State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0916

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lance J Walters,
Appellant.

Filed May 22, 2023
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-20-942

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David J. Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Abigail H. Lambert, Assistant County
Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for domestic assault and first- degree criminal
damage to property, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting as
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relationship evidence his two prior convictions for violations of a domestic-abuse no-
contact order (DANCO) against a different victim. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises out of appellant Lance Walters’ convictions for domestic assault
against his ex-wife, B.K., and for first-degree criminal damage to property. Walters and
B.K were separated at the time of the offenses, but were not yet divorced. B.K., however,
had started seeing another man, C.S. On the date of the offenses, July 2, 2020, B.K. was
inside C.S.’s home when she heard her car alarm go off. She looked outside and saw
Walters hitting and kicking her car. B.K. later testified that she ran outside to try to get
Walters to leave, but “[h]e started yelling at [her] and ran at [her] and started grabbing . . .
[her] hair and dragging [her] across the lawn and threw [her] up against . . . the back
window of [her] car . . . .” He then “started choking [her] and spitting on [her] and calling
[her] a ‘cheating whore.’” Walters also hit B.K. with a closed fist near her jawline.
B.K. testified that she was on the ground crying, “but [Walters] came back and
picked [her] up by [her] hair again. And someone drove by and said that they were going
to call the cops, and he let [her] go and took off to the middle of the street where a car came
and picked him up.” C.S. called 911, but the vehicle drove away with Walters; Walters
was not present when a police officer arrived at C.S.’s house.
The responding officer interviewed B.K. and C.S. and took photographs of B.K.’s
injuries and the damage to her vehicle. B.K. refused medical attention, informing the
officer that she had endured assaults by Walters in the past.
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Respondent State of Minnesota charged Walters with first-degree criminal damage
to property and with domestic assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2018). The
domestic-assault charge was enhanced to a felony offense based on Walters’ prior qualified
domestic violence-related convictions. The prior convictions included two convictions in
2015 for violations of a DANCO involving a different victim, not B.K. Walters stipulated,
before trial, that he had the requisite prior qualifying convictions to justify the enhancement
of the domestic-assault charge.
The state moved, prior to trial, to admit relationship evidence, which included prior
domestic conduct against B.K. and Walters’ 2015 convictions for DANCO violations
against a different victim. The district court allowed both B.K.’s testimony and the
certified records of the DANCO-violation convictions. In resp onse to Walters’ objection
to allowing the admission of the 2015 DANCO-violation convictions, the court reasoned
that these convictions “address[] exactly [why] our legislature decided to create a
legislative exception to the Rules of Evidence, and that is relationship evidence. And so
[the court] will permit it for the sole purpose of relationship evidence only.”
At trial, the jury heard testimony from B.K., C.S., and the responding officer. It
also received the photographs of B.K. and her vehicle taken by the officer at the scene, the
officer’s bodycam video, and the recording of C.S.’s 911 call. The state offered the
DANCO-violations evidence, laying a foundation by asking the responding officer to
define a DANCO, along with how and why DANCOs are pu t in place. The state did not
include the facts underlying Walters’ DANCO-violation convictions, but only the
conviction records themselves. The exhibit for the DANCO-violation convictions was
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redacted so that the jury only saw the two convictions, and did not see the counts that were
dismissed, the severity level of the offenses, or the resulting sentences.
The jury found Walters guilty of both domestic assault and first-degree criminal
damage to property. The district court imposed a 32-month sentence for the domestic-
assault conviction.1
DECISION
Walters contends that the district court committed reversible error by admitting as
relationship evidence his two prior convictions for DANCO violations against a different
victim. He argues that the prejudice caused by the admission of this evidence substantially
outweighed its probative value and influenced the jury’s decision. He asserts that his
convictions must therefore be reversed, and his case remanded for a new trial.
Evidence of prior criminal offenses unrelated to the crime for which a person is on
trial is generally inadmissible. State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965). An
exception exists for “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of
domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, . . . unless the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20
(2022); see also State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (adopting Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20 as a rule of evidence). “Domestic conduct” includes “evidence of domestic

1 The district court did not impose a sentence for the property-damage conviction based on
the state’s agreement that the facts underlying that conviction arose out of the same
behavioral incident as the domestic-assault conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1
(2018) (prohibiting, subject to exceptions, the imposition of multiple sentences for offenses
committed as part of a single behavioral incident).
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abuse” and “violation[s] of a domestic abuse no contact order.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. And
“family or household members” includes “spouses and former spouses” and “persons who
are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 2(b) (2022). This evidence “is commonly referred to as relationship
evidence.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010).
We review the admission of relationship evidence for an abuse of discretion. Id. at
553. The appellant “must prove that the admission of evidence was erroneous and
prejudicial.” State v. Loving, 775 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Minn. 2009). Appellate courts “will
reverse the district court’s ruling if the error substantially influenced the jury’s decision.”
Id.
Probative Value

Walters contends that the evidence of his DANCO-violation convictions had
minimal probative value because (1) “the victim of the [DANCO] violations was not the
victim of the charged offense in this case” and therefore “evidence related to the [DANCO]
violations was not necessary to illuminate the history of the relationship between [Walters]
and B.K.”; and (2) “this case does not present” any “unique prosecution challenges” so
there was no need for the evidence. We ack nowledge that the probative value is not
particularly great in this case but, as the district court noted, the evidence showing Walters’
convictions for DANCO violations “does address something independent of simply the
element [of the charged offense] that [Walters] stipulated to” —that he had previous
qualifying domestic violence-related convictions.
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As to Walters’ argument that the DANCO-violations evidence involved a different
victim, this court has stated:
[T]he rationale for admitting relationship evidence under
section 634.20 is to illuminate the relationship between the
defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime
in the context of that relationship. Obviously, evidence
showing how a defendant treats his family or household
members, such as his former spouses or other girlfriends, sheds
light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him,
which in turn suggests how the defendant may interact with the
victim.

State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010) (citation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). Based on this rationale, this court concluded in Valentine that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the appellant’s abuse of
another girlfriend to show “how the defendant interacts with those close to him.” Id. at
637-38.
As in Valentine, evidence of Walters’ prior convictions for violating a DANCO
involving a different victim is probative because it “sheds light on how [Walters] interacts
with those close to him.” Id. at 637. Not only do the prior DANCO violations show that
Walters had engaged in conduct such as domestic abuse, harassment, or stalking against a
prior household member, but the DANCO violations were probative to demonstrate his
failure to refrain from contacting that household member—even when legally prohibited
from doing so. See Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 1 (2022) (describing circumstances under
which a DANCO is issued). Here, B.K. testified that while she and Walters were not yet
divorced, she had separated from him and had begun dating C.S. And she told the
responding officer that Walters “normally just kinda hunts [her] down, and wherever [she
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is], he kinda just beats the crap outta [her].” Walters’ prior DANCO violations were thus
probative of how he may react to being cut off from a domestic relationship.
Additionally, despite Walters’ argument that this case did not present unique
prosecutorial challenges, the evidence had probative value because it bolstered B.K.’s and
C.S.’s credibility. See State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App. 2008) (stating
that relationship evidence “had significant probative value in assisting the jury to judge
witness credibility”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). Though law enforcement did
receive one other call likely reporting the same incident, the responding officer only
interviewed B.K. and C.S., and the state’s only witnesses at trial were B.K., C.S., and the
responding officer. The DANCO-violations evidence therefore had probative value in
aiding the jury in assessing the credibility of the witnesses describing Walters’ behavior.
Prejudice
Walters next argues that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the
probative value of the DANCO-violations evidence. “When balancing the probative value
against the potential prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even
severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by
illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635,
641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). Walters maintains that the admitted relationship
evidence here was unfairly prejudicial in part because the district court failed to provide a
cautionary instruction.
2

2 Walters also contends that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it involved
“irrelevant conduct occurring years earlier against another person.” But this argument goes
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This court has stated that “[ a] district court’s limiting instruction lessens the
probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” State v. Ware, 856
N.W.2d 719, 729 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). Here, the district court gave a
specific cautionary instruction prior to B.K.’s testimony regarding Walters’ prior assaults
against her but did not do so directly before the publication of the certified copy of Walters’
DANCO-violation convictions. However, we are not convinced that the lack of instruction
immediately prior to the publication of the DANCO-violation convictions gave the state
an unfair advantage because the district court took several other measures to mitigate
prejudicial impact.
For example, before closing arguments, the court repeated the limiting instruction
it had provided prior to B.K.’s testimony regarding other instances of alleged domestic
conduct. The district court cautioned the jury that “[t]he defendant is not to be tried for
and may not be convicted of any behavior other than the charged offenses,” and that “to
convict the defendant on the basis of conduct prior to July 2, 2020 . . . might result in unjust
double punishment.”
As another mitigating measure, the DANCO- violations evidence only included the
record of the convictions and did not include any of the underlying facts. In laying the
foundation for the exhibit, the state asked the officer to provide basic information, such as
what a DANCO is and why a DANCO is put in place. And before the jury received the

again to whether the relationship evidence was probative. And as we concluded above, the
relationship evidence was probative in this case even though the DANCO violations
occurred in 2015 against a different victim.
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DANCO-violations exhibit, the district court had it redacted so that the jury only saw the
two convictions, and did not see the counts that were dismissed, the severity level of the
offenses, or the resulting sentences.
Considering the precautions taken by the district court to limit the prejudicial impact
of the DANCO-violations evidence, we conclude that the evidence did not “persuade[] by
illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage. ” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641
(quotation omitted). We therefore discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in
allowing the DANCO-violations evidence.
Affirmed.