State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0841

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stacy Lee Sanders,
Appellant.

Filed April 24, 2023
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CR-21-883

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Abby Wikelius, Lyon County Attorney, Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assi stant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant seeks to withdraw his Alford pleas, arguing that they lack strong factual
bases. Alternatively, appellant argues that the district court erred by imposing multiple
sentences for a single behavioral incident. We affirm.
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FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Stacy Lee Sanders with soliciting
a child to engage in sexual conduct, interfering with the privacy of a minor with sexual
intent, and six counts of using a minor in a pornographic work. Sanders agreed to enter
Alford pleas of guilty1 to solicitation under Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2 (2020), and two
counts of using a minor in a pornographic work under Minn. Stat. § 617.246, subd. 2(a)
(2020). The state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. For the solicitation offense,
Sanders would receive a 15-month sentence stayed for four years. He would receive
concurrent 36- and 48 -month sentences for the two other offenses, both stayed for ten
years.
At the plea hearing, the state described the evidence that it would present at trial.
“Victim one” would testify that when she was 15 years old, she lived with her mother and
her mother’s boyfriend, Sanders. On September 4, 2021, Sanders told victim one that she
“should prepare her body for her . . . boyfriend’s later visit.” She understood Sanders as
“telling her to masturbate” before her boyfriend come over that evening.
The next evening, Sanders and victim one were at the residence while victim one’s
mother was away. Sanders asked victim one “to come to his bedroom.” Sanders told
victim one that on September 2, 2021, he had placed a camera in her bedroom that recorded

1 “A plea constitutes an Alford/Goulette plea if the defendant maintains innocence but
pleads guilty because the record establishes, and the defendant reasonably believes, that
the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8,
12 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009); see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970); State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977).
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her and her boyfriend (victim two) getting “hot and heavy” on September 4. Victim one’s
boyfriend was under 16 years old at the time. Sanders threatened to send the recording to
victim one’s family members if she did not “give [Sanders] some of that p-ssy.” Sanders
also told victim one that he “edited” the recording into “video files” on his phone, claiming
that “security on [his] phone” would erase the phone’s contents “if law enforcement
attempted to get into his phone and entered incorrect passcodes.”
Other prosecution evidence discussed at the plea hearing was expected testimony
from law enforcement about finding a camera “in a garbage bag” at Sanders’s residence.
Law enforcement also found “video clips” saved on Sanders’s phone. Each clip was “cut
to include only” victim one “masturbating or . . . engaged in sexual contact . . . with” victim
two—victim one’s boyfriend. The state indicated that it would offer two of these video
clips as exhibits.
Based on th is evidence, Sanders agreed that “a jury applying the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would likely find [him]
guilty of the[] offenses.” The district court accepted Sanders’s guilty plea and imposed
sentences according to the plea agreement. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Factual bases for Alford pleas
Sanders seeks to withdraw his Alford pleas, claiming that they are inaccurate. “[A]
court must allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if . . . necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). “A manifest
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injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Id. at 94. The validity of a guilty plea is a
question of law reviewed de novo. Id.
To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646
(Minn. 2007). An accurate Alford plea requires “a strong factual basis” supporting the
elements of the offense, and the defendant’s agreement “that evidence the [s]tate is likely
to offer at trial is sufficient to convict. ” Id. at 647, 649; see State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d
712, 717 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that factual basis established intent element “based on
[defendant’s] probable guilt and the likelihood a jury would convict him”). A strong
factual basis may be established by discussing the evidence that the state would likely offer
at trial “with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649.
Because Sanders agreed that a jury would likely find him guilty of the offenses based on
the evidence that the state would likely present at trial, we consider only whether that
prospective evidence provides strong factual bases for Sanders’s Alford pleas.
Use of minor in pornographic work
Sanders argues that his Alford pleas to using a minor in a pornographic work under
section 617.246, subdivision 2(a), lack strong factual bases because the statute “is designed
largely to ensure that employers are careful to hire only adults when hiring sexual
performers.” His argument requires us to interpret the statute, which we do de novo. See
State v. Defatte, 928 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn. 2019). “The first step in statutory
interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”
Id. (quotations omitted). “A statute is ambiguous only when [its] language is subject to
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more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted). Absent ambiguity, we
“apply the statute’s plain meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Under Minn. Stat. § 617.246, subd. 2(a), “[i]t is unlawful for a person to . . . use or
permit a minor to engage in . . . modeling alone or with others in any . . . pornographic
work if the person knows or has reason to know that the conduct intended is . . . a
pornographic work.” “‘Minor’ means any person under the age of 18.” Minn. Stat.
§ 617.246, subd. 1(b) (2020). A “[p]ornographic work” includes any “video” that “uses a
minor to depict . . . sexual conduct.” Id., subd. 1(f)(2)(i) (2020). “Sexual conduct” includes
“masturbation” and “physical contact with the clothed or unclothed pubic areas . . . of a
human . . . female . . . whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex” for
“apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.” Id., subd. 1(e)(3), (5) (2020). This language
unambiguously applies to using a minor in non-commercial pornography. We therefore
reject Sanders’s apparently contrary argument. Moreover, caselaw on possessing child
pornography suggests, and Sanders does not dispute, that the state may charge a defendant
with a separate count of using a minor in a pornographic work for “each individual
pornographic work” given the statutory reference to a singular “work.” State v. Bakken,
883 N.W.2d 264, 267-69 (Minn. 2016). We proceed on this understanding.
Here, the state would have offered evidence that Sanders placed a camera in victim
one’s bedroom that recorded victim one “rubbing her vaginal area over her clothing” in
one video clip and victim two “rubbing [victim one’s] vaginal area” in the other. The state
also would have offered evidence that both victims were under 18 years old. This evidence
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provides a strong factual basis that Sanders used or permitted one or both victims to depict
sexual conduct constituting a pornographic work as to both child-pornography counts.
Regarding mens rea, victim one would have testified that Sanders told her to
“prepare her body for her boyfriend’s later visit.” Victim one understood this as an
invitation “to masturbate.” Victim one would have recounted how Sanders told her the
next day that he had recorded her and victim two getting “hot and heavy.” Based on
Sanders’s statements to victim one and the evidence discovered through law enforcement’s
search of Sanders’s residence and phone, a strong factual basis supports that Sanders edited
the video clips manually to show only the sexual conduct depicted thereon. Thus, a strong
factual basis supports that Sanders knew or had reason to know that the conduct intended
constituted a pornographic work as to both child-pornography counts.
Sanders suggests that under section 617.246, subdivision 2(a), the victim must know
or have reason to know that they are “modeling” in a pornographic work. We disagree.
The statute’s knowledge requirement unambiguously applies only to “the person”—that is,
the defendant—who uses a minor in a pornographic work. See Minn. Stat. § 617.246, subd.
2(a). And we need not determine whether the intent requirement applies to the defendant,
the victim, or both . Here, a strong factual basis supports that Sanders intended for both
victims to engage in sexual conduct, that victim one and victim two intended to engage in
sexual conduct, and that Sanders knew or had reason to know that the conduct intended in
the video clips constituted pornographic works. Neither victim one nor victim two needed
to know or have reason to know that they were modeling in a pornographic work. We
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therefore conclude that a strong factual basis supports Sanders’s Alford pleas to using a
minor in a pornographic work, and we reject Sanders’s request to withdraw those pleas.
Solicitation of child to engage in sexual conduct
We next address Sanders’s request to withdraw his Alford plea to soliciting a child
to engage in sexual conduct. “A person 18 years of age or older who solicits a child . . . to
engage in sexual conduct with intent to engage in sexual conduct” violates Minn. Stat.
§ 609.352, subd. 2. “‘[C]hild’ means a person 15 years of age or younger.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.352, subd. 1(a) (2020). “[S]exual conduct” includes “sexual contact of the
individual’s primary genital area.” Id., subd. 1(b) (2020). To “solicit” includes
“attempting to persuade a specific person in person.” Id., subd. 1(c) (2020).
Here, a strong factual basis supports that victim one was 15 years old during the
relevant events. She would have testified that Sanders told her “to come to his bedroom”
while her mother was away from the residence. Victim one would have explained how
Sanders attempted to “blackmail” her into giving him “some of that p-ssy.” Victim one
also would have described Sanders claiming to her that security on his phone would delete
the video clips if law enforcement tried accessing his phone and entered incorrect
passcodes. This evidence provides a strong factual basis that Sanders attempted to
persuade victim one to engage in sexual conduct. And given the evidence that Sanders
tried coercing victim one into engaging in sexual conduct with him specifically in his
bedroom, a strong factual basis supports that he did so with intent to actually engage in
sexual conduct with victim one. As such, we conclude that a strong factual basis supports
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Sanders’s Alford plea to soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct. We reject Sanders’s
request to withdraw that plea.
Multiple sentences
Alternatively, Sanders contends that the district court violated Minn. Stat.
§ 609.035, subd. 1 (2020), by imposing multiple sentences. Under that statute, “if a
person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense . . . the person may be punished for
only one of the offenses.” Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1. “‘[C]onduct’ refers to a ‘single
behavioral incident’”—that is, “ acts committed at substantially the same time and place”
with “a single criminal objective.” Munt v. State, 920 N.W.2d 410, 416-17 (Minn. 2018)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 517, 524 (Minn. 1966)).
Whether offenses arose from a single behavioral incident is a mixed question of fact
and law. State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Minn. 2020). Appellate courts review
factual findings for clear error and application of law to the facts de novo. Id. The state
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses did not
arise from a single behavioral incident. Id. at 266.
The district court here made no express findings or conclusion regarding section
609.035, but the district court imposed a sentence for each offense according to the terms
of the plea agreement. We therefore review whether the record supports the implicit
conclusion that the offenses arose from separate behavioral incidents. See State v. Bertsch,
707 N.W.2d 660, 664, 666 (Minn. 2006) (reviewing “district court’s implicit determination
that . . . offenses were not a single behavioral incident” as required for exception from
Minn. Stat. § 609.04, which is “analogous” to the single-behavioral-incident determination
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under section 609.035). We review this conclusion under both the plea transcript and “the
facts alleged in the amended complaint” because “the entry of a guilty plea has the legal
effect of establishing” such facts “by judicial admission.” See Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d
236, 243 n.3 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that “a defect in” the “factual basis” for the guilty
plea “might [have] affect[ed] the [plea’s] validity” but “d[id] not raise” issue of whether
more fact-finding to support sentence was necessary).
Regarding whether the offenses occurred at substantially the same time, we focus
our inquiry on when Sanders “complete[d]” the offenses. See Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 270.
According to the amended complaint, Sanders completed the solicitation offense when he
attempted to blackmail victim one “[a]t approximately 10:30 p.m.” on September 5, 2021.
As to the child-pornography offenses, the record supports a finding that Sanders
committed the offense elements between September 2, 2021—when he placed the camera
in victim one’s bedroom—and the night of September 4, 2021. The amended complaint
establishes that during the “afternoon” of September 4, 2021, Sanders removed a “cup from
the vent” in victim one’s bedroom containing the camera that recorded the sexual conduct.
The record therefore supports that Sanders used or permitted one or both victims to model
in the pornographic works sometime between September 2, 2021, and when Sanders
retrieved the camera during the afternoon of September 4, 2021.
The amended complaint also establishes that the camera in victim one’s bedroom
had been recording “a direct view of her bed.” Further, the plea transcript supports that
during the “night” of September 4, 2021, Sanders told victim one to “prepare her body for
her boyfriend’s later visit,” which victim one understood as an invitation “to masturbate.”
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The record therefore supports that Sanders knew or had reason to know that the conduct
intended in the video constituted pornographic works no later than the night of
September 4, 2021, and that he completed the child-pornography offenses no later than that
time. This is not substantially close in time to when Sanders solicited victim one the
following night. State v. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d 354, 366 (Minn. 2020) (concluding that
offenses occurred at substantially different times when one occurred in the morning and
the other occurred in the afternoon the same day).
The record also supports that the child-pornography offenses occurred at
substantially different times from each other. Supporting this conclusion is that victim one
was apparently alone in one video clip but with victim two in the second clip. Sanders’s
comment to victim one about preparing for her boyfriend’s visit by masturbating —
suggesting that Sanders had previously seen this occur on video—further supports that the
video clips depicted “separate incidents.” See Barthman, 938 N.W.2d at 266- 67
(concluding that victim’s descriptions of separate instances sufficiently proved that
offenses occurred at substantially different times even though victim could not identify
exact dates and times).
“[A]cts that lack a unity of time . . . do not constitute a single behavioral incident. ”
Munt, 920 N.W.2d at 416-17. Because the record supports that the offenses here occurred
at substantially different times, we conclude that the state proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that the offenses did not arise from a single behavioral incident. The district
court did not err by imposing a sentence for each offense.
Affirmed.