Antonio Terrell Beasley, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0955

Antonio Terrell Beasley, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 6, 2023
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-17-3966

Beau D. McGraw, McGraw Law Firm, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, appellant Antonio Terrell
Beasley sought postconviction relief, asserting claims of ineffective counsel by his trial
and appellate attorneys. The district court denied relief on the ground that the petition for
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postconviction relief was untimely. Beasley appeals, arguing that his petition was not time-
barred and that he is entitled to relief on the merits of his claims. Respondent State of
Minnesota counters that the petition was time-barred, that the claims are procedurally
barred under Knaffla, and that the claims fail on their merits. We conclude that (1) the
district court erred by determining that Beasley’s petition was untimely, (2) Beasley’s
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is Knaffla-barred but his ineffective-
assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim is not, and (3) his ineffective-assistance-of-
appellate-counsel claim fails on the merits. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
In 2017, Rochester police began investigating Beasley for importing heroin into the
state and selling it . Between April and June 2017, officers monitored and recorded five
controlled heroin transactions between Beasley and an informant. In June 2017, the police
learned that Beasley planned to travel to Illinois to restock his drug supply. While Beasley
and the informant were on the road to Illinois, the police obtained a warrant to arrest
Beasley and to search his car. When Beasley returned to Minnesota, the police arrested him
and searched his car, finding approximately 200 grams of heroin, cash, and two cell phones.
Police questioned Beasley, and he admitted to selling drugs and transporting heroin across
state lines.
Police then applied for and obtained a search warrant to search the data and
downloads on Beasley’s two cell phones. They executed the search warrant and identified
a phone number associated with one of the cell phones. The state used the phone number,
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along with the testimony of officers and the informant and the recordings of the controlled
buys, to tie Beasley to the five controlled buys with the informant.
In an amended complaint, the state charged Beasley with aggravated first-degree
controlled substance crime (sale of heroin), Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2b(2) (2016)
(count I); importing heroin across state borders, Minn. Stat. § 152.0261, subd. 1 (2016)
(counts II and III); and tax-stamp violation, Minn. Stat. § 297D.04 (2016) (count IV).
Beasley moved to suppress evidence found pursuant to the warranted search of his car, but
the motion was denied. Beasley did not challenge the search warrant for his cell phones or
seek suppression of the evidence found on the cell phones. Following a jury trial, Beasley
was acquitted of count II but found guilty of counts I, III, and IV. The district court
convicted Beasley on counts I and IV and sentenced him to 192 months in prison.
Beasley appealed his convictions, arguing that he should receive a new trial because
the warrant authorizing the search of his car was invalid. See State v. Beasley , No. A18-
1470, 2019 WL 3541720, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 5, 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15,
2019). Beasley did not raise any issue regarding the search warrant for his cell phones. We
affirmed Beasley’s convictions, concluding that he was unable to demonstrate that the
search warrant for his car was invalid. Id. at *2-3.
1 The Minnesota Supreme Court denied
review on October 15, 2019, and this court entered judgment on October 16, 2019.

1 Beasley also argued that his convictions should be reversed because certain evidence had
been improperly admitted and the state failed to timely turn over information about the
informant. We rejected those arguments as well. Id. at *1-2, *8.
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On January 13, 2020, in a separate criminal case against Beasley involving evidence
obtained from the warranted search of his cell phones in this matter, the district court issued
an order concluding that the search warrant was invalid because it was unconstitutionally
overbroad. It therefore suppressed the resulting evidence in that case.
On January 11, 2022, Beasley filed his petition for postconviction relief in this case,
asserting that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
when his trial and appellate counsel failed to challenge the search warrant for his cell
phones. The district court summarily denied the petition as untimely without reaching the
merits of Beasley’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. It decided that Beasley’s
petition had to be filed within two years after this court’s entry of judgment on October 16,
2019, unless an exception applied, and that Beasley had failed to identify an exception.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
We review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. See Matakis
v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). Appellate courts will not reverse an order
denying postconviction relief “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in
an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made
clearly erroneous factual findings.” Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).
Beasley asserts that his petition for postconviction relief was timely, that his
postconviction-relief claims based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel
are not Knaffla-barred, and that his ineffective-assistance claims are successful on the
merits. We address each argument in turn.
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I. Time Bar
Beasley argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that his
postconviction-relief petition was time-barred. We agree.
A petition for postconviction relief may not be filed “more than two years after the
later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or
(2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(a) (2020). “[A] petition for postconviction relief filed after the two-year statute of
limitations runs is generally time-barred.” Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn.
2011). There are exceptions to the two -year statute of limitations, including an exception
for when a petition is not frivolous and hearing the petition is in the interests of justice.
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2020).
The district court decided that Beasley’s petition was time- barred because it was
filed more than two years after the date that judgment was entered following disposition of
his direct appeal and Beasley had cited no exception to the statute of limitations. In his
brief to this court, Beasley argued that the district court erred because the interests-of-
justice exception applies. In his oral argument to this court, however, Beasley changed his
position— contending that his petition was actually timely because, under the
postconviction statute, the limitations period did not begin to run until 90 days after the
final disposition of his direct appeal.
Beasley’s latter argument is correct. When a direct appeal is filed, the two-year
limitations period begins when an appellate court’s disposition of a petitioner’s direct
appeal becomes final. Hannon v. State, 957 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Minn. 2021). And “[a]
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conviction is final under [Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4] when the time
for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court has
expired.” Id.; see also Jackson v. State, 929 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Minn. 2019) (explaining
that the defendant’s conviction became final 90 days after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision because the defendant did not file a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court). The time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari is 90 days from the
date of the entry of judgment by a state court of last resort or 90 days from the entry of the
order denying discretionary review. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1). Thus, a conviction is final, and the
two-year statute of limitations begins to run, 90 days after an appellate court’s disposition
of a petitioner’s direct appeal becomes final. See Hannon, 957 N.W.2d at 435.
We issued our decision on Beasley’s direct appeal on August 5, 2019. The
Minnesota Supreme Court denied review on October 15, 2019. The disposition of the direct
appeal became final 90 days later—on January 13, 2020—when the time for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. As a result,
the two-year limitations period for Beasley’s petition for postconviction relief began to run
on January 13, 2020, and ended on January 13, 2022. Beasley’s petition was filed on
January 11, 2022. Thus, Beasley’s petition was not time-barred.
II. Knaffla Bar
The state contends that, even if the petition for postconviction relief was timely, it
was still properly dismissed because Beasley’s ineffective-assistance claims are
procedurally barred under Knaffla. Beasley argues that the claims are not procedurally
barred because they could not be resolved on the trial record alone and thus were not
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required to be brought on direct appeal. He also contends that, in any event, two exceptions
to the Knaffla rule apply. We conclude that the ineffective-assistance claim regarding trial
counsel is Knaffla-barred but the ineffective-assistance claim regardi ng appellate counsel
is not.
“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims
known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction
relief.” State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). When a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel can be adjudicated on the basis of the trial record, it must be
brought on direct appeal or it will be Knaffla-barred if raised in a postconviction petition.
Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004); Robinson v. State, 567 N.W.2d 491,
494 (Minn. 1997).
Beasley argues that his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are not Knaffla-
barred because he was not aware of his counsels’ ineffective assistance until January 13,
2020, when the district court, in a separate criminal prosecution against Beasley, issued its
order concluding that the search warrant for his cell phones was invalid. Beasley contends
that the trial record therefore was insufficient to resolve Beasley’s claims and he was thus
not required to bring his claims on direct appeal.
Beasley further cites two exceptions to the Knaffa rule, which he suggests apply:
(1) an exception for claims so novel that the legal basis was not reasonably available at the
time of direct appeal; and (2) a narrow exception for claims that should be heard in the
interest of fairness when the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the
claims on direct appeal. See Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295, 304 (Minn. 2021).
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Beasley’s arguments are unavailing as to his claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. That claim could have been adjudicated based on the trial record. It is founded on
his trial counsel’s failure to raise a particularity challenge to the search warrant. The
particularity challenge could have been determined based on the face of the warrant, the
supporting application and affidavit, and the factual circumstances in the trial record. See
State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. 2016).
Moreover, Beasley’s suggestion that an exception to Knaffla applies is
unpersuasive. Regardless of what happened in a separate, later prosecution, Beasley knew
that his trial counsel did not challenge the search warrant for his cell phones at the time of
trial. He learned from the January 13, 2020 order that a challenge to the search warrant
may have been successful. But the legal issue of whether a search warrant for an electronic
device is unconstitutionally overbroad is not a novel issue. See, e.g., State v. Keodouangdy,
A16-0121, 2016 WL 7438712, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec . 27, 2016) (addressing an
unpreserved challenge to the particularity of a cell -phone search warrant), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 14, 2017); State v. Bachman, No. A14-0996, 2015 WL 46547, at *1 (Minn.
App. Jan. 5, 2015) (holding that a search warrant was overbroad and lacked particularity).
As a result, the district court’s January 13, 2020 order did not create a legal claim so novel
that its legal basis was not reasonably known at the time of Beasley’s direct appeal . And
Beasley does not provide legal or factual support explaining why fairness requires that his
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim be heard. Because Beasley knew of but did
not raise his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal and that claim
could have been adjudicated on the basis of the trial record, it is Knaffla-barred.
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The same conclusion does not apply to Beasley’s claim for ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. Although the state asserts that this claim, too, is Knaffla-barred, claims
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal are not Knaffla-barred in a
subsequent postconviction petition because they could not have been brought at any earlier
time. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. 2007). Therefore, Beasley’s claim for
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not Knaffla-barred because it could not have
been raised in his direct appeal.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Because Beasley’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim is neither time-
barred nor Knaffla-barred, we turn to the merits of that claim.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to reasonably effective
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has the burden of showing that (1) counsel’s
performance was not objectively reasonable and (2) there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 669,
688-89, 694; State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Minn. 2013). If one Strickland prong is
determinative, we need not review the other. See Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665,
671 (Minn. 2020). We review a claim under Strickland de novo because it involves a mixed
question of law and fact. See State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).
Beasley asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial
counsel’s ineffective assistance in not challenging the validity of the search warrant and
seeking suppression of the resulting evidence. When a claim for ineffective assistance of
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appellate counsel is predicated on asserted error by the trial counsel, rather than an
independent error by appellate counsel, a petitioner must establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Sullivan v. State, 585 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Minn. 1998).
Beasley’s claim fails because, even if his trial counsel should have challenged the
warrant—a determination that we do not make here— he has not established prejudice
under the second prong of Strickland. Beasley asserts that the cell phones provided “key
evidence” that resulted in his conviction. That assertion is unsupported by the record. There
was significant direct evidence, unrelated to the cell phones, supporting Beasley’s
convictions. Beasley was arrested in a car with approximately two hundred grams of
heroin; he admitted to transporting heroin across state lines; he admitted to buying and
selling heroin ; there were five recordings of controlled buys between Beasley and the
informant; and there was extensive testimony from both the informant, who traveled with
Beasley across state lines with the heroin, and from the officers that monitored the
controlled buys and arrested Beasley.
The sole use of the cell phone evidence at trial was to further connect Beasley to the
five controlled buys with the informant for count I, first-degree sale of drugs. But each of
those controlled buys was monitored and recorded, and both the informant and the officers
who monitored them testified at trial. G iven the extensive evidence supporting Beasley’s
convictions, and the minimal use of the cell phone evidence at trial, there is no reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had trial counsel
succeeded in challenging the warrant and getting the evidence suppressed.
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Because a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails, Beasley’s claim for
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel likewise fails. The district court therefore did
not abuse its discretion by denying postconviction relief.
Affirmed.