In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0954

In re the Marriage of:

Pawel Dominik Rzeczkowski, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Carolina Uribe Borrero,
Respondent.

Filed April 3, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-6324

Robert W. Due, James R. Todd, DeWitt LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

John DeWalt, Melissa Chawla, DeWalt, Chawla + Saksena, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this marital-dissolution dispute, appellant argues that the district court erred by
enforcing the terms of a document purporting to dissolve and liquidate the marital estate
executed under Colombian law. Appellant also challenges the district court’s denial of
2
spousal maintenance, calculation of respondent’s income for child-support purposes, and
denial of need-based attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Pawel Rzeczkowski and respondent-wife Carolina Borrero met
at a retreat in New York in the summer of 2010. Borrero was living in her home country
of Colombia, in an apartment in Bogota, and Rzeczkowski was living in Newnan, Georgia,
where his parents lived, when the two met. The parties began a romantic relationship
shortly after meeting and, by August 2010, Rzeczkowski moved to Bogota to live with
Borrero in her apartment. During the parties’ time in Colombia, Borrero experienced
professional success as an executive for Pfizer. Rzeczkowski was not employed, but had
recently received a Global Executive Masters in Business Administration (MBA) through
a joint program of Columbia University and the London Business School.
In June 2011, the parties became engaged. Borrero was excited to get married, but
had serious concerns about Rzeczkowski ’s “lack of employment and apparent
unwillingness to accept anything less than his ideal job.” Rzeczkowski’s career aspiration
was to pursue start-up companies and, in his words, to “swing for the fences and take risks
by chasing unicorns (start-ups with billion- dollar potential).” Rzeczkowski had also
accumulated a significant amount of student- loan debt and had liquidated and spent his
401(k) assets accrued from a prior job. Borrero thus wanted to protect her assets from his
creditors and from the uncertainty of whether he would contribute fairly toward their
financial futures. And, at least according to Borrero, Rzeczkowski was also interested in
protecting his anticipated future assets from being part of the marital estate.
3
Borrero consulted a Colombian family-law attorney, who recommended that the
parties enter into a series of agreements to keep their assets and obligations separate.
Specifically, the attorney recommended that the parties enter into three agreements under
Colombian law: (1) a prenuptial agreement so that none of their preexisting assets or debts
would become part of the marital estate; (2) a marriage contract; and (3) an agreement to
immediately dissolve and liquidate the marital estate following the marriage, a “dissolution
and liquidation of marital partnership” agreement (the DLMP). According to the family-
law attorney, these agreements would, under Colombian law, allow the parties to enter into
a legally valid marriage, but would keep their finances and property separate. Borrero
offered evidence that these type s of agreements are not novel under Colombian law; she
submitted affidavits from two Columbian-law experts explaining that the agreements are
specifically provided for under Colombian law.
Borrero then spoke with her aunt, who is described by Borrero as a “well-known
Colombian attorney.” The aunt drafted the agreements based on the advice from the
family-law attorney. To prepare the agreements, Borrero and Rzeczkowski needed to
gather a number of documents, including bank statements and other information about their
individual assets, investments, liabilities, and debts.
The parties signed the prenuptial agreement on September 30, 2011. Borrero’s
premarital assets, kept separate by the agreement, “included property worth 500,000
Colombian pesos, her real property, her vehicle, her investment accounts, her retirement
savings account, and various savings and bank accounts.” Rzeczkowski’s premarital
“assets included property worth 500,000 Colombian pesos and the balance of [a credit
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union account].” The parties were married on October 1, 2011 . The DLMP was also
signed by the parties. T he DLMP is dated October 3, 2011 ; the parties’ signatures,
however, are not separately dated. The marriage records of the parties in Colombia show
that a Colombian notary public executed the prenuptial agreement on September 30, 2011,
and the DLMP on October 3, 2011.
In 2013, the parties moved to the United States at Rzeczkowski’s request. Prior to
the move, they consulted with multiple attorneys to ensure that the prenuptial and DLMP
agreements would be enforceable in the United States. As part of that process,
Rzeczkowski emailed an attorney based in New York City in December 2011 and indicated
that one of the major concerns the parties had was “making our prenuptial agreement and
separation of assets agreement legal in [the United States].”
Following the move to the United States, Borrero continued to primarily support the
parties. The parties lived in New York and Borrero continued to work for Pfizer;
Rzeczkowski built his professional network but was not employed. Borrero, however, lost
her job at Pfizer and subsequent ly accepted employment at Brambles in Atlanta. The
parties then moved to Atlanta and lived there for approximately three years.
1 Borrero
worked at Brambles and then did consulting work for Coca Cola; Rzeczkowski continued
to build his professional network and had intermittent employment at startup companies.
Rzeczkowski received some income from a few of the startup companies, but received no

1 Rzeczkowski’s parents lived near Atlanta in Newnan, Georgia where Rzeczkowski was
living when he met Borrero.
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compensation from others. In March 2015, while the parties lived in Atlanta, Borrero gave
birth to twins.
In 2017, Borrero accepted employment at Cargill and the parties moved to
Minnesota. Rzeczkowski worked at Thrivent Financial for approximately six months until
December 2018, when he lost his position due to changes in management at Thrivent. He
earned app roximately $130,000 during his six months with Thrivent. Rzeczkowski
remained unemployed between December 2018 and the dissolution trial in 2022. Borrero
also lost her position at Cargill in 2018, but has worked on various consulting projects to
earn income since losing that position. Despite Borrero’s position changes, she has
continually earned a “substantial income” and has considerable financial assets. The
parties’ homestead and vehicles are titled solely in Borrero’s name.
In September 2019, Rzeczkowski petitioned for dissolution of marriage. The parties
both filed motions for temporary relief . In August 2020, the district court established a
temporary parenting-time schedule and ordered Borrero to pay Rzeczkowski $2,500 per
month in financial support and to pay the mortgage, insurance, and other costs of the
homestead and to pay the loans and insurance for their vehicles, along with their mobile
phone bills, among other expenses. In doing so, the district court noted that “[t]he financial
disparity between the parties is large” and that Borrero had “significant financial assets.”
In contrast, the district court noted that Rzeczkowski had “limited financial assets” but had
“shown some capacity to obtain limited employment.” The district court ordered that the
parties “engage in a good faith effort to become employed and earn income” and expressed
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its concern that Rzeczkowski not engage in “freeriding” while receiving temporary
financial support from Borrero.
During the dissolution proceedings, Borrero brought a motion to enforce the
prenuptial agreement and the DLMP . She argued that, based on the DLMP , the vast
majority of the assets acquired during the marriage—including the homestead, vehicles,
and savings—were her nonmarital assets. Rzeczkowski moved the district court to declare
the DLMP invalid, arguing that he did not understand the ramifications of the document at
the time and that it was invalid under Colombian and Minnesota law. The district court
received submissions on the issue, including opinions from Borrero’s two experts on
Colombian law and one from a Colombian law expert offered by Rzeczkowski.
Based on those submissions, the district court ruled that the documents were
enforceable as foreign judgments under the principles of comity . The district court
reasoned that, even if the documents were treated as contracts instead of foreign judgments,
the principles of comity are still applicable under the “general rule that a contract made in
one state will be enforced in another state.” Seamans v. Christian Bros. Mill Co., 68 N.W.
1065, 1066 (Minn. 1896).
After analyzing the evidence surrounding the parties’ knowledge at the time the
documents were signed, their reliance on the documents following the marriage, and the
expert opinions, the district court rejected Rzeczkowski’s arguments against enforcement.
The district court found that there was “an abundance of circumstantial evidence that
suggests that [Rzeczkowski] knew about the details of the Colombian Documents” and
also that Rzeczkowski had “given [the] Court reason to believe that he would mislead the
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Court or distort facts in a self-serving manner.” The district court further found that,
because the DLMP was drafted to comport with Colombian law, the document could be
enforced in Minnesota even though it did not comport with Minnesota’s statute governing
postnuptial agreements, Minn. Stat. § 519.11 (2022). Finally, the district court found that
the DLMP did not violate the public policy against allowing a divorced spouse to become
a “public charge.”
The district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment, and
judgment and decree finalizing the dissolution was issued a number of months later.
Relevant to this appeal, the district court ordered that the assets and liabilities of the parties
be allocated as provided in the prenuptial agreement and the DLMP. As a result, most of
the property and assets at issue were deemed to be Borrero’s nonmarital property. The
district court ordered that the parties have joint legal and joint physical custody of the
children, with equal parenting time, and ordered Borrero to pay Rzeczkowski $241 per
month for child support. The district court also denied Rzeczkowski’s requests for spousal
maintenance and need-based attorney fees.
DECISION
On appeal, Rzeczkowski challenges the district court’s decision to enforce the terms
of the DLMP on several grounds. First, he argues that the DLMP is not entitled to
enforcement under the principles of comity as a foreign judgment because the DLMP is a
contract, not a judgment. Second, he argues that the DLMP cannot be enforced because it
is not valid under Colombian law for the following reasons: (1) the DLMP was signed by
the parties before they were married and, to be effective under Colombian law, it needed
8
to be signed after their wedding; and (2) he was fraudulently induced to sign the DLMP
and did not understand what he was signing because the DLMP was in Spanish, a language
that he is not fluent in, and he was not offered a translator as required by Colombian law.
Third, Rzeczkowski argues that the DLMP cannot be enforced under the principles of
comity because enforcement would violate Minnesota’s public policies against rendering
a divorced spouse a public charge and against unconscionable contracts.
In addition, Rzeczkowski challenges the district court’s decision to deny him
spousal maintenance, its calculation of Borrero’s income for purposes of child support, and
its decision to deny his claim for need-based attorney fees.
I. The principles of comity are applicable, but we remand to the district court to
analyze whether enforcement of the DLMP would violate the public policy
against unconscionable contracts.

Applicability of the Principles of Comity

We will address first the issue of whether the district court erred by applying the
principles of comity in determining whether to enforce the terms of the DL MP. The
application of comity
is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor
of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). “We review a district court’s application of
the principle of comity for an abuse of discretion.” In re Civ. Commitment of Hand, 878
N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. App. 2016), rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 2016). A court may
9
decline to recognize a foreign judgment as a matter of comity if it is “contrary to the public
policy of Minnesota.” Nicol v. Tanner, 256 N.W.2d 796, 802 n.11 (Minn. 1976).
At the outset, Rzeczkowski argues that the district court erred by applying the
principles of comity because the DLMP is a contract, not a foreign judgment. We
disagree.2 Under Colombian law, the DLMP is akin to a judgment even though it reflects
an agreement reached between the parties. The DLMP was entered into based on specific
provisions of Colombian law cited in the document. Those provisions require that, to be
valid under Colombian law, the DLMP had to be recorded in a public deed executed b y a
“notary public.” Thus, an agreement between the parties but not executed by a Colombian
notary public or recorded in a public deed— a mere contract—would not be enforceable as
a DLMP. And here, because the DLMP signed by the parties was recorded in a public deed
executed by a Colombian notary public, it had greater legal significance than a contract.
Additionally, as the district court explained, notaries in Colombia are different from,
and have more authority than, notaries in the United States. In support of her request to
enforce the DLMP, Borrero submitted a petition to the notary office in the district in which
the parties were married in Colombia. The petition requested information about the role
of notaries public in Colombia and how their role and authority differed from notaries in
the United States. The response from the acting head of the notary office explained that
“to be appointed as Notary Public in Colombia, there is a set of requirements, related to

2 Borrero argues in the alternative that the principles of comity apply even if the DLMP is
characterized as a foreign contract and not a judgment. The district court agreed. We do
not, however, address this alternative argument because we conclude that the district court
did not err in treating the DLMP as a foreign judgment.
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professional experience and education, which are more demanding than those established
for Circuit Judge appointments.”3 The response states that the requirements to be a “notary
public” in Colombia include having a law degree and at least one of the following: six
years of experience as a judge or university professor; ten years of legal practice; or four
years as a notary, registrar or commissioner of public instruments. As to the scope of
authority of a Colombian notary public, the acting head of the notary office stated that,
under Colombian law , notaries are empowered to “authoriz[e] . . . acts with declarations
that constitute juridical situations, if there is agreement and no controversy between the
parties.” The response further explained that “these juridical situations shall have the same
legal effects as if legally decreed in an adversarial or voluntary jurisdiction proceeding.”
The acting head of the notary office noted that, when the parties are in agreement
on the terms, a marriage in Colombia may be legally dissolved when “processed before
any Notary Public” and “formalized through a public deed.” The response also stated that
“Notaries Public are competent to authorize the dissolution and liquidation of the marital
estate, even when, by mutual agreement, the parties decide to continue their marriage, with
the civil effects of marriage still in force.” The acting head of the notary office commented
that the dissolution and liquidation of the marital estate in this case “was granted
immediately after the marriage proceeding and in definite manner dissolved and liquidated

3 This and the following quotes are from the official translation of the response to Borrero’s
petition to the notary office. The record also contains the original in Spanish that is signed
by the notary.
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the marital estate.” The response stated that “the spouses remain[ed] married but without
marital partnership and without common or joint property.”
As set out in the response summarized above, the role of a Colombian notary public
is very different from a Minnesota notary public whose role is limited to verifying the
identity of a person signing a document and that the signature is of that person. See Minn.
Stat. § 358.55 (2022) (describing duties of a notarial officer). As described by the acting
head of the notary office, the act of a Colombian notary public in granting documents like
the DLMP is akin to a judicial officer issuing an order or decree based upon a stipulated
agreement. We conclude that the DLMP is therefore comparable to a judgment and that
the district court did not err in applying the principles of comity in determining whether
the DLMP was enforceable.
Validity of the DLMP under Colombian Law
Rzeczkowski, however, argues that the district court nevertheless erred in enforcing
the DLMP because the DLMP is not valid under Colombian law. Rzeczkowski contends
that the DLMP is not valid because the document was signed by the parties before they
were legally married. He bases his argument on the assertion that he and Borrero signed
the DLMP on September 30, 2011 —the day before their wedding. He argues that the
DLMP was then “falsely notarized” on October 3, 2011, and is therefore invalid because
at the time it was signed there was no marital estate to dissolve and liquidate.
As the district court found, however, the DLMP does not state that it was signed on
October 3, 2011. Rather, the agreement states that the parties, in accordance with
Colombian law, “proceed to dissolve and liquidate their marital partnership without any
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property borne by the partnership at the date of execution of this public instrument.”
(Emphasis added.) The date listed on the agreement is October 3, 2011, the date the DLMP
was executed by the notary public and the public deed was recorded. The district court’s
finding on this issue is supported in the record by Borrero’s two experts on Colombian law
who opined that the DLMP was executed as of October 3 and is valid and enforceable
under Colombian law.4 We therefore discern no error by the district court in its finding
that there was no falsification by the notary public, and in its determination that the DLMP
is valid under Colombian law because it became effective, according to its terms, as of
October 3, 2011—after the parties were married.
Claim of Fraudulent Inducement and Failure to Offer a Translator
Rzeczkowski further argues that he was fraudulently induced into signing the
document because it was in Spanish and he did not fully understand the consequences of
entering into the document. See Nicol, 256 N.W.2d at 802 (noting that one of the
requirements to recognize a foreign judgment is that “there is nothing to show . . . fraud in
procuring the judgment” (quotation omitted)). He also asserts that he was not offered a
translator, as required by Colombian law, despite the fact that he was not fluent in Spanish.

4 While Rzeczkowski presented an affidavit from his own Colombian law expert opining
that the DLMP is not valid because the parties signed the document before their marriage,
the district court credited Borrero’s experts. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210
(Minn. 1988) (stating that “[d]eference must be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to assess the credibility of the witnesses”); see also Straus v. Straus, 94 N.W.2d 679, 680
(Minn. 1959) (stating that “[c]onflicts in the evidence, even though the presentation is
upon affidavits, are to be resolved by the trial court”); Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833,
837-38 (Minn. App. 2016) (citing this aspect of Straus).
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The district court rejected these arguments based on credibility determinations, and we
defer to those determinations. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210.
The district court thoroughly analyzed the evidence surrounding Rzeczkowski’s
knowledge about and understanding of the terms of the DLMP, including emails with
attorneys prior to entering into the agreements, email exchanges with attorneys only
months later in preparation for the parties’ return to the United States, and other
communications in which the DLMP was discussed. The district court determined that not
only was Rzeczkowski aware of the consequences of entering into the agreements, but that
Rzeczkowski’s “statements lack reliability, consistency with other facts, and are permeated
with [Rzeczkowski’s] self-interest to use the [DLMP ] when it suits him and disavow it
when it does not.” The district court determined that Rzeczkowski demonstrated bad faith
during the proceedings relating to his knowledge of the DLMP. And despite
Rzeczkowski’s assertion that he was not offered a translator, the district court found “there
is credible evidence that he was offered a translator.” Specifically, the record contains a
sworn statement from the acting head of the notary office in Colombia averring that the
notary public who authorized the DLMP asked Rzeczkowski if he needed a translation or
for the agreements to be read in English, that he declined that offer, and that he indicated
he understood the agreements. Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s
findings that the DLMP was valid under Colombian law.
5

5 We note that Rzeczkowski argues also that the DLMP is not enforceable because the
DLMP does not comport with the procedural requirements of Minnesota’s postnuptial
contract statute set out in Minn. Stat. § 519.11. The district court, however, concluded that,
because the DLMP is being enforced under the principles of comity as a foreign judgment,
14

Public-Policy Exception
Finally, Rzeczkowski argues that the DLMP should not be recognized as a matter
of comity because the terms of the DLMP are such that they would violate the public policy
of Minnesota. A court may decline to recognize a foreign judgment as a matter of comity
if it would be “contrary to the public policy of Minnesota” to enforce that judgment. Nicol,
256 N.W.2d at 802 n.11.
Rzeczkowski argues that the DLMP violates Minnesota’s public policy because
enforcement of the document would render him a public charge. See Abbott v. Abbott, 282
N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 1979). In Abbott, a party petitioned for modification of spousal
maintenance on the ground that his former spouse was living with and being supported by
a new romantic partner. Id. at 564. In reviewing the district court’s decision to modify
maintenance, the supreme court observed: “It is in the public interest that [maintenance]
be paid, since without such a postdivorce provision for support, there is a substantial
likelihood that a divorced spouse will become a public charge.” Id. at 565. Rzeczkowski
argues that enforcement of the DLMP would similarly render him a public charge because
under the agreements nearly all of the property acquired during the marriage would belong
solely to Borrero and Rzeczkowski would be unable to support himself. But the district
court determined that Rzeczkowski is capable of supporting himself and meeting his

such failure does not of itself render the DLMP unenforceable if it was in compliance with
the procedures required under Colombian law. We agree. See Ramsey County v. Lee, 770
N.W.2d 572, 576 (Minn. App. 2009) (“The general rule is that things done in one
sovereignty in pursuance of the laws of that sovereignty are regarded as valid and binding
everywhere.” (quotation omitted)).
15
reasonable monthly expenses through appropriate employment. As will be discussed in
greater detail in the next section of the analysis, the record supports this determination.
Enforcement of the DLMP therefore would not render Rzeczkowski a public charge, and
his public-policy argument on this ground fails.
Rzeczkowski, however, also argued to the district court—although not articulated
as clearly as his public-charge argument —that enforcement of the DLMP would be
unconscionable. There is no Minnesota caselaw addressing whether the public-policy
exception to the application of comity encompasses unconscionability. Minnesota does,
however, have a policy against enforcing unconscionable contracts. 6 See Holland v.
Sheehan, 122 N.W. 1, 3 (Minn. 1909) (“Public policy requires of courts of equity protection
from unjust and unconscionable bargains . . . .”), abrogated in part by Maslowski v.
Prospect Fundings Partners LLC, 944 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2020); see also Kauffman
Stewart, Inc. v. Weinbrenner Shoe Co., 589 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. App. 1999) (“If a
court determines that a contract contains an unconscionable clause, it may refuse to enforce
the contract, enforce it without the offending language, or limit application of the
unconscionable clause to avoid any unconscionable result.” (quotation omitted)). And, in
the context of antenuptial agreements, our supreme court has held that such agreements

6 Under Minnesota precedent, “[a] contract is unconscionable if it is such as no [person] in
[their] senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair [person] would accept on the other.” In re Est. of Hoffbeck, 415 N.W.2d 447, 449
(Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1988).

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“must be fair, both procedurally and substantively.”7 Kremer v. Kremer, 912 N.W.2d 617,
621 (Minn. 2018). The court stated that “[t]he common-law standard for substantive
fairness is whether an agreements’ terms are unconscionable or oppressive.” Id. We also
note that the legislature has expressed similar standards for postnuptial agreements in
subdivision 1a of Minn. Stat. § 519.11. That statute provides that to be “valid and
enforceable,” the agreement must be “procedurally and substantively fair and equitable.”8
Minn. Stat. § 519.11, subd. 1a.
Consequently, we can presume that there is a clear policy in this state against the
enforcement of unconscionable postnuptial agreements. And because “[c]omity is not a
formal rule but rather an informal policy of deference,” we also conclude that it is valid to
consider whether the DLMP is unconscionable regardless of whether Colombia would
judge the DLMP against the same standard. Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Bionics Corp. ,
630 N.W.2d 438, 449 (Minn. App. 2001). As such, we conclude that the public-policy

7 While this and other cases cited in this opinion refer to “antenuptial” agreements and the
DLMP is a stipulated postnuptial document, the distinction is not material for the purposes
for which the cases are cited.

8 In citing Minn. St at. § 519.11, we are not implying that the statute governs whether the
DLMP should be enforced. Under the principles of comity, the DLMP is enforceable,
subject only to the exceptions to the application of that doctrine, such as the public-policy
exception. We cite Minn. Stat. § 519.11 only as an example of an expression of
Minnesota’s public policy. See Holland, 122 N.W. at 3 (“Constitutions and statutes are
evidence of the general policy of a state; but when confronted with questions of general
public policy . . . the courts go beyond express legislation and look to the whole body of
the law—statutory, common, and judicial decisions.”).
17
exception to the application of comity encompasses a prohibition on the enforcement of
unconscionable provisions in postnuptial agreements.9
The district court here, however, did not address whether the provisions of the
DLMP are unconscionable. The district court limited its public-policy analysis to whether
enforcement of the DLMP would render Rzeczkowski a public charge, which in fairness
to the district court was Rzeczkowski’s most clearly articulated claim. We conclude that
it is therefore appropriate to remand this issue to the district court to determine whether
enforcement of the DLMP would be unconscionable, and we refrain from expressing any
opinion on the merits of this question at this time.

9 We caution that, in recognizing the existence of a public policy against unconscionable
postnuptial provisions in this context, we do not intend to accord courts with free rein to
reject the clearly stated intentions of the parties. We note in this regard that “Minnesota
has long recognized the validity of antenuptial agreements which altered statutory schemes
regulating the disposition of marital property.” McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d
259, 265 (Minn. 1989) , overruled in part by Kremer v. Kremer, 912 N.W.2d 617, 626
(Minn. 2018). The supreme court has cautioned that the mere fact that an agreement may
divide marital property differently than the property-division statutes, does not render an
agreement substantively unfair. McKee-Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 268 n.8. “Indeed, one of
the goals, if not the primary purpose, of an antenuptial agreement is to alter state-prescribed
property rights which would otherwise arise on dissolution of marriage.” Id. Thus, the
fact that an agreement may result in a different or less favorable outcome than would
otherwise have occurred in the absence of the agreement does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the agreement is unconscionable.
18
II. The district court did not err in determining that Rzeczkowski is not entitled
to temporary spousal maintenance.

Rzeczkowski next argues that the district court should have awarded him temporary
spousal maintenance.10 We review a district court’s spousal-maintenance decision for an
abuse of discretion. Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). A district
court abuses its discretion if it reaches a “ conclusion that is against logic and the facts on
record.” Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Dobrin, 569
N.W.2d at 202). The court reviews legal questions de novo, but reviews findings of fact
for clear error. Kampf v. Kampf , 732 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 21, 2007). Findings are clearly erroneous if “they are manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
A district court may order spousal maintenance if it finds that the spouse requesting
maintenance either:
(a) lacks sufficient property . . . to provide for
reasonable needs of the spouse considering the standard of
living established during the marriage . . . or
(b) is unable to provide adequate self-support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate
employment.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2022); see also Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn.
1989) (stating that an award of spousal maintenance requires a showing of need). The
district court may award spousal maintenance “in amounts and for periods of time, either

10 Rzeczkowski made no request for permanent spousal maintenance.
19
temporary or permanent,” as it deems just after considering “all relevant factors.” Id., subd.
2 (2022).
“If a party requests spousal maintenance, a district court must engage in a two-step
analysis.” Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 695 (Minn. App. 2019). The first step is
to consider “whether the party seeking maintenance has demonstrated a showing of need.”
Id. (quotation omitted). A party demonstrates a showing of need if “the party is unable to
provide for his or her reasonable expenses through employment income or investment
income or a combination of both.” Id. If a party makes the threshold showing of need, the
second step is for the district court to consider the appropriate amount and duration of
maintenance. Id.
Rzeczkowski argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
request for temporary spousal maintenance because the district court “did not make
detailed findings reflecting consideration of the factors listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 2,” which sets forth relevant factors to be considered when determining the amount
and duration of maintenance. But such consideration is to be undertaken only if the party
requesting maintenance first makes a showing of need that demonstrates “the party is
unable to provide for his or her reasonable expenses through employment.” Id.; see also
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(b). Here, the district court determined that Rzeczkowski is
capable of providing for his reasonable expenses through employment. The district court
thus determined that Rzeczkowski failed to make the threshold showing of need and as
such the court was not required to make findings on the second step of the analysis. Cf.
Tuthill v. Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. App. 1987) (ruling, in the maintenance-
20
modification context, that the movant’s failure to show the statutorily required change of
circumstances was fatal to the motion to modify maintenance, and hence that “it is not
necessary for the trial court to make findings regarding any other factors addressed in the
statute”). Accordingly, we turn our attention to a review of the district court’s
determination that Rzeczkowski is capable of meeting his reasonable monthly expenses
through employment.
Rzeczkowski was unemployed at the time of trial and submitted an itemized list of
expenses totaling $4,999 per month. In his written final argument, Rzeczkowski indicated
that in addition to the listed expenses he also had a monthly expense of $300 for his health-
insurance premium. He requested spousal maintenance in the amount of $4,550 per month
for a period of five years and argued that, “[t]ogether with child support, this amount of
temporary spousal maintenance will afford [ Rzeczkowski] the opportunity to meet his
budget of approximately $5,300 per month.” The district court denied Rzeczkowski’s
request for temporary spousal maintenance after determining that Rzeczkowski could and
should be able to obtain appropriate employment that would allow him to meet his monthly
budget.
In the initial order granting temporary relief issued in August 2020, the district court
ordered “[b]oth parties [to] engage in a good faith effort to become employed and earn
income.” The initial order also required Borrero to pay temporary financial support to
Rzeczkowski in the amount of $2,500 per month in addition to paying for the mortgage,
property taxes, homeowner’s insurance, and utilities for the homestead, along with
21
covering the vehicle payments, auto-insurance premiums, and mobile-phone bills for her
and Rzeczkowski.11
In an attempt to demonstrate that he had conducted a serious job search during the
year and a half between the initial order and trial, Rzeczkowski submitted an exhibit
indicating that he had applied for 55 jobs between July 2020 and December 2021, an 18-
month period. Approximately two-thirds of the total applications were submitted in just
two months —March and November 2021 —and there were several months when
Rzeczkowski seemingly did not apply for any jobs. Moreover, many of the positions were
high-level director or vice-president positions at large companies, and Rzeczkowski
received interviews for only two positions, neither of which resulted in an offer of
employment.
The district court found that, in the period of time between the initial order and trial,
Rzeczkowski should have been able to gain employment and that he “has not shown
credible evidence of his attempts to gain sufficient employment.” The district court found
that Rzeczkowski “is capable of gaining employment, that no further education or training
would be necessary, and that his history of employment supports this position.” The
district court then explicitly stated that it “would like to emphasize the difference that exists
between sufficient employment and [Rzeczkowski’s] preferred employment.”
We discern no clear error in the district court’s findings. The record shows that
Rzeczkowski has an impressive educational background, including an MBA from

11 Borrero also offered to pay to furnish Rzeczkowski’s new living space.
22
Columbia University a nd the London Business School. After receiving his joint degree,
instead of seeking employment with established companies, Rzeczkowski pursued start-up
opportunities in hopes of finding a “unicorn” that never materialized. Rzeczkowski did
work for Thrivent Financial in 2018 and was able to make approximately $130,000 in his
six months of employment there. And Rzeczkowski received vocational placement
coaching while they were living in Minnesota, paid for by Borrero’s employer.
The record also contains testimony from a vocational expert retained by Borrero
who reviewed Rzeczkowski’s education and employment history. The expert testified that,
in his opinion, Rzeczkowski was immediately employable and capable of earning $100,000
to $125,000 per year.12 This supports the district court’s determination that Rzeczkowski
is capable of obtaining suitable employment but, because he chooses to apply for only his
ideal positions, is voluntarily unemployed.
Rzeczkowski cites to Carrick v. Carrick as support for his argument that the district
court denied spousal maintenance to punish him for failing to obtain employment during
the proceedings. 560 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. App. 1997). But that case is thoroughly
distinguishable. First, the district court in this case found Rzeczkowski voluntarily
unemployed in the dissolution judgment only after the court had ordered him in the
temporary order to engage in a “good faith” search for employment. There was no such

12 Borrero’s vocational expert also testified that an active job search typically involves
applying for three to five positions per week, compared to Rzecz kowski’s search that
involved an average of about three applications per month. Additionally, t he expert
testified that many of the positions Rzeczkowski applied for were too high level given the
gaps in Rzeczkowski’s employment history. Rzeczkowski presented no vocational expert
testimony.
23
temporary order to seek employment in Carrick. Second, “Carrick addressed only the
period between the parties’ separation and the dissolution judgment”; district courts “read
Carrick too broadly” if they “apply [Carrick ] to the post-judgment period.” Passolt v.
Passolt, 804 N.W.2d 18, 24 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011).
Carrick thus addresses a different question (need of a potential maintenance recipient to
seek a job before entry of a dissolution judgment) i n a different context and lacks
persuasive weight here.
Third, Carrick is also factually distinguishable from this case. In Carrick, the
parties were married for more than 21 years. Id. at 411. The wife did not work outside of
the home for the first ten years of the parties’ marriage, but rather “was a full-time
homemaker and caretaker” of the parties’ child and the husband’s three children from a
prior marriage. Id. The wife then worked on a part-time basis for the last ten years of the
marriage and continued her part-time employment after the parties separated. Id. The
district court in Carrick awarded the wife spousal maintenance but did so only after
imputing additional income to her. The district court imputed the income based on its
determination that the wife “acted in bad faith by remaining intentionally underemployed”
because she remained employed only in a part-time, instead of a full -time, status between
the parties’ separation and the dissolution of their marriage. Id. at 410.
In Carrick, this court reversed the imputation of additional income to the wife,
noting that “[t]here is no authority for finding bad faith underemployment . . . merely
because a potential obligee has not yet rehabilitated when the record indicates the obligee
has continued in the same employment and there is no evidence of an intent to reduce
24
income for the purposes of obtaining maintenance.” Id. at 410-11. This court went on to
note that “the evidence indicated that [the wife] earned a reasonable income from [her]
position, enjoyed working . . . and was very committed emotionally to the job.” Id. at 411.
Here, Rzeczkowski petitioned for dissolution of marriage after the parties had been
married for just eight years. This is significantly less than the 21-year marriage in Carrick.
And unlike the wife in Carrick, Rzeczkowski was not a “full-time homemaker and
caretaker.” The record is clear that both parties expected Rzeczkowski to work full-time
outside the home. While both parties have been actively involved in the parenting of the
twins, the parties had a live-in nanny from the time of the children’s birth in March 2015
until the end of 2018. In the order granting temporary relief , the district court found that
“[t]he totality of the evidence supports that the parties are equally responsible for the
children’s care rather than one party being the sole caretaker of the children.” This further
distinguishes the facts of this case from Carrick.
Finally, we note that this court observed in Carrick that the wife continued her pre-
separation employment, earned a reasonable income, and was committed to her job, and
there was no evidence that the wife had attempted to reduce her income to obtain
maintenance. Here, the record supports that Rzeczkowski has limited his job search to his
ideal jobs despite the district court’s order in August 2020 that both parties engage in a
good-faith effort to obtain employment. In that order, the district court also explicitly
stated that “the Court is concerned that [Rzeczkowski’s] motion for financial support may
encourage freeriding.” And in the final order denying Rzeczkowski’s request for spousal
25
maintenance, the district court found a “lack of evidence” that Rzeczkowski’s “inability to
be self-sufficient was not due to his unwillingness to gain employment.”
On this record, we discern no clear error by the district court in finding that
Rzeczkowski was voluntarily unemployed and was capable of meeting his reasonable
monthly expenses through suitable employment. Because the record supports the
determination that Rzeczkowski did not demonstrate a need for spousal maintenance, the
district court did not err in failing to make findings related to the duration and amount of
maintenance. See Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d at 232.
III. The district court did not err in calculating child support.
Rzeczkowski argues that the district court erred in calculating child support because
it understated Borrero’s income and overstated his own. Generally, the “determination of
income must be based in fact and will stand unless clearly erroneous.” Newstrand v. Arend,
869 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15,
2015).
In calculating the parties’ child-support obligations, the district court found that
Borrero had a monthly income of $15,810 and that Rzeczkowski had a potential monthly
income of $8,333 based on the lower end of the estimation made by Borrero’s vocational
expert. Rzeczkowski argues that both income determinations are clearly erroneous. The
district court based its determination of Borrero’s monthly income on her 2020 income of
$189,724. Rzeczkowski argues that the district court should have instead found Borrero’s
annual income to be $350,920 —the gross revenue of her business in 2021 minus the
business expenses that she testified to at trial. Notably, in its general findings of fact on
26
the parties’ “income and expenses” the district court observed that Borrero’s “gross
earnings after business expenses in 2021 were approximately $350,920.” This is
significantly more than the $189,724 used by the district court to calculate child support.
However, the record as a whole persuades us that the district court did not clearly
err in determining Borrero’s income for child-support purposes. As Borrero notes, the
district court used the most recent full year of taxable income, whereas the $350,920 figure
was based on an exhibit showing the gross revenue of the business that was prepared by
Borrero—rather than reflecting information from tax documents—and her testimony about
business expenses. Additionally, Borrero ’s income varies as she is now self-employed. 13
Prior to 2021, her prior three years of income were approximately $190,000; $160,000;
and $131,000, with the district court selecting the highest level of income from the prior
three years. And the revenue figure of $350,920 in 2021, which included her gross revenue
of $385, 920 minus certain expenses, was an outlier from her recent earning history. Based
on this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in opting to

13 The calculation of income for child- support purposes for individuals who are self -
employed is generally governed by Minn. Stat. § 518A.30 (2022). Under that statute , a
self-employed individual’s income for child-support purposes “is defined as gross receipts
minus costs of goods sold minus ordinary and necessary expenses required for self-
employment or business operation.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.30. Neither the district court nor
the parties cite to this statute, and we decline to consider it on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts do not address questions
not previously presented to and considered by the district court). In doing so, we note that
Borrero was recently self-employed at the time of the district court proceedings and that
the record contains only basic estimates of her business’s revenue and expenses, rather than
the more thorough documentation contemplated by the statute.
27
use Borrero’s most recent full year of taxable income when calculating her child-support
obligation.
The record also supports the district court’s determination that Rzeczkowski was
capable of earning $100,000 per year, or $8,333 per month. As discussed above, the district
court did not err in determining that Rzeczkowski was voluntarily unemployed. When
such a finding is made, a district court “must” determine potential income based on one of
three calculations, including “the parent’s probable earnings level based on employment
potential, recent work history, and occupational qualifications in light of prevailing job
opportunities and earnings levels in the community.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 2
(2022). Here, the district court determined that Rzeczkowski’s potential income was
$100,000 per year based on the testimony and evidence presented by Borrero’s vocational
expert. This evidence included a “labor market survey” that analyzed Rzeczkowski’s
employment history, educational qualifications, and employment opportunities in the area,
and testimony on the same topics. Thus, the vocational expert’s opinion, which the district
court credited and relied on in computing Rzeczkowski’s potential income, was based on
the appropriate statutory factors. We therefore discern no clear error in the district court’s
imputation of income to Rzeczkowski.
IV. We must remand to the district court to make additional findings on
Rzeczkowski’s request for need-based attorney fees.

Finally, Rzeczkowski challenges the denial of his request for need- based attorney
fees. We review an award of need-based attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. See Gully
v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999).
28
In a marriage-dissolution action, a district court “shall award attorney fees, costs,
and disbursements in an amount necessary to enable a party to carry on or contest the
proceeding,” provided that the district court finds:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith
assertion of the party’ s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay
them.

Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022) (emphasis added).
Here, the district court found that the second and third statutory requirements were
satisfied— Borrero has the ability to pay attorney fees and Rzeczkowski does not. But the
district court declined to award Rzeczkowski need-based attorney fees based on the
determination that an award of such fees was “not necessary for the good-faith assertion of
[Rzeczkowski’s] rights as [Rzeczkowski] has acted in bad faith during these dissolution
proceedings.” In doing so, the district court reiterated its findings from the order enforcing
the DLMP that the district court “does not find [Rzeczkowski’s] statements to be credible
because he has given this Court reason to believe that he would mislead the Court or distort
facts in a self- serving manner” and that Rzeczkowski’s “statements lack reliability,
consistency with other facts, and are permeated with [Rzeczkowski’s] self-interest to use
the economic divorce when it suits him and disavow it when it does not.”
We first note that the district court’s finding that Rzeczkowski acted in bad faith is
based largely on the district court’s assessment of Rzeczkowski’s credibility. We defer to
29
the district court’s credibility determinations. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. But we also
note that the district court’s finding relates solely to Rzeczkowski’s assertion of rights
regarding the validity and enforcement of the DLMP. As Rzeczkowski observes, that was
not the only assertion of right s at issue during the proceedings. For example, the parties
were unable to reach an agreement on legal custody of the children and argued that issue
to the district court. The parties presented their own testimony and argument, participated
in a custody evaluation, and the custody evaluator and an expert retained by Borrero also
testified on the issue. Borrero argued that she should be granted sole legal custody of the
children; Rzeczkowski requested joint legal custody. The district court ultimately agreed
with Rzeczkowski and awarded the parties joint legal custody. Thus, some of the claimed
attorney fees relate to assertions of rights that were made in good faith.
On this record, we must remand to the district court to make additional findings on
Rzeczkowski’s request for need-based attorney fees. As discussed above, a district court
shall award need-based attorney fees if the three statutory criteria are met. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.14, subd. 1. The two criteria relating to ability to pay are met here; the only criterion
at issue is whether “the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of the party’s rights
in the proceeding and will not contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding.” Id. Because the district court’s finding that Rzeczkowski acted in bad faith
relates solely to his assertion of rights regarding the Colombian documents, we must
remand for additional findings addressing whether an award of need-based attorney fees is
necessary for Rzeczkowski’s assertion of other rights that were made in good faith.
30
On remand, the district court may, in its discretion, reopen the record on either or
both issues —whether the DLMP violates the public policy against unconscionable
agreements and whether Rzeczkowski is entitled to an award of need-based attorney fees
for the assertion of other rights that were made in good faith.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.