea
was intelligent even though the district court did not inquire into his mental health. And,
because the district court acted within its discretion by imposing a presumptive sentence,
we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2020, appellant Julian Leon Hooks was charged with felony
driving-while-impaired (DWI), gross misdemeanor driving after cancellation–inimical to
public safety, and two misdemeanor open-bottle violations.
In January 2022, Hooks signed a rule 15 petition and pleaded guilty. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15. In the plea petition, Hooks disclosed that he had been a “patient in a mental
hospital,” he had “talked with or been treated by a psychiatrist or other person for a nervous
or mental condition,” he had “been ill, injured, or to the emergency room recently,” and he
had “recently taken pills or medications.” The terms of the plea agreement were as follows:
upon Hooks’ plea of guilty to felony DWI, the remaining counts would be dismissed;
Hooks would argue for a downward dispositional departure; and if the district court
imposed the presumptive prison sentence, it would be at the low end of the presumptive
range.
3
At sentencing, the district court denied a dispositional departure because Hooks was
“on probation in Oregon” and was then on “[a]bscond status,” concluding that it “can’t find
that somebody who absconded from supervision and is still on abscond status is particularly
amenable to probation.” The district court imposed a 57-month sentence, the bottom of
the presumptive imprisonment range, and five years of conditional release pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(d) (2020). Hooks appeals.
DECISION
I. Hooks’ guilty plea was valid.

A. Conditional-Release Term
Hooks argues that the district court violated the plea agreement when it imposed
five years of statutorily required conditional release, which was not a term of the plea
agreement and, as a result, his plea was unintelligent. 1 The state argues that Hooks was
sufficiently notified of the conditional-release term by reference to the term in the pre-plea
sentencing worksheet, the presentence investigation, and during the district court’s
imposition of the term at sentencing.
The interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements is a question of law that we
review de novo. See State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000).
Conditional-release terms mandated by statute “cannot be waived.” Kubrom v. State, 863
N.W.2d 88, 92 n.3 (Minn. App. 2015).

1 Hooks does not argue that the five years of conditional release is otherwise inapplicable
to his circumstances.
4
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once
it is entered. Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 1997). Rather, “[t]he court
shall allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty upon a timely motion and proof to the
satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if the plea is not accurate, voluntary
and intelligent.” State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004). A guilty plea is not
intelligent if the defendant does not understand “the consequences of his plea.” State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 2010). The validity of a guilty plea is reviewed de
novo. Id. at 94.
The criminal penalty for first-degree DWI includes “imprisonment for not more than
seven years” and “the mandatory penalties described in section 169A.276.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.24, subd. 2 (2020). The mandatory- penalty statute provides that the sentencing
court “shall provide that after the person [convicted of first-degree DWI] has been released
from prison the commissioner [of corrections] shall place the person on conditional release
for five years.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(d). It further provides that “[t]he
commissioner [of corrections] shall impose any conditions of release that the commissioner
deems appropriate” and permits the commissioner, “[i]f the person fails to comply with
any condition of release,” to revoke the conditional release “and order the person to serve
all or part of the remaining portion of the conditional release term in prison.” Id.
Hooks relies on State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 526 (Minn. 2003), and Jumping
Eagle, 620 N.W.2d at 44, to argue that “when a plea agreement calls for a sentence without
a conditional-release term, the addition of a conditional -release term violates the
5
agreement, and the plea must be withdrawn.” But these cases are factually distinguished
and, instead, Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d at 323, controls our analysis.
In Wukawitz, the defendant had pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, the
district court sentenced him to a total of 140 months, and a mandatory conditional-release
term was not discussed during the plea negotiations, during the plea hearing, nor imposed
at the sentencing hearings. 662 N.W.2d at 520. Over two years later, “the district court
issued an amended sentencing order adding the five-year conditional release term” and the
defendant “moved to withdraw his plea asserting that he was unaware of the mandatory
five-year conditional release term applicable to his convictions when he agreed to plead
guilty.” Id. The supreme court held that in “limited circumstances where imposition of a
conditional release term after sentencing would violate the plea agreement, the district
court may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea.” Id.
In Rhodes, the supreme court was specifically asked, as Hooks asks, “to extend the
holding in State v. Wukawitz . . . to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or the
court to modify the sentence where a mandatory conditional release term is not included in
the maximum executed sentence described in the defendant’s plea petition,” but is imposed
at sentencing. 675 N.W.2d at 324-25. The supreme court declined to do so when a
“defendant is on notice of the state’s intention to seek the term before sentencing and fails
to object to its inclusion in the sentence.” Id. at 325. The supreme court ultimately held
the plea was valid because “both [at] the time of his plea and [at] sentencing, Rhodes was
on notice that the conditional release-term . . . was mandatory and could not be waived by
the district court.” Id. at 327. Moreover, the supreme court determined that “[t]he statutory
6
requirement of a conditional release term was added in 1992, years before Rhodes entered
his plea.” Id.
The supreme court also determined that it could be
infer[red] from Rhodes’ failure to object to the presentence
investigation’s recommendation [which included the
conditional-release term], the state’s request at the sentencing
hearing [to impose the conditional-release term] and the
court’s imposition of the [conditional-release term] that
Rhodes understood from the beginning that the conditional
release term would be a mandatory addition to his plea bargain.

Id. The supreme court stated that the inference that Rhodes understood the
conditional-release term to be a mandatory addition to his plea bargain “materially
differentiates this case from Wukawitz and the precedent on which it relies” and “also
disproves any claim that Rhodes might make that the state had promised to recommend a
sentence that did not include a conditional release term.” Id.
As in Rhodes, Hooks was provided notice of the statutorily required
conditional-release term in the pre-plea sentencing worksheet, which was filed almost nine
months before he signed the plea petition and pleaded guilty. Id. at 325. Additionally, the
mandatory conditional-release term was identified in the presentence investigation and in
the sentencing worksheet submitted by the department of corrections after Hooks pleaded
guilty but before sentencing. Also, like Rhodes, “[t]he statutory requirement of a
conditional release term was added years before [Hooks] entered his plea”—approximately
20 years earlier. Id. Thus, it can also be inferred that Hooks similarly “understood from
the beginning that the conditional release term would be a mandatory addition to his plea
7
bargain” because he failed to object to the presentence investigation’s recommendation or
the district court’s imposition of the sentence. Id.
Thus, Wukawitz is inapplicable because it cannot be said that Hooks was unaware
of the conditional-release term at the time of his guilty plea. 2 Therefore, the district court
did not violate the plea agreement by imposing the five- year conditional-release term
because it was required by statute and Hooks had sufficient notice of it. For the same
reasons, Hooks’ plea was intelligent.
B. Mental-Health Inquiry
Hooks argues that his plea was unintelligent because the district court failed to
inquire into his mental-health status. 3
“The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges
against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 96. Although a guilty plea may still be valid despite the fact that a defendant
was not questioned about certain criteria listed in Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1, it is
critical that “the record is adequate to establish that the plea was intelligently and
voluntarily given.” State v. Doughman, 340 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1983) (holding
that “[w]hat is important is not the order or the wording of the questions, but whether the

2 Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d at 43 had a similar fact pattern in that the conditional-release
terms were not imposed until five years after the sentencing hearing.
3 Although Hooks also argues that his plea was involuntary, he points to no evidence
indicating that his guilty plea was due to improper pressure or coercion as required by the
caselaw discussing the voluntariness of a plea. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (“The
voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to improper
pressure or coercion.”). Id. Therefore, we only consider whether the plea was intelligent.
8
record . . . establish[es] that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily given”) , rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 15, 1984). Thus, the district court need not create a perfect record to establish
an intelligent guilty plea. If the “record reveals careful interrogation by the trial court and
the defendant had full opportunity to consult with his counsel before entering his plea, the
court may safely presume that the defendant was adequately informed of his rights.”
Hernandez v. State, 408 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing State v. Propotnik,
216 N.W.2d 637, 638 (Minn. 1974)). The validity of a guilty plea is reviewed de novo.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
The record plainly shows that Hooks understood the charges against him, the rights
he was waiving, and the consequences of his plea. The plea petition, read and signed by
Hooks, outlined the charges, his right to a pretrial hearing and the procedures therein, his
right to a trial and the procedures therein, and the consequences of the plea agreement.
During the plea hearing, Hooks was asked by his counsel, “Are you thinking clearly
today?” Hooks answered “Yes.” Hooks was also asked, in reference to the plea petition,
“Did you understand the document before you signed it?” and Hooks answered “Yes.”
Hooks was read the four charges against him and was asked “Do you understand the
charges that the state filed against you?” to which he answered “Yes.” Hooks testified that
he knowingly waived his right to a trial, along with the accompanying procedures and the
state’s burdens therein, and he testified that he understood the collateral consequences of
pleading guilty to a DWI which were explained to Hooks by his counsel, specifically, that
“all future DWIs in Minnesota, no matter how much time passes, they will be felony level.”
Therefore, the record shows that Hooks’ plea was intelligent. Id. at 96.
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II. The district court acted within its discretion by imposing the presumptive
sentence.

We review the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 -08 (Minn. 2014); State v. Larson, 473 N.W.2d 907, 909
(Minn. App. 1991). “ The district court must order the presumptive sentence provided in
the sentencing guidelines unless substantial and compelling circumstances warrant a
departure.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). We will affirm a
presumptive sentence if “the record shows that the sentencing court carefully evaluated all
the testimony and information presented, ” even if reasons for a departure exist . State v.
Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2013); State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006). Only in a “rare”
case will we reverse the district court’s refusal to depart from a presumptive sentence. State
v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d
6, 7 (Minn. 1981)).
When considering a dispositional departure, the district court focuses on the
defendant as an individual. State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). A
defendant’s particular amenability to probation may justify a dispositional departure. Soto,
855 N.W.2d at 308. The supreme court has explained that “particular” in this context
means “exceptional” or “distinctive among others of the same group,” and “particularly”
means “especially” or “specifically.” Id. at 309 (quotation omitted).
Hooks argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a dispositional
departure “without explaining the full basis for the denial and because the testimony and
10
information before the district court shows that substantial and compelling circumstances
existed to support it.” Because Hooks was “on probation in Oregon” and on “[a]bscond
status,” the district court denied Hooks’ motion for a dispositional departure, concluding
that it “can’t find that somebody who absconded from supervision and is still on abscond
status is particularly amenable to probation.” The district court imposed a 57- month
sentence, the bottom end of the presumptive sentence range. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A.
“A reviewing court may not interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of
discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the
testimony and information presented before making a determination.” Pegel, 795 N.W.2d
at 255 (quotation omitted). The record indicates that before making its determination, the
district court read the presentence investigation and heard Hooks’ motion. Therefore, we
“may not interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion ” to decline to depart
from the presumptive sentence. Id. (quotation omitted).
Hooks also argues that he is particularly amenable to probation due to his
amenability to “individualized treatment in a probationary setting,” his age, criminal
history, family connection, employment, remorse, and motivation to change. See State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (discussing factors for determining whether a
defendant is particularly amenable to probation). Although the district court did not
explicitly explain its reasoning for declining to grant a dispositional departure, this was
well within the district court’s discretion because reasoning is not required when the district
court considers factors supporting departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.
State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985). As discussed, the record
11
indicates that the district court read the presentence investigation and heard Hooks’ motion.
Moreover, the record does not show that Hooks is especially exceptional or distinctive to
justify a dispositional departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309. And even if he were
particularly amenable to probation, the district court had discretion to impose a downward
dispositional departure, but it was not required to do so. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662,
664-65 (Minn. App. 2009). Only in a “rare” case will we reverse the district court’s refusal
to depart from a presumptive sentence, and this is not such a case. Walker, 913 N.W.2d at
468.
Affirmed.