State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0840

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shaniqua Denise Lampkin,
Appellant.

Filed May 1, 2023
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-27767

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie L. Nelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Shaniqua Denise Lampkin, who is Black, was convicted of felony threats
of violence by an all- White jury. She appeals this conviction on the basis that the denial
of her pretrial motion challenging the racial composition of the jury— without granting her
2
a hearing— was error. Because Lampkin’s motion did not satisfy the requirement that she
specify the grounds on which the jury pool violated the law, in light of the three prima facie
factors for a pretrial jury challenge under Rule 26.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, she was not entitled to a hearing. As a result, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Lampkin with one count
of felony threats of violence 1 due to the allegation that Lampkin approached her
boyfriend’s ex-girlfriend at his apartment complex with a handgun, shouted obscenities at
her, and then followed her in a car when ex-girlfriend tried to leave the apartment. Lampkin
maintained her innocence and proceeded to trial.
After the first day of jury selection, before the jury was sworn, Lampkin filed a
motion challenging the jury venire
2 and requesting a new jury panel “that is an actual clear
representation of the cross-section of the population of Hennepin County.” Lampkin’s
one-sentence motion described the basis for her challenge: because Black individuals are
grossly underrepresented on Hennepin County jury panels “as reflected in the United States
Census Bureau statistics for Hennepin County.” The jury venire consisted of
24 individuals who all identified their race as White. Lampkin did not supplement her
motion with exhibits or statistical data. The district court denied Lampkin’s pretrial
motion. Lampkin noted her objection to this denial, and the parties completed voir dire.
3

1 A charge for felony threats of violence is a violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.713, subdivision 1 (2020).
2 A venire is a panel of prospective jurors from which the jury is eventually chosen.
3 Voir dire is the examination of jurors by trial counsel.
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The jury found Lampkin guilty. Subsequently, Lampkin filed a motion for a new
trial due to the jury composition infringing on her Sixth Amendment rights. Lampkin also
argued that, because she was denied a hearing before the jury was sworn on her initial
jury-composition challenge, she is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice due to an
irregularity in the proceedings and errors of law by the district court. The district court
denied Lampkin’s posttrial motion. Specifically, the court stated:
[T]his is a really important issue. It does come up from time
to time, and I’ve had some experience with
it. . . . Ms. Lampkin’s obligation is to show that over a
significant period of time, panel after panel, month after
month, that the group of eligible jurors in question has been
significantly underrepresented on the panels and that this
results from an unfair or an inadequate selection
procedure . . . . I don’t think here Ms. Lampkin can meet that
burden. She’s not able to show that the underrepresentation of
jurors who are Black, African American or of African descent
has occurred over a significant period of time or is the result of
any systematic exclusion from the jury selection process. The
process used by Hennepin County has been approved by
the . . . Supreme Court in the State v. Roan, case
532 N.W.2d 563. So I don’t think that Ms. Lampkin can meet
her burden of proof there.

Lampkin was sentenced to a stay of imposition of her felony sentence and placed
on probation for a period of three years.
Lampkin appeals.
DECISION
Lampkin asserts that her case should be remanded for further proceedings because
her constitutional right to a jury trial in front of a fair cross-section of the community was
violated when she challenged an all- White jury venire twice, and the district court denied
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both motions without a hearing. The district court, in denying both jury-composition
motions, relied on State v. Roan in determining that Lampkin did not meet her burden of
establishing the systematic exclusion of Black individuals from Hennepin County’s
jury-selection process as required to warrant a hearing. 532 N.W.2d 563, 569
(Minn. 1995).
Turning to the standard of review for issues concerning jury composition, we apply
a de novo standard to “cases concerning Sixth Amendment challenges to the
fair-cross-section requirement.” State v. Griffin, 846 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Minn. App. 2014),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014). In applying that standard of review, we look to the
provisions of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, which protect a criminal
defendant’s rights to a fair trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A fair
trial includes the requirement “that the jury venire . . . reflect a fair cross-section of the
community.” State v. Willis, 559 N.W.2d 693, 700 (Minn. 1997). But “[t]he Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or
one that mirrors the community.” State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn. 1994);
see also Hennepin County v. Perry, 561 N.W.2d 889, 895 (Minn. 1997) (explaining that
the fair-cross-section-of-the-community requirement is limited and does not guarantee a
defendant will receive a jury of a particular racial composition or one that mirrors the racial
makeup of the community).
We begin our de novo review by explaining the process of selecting a jury venire
and the defendant’s burden with regard to a challenge concerning the jury’s composition.
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Then we apply the law to the facts before us to determine whether the district court erred
in denying Lampkin’s pretrial and posttrial motions without a hearing.
The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the “jury list” is
“composed of persons randomly selected from a fair cross-section of qualified county
residents,” and requires that “[t]he jury must be drawn from the jury list.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 1. The “jury panel” is comprised of prospective jurors and
is selected from the “jury list.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 2; see also Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.02, subd. 4 (providing for selection of the jury from the jury panel). Further, the rules
allow a criminal defendant to “challenge the jury panel if a material departure from law
has occurred in drawing or summoning jurors.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 3. In
challenging the jury venire, the defendant must (1) put their motion in writing, (2) before
the district court swears in the jury, and (3) specify the grounds by which the jury pool
departed from law. Id. If these three items are satisfied, the district court “must conduct a
hearing to determine the sufficiency of the challenge.” Id. (emphasis added).
But with regard to the third requirement—specifying the grounds in which the jury
pool departed from the law—the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the jury
panel failed to reflect a fair cross-section of the community in order to be entitled to a
hearing. Perry, 561 N.W.2d at 896; Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 542; see also Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.02, subd. 3 (explaining that the jury challenge must specify grounds). This prima
facie showing requires establishing three factors: (1) the “group allegedly excluded is a
distinctive group in the community,” (2) the “group in question was not fairly represented
in the [jury panel],” and (3) the “underrepresentation was the result of a systematic
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exclusion of the group in question from the jury selection process.” Perry, 561 N.W.2d at
896 (quotation omitted); see Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 542.4
Here, Lampkin’s right to a hearing on her jury-composition challenge fails because
she did not sufficiently satisfy the specify-grounds requirement in rule 26.02,
subdivision 3.5 Specifically, Lampkin’s single sentence in her motion describing the basis
for her jury-composition challenge was not enough to make a prima facie showing that the
jury panel failed to reflect a fair cross- section of the community due to the systematic
exclusion of Black jurors.
To reach this conclusion, we begin with Lampkin’s motion, where she challenge d
and requested a new jury panel. Her motion stated the grounds for her challenge as
follows: “as it currently stands, any jury panel, as selected grossly under-represents a fair
cross-section of the population of Hennepin County as the panels are grossly
under-represented by African American individuals as reflected in the United States
Census Bureau statistics for Hennepin County.” But outside of this one sentence, Lampkin
did not provide any exhibits or statistical data with her motion. Assuming Lampkin
satisfied the first two prima facie factors—(1) the “group allegedly excluded is a distinctive
group in the community” and (2) the “group in question was not fairly represented in the”
jury panel— because “African-American individuals” are a distinctive group in the

4 If the defendant makes this prima facie showing, the state may rebut the showing by
establishing that the jury-selection process that produced the underrepresentation
nonetheless advanced a significant state interest. Perry, 561 N.W.2d at 896.
5 Lampkin satisfied the first two requirements for a pretrial jury challenge under rule 26.02,
subdivision 3, because she made her challenge in writing before the jury was sworn in.
7
community and the members of her jury all identified as White, caselaw6 instructs us that
Lampkin failed to satisfy the third factor, which requires a showing of a systematic
exclusion of Black jurors by Hennepin County.
To make a showing of systematic exclusion, a defendant must establish, as the
district court aptly described, that “over a significant period of time—panel after panel,
month after month —the group of eligible jurors in question has been significantly
underrepresented on the panels and that this results from . . . unfair or inadequate selection
procedures used by the state.” Andersen v. State, 940 N.W.2d 172, 182 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted). In Andersen, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Andersen was
not denied his right to a fair trial because he failed to demonstrate that the jury-selection
process systematically excluded a cross-section of the community, given that he did not
submit any evidence to satisfy this factor. Id. Similarly, Lampkin failed to make a showing
of systematic exclusion of Black jurors because she provided no evidence to support her
jury-composition challenge. And without evidence of systematic exclusion, we must apply
the analysis in Roan. 532 N.W.2d at 569. In Roan, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that Roan was not denied his right to a jury trial by a fair cross-section of the community
because he failed to demonstrate that the underrepresentation of “pe[ople] of color” from
the jury pool was a result of systematic exclusion, given that the Hennepin County
jury-selection system uses registered voters, driver’s licenses, and registered Minnesota
identification-card holders, which reaches over 98% of Hennepin County’s citizens. Id.

6 In our review, we must rely only on Lampkin’s motion, the transcripts, and relevant
caselaw. State v. Breaux, 620 N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn. App. 2001).
8
Accordingly, on this record, Lampkin’s jury-composition challenge—in which she stated
in one sentence that the jury panel underrepresented Black jurors when looking at United
States Census Bureau data without any further evidence to support that statement— was
insufficient to establish that Hennepin County’s jury-selection process systematically
excludes Black jurors.7
In sum, the district court’s rulings on Lampkin’s jury-composition challenges were
not in error given the lack of evidence Lampkin provided.
Affirmed.

7 Lampkin also asserts that the district court erred when it denied her posttrial jury-venire
challenge without holding a hearing. But this argument is a continuation of Lampkin’s
initial argument about her pretrial jury-venire challenge. Rule 26.02, subdivision 3, of the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the district court to hold a hearing
for a posttrial challenge of the jury venire because this rule only allows a challenge before
the jury is sworn in. As a result, this argument fails.