State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0838

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kelsey Anne Weidell,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2023
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-21-3089

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant State
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for first-degree assault,
appellant Kelsey Anne Weidell argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying her motion for a downward dispositional departure. We affirm.
2
FACTS1
On May 17, 2021, police responded to an apartment building in St. Paul based on a
report that a man had been run over by a black SUV. Witnesses told police that they saw
Weidell intentionally drive her SUV into a group of fighting people, striking two people
and running over L.H. Then, the SUV went into reverse and ran over L.H. for a second
time before fleeing the scene. L.H. suffered severe injuries to his waist, legs, and hips.
The state charged Weidell with one count of first-degree assault pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 609.221, subdivision 1 (2020), and two counts of second-degree
assault pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdivision 1 (2020). Weidell
pleaded guilty to first-degree assault, and the state dismissed the remaining charges.
Weidell filed a motion for a downward dispositional departure or, in the alternative,
for a downward durational departure. Neither the state nor the probation department
supported a departure. At the sentencing hearing, the district court heard victim impact
statements, reviewed a presentence-investigation report, and expressly stated that it “read
and considered all of the statements of support as well as [Weidell’s] letter expressing
remorse, arguments of [her] attorney, as well as [Weidell’s] statement both in court and in
writing.” Although the district court recognized that Weidell had a criminal history score
of zero and had “turned [her] life around,” it denied Weidell’s motion and sentenced her to
a presumptive executed sentence of 86 months in prison.
Weidell appeals.

1 These undisputed facts are taken from the complaint.
3
DECISION
Weidell argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
for a downward dispositional departure because multiple factors demonstrate that she is
particularly amenable to probation.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences to “maintain
uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat.
§ 244.09, subd. 5 (2022). A district court may depart from the sentencing guidelines “only
if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present, and those circumstances provide a
substantial and compelling reason not to impose a guidelines sentence.” State v. Soto, 855
N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (emphasis omitted) (quotations and citations omitted);
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). But, even if substantial and compelling
circumstances are present, a district court is not required to depart from the guidelines.
State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018); Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1;
see, e.g., State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984). District courts are afforded a
great deal of discretion in the imposition of sentences, and appellate courts review for an
abuse of that discretion. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. Only in a “rare case” will an appellate
court “reverse the imposition of a presumptive sentence.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251,
253 (Minn. App. 2011).
A downward dispositional departure is generally based on characteristics of the
defendant showing that the defendant is particularly amenable to probation. State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). Particular amenability to probation may
constitute a substantial and compelling reason for a downward dispositional departure. Id.
4
Various factors, including “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his
cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family” are all
relevant to determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation. State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). These factors are often referred to as the Trog
factors. See Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253.
Weidell argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
for a dispositional departure because the Trog factors demonstrate that she is particularly
amenable to probation. Weidell highlights her genuine remorse, amenability to substance
and psychological treatment, successful record on pretrial release and probation, criminal-
history score of zero, demonstrated motivation to change, and community support.
The district court considered the arguments of the parties and all the information
presented. It recognized that Weidell had no criminal history; that, since Weidell had been
released, she had turned her life around and “made many steps in the right direction” for
her and her children; and that her remorse was sincere. Stating that it was not “an easy
decision,” the district court decided, after “serious consideration of all of the facts and
circumstances of this case,” to deny a departure and impose a presumptive sentence.
District courts are afforded “great discretion” in sentencing. State v. Vang , 847
N.W.2d 248, 264 (Minn. 2014). Even though the district court recognized that multiple
Trog factors weighed in Weidell’s favor, it was within its discretion to nevertheless choose
not to depart. See Walker, 913 N.W.2d at 468; Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1. In essence,
Weidell asks us to substitute our judgment for that of the district court, which we may not
5
do. See Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 264. This is not the “rare case” that requires reversal of a
presumptive sentence. See Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253.
Affirmed.