State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0897

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Michael Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed July 17, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-20-3918

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Bryan , Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal f rom a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm,
appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a vehicle search. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 17, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant James Michael
Anderson with unlawful possession of a firearm under Minnesota Statutes section 624.713,
subdivision 1(2) (2018). Anderson moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the law
enforcement officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. At the suppression
hearing, t he parties submitted witness testimony and several exhibits, including
photographs of the items recovered, police reports, a map of the area surrounding the stop,
and a partial transcript of testimony from a related case comparing the appearance of hemp
and marijuana. The following factual summary is based on the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing and the uncontested facts of this case.
On May 17, 2020, two Saint Paul police off icers observed a red vehicle leaving a
residence. The officers characterized the residence as a “problem property,” one that they
were familiar with based on “numerous arrests for narcotics and stolen vehicles.” The
officers followed the vehicle and saw it cross over the center line for about half a block.
The officers also saw the vehicle pass through a stop sign and then stop mid -intersection.
The officers initiated a traffic stop based on the se traffic violations and the vehicle pulled
over. As the officers approached the vehicle, they observed the occupants moving around
3
inside of the vehicle . Based on their movements, the officers grew concerned that the
occupants were concealing contraband or were about to flee.
One officer testified that as he walked along the passenger side of the vehicle , he
observed a plastic bag containing what he suspected to be marijuana in plain view near the
center console. The officer also saw an empty prescription pill container at the feet of the
rear, right-side passenger. This officer knew from experience that narcotics are often stored
in pill containers like the one he observed . The officers asked the four occupants of the
vehicle, including Anderson who was the right rear passenger of the vehicle , for
identification. After identifying the occupant s, t he officers instructed the m to exit the
vehicle. The officers began searching the vehicle, and one officer noticed that the right
rear seat was loose. This officer knew from experience that firearms are often concealed
under the seats in vehicles, so he lifted up the seat and saw a firearm next to a black glove.
Officers also recovered a digital scale and a second black glove from Anderson’s person.
A review of Anderson’s criminal history indicated that he had prior convictions making
him ineligible to possess a firearm. Anderson was arrested and later charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm.
Anderson moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of the vehicle.
The district court denied the suppression motion, concluding that the following
circumstances established probable cause: the vehicle’s presence at a property associated
with previous arrests for narcotics , the observation of the occupants ’ movements, the
observation of a plastic bag containing suspected marijuana in plain view , and the
observation of an empty pill bottle near Anderson’ s feet. The district court explained that
4
the officers’ uncertainty whether the substance th ey observed was actually marijuana did
not preclude a determination that the officers had probable cause to believe the vehicle
contained contraband or evidence of criminal activity. The case proceeded to trial and a
jury found Anderson guilty of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. The district
court sentenced Anderson to 60 months in prison. Anderson appeals.
DECISION
Anderson challenges the den ial of the motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the
officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle.1 We conclude that the totality of the
facts and circumstances known to the officers would lead a reasonable officer to entertain
an honest and strong suspicion that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of
criminal activity.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches and
seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798-
99 (Minn. 2012). “The state bears the burden of establishing the applicability of an
exception [to the warrant requirement].” State v. Licari , 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn.
2003). Evidence obtained during an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed.
State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).

1 The parties agree that the initial traffic stop was lawful and Anderson challenges only the
subsequent, warrantless search of the vehicle .
5
Here, the state justified the search under the “automobile exception” to the warrant
requirement. A search is constitutional pursuant to the automobile exception when “the
totality of the facts and circumstances known would lead a reasonable officer to entertain
an honest and strong suspicion . . . that the vehicle is carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise.” State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 610- 11 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation and
citations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014); see also State v. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d
682, 685 (Minn. 2023) (stating that a warrantless search under the automobile exception is
constitutional if the investigating officers had “probable cause to believe the search will
result in a discovery of evidence or contraband”) (quotation omitted) .
“[T]he totality of the circumstances includes reasonable infe rences that police
officers draw from facts, based on their training and experience, because police officers
may interpret circumstances differently than untrained persons.” State v. Lester , 874
N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016). We “afford due weight to the inferences of [the officer]
that were credited by the district court in its determination of probable cause. ” Id. at 772.
When, as here, multiple law enforcement officers are involved in an investigation, courts
consider the “collective knowledge ” of the officers in determining whether probable cause
existed. State v. Riley , 568 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. 1997) ( quotation omitted ). When
reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress where the facts are not in dispute ,
appellate courts review de novo the probable cause determination . State v. Lugo, 887
N.W.2d 476, 487 (Minn. 2016).
In this case , t he officers had sufficient pr obable cause to search the vehicle based
on the following undisputed facts . The officers observed the vehicle leaving a known
6
“problem property” that the officers were familiar with based on past arrests involving
narcotics and stolen vehicles .2 While the officers were approaching the vehicle, they
observed the passengers moving around inside in a manner that suggested the passengers
were concealing contraband or were about to flee. See State v. Munoz, 385 N.W.2d 373,
376 (Minn. App. 1986) ( “Furtive gestures can provide a basis for probable cause.” ). One
officer observed an empty prescription pill bottle near Anderson’s feet , which the officer
knew to be consistent with the common storage of narcotics . See State v. Hodgman, 257
N.W.2d 313, 314 (Minn. 1977) ( stating that an o fficer’s observation of “a plastic pill
bottle” and knowledge that this “is how people carry narcotics ” supported the
determination that there was probable cause to search the vehicle). This officer also
observed a plastic bag containing suspected marijuana in plain view. See Thiel, 846
N.W.2d at 611 (“The discovery of marijuana in a car gives law enforcement probable cause
to search for more anywhere in the car where one might reasonably expect to find
marijuana.”); see also State v. Hanson, 364 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. 1985) (“The discovery
of the [marijuana] cigarette clearly justified the further search of the car . . . .”). Based on
these observations, we conclude that a reasonable officer would have an honest and strong
suspicion that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of criminal activity .

2 We note that while mere presence in a high-crime area is insufficient to justify a stop , see
State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 1998), courts may consider a person’s
presence in a high-crime area to contextualize other evidence , see State v. Dickerson, 481
N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (contextualizing suspect’s behavior by considering his
departure from a building with a history of drug activity).
7
Anderson tries to persuade us otherwise by making t wo arguments, but we remain
unconvinced. First, Anderson invites this court to “overturn its precedent in Thiel” given
recent changes to the legality of hemp . Specifically, Anderson contends that the officers
lacked probable cause to search the vehicle because they had no way of knowing whether
the small amount of the substance in plain view was “ marijuana” or “hemp.” We must
apply precedential authority, however, State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App.
2010), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010), and Thiel remains binding. In addition, we have
previously concluded that “chemical testing establis hing that the plant material is
marijuana rather than hemp is not required . . . to support a finding of probable cause .”
State v. Dixon, 963 N.W.2d 724, 731 (Minn. App. 2021), aff’d, 981 N.W.2d 387 (Minn.
2022); see also State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 544 (Minn. App. 2005) ( “[T]he test is
not whether the residual amounts of marijuana are criminal. Rather, t he test is whether
those amounts support a reasonable expectation that more marijuana or other evidence of
criminal activity will be fou nd.”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006).
Second, Anderson argues that we should disregard the officer’s observation of the
empty pill bottle because such containers can have ordinary, non-criminal uses. While pill
bottles can have such permissible uses a nd are not illegal to possess, this fact does not
preclude an officer from reasonably inferring that a vehicle contains contraband or other
evidence of criminal activity based on such an object being observed in plain view. See
Hodgman, 257 N.W.2d at 314 (stating that the observation of “a plastic pill bottle ”
supported the determination of probable cause) ; see also State v. Munoz, 385 N.W.2d 373,
376-77 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that an officer’s “observation of glassine envelopes in
8
plain view” inside the car and familiarity “with such containers as being commonly used
to market controlled substances ” gave the officer probable cause to sea rch vehicle); State
v. Lembke, 509 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Minn. App. 1993) (stating that the incriminating nature
of a plastic bag was apparent because even though “ [a] bag has many legitimate uses . . . .
[a]n officer may . . . rely on trained intuition and observations drawn from his experience”).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, incl uding the officers ’ observations and
with due weight given to reasonable inferences drawn from their training and experience,
we conclude that there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband
or evidence of criminal activity . Because the search of the vehicle was lawful, the district
court properly denied Anderson’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.