State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0881

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Maria Louise La Rose,
Appellant.

Filed May 22, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Wheelock, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-20-7368

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this direct appeal from judgments of conviction for felony simple robbery, aiding
and abetting simple robbery, and obstruction of legal process, appellant argues that (1) the
evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant or her
codefendant inflicted bodily harm or intended to cause fear of imminent bodily harm
relating to the simple-r obbery convictions, and (2) the district court abused its discretion
in imposing a three-year probation term for the obstructing-legal-process conviction. We
affirm the sufficiency of the evidence for the simple-robbery conviction, reverse the
conviction for the included offense of aiding and abetting simple robbery, and reverse and
remand the sentence for obstructing legal process.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Maria Louise La Rose with felony
simple robbery (count one), gross-misdemeanor obstruction of legal process (count two),
and aiding and abetting simple robbery (count three). La Rose waived a jury trial, and the
case proceeded to a bench trial in October 2021. The state presented the following evidence
at trial.
L.S. was working as a cashier at a gas station in Shakopee on the evening of May 30,
2020. At approximately 9:50 p.m., a woman—later identified as La Rose—entered the gas
station and walked into the employee space behind the counter to where L.S. was standing
next to a register.
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L.S. testified that La Rose “right away just came in [L.S.’s] face,” appearing angry
and yelling about the police harassing her son. L.S. testified that she was fearful La Rose
would “beat [her] up” due to La Rose’s physical proximity, anger, and continued yelling.
L.S. testified that a man—later identified as La Rose’s codefendant, Cruze White—also
came behind the counter while La Rose was yelling at her and asked L.S. to “get into the
safe” and “pull the tape for the surveillance.” L.S. told the man she could not get into the
safe and did not know where the surveillance tape was. L.S. testified that she saw the man
take cigarettes from behind the counter. The man took the cigarettes and left the store. The
district court admitted into evidence the gas- station surveillance video that captured the
robbery; the surveillance video showed La Rose taking cigarettes as well.
A customer called 911 while these events transpired. The customer reported that
three people were robbing the gas station and taking cigarettes, and he gave a description
of the three suspects.1 The customer saw the suspects leave the store and stand in front of
their vehicle.
A police officer who responded to the 911 call also testified at trial. He testified
that when police officers arrived at the scene, they observed two people who matched the
911 caller’s description of the suspects standing near a vehicle that matched the description
of the suspects’ vehicle. When police approached the suspects, one of them fled the scene
on foot.

1 The third suspect was later identified as La Rose’s daughter, M.L.M.
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The officer testified that he directed the other suspect, La Rose, towards the vehicle.
La Rose refused to comply. The officer gave several other commands to La Rose and
informed her that she was going to be detained. La Rose began to yell at the officer and
again refused to comply. The officer attempted to handcuff La Rose, but she physically
resisted arrest.
Although the officer was eventually able to handcuff La Rose, she continued to
resist as two officers attempted to put her in the back of their squad car. She “was verbally
non-compliant” and yelled at the officers. One of the officers testified that La Rose pushed
her foot against the frame of the squad car and used “every ounce of her strength” to avoid
getting into the back seat. The district court admitted into evidence the officer’s
body-camera footage that captured the arrest of La Rose. The officer also testified that
cigarettes, a cigarette display case, and a white hat matching the description of the hat one
of the suspects wore were recovered from the suspects’ vehicle.
Both White and La Rose testified for the defense. White testified that he stole
cigarettes from the gas station but that La Rose had not told him to do so, and she was not
involved in the robbery. La Rose testified that she intended to purchase groceries and gas
at the gas station. She testified that L.S. immediately threatened to call the police when
La Rose entered the store, which angered La Rose and caused her to “confront” L.S.
La Rose testified that she was not aware that White was going to take any cigarettes and
that she told him to put them back when she saw him take them.
In a January 20, 2022 order, the district court entered its findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and order finding La Rose guilty of all three counts—felony simple robbery (count
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one), gross-misdemeanor obstruction of legal process (count two), and aiding and abetting
simple robbery (count three). The district court stayed imposition of La Rose’s sentences
for counts one and two and ordered three years’ supervised probation for both counts to be
served concurrently.
La Rose appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficient evidence supports La Rose’s conviction for felony simple robbery.

La Rose argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of simple robbery
or aiding or abetting simple robbery because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that that either she or her codefendant caused L.S. actual harm or intended to cause
L.S. to fear immediate bodily harm or death. We are not persuaded.
When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we “carefully examine the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the [fact -finder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted). We apply the same standard of review to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction in a bench trial as in a jury trial. State v. Palmer ,
803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
We first identify the elements of simple robbery. Simple robbery is defined in Minn.
Stat. § 609.24 (2018):
Whoever, having knowledge of not being entitled thereto,
takes personal property from the person or in the presence of
another and uses or threatens the imminent use of force against
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any person to overcome the person’s resistance or powers of
resistance to, or to compel acquiescence in, the taking or
carrying away of the property is guilty of robbery . . . .

In State v. Stanifer, we concluded that the statutory phrase “uses or threatens the imminent
use of force” incorporates the elements of fifth-degree assault because fifth-degree assault
is a lesser-included offense of simple robbery. 382 N.W.2d 213, 220 (Minn. App. 1986).
Fifth-degree assault occurs when an actor “commits an act with intent to cause fear
in another of immediate bodily harm or death.”2 Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(1) (2018).
The offense of assault with intent to cause fear is a specific-intent crime that “requires the
State to prove the defendant committed an act with an additional special mental element.”
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012).
Having identified the elements of the simple-robbery offense, we turn to La Rose’s
argument that the state did not prove specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt here.
“Intent is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’s words or actions in light
of all the surrounding circumstances.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted); see also State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 321 (Minn. 2009) (noting
that the jury draws an inference of intent “from the totality of circumstances” (quotations
omitted)). And a fact-finder may infer that a defendant intended the natural and probable
consequences of their actions. See, e.g., State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396- 97 (Minn.

2 Fifth-degree assault also occurs if an actor “intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict
bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2018). However, this
subdivision is inapplicable here. See Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2018) (a robbery that
involves bodily harm is a first-degree aggravated robber y). The record reflects that
La Rose did not inflict or attempt to inflict bodily harm on L.S., and the parties agree on
this point as well.
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1998) (affirming conviction based upon the conclusion that the defendant intended the
natural and probable consequences of his actions).
Evidence of intent is thus typically circumstantial because intent is a state of mind.
State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). Circumstantial evidence is evidence
that requires a fact-finder to “infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.”
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial
evidence differs from direct evidence in that it “always requires an inferential step to prove
a fact.” Id.
We review a conviction with “heightened scrutiny” when the conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence. 3 State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). To
evaluate the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-step standard of
review. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify the
circumstances proved at trial. Id. In doing so, we defer to the fact-finder’s “acceptance of
the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with
the circumstances proved by the State.” State v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted). In other words, we review conflicting evidence in the light most
favorable to the state. See id. at 330; State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008).

3 La Rose argues that the district court did not apply the heightened level of scrutiny that
the circumstantial-evidence standard requires when it determined that La Rose intended to
cause L.S. fear of immediate bodily harm. However, the district court is not required to
apply this standard when determining whether the state has proved a defendant’s guilt at
trial. State v. Olson, 982 N.W.2d 491, 493, 496-97 (Minn. App. 2022).
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Second, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d
at 599 (quotations omitted). At this step of the analysis, we “give no deference to the fact
finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Id. (quotation omitted). We consider the
circumstantial evidence “as a whole” when completing this step of the analysis. Id. ;
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 332 (“[W]e do not review each circumstance proved in isolation.
Instead, we must consider whether the circumstances presented are consistent with guilt
and inconsistent, on the whole , with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” (quotation
omitted)).
Turning to the facts of this case, we first identify the circumstances proved. The
district court made several findings of fact that summarize the circumstances proved at
trial, and we defer to the district court’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances at
this stage of the analysis. See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329. The circumstances proved
here are:
• La Rose “stretched her arm out toward [L.S.], whose face
showed a look of shock and fright”;

• “[L.S.] testified that [La Rose] was angry and yelling at her”;

• “Within the next five seconds, [La Rose] approached [L.S.]
until they stood face-to -face—their torsos almost flush and
their faces just centimeters apart”;

• “[La Rose] moved even closer to [L.S.], leaning over her, and
gesturing threateningly; [L.S.] backed up until she hit the
counter located behind her, seeming to cower under
[La Rose’s] raised arm”;

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• After grabbing cigarettes from behind the counter, “[La Rose]
once again cornered [L.S.] and raised her fist in another
threatening gesture.”

We next determine whether the circumstances proved were consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La Rose concedes that the
circumstances proved were consistent with guilt, but then argues that the circumstances
proved were also consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence—that La Rose
“intended not to cause L.S. fear of bodily harm, but rather to create a non-assaultive
diversion to allow her, her daughter, and White to steal cigarettes.”
However, La Rose’s argument ignores the district court’s findings of fact that
La Rose cornered L.S. behind the counter, stood just centimeters away from L.S., and twice
raised her arm or fist above L.S.’s head. These actions contradict La Rose’s theory that
she intended only to distract L.S. and that she “did not do or say anything that demonstrated
she intended to hurt L.S.” After reviewing the circumstances proved, we conclude that the
only reasonable inference to be drawn from La Rose’s threatening gestures is that La Rose
intended to cause L.S. fear of immediate bodily harm.
In sum, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show that La Rose intended
to cause L.S. fear of immediate bodily harm, and therefore the district court was correct in
determining that La Rose “used or threatened the imminent use of force against” L.S.
during the commission of the robbery.4

4 The state makes an alternative argument that this court should overrule Stanifer and
conclude that simple robbery does not incorporate the elements of the fifth-degree-assault
statute. However, we are generally “extremely reluctant” to overrule our own precedent

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Our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict La Rose pertains
specifically to La Rose’s role as a principal actor in the commission of simple robbery.
La Rose also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for aiding
and abetting simple robbery. La Rose’s argument presents us with a separate, dispositive
issue: the district court impermissibly entered a judgment of conviction for both simple
robbery and aiding and abetting simple robbery. Although neither party raised this issue
on appeal, we may address it sua sponte. State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7
(Minn. 1990) (stating “it is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases according
to law” despite oversights of counsel).
We note that a district court may not adjudicate both an offense and a lesser-included
offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (20 18). Aiding and abetting is not a separate
substantive offense, State v. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Minn. 1999); rather, it is
akin to a lesser-included offense. Thus, the district court erred by entering a judgment of
conviction for both simple robbery and aiding and abetting simple robbery. We therefore
reverse and remand to the district court to vacate the conviction for the included offense of
aiding and abetting simple robbery. Based on our conclusion that the aiding-and-ab etting
conviction must be vacated, we need not address La Rose’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence
argument regarding that conviction. See State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn.
1979) (stating that appellate courts need not decide the sufficiency of the evidence to
support unadjudicated counts).

and will only do so for “a compelling reason.” State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn.
2009) (quotation omitted). We decline to overrule Stanifer in the instant case.
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II. The district court abused its discretion by sentencing La Rose to three years’
probation for the gross-misdemeanor obstructing-legal-process offense.

The parties correctly agree that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing
La Rose to three years’ probation for the gross-misdemeanor obstructing-legal -process
offense.
In certain circumstances, “a district court has discretion to stay imposition of a
sentence and order probation with certain conditions.” State v. Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79,
82 (Minn. 2000). Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to impose or stay a
sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id. A district court abuses its discretion by, among
other things, ordering a sentence that is “inconsistent with statutory requirements.” See id.
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (1998)5).
A conviction for a gross-misdemeanor offense not specified in Minn. Stat.
§ 609.135, subd. 2(b) (2018), carries a maximum stay of sentence of two years. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.135, subd. 2(c) (2018). Gross-misdemeanor obstruction of legal process in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2018), is not one of the offenses specified in Minn.
Stat. § 609.135, subd. 2(b). Therefore, gross -misdemeanor obstruction of legal process
carries a maximum stay of sentence of two years.
Here, the district court stayed imposition of the sentence and ordered La Rose to
serve three years of probation. Because the maximum stay of sentence and probationary
period for this gross- misdemeanor offense is two years, see Minn. Stat. § 609.135,

5 The quoted portion of Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b), remains unchanged in the most
recent 2022 publication of the Minnesota Statutes.
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subd. 2(c), the district court abused its discretion. We reverse and remand to the district
court for resentencing on this conviction.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.