Anita M. Froderman, n/k/a Sydorowicz, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0862

Anita M. Froderman, n/k/a Sydorowicz, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey T. Lais,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-FA-13-838

Sara J. Runchey, Runchey, Louwagie & Wellman, P.L.L.P., Marshall, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant-father challenges an order of the district court that established a
parenting-time schedule for the summer of 2022 and that addressed enrollment of the
parties’ minor child in 4-H. Appellant seeks reversal and remand, arguing that the district
court’s decision regarding the parenting-time schedule is not supported by sufficient factual
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findings and that the district court exhibited bias in its decision regarding the child’s 4-H
enrollment. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-father Jeffrey T. Lais and respondent-mother Anita M. Froderman, now
known as Anita M. Sydorowicz, are the parents of a child born in 2013. In January 2014,
father and mother stipulated to an agreement to resolve custody, parenting time, and child
support. The agreement granted father and mother joint legal custody and granted mother
physical custody of the child, subject to father’s parenting time. The agreement included
an annual parenting-time schedule. The district court incorporated the terms of the
agreement in an order filed in January 2014. Since then, the parties have had ongoing legal
disputes regarding parenting time, custody, and other matters. A summary of the relevant
proceedings follows.
In May 2014, the parties stipulated to amend the January 2014 order. The stipulation
vacated the prior parenting-time schedule and set a new schedule. The new schedule
increased father’s parenting time. The district court again incorporated the terms of the
agreement in a written order.
In August 2018, just before the child started kindergarten, both parties filed motions
regarding parenting time and school choice. The district court denied both motions,
maintained the existing parenting-time schedule, and ordered the parties to attend
mediation. At that time, father had 43% of parenting time and mother had 57% of parenting
time.
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After mediation, the parties stipulated to the appointment of a parenting-time
consultant. The stipulation provided:
The Parenting Time Consultant shall work with the
parties to establish an acceptable parenting time schedule and
if the parties are unable to reach [an ] agreement, establish a
schedule of parenting time for Father, and . . . Father shall
receive three (3) weekends a month during the school calendar
year, including any adjacent days off from school and greater
than one-half of the summer non-school months.

The parties worked with the parenting-time consultant but were unable to agree
upon a schedule for the upcoming school year. As a result, the parenting-time consultant
developed a schedule in which father received three weekends a month during the
2019-2020 school year and alternating weeks in the summer of 2020, along with “expanded
periods of time each [summer] month to ensure more than six (6) weeks of summer
parenting time [for father].” The district court issued an order in January 2020 affirming
the parenting-time consultant’s schedule. The district court also ordered the parties to meet
with the parenting-time consultant prior to mid-August 2020 to establish a parenting-time
schedule for the 2020-2021 school year and the summer of 2021. The parties failed to do
so.
Instead, in September 2020, father filed a motion to modify custody, modify the
parenting-time schedule, and appoint a parenting-time consultant.
1 Shortly thereafter, the
district court issued a temporary order that required the parties to continue following the

1 Father’s motion does not specify why he was requesting the appointment of a new
parenting-time consultant. As discussed below, the parties later agreed to retain the same
parenting-time consultant that was appointed after mediation.
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parenting-time schedule adopted in the prior order while the district court considered
father’s pending motion.
In December 2020, father filed another motion seeking to modify custody, appoint
a parenting-time consultant, and modify the parenting-time schedule. Following a hearing
on the outstanding motions, the parties agreed to have the parenting-time consultant already
in place address the parenting-time issues. The parties met with the parenting-time
consultant in May 2021 and agreed to a summer 2021 parenting-time schedule that was
similar to the prior summer schedule. In August, the parenting-time consultant set a
proposed schedule for the 2021- 2022 school year. The new schedule did not address the
summer of 2022 or any time thereafter.
In November 2021, the district court issued an order approving the parenting-time
consultant’s 2021-2022 school-year schedule and denying father’s motion to modify
custody. And to help the parties address their ongoing conflicts, the district court ordered
both parents to participate in a parenting class focused on conflict. Finally, the district
court set a review hearing for March 14, 2022. Prior to the review hearing, the
parenting-time consultant resigned.
At the review hearing, the district court noted that the parenting-time schedule for
the summer of 2022 remained an outstanding issue. The district court asked the parties
whether they wished to have a new parenting-time consultant appointed or have the district
court set the schedule. The parties agreed to have the district court set the summer
parenting-time schedule and to submit proposed calendars for the court’s consideration.
Counsel for father noted that father’s proposed schedule would not be a set “5-2-2-5”
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schedule because he would be proposing a few extra days to “re balance” the overall
calendar. Counsel then stated that father would file his proposed calendar and that the
district court could “do as [it] wish[ed].”
At the review hearing, the parties also discussed the child’s 4-H2 enrollment. Father,
who is a farmer, had signed the child up for 4-H in Nobles County. He did so without
consulting mother. Father wanted the child to participate in the Nobles County 4-H
program so that the child could show cattle at the Nobles County Fair. Mother told the
district court that the child wanted to show horses in addition to cattle and stated that Nobles
County did not have any opportunities for the child to show both cattle and horses at the
county fair. For that reason, she requested that the child be enrolled in a 4-H program in a
different county. After learning that the child wanted to show both animals, the district
court inquired of mother: “From your position, where would it make most sense,
considering where Dad lives and having equal participation, for [the child] to participate
[in 4-H]?” Mother responded, “Cottonwood County.” The district court concluded the
hearing by taking the outstanding issues—4 -H enrollment and summer parenting-time—
under advisement.
Following the hearing, the parties both filed proposed summer parenting-time
schedules and information regarding 4-H enrollment options. Father proposed a variation
of a “5-2-2-5” schedule with one extra weekend per month of parenting time allocated to
father. Father also detailed information about the child’s options for showing cattle

2 4-H is a national youth-development program that provides opportunities for children to
learn various hands-on skills.
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through the Nobles County 4-H program. Mother proposed her variation of a “ 5-2-2-5”
schedule that mostly mirrored father’s schedule but without the extra weekend per month
for father. Mother also asserted in her filing that the child’s 4-H enrollment should not be
in Nobles County because enrolment in a different county would best maximize the child’s
ability to show both cattle and horses.
On April 8, 2022, the district court issued an order adopting mother’s proposed
summer parenting-time schedule. T he district court also ordered that the child’s 4-H
enrollment be changed to Cottonwood County. Father requested reconsideration. In an
order on reconsideration, the district court updated the parenting-time schedule to allow
additional parenting time with father for a scheduled trip but did not otherwise modify the
April 8 order. Father appeals.
DECISION
Father challenges both the summer 2022 parenting-time schedule established by the
district court and the district court’s decision to change the child’s 4-H enrollment to
Cottonwood County. We address father’s arguments regarding each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the 2022 summer
parenting-time schedule.

District courts have broad discretion in deciding parenting-time issues.
Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). We will not reverse a
parenting-time decision unless the district court “abuses its discretion by making findings
of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision
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that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506
(Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
As an initial matter, father challenges the district court’s authority to create the 2022
summer schedule, arguing that the district court acted sua sponte in changing the parties’
parenting time. We disagree. Father filed a motion to modify parenting time in
December 2020. The district court order that followed adopted the 2021-2022 school-year
schedule proposed by the parenting-time consultant and set a March 2022 review hearing.
At the review hearing, both parties expressly agreed to have the district court set the
summer 2022 parenting-time schedule. Thus, the district court did not act sua sponte when
it set the summer 2022 schedule.
Father next argues that the district court abused its discretion by reducing his
parenting time for summer 2022 compared to prior summers without making factual
findings to support the reduction in father’s parenting time.3 He further contends that, in
setting the summer parenting-time schedule for 2022, the district court effectively
restricted rather than modified his parenting time. He maintains that the district court
should have set the 2022 summer schedule according to the terms of the 2019 district court
order adopting the parties’ stipulation governing the parenting-time consultant, which

3 During oral arguments before this court, we asked the parties to address whether this issue
is moot because summer 2022 has passed. See In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 327
(Minn. 1999) (“The doctrine of mootness requires that we decide only actual controversies
and avoid advisory opinions.”). The parties assert, and we agree, that this issue is not moot
because judgment in this case can yield collateral consequences. See id. (stating that
collateral consequences form an exception to the mootness doctrine).
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provided that father would receive “greater than one-half of the summer non-school
months.”
To address father’s argument, we must first determine whether the district court’s
order “modified or restricted” father’s parenting time. A district court may modify an order
granting parenting time “[i]f modification would serve the best interests of the child.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2022). With an exception not relevant here, a district
court may not “restrict” parenting time unless it finds either that “parenting time is likely
to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional
development” or that “the parent has chronically and unreasonably failed to comply with
court-ordered parenting time.” Id., subd. 5(c)(1), (2) (2022). “To determine whether a
reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the court should
consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction.” Dahl v. Dahl,
765 N.W.2d 118, 124 (Minn. App. 2009).
We begin our analysis here by “identify[ing] the order that establishes the baseline
parenting-time schedule and then determine[ing] whether the district court’s
parenting-time change from the baseline parenting-time schedule is significant enough to
constitute a restriction. ” Id. at 123. The baseline parenting-time schedule is generally
found in “the last permanent and final order setting parenting time.” Id. (emphasis added).
A parenting-time schedule includes “a specific schedule for parenting time, including the
frequency and duration of visitation and visitation during holidays and vacations.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(e) (2022).
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Father suggests that the district court order adopting the parties’ 2019 stipulation
should be considered the baseline parenting-time schedule. We disagree. The 2019 order
provided general parameters for the parenting-time consultant to follow in establishing a
schedule, but it did not set a parenting-time schedule. Therefore, the 2019 district court
order adopting the parties’ stipulation with regard to the parenting-time consultant does not
constitute the baseline parenting-time schedule. And, since 2019, the district court has not
issued a permanent and final order governing parenting time. It has only issued temporary
orders. To find the last permanent and final parenting-time schedule, one has to go back
to the district court’s May 2014 order. And, while the May 2014 order sets an annual
parenting-time schedule, the order was established before the child entered school and thus
did not set a specific school-year or summer schedule. Consequently, it is unclear which
district court order establishes the parties’ baseline parenting-time schedule for the issue
before us.
Even assuming without deciding that the 2019 district court order was a permanent
and final order setting the baseline from which the parenting-time change should be
measured, the district court’s 2022 summer parenting-time schedule did not amount to a
restriction of father’s parenting time. See Dahl, 765 N.W.2d at 123. As noted above, the
2019 district court order adopted the parties’ stipulation. That stipulation provided that the
parenting-time consultant would work with the parties to set a schedule “consistent with
the agreement that Father shall receive three (3) weekends a month during the school
calendar year . . . and greater than one-half of the summer non -school months.” For the
summer of 2020, the parenting-time consultant developed (and the district court
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subsequently adopted) a schedule that gave father a total of approximately 56 overnights
for June, July, August, and a portion of September. The next year, the parties again agreed
to work with the parenting-time consultant to set the summer 2021 schedule. The summer
2021 schedule gave father approximately the same number of overnights as the summer
prior. Then, in 2022, the district court set the summer schedule giving father approximately
48 overnights for June, July, August, and a portion of September.
While the district court’s order setting the summer 2022 parenting time schedule
resulted in father receiving fewer days in the summer of 2022 compared to the summers of
2020 and 2021, this change in father’s summer parenting time wa s not substantial given
that the reduction was only approximately eight overnights and the district court properly
laid out its reasons for the change in schedule for summer 2022. The district court adopted
a variation of the rotating “5-2-2-5” schedule for the 2022 summer to promote the child’s
best interests by providing an “opportunity for the child to bond and spend time with both
parents as well as no longer have long periods of time away from either parent.” Based on
the reasons for the change and the amount of the reduction, we cannot conclude that the
decrease constitutes a restriction in father’s parenting time.
Father also seems to argue that, even if the change in summer parenting time
amounts to a modification rather than a restriction, the district court failed to make adequate
findings to support the modification. We are not persuaded. A district court shall grant a
motion to modify parenting time “[ i]f modification would serve the best interests of the
child” and “would not change the child ’s primary residence.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 5(b). Here, as noted above, the district court determined that the summer
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parenting-time schedule served “the best interests of this child” because it “provide[d]
opportunity for the child to bond and spend time with both parents.” The district court
reasoned that the child had a strong bond with his mother and half -siblings and that the
variation of the “5 -2-2-5” schedule allowed the child to build tha t bond without long
periods of time away from either parent or family. The district court also reasoned that the
schedule would allow for the child to maintain a daily routine with each parent. And the
district court considered “the child’s age and his overall general happy and adjusted
personality” when determining the schedule. Therefore, keeping in mind the district
court’s broad discretion in parenting-time decisions, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by setting a parenting-time schedule for summer 2022 that slightly
reduced father’s parenting time from the prior summers.
II. The district court did not improperly rely on extra judicial knowledge or
exhibit bias in its order.

Father also argues that this court should reverse the district court’s decision to
change the child’s 4- H enrollment because the district court improperly relied on
extrajudicial knowledge when it made its decision regarding the child’s 4-H participation.
He further argues that the district court’s decision exhibited bias against him. We are not
persuaded.
The supreme court has cautioned district court judges that “the extraordinary
prestige” of a district court judge creates “an extraordinary obligation to refrain from any
act” that suggests “a predisposition on the part of the court toward one side or the other in
connection with the legal controversy.” Hansen v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 43 N.W.2d 260,
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265 (Minn. 1950). An impartial judge has no actual bias against a party “or interest in the
outcome of his particular case.” McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 19 98)
(quotation omitted). “In order for bias or prejudice to be disqualifying[,] it must stem from
an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what
the judge learned from [their] participation in the case.” Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798,
804 (Minn. App. 1992) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
While the district court in this matter noted that it is familiar with 4-H programs ,
nothing in the order suggests that the district court was biased toward either party or toward
a particular county’s program. Instead, the record reflects that the district court based its
decision on the child’s best interests. In explaining its decision, the district court reasoned
that enrollment in a 4-H program in a county other than Nobles County is more appropriate
because other counties offer more opportunities for the child. The district court based its
decision on mother’s testimony that the child is interested in showing both cattle and horses
but would not be able to do so in Nobles County. The district court ultimately ordered the
child to be enrolled in 4-H in Cottonwood County, based on information from mother that
Cottonwood County would allow the child to show both horses and cattle but still allow
father to have “equal participation.” In reaching this decision, the district court explained
that “[a]rranging for the child, in the first year of his participation in 4-H, to be able to
long-term participate in a singular county program will give him the opportunity to develop
long-term connections and support for full participation in all ways if he chooses to
continue his participation.” The district court’s reasoning shows that it considered the
child’s preferences and best interests based on the record when it ordered the child’s 4-H
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enrollment to be moved to a different county. We discern no bias or prejudice by the
district court in its decision regarding the child’s 4-H participation.
Affirmed.