In the Matter of: S. A. A., Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0961

In the Matter of: S. A. A.,
Appellant,

vs.

S. D.,
Respondent,
Hennepin County,
Intervenor.

Filed April 10, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-FA-18-920

Erika N. Donner, Mary B. Rannells Rowan, Hellmuth & Johnson, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael Ortner, Theresa A. Bofferding, Ortner & Bofferding, L.L.C., St. Paul, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s decisions (1) finding that father did
not commit domestic abuse ; (2) ordering the disclosure of her Safe-at-Home address ; and
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(3) changing child’s surname. We reverse and remand the disclosure order but affirm on
all other issues.
FACTS
On August 24, 2018, appellant -mother gave birth to child within a marriage to her
then-husband M.B. The couple named child together with mother’s surname. On
November 19, 2018, M.B. commenced a paternity action seeking to rebut the presumption
that he wa s child’s legal father. A genetic test showed that appellant -father, who never
lived with mother and was not married to her, was the biological father of child. The
district court adjudicated father as the legal father of child on August 29, 2019, and
dismissed M.B. from the action.
The district court originally scheduled a court trial via Zoom for December 15 and
17, 2021. On August 26, 2021, the parties reached a mutual agreement on parenting time
following mediation. Based on the resolution of tha t issue, the trial address ed the
remaining issues of legal and physical custody, child’s name, holiday and vacation
schedule, and child support.
Mother asserted that father was abusive toward her during their relationship, which
father denied . An evalua tor from Hennepin County Family Court Services interviewed
each party three times and observed them with child separately in preparation of a custody
and parenting-time evaluation. In his report, the evaluator found that father did not commit
domestic abuse against mother. The district court found father’s testimony more credible
on the issue of domestic abuse, as it was consistent with the findings in the custody-
evaluation report.
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Mother participates in the Safe-at-Home (SAH) program and lives at an undisclosed
location with child and child’s stepsister. After finding that father did not commit domestic
abuse against mother, the district court ordered mother to disclose her residential address
to father.
At trial, father expressed that it is important for him that child bears a name that ties
her to him. Because mother and M.B. named child at her birth without father’s input, father
initially wanted child’s first, middle, and last name s to be changed . However, he
acknowledged that this would cause confusion for child. In father’s proposed order
submitted after trial, he asked the district court to change only child’s last name to his and
keep the first and middle names. The district court granted father’s request, reasoning that
it is in the best interest of child to change her name to include father’s surname and keep
the given first and middle names chosen by mother, because this supports child’s
relationship with both parents.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court ’s finding that father did not commit domestic abuse was not
clearly erroneous.

Mother argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that father did not
commit domestic abuse against her in violation of Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1), (2)
(2022). We are not persuaded.
We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Welfare of J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A finding is
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clearly erroneous only if there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an
appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” In re
Welfare of J.H. , 844 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Minn. 2014). We defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Domestic abuse occurs when one “family or household member” commits “physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault” or inflicts “fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury,
or assault” against another. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1), (2).
At trial, the district court heard conflicting testimony from mother and father. It
also reviewed the evaluat or’s report. The evaluator, who also testified at trial, conducted
extensive research in preparation of the report. Consistent with father’s testimony, the
evaluator found that , while father’s “jokes” of violent acts were “crude and thoughtless,”
they were not real threats.
Mother contends, both at trial and on appeal, that the evaluator failed to consider all
the evidence she provided, specifically, an audio recording in which father allegedly called
mother “stupid and f —ing stupid” multiple times. The evaluator admitted th at he did not
listen to this recording, likely due to technical problems. However, he explained that,
without knowing the context of the recording or whether it had been edited, he would be
“very hesitant” to listen to it anyway. Among other things, t he record shows that the
evaluator interviewed father and mother three times each over Zoom, observed each parent
with child, talked to mother’s therapist, and reviewed “all or next to all” communications
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between the parties on Our Family Wizard 1 and psychological evaluations of both parties.
The evaluator noted that “[mother] often conflates her abuse history with [ M.B.] and
[father] when describing her visceral reactions to her children’s fathers and men in
particular,” and “the specific instances [mother] has chosen to describe are either disputed
and unverifiable or are highly questionable examples of abuse.”
Ultimately, the district court found father’s testimony more persuasive and credible.
Because substantial evidence in the record supports the district court’s finding that father
did not commit domestic abuse against mother, this finding is not clearly erroneous. 2
II. The district court erred by ordering mother to disclose her SAH address to
father without making the threshold findings and determination under section
5B.11.

Mother argues that the district court erred by ordering the disclosure of her SAH
address to father without making the statutorily required findings and determination under
Minn. Stat. § 5B.11 (2022). We agree.

1 Our Family Wizard is a court -approved communication website for families that have
difficulty with communication.
2 Mother asserts that the district court should analyze her request for sole legal custody
without the presumption for joint legal custody on remand. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(9) (2022). Because we conclude that the district court ’s finding on domestic
abuse was not clearly erroneous , we need not address this issue. Mother also argues that
the time limit at trial deprived her of the opportunity to provide more testimony regarding
father’s domestic abuse or to cross-examine father on this matter. We are not persuaded.
Because mother did not move for a new trial at the district court, as she admits, “the only
questions for [our] review are whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and
whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment .” Gruenhagen v.
Larson, 246 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 1976). As discussed above, the evidence supports
the district court’s finding that father did not commit domestic abuse against mother.
Mother’s claim fails.
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The purpose of Minnesota statutes c hapter 5B is to protect “individ uals attempting
to escape from actual or threatened domestic violence, sexual assault, or harassment or
stalking” by providing them address confidentiality. Minn. Stat. § 5B.01 (2022). E ligible
individuals may apply to the secretary of state to become certified participants in the SAH
program. Minn. Stat. § 5B.03, subd. 1 (2022). The secretary of state designates “a mailing
address to which all mail for program participants is to be sent.” Minn. Stat. § 5B.03, subd.
5 (2022).
Notwithstanding the confidentiality protection, the statute allows limited disclosure
of a program participant’s address in a judicial proceeding if a court finds that :
(1) there is a reasonable belief that the address is needed to
obtain information or evidence without which the
investigation, prosecution, or litigation cannot proceed; and
(2) there is no other practicable way of obtaining the
information or evidence.

The court must provide the program participant with
notice that address disclosure is sought and an opportunity to
present evidence regarding the potential harm to the safety of
the program participant if the address is disclosed. In
determining whether to compel disclosure, the court must
consider whether the potential harm to the safety of the
participant is outweighed by the interest in disclosure.

Minn. Stat. § 5B.11.
Here, t he district court failed to make the findings and determination required by
section 5B.11. We therefore reverse the disclosure order and remand the case to the district
court to analyze whether mother’s address should be disclosed under the appropriate
standard.
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the change of child’s
surname.

Mother claims that the district court abused its discretion by granting father’s
request to change child’s surname. We disagree.
“We review a district court’s grant of a request to change a child’s name for [an]
abuse of discretion.” Foster v. Foster, 802 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Minn. App. 2011). “A
district court abuses its discretion when evidence in the record does not support the factual
findings, the court misapplied the law, or the court settles a dispute in a way that is against
logic and the facts on the record.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
“[N]o minor child’s name may be changed without both parents having notice of
the pending of the application for change of name, whenever practical, as determined by
the court.” Minn. Stat. § 259.10 (2022). When either parent opposes the name -change
request, the opposing parent bears the burden to show “that evidence in support of the name
change is not clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates
such change .” Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757 (quotation omitted). The district court then
“must examine the evidence and arguments of the parent opposing the request” and “set
forth clear and compelling reasons for its decision whether the court grants or denies the
request.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“Upon meeting the requirements of section 259.10, the court shall grant the
application unless . . . [it] finds that such name change is not in the best interests of the
child.” Minn. Stat . § 259.11(a) (2022). In In re Saxton, our supreme court provided five
nonexclusive factors for determining whether a proposed name change serves a child’s best
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interests, including: (1) the length of time that the child has had the current name; (2) any
potential harassment or embarrassment the change might cause; (3) the child ’s preference;
(4) the effect of the change on the child ’s relationship with each parent; and (5) the degree
of community respect associated with the present and proposed names. 309 N.W.2d 298,
301 (Minn. 1981).
Here, contrary to mother’s assertion that the district court did not state reasons for
granting the name change except for the father’s preference, the district court considered
all five best -interest factors from Saxton. Specifically, it found that (1) child had carried
mother’s surname since birth; (2) the change of surname to that of father’s is unlikely to
result in any harassment or embarrassment; (3) child was too young to express a preference;
(4) the change to fa ther’s surname, while keeping the first and middle names chosen by
mother, would promote child’s connection with both parents; and (5) there is no difference
in the degree of community respect associated with the current or proposed surname for
child.
Because the district court made particularized findings supporting its determination
that the change of surname is in child’s best interests, the burden shifts to mother to
demonstrate that evidence supporting the name change is not clear and compelling. See
Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757. Our review of mother’s trial testimony and her proposed
findings of fact shows that mother’s main opposition was against father’s initial choice of
child’s given names. Neither at the district court nor on appeal has mother provided any
evidence to demonstrate that evidence supporting the change of child’s surname was not
clear and compelling.
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Mother’s reliance on Aitkin County Family Service Agency v. Girard is misguided.
390 N.W.2d 906 (Minn. App. 1986). In Girard, we reversed a district court’s decision
granting the change of the minor children’s surnames over the mother’s objection because
it did not make any findings about the best interests of the children. Id. at 909. Girard is
also factually distinguishable from the present case . The mother in Girard retained full
custody of the children after she and the father had separated, and we deferred to the
custodial mother’s preference to keep the children’s names bec ause “[i]t is in the best
interest of such young children to provide them with stability and continuity.” Id. at 909
(emphasis added). That concern does not exist here because the district court granted father
and mother joint legal and joint physical custody, and both parties will share parenting time
equally.
As for mother’s alternative request to add her surname in conjunction with father’s
without a hyphen, the district court implicitly denied it by determining that it does not
promote child’s best interests in preserving an equal connection to both parent s. We
therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting father’s
request to change child’s surname.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.