Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Goodman v. MINN. DEPT. OF EMP. SERV. 255 N.W.2d 222
- McNeilly v. DEPT. OF EMPLOY. & ECON. DEV. 778 N.W.2d 707
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0875
In the Matter of: Chee Vue.
Filed April 24, 2023
Affirmed
Ross, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 48560898-5
Chee Vue, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Anne B. Froelich, Keri Phillips, Lossom Allen, Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Chee Vue quit her job and applied to the department of employment and economic
development for unemployment benefits. The department determined that she was
ineligible for benefits beginning in February 2022. An unemployment-law judge found that
Vue had been neither available for nor actively seeking suitable employment. Because
substantial evidence supports the decision, we affirm.
FACTS
Relator Chee Vue quit her employment as a court operations associate in August
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2021, asserting in part medical and mental-health concerns. Vue applied to respondent
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development for unemployment
benefits. The department established her account in October 2021, but it decided in March
2022 that Vue had not sought suitable employment beginning in February 2022. Vue
appealed that determination, and an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) conducted an
evidentiary hearing.
Vue testified at the April 2022 hearing, describing her medical conditions and the
restrictions they imposed on her job search. She said that her medical providers
recommended that she should not work full- time or in-person. Vue disclosed spending
about six hours weekly seeking employment, using mainly online resources. She testified
that, since February 2022, she had contacted only three potential employers about job
opportunities, attended one job fair, and spoken with one recruiter. She acknowledged that
she had not interviewed for any job, opining that the employers she contacted were not
hiring. She asserted that she was being “very selective” in her employment search because
of her mental-health concerns.
The ULJ determined that Vue was not available for suitable employment or actively
seeking suitable employment beginning in February 2022. The ULJ denied Vue’s later
request for reconsideration, which Vue based on her medical conditions and additional job-
search efforts. The ULJ explained that the medical conditions had already been taken into
account and that Vue did not show that her new job-search efforts occurred before the
evidentiary hearing. Vue appeals by certiorari.
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DECISION
We construe Vue’s challenge on appeal as contesting the ULJ’s factual findings
about the effect of her medical conditions on her ability to work and the quality of her
prehearing job search. Vue’s assertions that she acted in good faith and did not commit
misconduct are not relevant to this argument. We may reverse a ULJ’s decision if, among
other reasons, the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision rests on insubstantial
evidentiary support. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5) (2022). Whether an applicant is
available for and actively seeking suitable employment are questions of fact. Goodman v.
Minn. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 255 N.W.2d 222, 223 (Minn. 1977) (availability); McNeilly v.
Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev., 778 N.W.2d 707, 711–12 (Minn. App. 2010) (actively
seeking). We rely on the ULJ’s evidentially supported factual findings and credibility
decisions, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the decision. McNeilly, 778
N.W.2d at 710. Under this deferential review standard, Vue’s challenge fails.
Substantial evidence supports t he ULJ’s conclusion that Vue was unavailable for
and not actively seeking suitable employment. An applicant is eligible to receive
unemployment benefits only if she is available for and actively seeking suitable
employment. Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 1(4), (5) (2022). An applicant is “[a]vailable for
suitable employment” if she is ready, willing, and able to accept suitable employment, and
any restrictions affecting her availability must not prevent her from accepting employment.
Id., subd. 15(a) (2022). An applicant is “[a]ctively seeking suitable employment” if she
makes “reasonable, diligent efforts an individual in similar circumstances would make if
genuinely interested in obtaining suitable employment under the existing conditions in the
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labor market area.” Id., subd. 16(a) (2022). If reasonable employment prospects in an
applicant’s usual or customary occupation do not exist, she must actively seek other
suitable employment to remain eligible for unemployment benefits. Id., subd. 16(c) (2022).
The ULJ applied these standards when deciding that Vue’s extremely limited efforts do not
establish that she was available for or actively seeking suitable employment. Spending only
six hours a week casually exploring potential employment online and sending inquiries to
only three potential employers in over a month’s period (while submitting job applications
to none) is not actively seeking suitable employment, nor is it a basis on which the ULJ
could find that Vue was available for suitable employment.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Vue’s contention that the ULJ failed to consider
the effect her medical conditions had on her failure to obtain employment. It is true that a
potential job’s risk to an applicant’s health and safety is a relevant consideration when
assessing employment suitability. Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 23a(a) (2022). But the ULJ
acknowledged that “[s]uitable employment for Vue includes part-time work with limited
face-to-face interactions.” And the record provides ample support for the ULJ’s implicit
recognition that Vue did not actively seek any position within the scope of her asserted
restrictions. We therefore cannot say that the ULJ’s decision rests on insubstantial
evidence.
Affirmed.