In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0943

In re the Marriage of:

Timothy Daniel Lorbiecke, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Wendy Leigh Lorbiecke,
Respondent.

Filed March 27, 2023
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-FA-19-254

Timothy Daniel Lorbiecke, Buffalo, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Shannon L. Ort, Tasya Rivera Martin, Terzich & Ort, LLP, Maple Grove, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Timothy Daniel Lorbiecke challenges the district court’s order holding
him in constructive civil contempt for refusing to sign a purchase agreement as directed by
the district court following the dissolution of appellant’s marriage to respondent Wendy
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Leigh Lorbiecke. Appellant, who is self-represented, argues that the district court lacked
authority to order him to sign the purchase agreement because he had appealed the
judgment and decree finalizing the dissolution and the appeal was pending. He also
contends that the district court erred in determining that his refusal to sign the purchase
agreement was constructive civil contempt. Because the pending appeal did not suspend
the district court’s authority to enforce the dissolution order, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in ruling appellant in constructive civil contempt, we affirm.
FACTS
In April 2021, the district court entered a judgment and decree finalizing the divorce
of appellant and respondent. The district court awarded the marital homestead to
appellant— who was residing in the home—subject to a marital lien in favor of respondent.
The lien, in the amount of $43,067, served as the property equalizer for the parties. To
satisfy respondent’s lien, the district court’s judgment and decree required appellant to
refinance the mortgage on the home within 90 days of the filing of the judgment and decree.
If respondent’s lien was not satisfied within the 90-day period, it would begin to accrue
interest at the statutory judgment rate until paid in full. The judgment and decree provided
that, if the lien was not satisfied when the parties’ youngest child turned 18 and graduated
from high school, the home was to be sold.
Both appellant and respondent filed motions for amended findings, which the
district court denied in October 2021. Appellant then filed a notice of appeal to this court
from the April 2021 judgment and decree and the October 2021 order denying amended
findings.
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In January 2022, while appellant’s appeal was pending in this court, respondent filed
a motion in the district court seeking enforcement of the April 2021 judgment. Respondent
alleged that appellant had stopped making payments on the mortgage and had abandoned
the marital homestead. She sought an order requiring, among other things, immediate sale
of the home. Appellant acknowledged that he had abandoned the property in his response
to the motion. His response also made the following concession: “Respondent may take
possession of said property and list it for sale if she wishes.” But in his response to the
motion, appellant asked the district court to place some of the proceeds of the sale in escrow
pending the resolution of his appeal. During a February 2022 hearing before the district
court, the parties disagreed about several issues not pertinent to this appeal, but appellant
did not contest respondent’s request for immediate sale of the home.
In March 2022, the parties entered into a stipulated agreement that became the
district court’s order. That order authorized respondent to “have sole discretion over the
sale of the former marital residence and full authority to convey the property.” The order
also required appellant to “fully comply and sign without additional delay” any documents
necessary “for the purpose of sale.” Additionally, the order provided, “Should a purchase
agreement require both parties to execute, [appellant] shall be obligated to ful ly comply.”
The district court also granted appellant’s request for escrow of “all net sale proceeds”
pending this court’s decision in appellant’s appeal of the judgment and decree.
On April 7, respondent filed an emergency motion for an order directing appellant
to sign a purchase agreement for sale of the home. Respondent alleged that, while
preparing the home for sale, she found extensive damage caused by appellant, including
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damage that would require a new septic system. Thus, the property value had diminished,
and it had become more challenging to sell the home. Respondent alleged that there was a
potential buyer who had made an offer, and she believed there would be no other offers
due to the condition of the home. But, according to respondent’s motion, appellant refused
to sign the purchase agreement. Respondent asked the district court to sanction appellant
$500 per day for each day that he “fail[ed] to execute the required sales documents.”
At an April 20 hearing on respondent’s emergency motion, the district court heard
arguments from appellant, who appeared without counsel, and from respondent about
whether appellant should be required to sign the purchase agreement. Appellant did not
offer a satisfactory reason for failing to comply with the previous order requiring him to
sign any documents required for the sale of the marital home, and the district court
subsequently issued a conditional contempt order from the bench. The district court
ordered appellant to either sign the purchase agreement or personally appear at a second
hearing on April 27 “to show cause why he should not be held in Constructive Civil
Contempt of Court for failing to abide by the Court’s orders.”
On April 27, appellant appeared at the hearing, but still refused to sign the purchase
agreement. The district court provided appellant an opportunity to show cause for his
refusal. But the district court found that appellant failed to present any legitimate
explanation for his refusal. The district court ordered appellant to be confined in the jail.
It issued a noncriminal conditional-release order requiring appellant’s release from
confinement once appellant signed the purchase agreement. On April 29, while appellant
remained confined, the district court filed a written order finding appellant to be in
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constructive civil contempt of court and ordering appellant to remain confined “until such
time that he has executed the purchase agreement.” The district court provided the
purchase agreement to the jail so that appellant could sign at any time and be released. The
district court’s order stated that the contempt finding was “not to punish [appellant] for
past conduct but ordered to compel [appellant’s] future compliance with this Court’s
order.”
While appellant was in jail, this court dismissed his appeal of the judgment and
decree because appellant failed to file a brief. Appellant then appealed the district court’s
contempt order, which is the instant appeal.1
DECISION
In his appeal of the district court’s contempt order, appellant challenges both the
validity of the order that he refused to follow, which led to the contempt finding, and the
contempt proceedings. We reject appellant’s legal challenge to the underlying order and
discern no error in the district court’s finding of constructive civil contempt.
I. Notwithstanding appellant’s appeal of the judgment and decree , the district
court had authority to order appellant to sign the purchase agreement.

Appellant first argues that the district court had no authority to order him to sign the
purchase agreement because he had appealed the district court’s judgment and decree,
which addressed the parties’ interest in the marital home. He argues that his appeal of the

1 Respondent moved to dismiss this appeal, contending that appellant’s challenge to the
district court’s contempt order is moot because appellant was released from jail and the
appeal of the judgment and decree was dismissed. We denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground of mootness.
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judgment and decree suspended the district court’s authority to issue additional orders
concerning the marital home. We construe appellant’s argument as a challenge to the
district court’s jurisdiction to entertain a specific claim for relief, which is a question of
law that we review de novo. City of Waite Park v. Minn. Off. of Admin. Hearings, 758
N.W.2d 347, 352 (Minn. App. 2008) (reviewing de novo whether an appeal deprived the
district court of jurisdiction to consider a claim brought after the appeal was taken), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 25, 2009).
In support of his argument, appellant cites Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate
Procedure 108.01. The rule provides that “the filing of a timely and proper appeal suspends
the [district] court’s authority to make any order that affects the order or judgment appealed
from.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2. However, the rule also states that,
notwithstanding a pending appeal, the district court “retains jurisdiction as to matters
independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to” the ruling being appealed. Id. Collateral
matters over which a district court retains jurisdiction pending appeal include enforcement
of an order or judgment. David N. Volkmann Constr., Inc. v. Isaacs, 428 N.W.2d 875, 876-
77 (Minn. App. 1988) (citing Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn.
1984)). Thus, although the district court has no authority to modify or set aside rulings at
issue in an appeal, it may enforce those rulings while the appeal is pending. Id.
Although a party may move to stay enforcement of a judgment or order pending
appeal, an appeal does not automatically stay enforcement. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
108.01, subd. 1. Except under circumstances that do not apply here, there is no stay of
enforcement unless the district court specifically orders one. Id.
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Here, appellant did not seek—and the district court did not grant— a stay of the
judgment and decree pending the prior appeal. Thus, the district court had authority to
enforce the provisions of that judgment while appellant’s prior appeal was pending.2 The
district court’s subsequent orders requiring the sale of the marital property—including the
order directing appellant to sign the purchase agreement that was the basis for the contempt
finding— were collateral orders enforcing the judgment and decree. Notwithstanding
appellant’s prior appeal, the district court had authority to issue these enforcement orders.
We therefore reject appellant’s challenge to the validity of the order underlying the district
court’s finding of contempt.
II. We discern no error in the district court’s decision finding appellant to be in
constructive civil contempt.

Appellant next challenges the district court’s decision finding him to be in
constructive civil contempt for refusing to comply with the order to sign the purchase
agreement. He contends that the procedures the district court followed to find him in
contempt were unlawful. And he argues that the district court’s contempt finding was
erroneous. On appeal, a reviewing court will not reverse a district court’s decision to
invoke its contempt powers absent an abuse of discretion. Mower Cnty. Hum. Servs. ex
rel. Swancutt v. Swancutt, 551 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. 1996).

2 We also note that appellant agreed to allow respondent to sell the home while his appeal
was pending, thereby assenting to the enforcement of some provisions of the judgment and
decree. Furthermore, in enforcing the judgment, the district court was mindful of
appellant’s pending appeal. The district court ordered the proceeds of the sale to be placed
in escrow until the conclusion of the appeal.
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Constructive civil contempt “may” occur when an individual disobeys a lawful court
order. Minn. S tat. § 588.01, subd. 3(3) (2022). “When the contempt consists in the
omission to perform an act which is yet in the power of the person to perform, the person
may be imprisoned until the person performs it. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 588.12 (2022).
Before a district court can invoke its authority to hold an individual in constructive
civil contempt, it must follow certain procedural requirements. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has specified the following minimum requirements that a civil-contempt proceeding
must meet:
(1) the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
person;
(2) a clear definition of the acts to be performed;
(3) notice of the acts to be performed and a reasonable time
within which to comply;
(4) an application by the party seeking enforcement giving
specific grounds for complaint;
(5) a hearing, after due notice, to give the nonperforming party
an opportunity to show compliance or the reasons for failure;
(6) a formal determination by the court of failure to comply
and, if so, whether conditional confinement will aid
compliance;
(7) an opportunity for the nonperforming party to show
inability to comply despite a good faith effort; and
(8) the contemnor’s ability to gain release through compliance
or a good faith effort to comply.

Swancutt, 551 N.W.2d at 223 (citing Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 -17 ( Minn.
1968)); see also Minn. Stat. § 588.04(a) (2022) (“In cases of constructive contempt, an
affidavit of the facts constituting the contempt shall be presented to the court . . . who may
either issue a warrant of arrest to bring the person charged to answer or, . . . upon notice,
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or upon an order to show cause . . . may commit the person to jail, impose a fine, or
both . . . .”).
A district court’s contempt order “can be either remedial or punitive.” State v.
Tatum, 556 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. 1996). Civil contempt orders, which are “designed
to induce future performance of a valid court order, not to punish for past failure to
perform,” are remedial. Mahady v. Mahady, 448 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. App. 1989). By
contrast, criminal contempt orders are punitive. Tatum, 556 N.W.2d at 544. Our supreme
court recommends that “courts considering a contempt penalty determine at their earliest
convenience whether the purpose of the contempt proceeding is remedial or punitive.” Id.
at 545.
Against this legal backdrop, we now consider the contempt proceedings in
appellant’s case. Initially, we note that the scope of our review is limited because appellant
did not order the full record on appeal. While we have the documents filed with the district
court and the transcripts and exhibits from the underlying marriage dissolution
proceedings, appellant failed to obtain the transcripts of the February 2022 hearing or
transcripts of the April 20 and 27 contempt proceedings for our review.
3 “An appellant

3 Appellant’s brief asserts that this court never instructed him how to order the record. But
it is the appellant’s duty to order a transcript “of those parts of the proceedings not already
part of the record which are deemed necessary for inclusion in the record.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 110.02, subd. 1(a). Moreover, “[w]hen an appellant acts as attorney pro se,
appellate courts are disposed to disregard defects in the brief, but that does not relieve
appellants of the necessity of providing an adequate record and preserving it in a way that
will permit review.” Thorp Loan & Thrift Co. v. Morse, 451 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. App.
1990), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990).
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has the burden of providing an adequate record for appeal. Error cannot be presumed.”
Custom Farm Servs., Inc. v. Collins, 238 N.W.2d 608, 609 (Minn. 1976).
Although we do not have the full record of the proceedings, the district court issued
a detailed order. Based on our review of the district court’s reasoning, we discern no error.
There is no merit to appellant’s argument that the district court failed to comply with
the procedural requirements for a contempt finding. The district court had personal
jurisdiction over appellant, clearly identified the act to be performed, gave appellant over
one week to comply with the order to sign the purchase agreement, scheduled an
evidentiary hearing to provide appellant with an opportunity to show compliance or explain
his failure, made a formal determination of noncompliance, found that conditional
confinement would likely induce compliance, and gave appellant the opportunity for
immediate release from jail upon signing the purchase agreement. See Swancutt, 551
N.W.2d at 223. Given these circumstances, we conclude that the district court satisfied the
procedural requirements for constructive civil contempt.
Appellant also seems to challenge the district court’s ultimate determination that his
refusal to sign the purchase agreement was constructive civil contempt warranting the
confinement. Based on our review of the limited record and the district court’s order, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant’s steadfast refusal to
follow the order to sign the purchase agreement was an act of constructive civil contempt
and that the confinement would induce compliance.
Appellant’s brief raises several additional challenges to the district court’s contempt
order for the first time on appeal and provides little, if any, analysis of those issues. His
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brief alleges that the district court judge was biased, that appellant agreed to the sale of the
property under duress, and that the district court’s ruling violated appellant’s federal and
state constitutional rights, including the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
and the right to “freedom of conscience.”
Generally, we do not address issues that were not presented to and considered by
the district court in the proceedings below. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1988); see also In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (declining to
address a constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal). Likewise, we do not
consider issues that are unsupported by legal argument or citation to supporting authority.
See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480
(Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733
N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-law appeal).
We note that adverse rulings alone are insufficient to impute bias to a judge, Olson
v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986), and that the record before us reveals
no evidence of judicial bias. As to appellant’s remaining issues, we conclude that appellant
forfeited them by failing to raise them before the district court and by providing this court
with insufficient briefing.
Affirmed.