Lisa Stone, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0928

Lisa Stone, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Respondent,

vs.

Invitation Homes, Inc., et al.,
Appellants,

THR Property Management, L.P., et al.,
Defendants.

Filed February 6, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-21-8758

Mark L. Vavreck, Gonko & Vavreck PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Consumer Justice Center, P.A., Vadnais Heights, Minnesota; and

Michael Davey, Full Circle Law, Wyndmoor, Pennsylvania (for respondent)

Lindsay W. Cremona, Garth G. Gavenda, John W. Kuehl, Jellum Law, P.A., Stillwater,
Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
An order denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted is immediately appealable when the defendant’s motion is
based on the plaintiff’s lack of standing.
2
OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant Invitation Homes Inc. (IH) and its subsidiaries, appellants IH3 Property
Minnesota L.P., IH4 Property Minnesota L.P. , IH5 Property Minnesota L.P., 2015-3 IH2
Borrower L.P., and 2015-2 IH2 Borrower L.P. (together, the L.P. subsidiaries), seek
interlocutory review of the district court’s order denying their motion s to dismiss
respondent Lisa Stone’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. The amended complaint alleges various claims detailed below; the gist of
these allegations is that Stone rented a home from IH under an unlawful lease that required
her to perform maintenance without compensation.
Appellants’ motions and memoranda argued that the amended complaint fails to
allege facts showing (1) personal jurisdiction over IH; (2) Stone’s standing to pursue
claims against all appellants; or (3) a public benefit under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud
Act (MCFA), Minn. Stat. § 325F.69 (2022). Appellants contend that the district court erred
in its analysis of these three issues. Stone argues that the district court correctly analyzed
each of these issues on the merits and also that we lack jurisdiction over the portions of the
district court’s order based on standing and the MCFA claim.
Our analysis tracks the three issues appellants raise, but we decline to decide two
issues. First, because the district court did not rule on personal jurisdiction over IH, we
remand for the district court to decide the issue. Second, we consider whether we have
jurisdiction over the district court’s standing determination, and because the Minnesota
Supreme Court has stated standing is jurisdictional, we conclude that a defendant may seek
3
immediate review of an order denying dismissal based on lack of standing. For that reason,
we have jurisdiction over the standing ruling in the district court’s order. We then affirm
the district court’s determination that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges standing
as to IH and reverse the district court’s determination that the amended complaint
sufficiently alleges standing as to the L.P. subsidiaries. Third, we conclude that appellants
have no right to immediate appellate review of the district court’s ruling that the amended
complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief under the MCFA.
FACTS
The following summarizes the factual allegations in Stone’s amended complaint;
any inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to Stone.
In February 2018, Stone entered into a two-year lease with an IH subsidiary, 2015-1
IH2 Borrower L.P. (landlord), for a home on Waterside Lane in Mound. The lease listed
THR Property Management L.P. (THR) as the property manager and stated that Stone
would pay rent to “Invitation Homes.”
Section 12 of the lease provided that Stone would perform maintenance,
landscaping, and “outside care,” including watering, “edging, irrigation, lawn fertilization,
weed control, shrub and tree trimming, lawn mowing, removal of sticks and fallen
branches, pine island rejuvenation, snow and ice removal, gutter cleaning, lawn
overseeding, and leaf removal.” An addendum to the lease stated that “$0.00 per month”
would be deducted from the monthly rent for any maintenance required by section 12. In
October 2019, Stone and landlord agreed to terminate the lease three and one-half months
early.
4
In July 2021, Stone commenced a putative class action against IH, as owner of the
home on Waterside Lane, and defendant THR, as property manager, for unlawfully failing
to provide adequate consideration for maintenance responsibilities required by the lease.
The complaint alleges that IH “owns, leases, and manages . . . hundreds of rental homes in
Minnesota” and that Stone’s lease is typical of the leases used by IH.
Rather than answer, IH and THR moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. First, IH and THR contended
that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over IH because “IH is not registered
with the Minnesota Secretary of State to conduct business in the state” and “does not own
the property [Stone leased] or any properties in Minnesota.” Second, IH and THR argued
that the amended complaint fails to state a claim under the MCFA.
In response, Stone filed and served an amended complaint, also styled as a putative
class action, adding allegations and new defendants. The new defendants were seven
limited partnerships, all of which the amended complaint alleges to be subsidiaries of IH.
These limited partnerships are landlord, IH2 Property Illinois L.P., IH3 Property Minnesota
L.P., IH4 Property Minnesota L.P., IH5 Property Minnesota L.P., 2015-3 IH2 Borrower
L.P., and 2015-2 IH2 Borrower L.P.1
Stone’s amended complaint repeat s the factual allegations outlined above about
Stone’s lease, claiming the lease obligated her to perform “a considerable number of

1 Of the seven limited partnerships named in Stone’s amended complaint, only five appeal;
landlord and IH2 Property Illinois L.P. did not appeal. (THR, the property-management
company, also did not appeal.) As noted above, we use the “L.P. subsidiaries” to refer only
to the limited partnerships that appealed the district court’s interlocutory ruling.
5
[landscaping] duties,” which she performed , but the lease “provided zero consideration”
for performance of the required maintenance and “did not make conspicuous” that tenants
would receive a “$0.00” maintenance credit. Based on these allegations, the amended
complaint claims the lease breached the statutory landlord covenant under Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.161 (2022), violated the MCFA, and unjustly enriched the defendants. The
amended complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, costs, and attorney
fees. In support of a putative class action, the amended complaint all eges that defendants
leased other properties in Minnesota and used the same unlawful maintenance provision.
Defendants—landlord, THR, IH2 Property Illinois L.P., IH, and the L.P.
subsidiaries—moved to strike the amended complaint as improper or, in the alternative, to
dismiss the amended complaint under rule 12 .02. Reading defendants’ motions together
with their memoranda, they sought dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction over
IH, lack of standing as to all defendants, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted under the MCFA. Stone opposed both motions.
After a hearing, the district court issued an order denying the motion to strike and
requesting supplemental briefing on “the merits of the motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.” Defendants’ supplemental brief again argued for dismissal based on lack of
personal jurisdiction over IH and failure to state a claim under the MCFA. Defendants’
supplemental brief narrowed their standing argument to focus solely on IH and the L.P.
subsidiaries, contending that the amended complaint fails to sufficiently allege standing to
sue IH and the L.P. subsidiaries because Stone did not have “a lease agreement or any other
relationship” with these defendants.
6
Stone’s supplemental brief argued that she has standing to sue “some” of the
defendants and that because the defendants’ actions are “tightly interwoven,” Stone “may
bring a class action against all of the defendants.” Stone also argued that defendants’
motion to dismiss should be denied because the amended complaint adequately pleads each
cause of action. Stone’s supplemental brief did not address personal jurisdiction over IH.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The memorandum accompanying
the district court’s order first stated that Stone has standing to pursue claims against all
defendants. The district court reasoned that Stone’s amended complaint alleges IH used “a
network of alter-ego subsidiaries designed to violate tenants’ rights” and that the lease,
which was referenced in the complaint, 2 showed the “undeniable” overlap in “identity,
location, and affiliation” between IH and its subsidiaries. Second, the district court
determined that the amended complaint “properly allege[s] a claim for violation of the
CFA” because it sufficiently alleges a public benefit by claiming that defendants “lease
residential property to low-income renters and regularly utilize improper fee-shifting
provisions.” Third, the memorandum did not discuss personal jurisdiction over IH, yet
denied the motion to dismiss.3 IH and the L.P. subsidiaries appeal.4

2 A district court “may consider documents referenced in a complaint without converting
the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment.” N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro.
Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2004).

3 Defendants’ motion to dismiss asserted other grounds, which the district court rejected.
On appeal, appellants’ brief to this court challenges only the district court’s determinations
about personal jurisdiction, standing, and the MCFA.

4 As stated above at note 1, landlord, THR, and IH2 Property Illinois L.P. did not join in
the appeal.
7
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err by denying appellants’ motion to dismiss the amended
complaint without ruling on personal jurisdiction over IH?

II. May a defendant seek immediate appellate review of an order denying a motion to
dismiss a complaint for lack of standing, and if so, did the district court err by failing
to dismiss the amended complaint because the allegations fail to show Stone’s
standing to sue IH and the L.P. subsidiaries?

III. Is the district court’s determination that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges
a public benefit under the MCFA immediately appealable?

ANALYSIS
I. The district court erred by denying appellants’ motion to dismiss without
ruling on personal jurisdiction over IH.

Personal jurisdiction refers to a “court’s power to exercise control over the parties”
in a case. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979). Whether personal
jurisdiction exists is a question of law subject to de novo review. Bandemer v. Ford Motor
Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn. 2019). If a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction,
the plaintiff must make “a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction is proper.” Id.
When a court reviews a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court
“accepts all of the factual allegations in the complaint and supporting affidavits as true. ”
Id. “In a close case, we resolve any doubt in favor of retaining jurisdiction.” Id.
Here, the amended complaint alleges that IH owns, leases, and manages “hundreds
of rental homes in Minnesota,” including the one Stone leased. IH argues in its brief to this
court that IH does not own the property Stone leased, this fact is “evidenced by the lease,”
and IH owns no other property in Minnesota. In support of its motion in district court, IH
submitted an affidavit from its attorney stating, “The lease does not identify IH as the
8
landlord and IH is not referenced in the lease.” The same attorney’s affidavit identified and
attached a copy of Stone’s lease, which provided that Stone would pay rent to “Invitation
Homes.” The lease does not state who owns the Waterside Lane home.
Appellants contend the district court erred by denying their motion to dismiss
because the amended complaint fails to allege facts showing personal jurisdiction over IH.
Appellants also point out that a defendant may seek immediate appellate review of an order
when it denies a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Hunt v. Nev. State
Bank, 172 N.W.2d 292, 300 (Minn. 1969). Appellants argue that we should either
(a) reverse the district court’s decision denying the motion to dismiss because Minnesota
lacks personal jurisdiction over IH as a matter of law or (b) remand the issue to the district
court for a ruling on personal jurisdiction. Appellants contend that they challenged the
jurisdictional grounds alleged in the amended complaint, and Stone did not meet her burden
to respond and produce evidence showing personal jurisdiction over IH.
On appeal, Stone argues that the allegations in the amended complaint must be taken
as true and that these allegations sufficiently show that Minnesota has personal jurisdiction
over IH because it owns, leases, and manages rental homes in Minnesota, including the
home on Waterside Lane. In support of her position, Stone cites to JL Schwieters
Construction, Inc. v. Goldridge Construction, Inc., 788 N.W.2d 5 29, 536 (Minn. App.
2010) (holding a party was subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota based on land
9
ownership and business activities in the state, including renting property), rev. denied
(Minn. Dec. 14, 2010).5
Here, the district court did not discuss or decide personal jurisdiction over IH when
it denied appellants’ motion to dismiss. “A reviewing court must generally consider only
those issues that the record shows were presented [to] and considered by the trial court in
deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)
(quotation omitted). Even when the parties raised an issue, the appellate court will not
consider the issue “if it was not passed on by the trial court.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court did not “pass on” Minnesota’s pers onal jurisdiction over IH,
despite appellants raising the issue in their motion to dismiss, at the motion hearing, and in
supplemental briefing. Thus, we decline to review the issue and remand for the district
court to address it. See Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 385 (Minn. 2008)
(remanding for the district court to make findings necessary to determine jurisdiction);
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
II. The district court erred in determining Stone had standing to sue the L.P.
subsidiaries.

“Standing is the requirement that a party have a sufficient stake in a justiciable
controversy.” Sec. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 916 N.W.2d
491, 496 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “A party has standing when (1) the party has

5 We note that Stone makes other arguments in support of the district court’s personal
jurisdiction over IH, such as IH having a registered agent for service in Minnesota and IH’s
“alter-ego” relationship with the L.P. subsidiaries. Because we remand this issue, we need
not address each of Stone’s arguments.
10
suffered an injury-in-fact, or (2) the party is the beneficiary of a legislative enactment
granting standing.” Webb Golden Valley, LLC v. State, 865 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn. 2015).
“Standing focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a particular lawsuit.”
Citizens for Rule of Law v. Senate Comm. on Rules & Admin., 770 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn.
App. 2009) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2009).
We first consider our jurisdiction over this issue. No Minnesota caselaw discusses
whether a defendant may obtain immediate appellate review when a district court denies a
motion to dismiss based on standing. Because the supreme court has held that standing is
a jurisdictional doctrine, we conclude that an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing is immediately appealable. We then consider whether the amended complaint
alleges sufficient facts to show that Stone has standing to sue appellants.
A. An order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is immediately
appealable.

Appellants argue that the standing issue is immediately appealable because
“standing goes to the heart of jurisdiction,” “the issues of personal jurisdiction and standing
are intertwined,” and “the interests of justice and judicial economy warrant review.” Stone
responds that the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of standing is not
immediately appealable because it was “not a final judgment” and does not “meet the
requirements of the collateral order doctrine.”6

6 Stone also contends that “the standing issue is not immediately appealable as an issue
‘inextricably intertwined’ with personal jurisdiction,” citing to Aon Corp. v. Haskins,
817 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. App. 2012). But Aon is distinguishable. In Aon, we concluded that
the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was not “inextricably
intertwined” with the appeal of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and
11
Minnesota favors a unitary appeal after a final judgment. 3 Erica A. Holzer &
Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, Minnesota Practice § 101.3 (2022 ed. 2022); see Patton v.
Minneapolis St. Ry., 71 N.W.2d 861, 862 (Minn. 1955) (“Ordinarily an appeal will not be
considered piecemeal . . . .”). Minnesota recognizes a right to appeal from a final judgment,
a partial judgment entered under Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, as well as other orders enumerated
in a “nearly exhaustive list.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a) -(j); Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
103.03 1998 advisory comm. cmt. (noting that “there are limited grounds for appeal other
than those set forth in Rule 103.03”). This list incorporates statutes and caselaw; for
instance, it provides that an appeal may be taken “from such other orders or decisions as
may be appealable by statute or under the decisions of the Minnesota appellate courts.”
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(j).
Orders denying motions to dismiss are, generally, not appealable. Kokesh v. City of
Hopkins, 238 N.W.2d 882, 884 (Minn. 1976). But see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(i)
(allowing an appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment when the trial court certifies the question as important and doubtful). As
mentioned above, however, when a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is
denied, that determination is immediately appealable. Hunt, 172 N.W.2d at 300. Still, when
an order is appealable in part and not appealable in part, then an immediate appeal “brings

thus was not immediately appealable. 817 N.W.2d at 742. Here, the district court did not
rule on personal jurisdiction; therefore, the district court’s order cannot sustain appellate
jurisdiction, as it did in Aon. As a result, the inextricably intertwined analysis does not
apply here, as it did in Aon.
12
up for review only that part which is appealable.” Storey v. Weinberg, 31 N.W.2d 912, 916
(Minn. 1948).
Caselaw recognizes that immediate appellate review is available for an interlocutory
order rejecting jurisdictional grounds for dismissal. In Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, LLP,
the supreme court reasoned that an order was immediately appealable because the district
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss was “based, at least in part, on the court’s rejection of
jurisdictional grounds for dismissal. ” 704 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 2005). Similarly, in
McGowan v. Our Savior’s Lutheran Church , the supreme court held an order denying a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is immediately appealable because
“no purpose is served by putting the parties or the court through the rigors of trial before
that determination is made” if “the district court is without jurisdiction to proceed further.”
527 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1995).
We see a parallel to the order on appeal here. “Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine,
and the lack of standing bars consideration of the claim by the [district] court.”7 Richards

7 We recognize that federal caselaw has discussed standing as an indicium of justiciability.
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 219 (2011) (holding standing involves
justiciability, not the merits of a dispute, and these concepts should not be conflated);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536 (2007) (“Standing to sue is part of the common
understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case . . . .” (quotation omitted)). But
we follow precedent as established by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which we read to
embrace two related points of law. First, the supreme court has connected jurisdiction to
justiciability. See Onvoy, Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn. 2007) (“[T]he
court has no jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment proceeding unless there is a
justiciable controversy.”); Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005) (“[W]e will
not deem a case moot, and thus will retain jurisdiction, if the case is functionally
justiciable.” (quotation omitted)); State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 25 N.W.2d 474, 476
(Minn. 1946) (“[T]he court has no jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment in the
absence of a justiciable controversy
.”). Second, the supreme court has repeatedly held that
13
v. Reiter, 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011). Based on the supreme court’s reasoning
expressed in Janssen, McGowan, and Richards, we conclude that an order denying a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing is immediately appealable.8
Though appellants also contend that immediate appellate review of the standing
issue is “available under the collateral order doctrine,” 9 we need not apply the doctrine.
Indeed, we observe that federal courts, which regularly apply the collateral-order doctrine,
have consistently held that orders denying dismissal based on standing are not immediately
appealable. See, e.g., Summit Med. Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999)
(collecting cases). For example, the Eighth Circuit determined that an order deciding

standing is required before a court may exercise jurisdiction. See Glaze v. State,
909 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Minn. 2018) (“Jurisdiction is fundamental to the exercise of judicial
power. An essential element of jurisdiction is standing of the parties . . . .” (citation
omitted)); League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 645 n.7 (Minn.
2012) (“Because standing is essential to our exercise of jurisdiction, the issue is one which
can be raised by this court on its own motion . . . .” (quotation omitted)); Richards,
796 N.W.2d at 512 (“Minnesota case law also requires that a party have standing before a
court can exercise jurisdiction.”).

8 In special term orders, this court has recognized a right to immediate appellate review of
orders denying a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. See Ne. Minnesotans for
Wilderness v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., No. A21-0857 (Minn. App. Aug. 3, 2021) (order);
Erikson v. Bothwell, No. A12-2211 (Minn. App. Jan. 2, 2013) (order).

9 Minnesota courts have adopted “the collateral order doctrine as a clear analytical
framework to assess the immediate appealability of an order or judgment not specifically
identified in the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.” Kastner v. Star Trails Ass’n,
646 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn. 2002). The collateral-order doctrine “recognizes a small class
of decisions that are immediately appealable prior to the entry of final judgment.”
McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 586 (Minn. 2016).
“For an order to be immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, it must
(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from
a final judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted).
14
standing is not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine because the
appellant’s interest was not “irretrievably lost” when effective review would be available
after a final judgment. Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Ill . Farmers Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 679, 685 (8th
Cir. 2008); see also Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1334 (declining to review a district
court’s standing determination because “a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on
justiciability grounds is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine”).
Having concluded that the district court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dismiss
for lack of standing is immediately appealable because the supreme court has recognized
that standing is a jurisdictional doctrine, we next consider whether the district court erred
in determining that the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to show that Stone has
standing to sue appellants.
B. The amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to show Stone has
standing to sue IH but not the L.P. subsidiaries.

To demonstrate standing, the complaint must allege facts to show the plaintiff
suffered “some injury-in-fact . . . fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant
and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy
Tahoe, 852 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Minn. 2014). “For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss
for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining
party.” Forslund v. State, 924 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2019) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). Appellate courts review de novo a district court’s determination
15
of whether a party has standing to sue. In re Consol. Hosp. Surcharge Appeals, 883 N.W.2d
778, 784 (Minn. 2016).
Appellants claim that the district court erred because the amended complaint does
not allege facts showing that Stone has “standing against each defendant.” Appellants argue
that the parent-subsidiary relationship alone does not establish standing, and appellants
“have no connections whatsoever” with Stone. Stone responds that “to have standing, a
plaintiff must have been injured by at least one defendant.” In the alternative, Stone
contends that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges standing under the juridical-link
doctrine.
1. Standing to Sue IH
The amended complaint alleges that Stone performed maintenance, for which she
received no compensation, under a lease and that IH owned the leased property. The lease
provided that Stone’s rent was payable to IH. Accepting these allegations as true, the
amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Stone’s injury— performing maintenance
under the lease without consideration—is “fairly traceable to the challenged action” of IH
and “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision” against IH. Garcia-Mendoza,
852 N.W.2d at 663; see also Thompson v. St. Anthony Leased Hous. Assocs. II,
979 N.W.2d 1, 6-8 (Minn. 2022) (concluding plaintiff had standing to sue based on alleged
breach of lease).
2. Standing to Sue the L.P. Subsidiaries
We next consider whether the amended complaint alleges facts to show Stone’s
standing to sue the L.P. subsidiaries. The district court determined that the amended
16
complaint sufficiently alleges standing as to the L.P. subsidiaries because it asserts IH
“conducts its business by using a network of alter-ego subsidiaries.” The district court also
noted that the amended complaint alleges the L.P. subsidiaries “appear on [IH’s] 10 -K
filings,” “do business in Minnesota as [IH],” use the same agent for service of process in
Minnesota, and “each authorize THR to act on their behalf with respect to residential
leases.” The district court determined that the “overlap in identity, location, and affiliation”
between IH and the L.P. subsidiaries is “undeniable” and supports Stone’s claim that they
“are one in the same.”
The district court’s ruling lacks support in the record and caselaw. The amended
complaint does not allege an alter-ego theory, nor was this theory discussed in Stone’s
supplemental brief in opposition to appellants’ motion to dismiss. At the hearing on the
motion to dismiss, the district court asked Stone’s attorney whether Stone was “require[d]”
to allege “information upon which a corporate veil would be” pierced as to “the other
corporate entities.” Stone’s attorney stated that Stone was not required to allege grounds to
pierce the corporate veil because the amended complaint alleges that the L.P. subsidiaries
are “registered with the Minnesota Secretary of State” and “doing business as Invitation
Homes.”
Even if we assume Stone’s amended complaint asserts an alter -ego theory, the
district court did not cite to—nor are we aware of—any caselaw establishing a plaintiff has
standing against subsidiaries based on an alter-ego theory. See Victoria Elevator Co. v.
Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979) (describing alter ego as a theory
of liability). Thus, we reject the district court’s determination that the amended complaint
17
alleges facts sufficient to show Stone’s standing to sue the L.P. subsidiaries based on their
claimed role as alter egos of IH.
We appreciate the candor in Stone’s brief to this court, in which she concedes that
she “has not personally been injured by every” appellant. Stone, though, contends that she
has “standing to sue all appellants under the juridical link doctrine.” The juridical-link
doctrine arose out of La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., in which the Ninth Circuit,
reviewing a class-certification decision, determined that plaintiffs may only pursue a class
action against defendants that injured them. 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973). The Ninth
Circuit, however, also recognized that a class-action complaint may include claims for
injuries that are “the result of a conspiracy or concerted schemes between the defendants
at whose hands the class suffered injury” or against defendants that are “juridically related
in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be expeditious.” Id.10
Stone appears to be raising the juridical-link doctrine for the first time on appeal. In
Stone’s memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss, Stone did not assert the
juridical-link doctrine or cite to related caselaw. We generally refrain from deciding issues
raised for the first time on appeal. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. But even if Stone had
sufficiently raised the juridical-link doctrine in district court, we are not persuaded that the
doctrine applies for three reasons.

10 The Ninth Circuit recently clarified La Mar and explicitly “confined the juridical link
exception to plaintiffs suing ‘officials of a single state and its subordinate units of
government’ who applied a ‘common rule.’” Martinez v. Newsom, 46 F.4th 965, 971 (9th
Cir. 2022) (quoting La Mar, 489 F.2d at 470).
18
First, Stone cites no Minnesota caselaw applying the juridical-link doctrine to
determine standing to sue. Stone claims that “Minnesota courts have adopted [the
juridical-link] doctrine” and cites to Streich v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,
399 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987). In Streich, the
named plaintiff in a class action who was injured by one insurance company sought to
certify a defendant class of all insurance companies in the state , arguing the insurance
companies were juridically linked. 399 N.W.2d at 213. There, we adopted the juridical-link
doctrine only in “considering whether to certify [a] defendant class[] .” Id. at 216. We are
aware of no Minnesota caselaw applying the juridical-link doctrine to standing.
Second, a “substantial number of [federal] courts have rejected” plaintiffs’ attempts
to “use the juridical -link exception as a means to establish standing.” Buetow v. A.L.S.
Enters., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1045 (D. Minn. 2008). For example, the Eighth Circuit has
determined that “[t]he juridical link doctrine does not confer standing” upon individual
named plaintiffs to sue defendants that “did not cause the named plaintiff’s injury.” Wong
v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 789 F.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2015).
11
Third, even if we assume the juridical-link doctrine applies to standing, the amended
complaint does not sufficiently allege a conspiracy or concerted scheme by appellants. In
Stone’s brief to this court, she claims that appellants operate through “a conspiracy or

11 Stone argues “appellants are juridically linked to each other” because they “do not
maintain a separate existence,” citing to Barker v. FSC Securities Corp., 133 F.R.D. 548
(W.D. Ark. 1989). But the district court in Barker determined whether class certification
was appropriate and concluded that two “commonly owned” companies were “juridically
linked.” 133 F.R.D. at 551, 553. Because Barker applied the juridical-link doctrine to class
certification—not to standing—it is not instructive.
19
concerted scheme” as they “all do business as the same entity, use the same lease forms,
and operate from the same address.” It is true that the amended complaint alleges appellants
use “standard printed form” leases and claims the L.P. subsidiaries are listed on IH’s 10-K
filing form and share the same agent for service of process and the same
property-management company. The amended complaint, however, does not mention a
conspiracy or concerted scheme among IH and the L.P. subsidiaries. And on appeal, Stone
cites no authority to establish that the use of common forms, the same agents for service of
process, or the same property manager is sufficient to allege civil conspiracy.
We conclude that the amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show
Stone suffered an injury-in-fact “fairly traceable” to the actions of the L.P. subsidiaries.
Garcia-Mendoza, 852 N.W.2d at 663. Stone’s lease referenced IH, 2015-1 IH2 Borrower
L.P., and THR. The amended complaint does not allege that Stone either contracted with
or had any contact with the L.P. subsidiaries. Thus, the district court erred in determining
the amended complaint sufficiently alleges Stone’s standing to sue the L.P. subsidiaries
and by denying the motion to dismiss the claims against them.
III. Stone’s MCFA claim is not properly before this court.
Appellants challenge the district court’s determination that the amended complaint
“properly allege[s] a claim for violation of the CFA.” The amended complaint alleges
appellants violated the MCFA by engaging in “deceptive practices . . . intended to cause
[Stone] and other tenants to understand that they were responsible for certain maintenance
activities even though they were not provided consideration for them.” The amended
complaint also claim s standing “under the Minnesota Private Attorney General [AG]
20
statute, Minn. Stat. § 8.31[,] subd. 3a” (2022). The MCFA contains no private enforcement
mechanism, and “the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate
that their cause of action benefits the public.” Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn.
2000); see also Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a.
In their initial brief, appellants argue that Stone “lacks standing” to bring a claim
under the MCFA because she “cannot establish that her claims are brought for a public
benefit.” Stone argues that “[p]ublic benefit is an element respondent must prove, not an
issue of standing.” In response, appellants’ reply brief asserts that this court may review
the MCFA issue in the interest of justice under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04.
We are persuaded that the public-benefit requirement does not implicate standing.
Standing is typically determined “at the time a lawsuit is commenced and generally cannot
be lost by subsequent events.” Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., 888 F. Supp. 2d 956, 959 (D. Minn.
2012). In contrast, public benefit is “a necessary element of a plaintiff’s cause of action
under the Private AG statute.” Id. (citing Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314 (“[P]ublic interest must
be demonstrated to state a claim under the Private AG Statute.”)). We are aware of no
Minnesota caselaw holding a plaintiff must establish public benefit to show standing to sue
under the MCFA.
Because the public-benefit issue does not implicate standing, this part of the district
court’s order is not properly before us.12 Appellants do not have a right to an interlocutory

12 “Although the same pleading standards apply both to standing determinations and rule
12(b)(6) determinations, the two inquiries remain fundamentally distinct: ‘standing in no
way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal.’”
Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 734 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Warth,
21
appeal of the denial of their motion to dismiss on every issue raised in the motion to
dismiss. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(i) (recognizing an immediate right to appeal
from denial of a motion to dismiss when the district court certifies the question as important
and doubtful); Cruz- Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2018) (“A district court
order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is generally not immediately
appealable as of right .”). Further, the public-benefit issue is reviewable upon a final
judgment. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (providing the scope of review on appeal from
a final judgment). We conclude the district court’s ruling on the public-benefit issue is not
properly before us, and we decline to address it.
DECISION
We remand to the district court for a ruling on appellants’ motion to dismiss the
claims against IH for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm in part the district court’s
determination that the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to show Stone’s standing
to sue IH. But we conclude that the amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts to
show Stone’s standing to sue the L.P. subsidiaries, and thus, we reverse in part. Finally, we
do not address the district court’s ruling on the public-benefit issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

422 U.S. at 500); see also United States v. Letter from Hamilton, 15 F.4th 515, 521 (1st
Cir. 2021) (“As a general rule, courts should be chary about conflating the threshold
standing inquiry with the subsequent merits inquiry.”).