In re the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0962

In re the Matter of:

Elizabeth Joy Glirbas (n/k/a Elizabeth Joy Southwell), petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Joshua Robert Glirbas,
Respondent.

Filed March 20, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-13-8939

Elizabeth Joy Glirbas (n/k/a Elizabeth Joy Southwell), Albertville, Minnesota (pro se
appellant)

Joshua Robert Glirbas, Maplewood, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal from an order enforcing a stipulated dissolution judgment,
appellant-mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering her to
amend her state and federal tax returns to remove the parties’ minor child as a claimed
2
dependent for the 2021 tax year. Because the stipulated dissolution judgment granted
respondent-father the exclusive right to claim the parties’ minor child as a dependent on
his 2021 tax returns, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. We
therefore affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Elizabeth Southwell (mother) and respondent Joshua Glirbas (father)
were married in 2001. The parties have two children: B.I.G., born in 2002, and B.J.G.,
born in 2005.
In 2014, the parties decided to divorce pursuant to a stipulated agreement. The
district court incorporated the parties’ agreement into a stipulated judgment dissolving their
marriage.
The stipulated judgment addressed custody, parenting time, and child support. It
granted joint legal custody of the children to the parties and awarded mother sole physical
custody of the children . The stipulated judgment also awarded father parenting time and
required father to pay child support. And, relevant to this appeal, the stipulated judgment
specified who would be entitled to claim the children as dependents for tax purposes. The
parties agreed that mother would be entitled to claim B.J.G. on her tax returns every year
until B.I.G. became emancipated. But once B.I.G. became emancipated, mother could
claim B.J.G. only in even-numbered years while father could claim B.J.G. in odd-numbered
years. B.I.G. became emancipated in 2020.
Since 2014, when the district court entered the stipulated judgment, the district court
has modified the judgment’s parenting-time and child -support provisions in response to
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motions brought by the parties . But the court has not modified the language of the
stipulated judgment relating to tax-dependency exemptions.
Nevertheless, mother claimed B.J.G. as a dependent on her federal and state tax
returns for 2021—a year that father was entitled to claim B.J.G. After discovering mother
had done so, father filed a motion asking the district court to enforce the stipulated
judgment by ordering mother to amend her 2021 tax returns to remove B.J.G. as a
dependent so that father could claim B.J.G. for the 2021 tax year. Mother filed a responsive
motion, requesting that the court deny father’s motion and modify the stipulated judgment
to allow mother to claim B.J.G. “each year.”
The district court held a hearing on the matter. At the hearing and in her responsive
motion filing, mother explained that she believed that she was entitled to claim B.J.G. as a
dependent on her 2021 tax returns because, in her view, a 2020 parenting-time order had
the effect of modifying the tax-dependency provision of the stipulated judgment. She also
argued that her financial circumstances necessitated her claiming B.J.G. as a dependent.
Father disagreed with mother’s characterization of her financial circumstances and argued
that the stipulated judgment entitled him to claim B.J.G. as a dependent for the 2021 tax
year.
In a written order, the district court granted father’s motion. The district court
agreed with father’s interpretation of the stipulated judgment and rejected mother’s
argument regarding the effect of the 2020 parenting-time order. Accordingly, the district
court ordered mother to amend her 2021 state and federal taxes to “not claim [B.J.G.] as a
dependent for the 2021 tax year.” But the district court did grant mother the right to claim
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B.J.G. as a dependent on her tax returns from 2022 onward “for so long as [B.J.G.] can be
claimed as a dependent.” Mother filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district
court denied. Mother appeals.1
DECISION
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering her to amend
her 2021 tax returns. 2 Because the district court properly enforced the terms of the
stipulated judgment when it ordered mother to amend her tax returns, we discern no basis
for reversal.
“Marriage-dissolution stipulations are a judicially favored means of simplifying and
expediting dissolution litigation and are accorded the sanctity of binding contracts.”
Pooley v. Pooley, 979 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). For this reason,
we treat a stipulated dissolution judgment as a contract for purposes of construction.
Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. App. 2011). In construing a contract, we
first consider de novo whether the contract language is clear or ambiguous. Id. “Contract
language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Id.
(quotation omitted). When contract language is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning

1 Father moved to dismiss this appeal under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.02 because mother
allegedly failed to (1) “file a motion to request to file an informal brief”; (2) provide father
“with a copy of the April 25th hearing transcript;” and (3) provide father with two copies
of her informal brief. This court denied father’s motion, concluding that mother had
properly filed her informal brief and that father had received a copy of the hearing
transcript.

2 Mother does not challenge the district court’s decision granting mother the ability to claim
B.J.G. going forward from 2022.
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without reference to extrinsic evidence. Id. If there is ambiguity, we review the district
court’s resolution of that ambiguity for clear error. Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 339
(Minn. App. 2014) (“A district court’s determination of the meaning of an ambiguous
judgment and decree provision is a fact question, which appellate courts review for clear
error.”). But “[t]his court will not disturb an appropriate order to clarify, implement, or
enforce terms of a [judgment], absent an abuse of discretion.” Nelson, 806 N.W.2d at 871.
Based on our review of the language of the stipulated judgment as applied to the
undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that the district court properly interpreted the
judgment as affording father the right to claim B.J.G. as a dependent for the 2021 tax year.
The relevant language of the stipulated judgment states:
6. DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION. Minor Tax
Exemption. [Mother] shall have the right to claim [B.J.G.] as
a dependency exemption for federal and state income tax
purposes and [father] shall have the right to claim [B.I.G.] as a
dependency exemption for federal and state income purposes
commencing in 2014.

Once [B.I.G.] can no longer be claimed, [mother] and
[father] shall alternate years claiming [B.J.G.] as a
dependency exemption for federal and state income tax
purposes, with [mother] claiming [B.J.G.] in all even
numbered years and [father] claiming [B.J.G.] in all odd
numbered years.

. . . .

Neither party shall have any right to claim the children
as dependency exemptions except as stated above. Both parties
will execute whatever documents are necessary to effectuate
this provision.

(Emphasis added.)

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The language of this provision is clear and unambiguous. The plain language
provides that, once B.I.G. is emancipated, father has the right to claim B.J.G. as a
dependent in odd-numbered years and mother has the right to claim B.J.G. in
even-numbered years. It also states that “[n]either party shall have any right to claim the
children as dependency exemptions except as stated above.” And the record reflects that
B.I.G. became emancipated in 2020 . Accordingly, under the unambiguous terms of the
stipulated judgment, only father was entitled to claim B.J.G. as a dependent for the 2021
tax year. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that the terms of the stipulated
judgment prohibited mother from claiming B.J.G. as a dependent on her 2021 tax returns.
Nevertheless, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by enforcing
the dependency-exemption provision included in the stipulated judgment. “A district court
abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Mother
makes several arguments to support her contention that the district court’s order constitutes
an abuse of discretion . For the following reasons, none of these arguments warrant
reversal.
First, mother contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
consider current federal law—namely, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (TCJA)—when rendering its decision. Mother appears to argue
that the TCJA, which temporarily suspended dependency exemptions and increased child
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tax credits, 3 nullified the tax-dependency provision of the parties’ stipulated judgment.
Mother further contends that she is entitled to claim B.J.G. as a dependent because the
stipulated judgment did not award the child tax credits to either party and the law requires
that she receive them as the custodial parent.
4
As a preliminary matter, this argument is not properly before this court because
mother makes the argument for the first time on appeal. Appellate courts “generally
consider only those issues that the record shows were presented [to] and considered by the
[district] court.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, we decline to reverse based on this claim of error.
Regardless, even if this argument were properly before us, it would not merit relief.
Under federal and state law, a non-custodial parent may claim a minor child as a dependent
on their tax returns if the parents agree to it. 26 U.S.C. § 152(c)(1), (e)(1)-(2) (2018 )
(providing that the custodial parent of a minor child is presumptively entitled to claim that
child as a dependent on their federal tax returns unless the custodial parent releases their
claim to the noncustodial parent); Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(a) (2022) (implying the
same for state tax returns); see Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(d) (2022) (allowing a parent
with less than ten percent of parenting time to claim a tax-dependency exemption pursuant

3 U.S. Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Reform Basics for Individuals and
Families (Pub’n 5307) 7 (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5307.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YHP-K83K].

4 For federal income tax purposes, the custodial parent of a minor child is the parent who
has the minor child in their physical custody for more than half of the year.
26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(4)(A) (2018).
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to the parents’ agreement). Here, mother and father agreed that father would be entitled to
claim B.J.G. as a dependent on his tax returns in odd-numbered years, regardless of other
circumstances. Accordingly, mother’s reliance on federal tax law is unpersuasive.
Second, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that
the tax-dependency provision of the 2014 stipulated judgment is still in effect and was not
modified by a 2020 parenting-time order. To support this argument, mother notes that the
district court’s 2020 parenting-time order allocated less than ten percent of parenting time
to father. She further argues that a parent with less than ten percent of parenting time is
not entitled to a tax- dependency exemption under state law and therefore the 2020
parenting-time order resulted in a de facto modification of the tax-dependency provision
of the stipulated judgment. We are not persuaded.
Although mother is correct that a parent “with less than ten percent of court-ordered
parenting time” generally is not entitled to a tax-dependency exemption, parents can
overcome this general rule by agreement. Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(d). Here, the
parties reached such an agreement. Mother and father agreed (and the stipulated judgment
reflects) both that father would be entitled to claim B.J.G. as a dependent on his tax returns
in odd-numbered years once B.I.G. became emancipated, and that “[n]either party shall
have any right to claim the children as dependency exemptions except as stated [in the
stipulated judgment].” Moreover, the 2020 parenting-time order contains no language
modifying the tax-dependency provision of the stipulated judgment. Accordingly, this
argument is unavailing.
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Third, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to make
findings under Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(b) (2022), when it ordered mother to amend
her 2021 tax returns to remove B.J.G. as a dependent. The statutory provision that mother
relies on sets forth the factors that a district court is required to consider during the initial
allocation of a tax-dependency exemption. Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(b). By contrast,
here, the district court was not allocating tax- dependency exemptions—it was enforcing
the existing allocation of the tax-dependency exemption for B.J.G., which was included in
the stipulated judgment. There is no requirement that a district court make findings under
Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(b), when it enforces a stipulated dissolution judgment. See
id.; Potter v. Potter, 471 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Minn. App. 1991) (providing that “a [district]
court may issue appropriate orders implementing or enforcing the provisions of a
dissolution decree” without requiring specific findings). Accordingly, this argument is also
unavailing.
Lastly, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
retroactively modify the stipulated judgment to allow mother to claim B.J.G. as a
dependent for the 2021 tax year. During the hearing on father’s motion to enforce the
tax-dependency provision of the stipulated judgment, mother asked the district court to
deny father’s motion and to issue an order allowing mother to “claim [B.J.G.] each year.”
In her accompanying affidavit, she similarly requested that the district court “enter an order
making it clear that [she is] entitled to the dependency exemption for 2021 and until
[B.J.G.] emancipates.” The district court apparently construed this request as a motion to
prospectively modify the tax-dependency provision and granted mother “the sole right to
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claim [B.J.G.] as a dependent for so long as she can be claimed as a dependent” from 2022
onward. Mother now contends that the district court’s decision to modify the
tax-dependency provision prospectively only—as opposed to prospectively and
retroactively—constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Mother’s argument, however, is not supported by any legal authority. Generally,
we do not consider arguments that are unsupported by the law. See State, Dep’t of
Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address an inadequately briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471,
479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-law appeal). Moreover, we discern no
clear abuse of discret ion on mere inspection. See In re Welfare of Child of J.H.,
968 N.W.2d 593, 602 n.7 (Minn. App. 2021) (“An assignment of error based on mere
assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived
and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). We therefore decline
to address the merits of this argument.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing the
tax-dependency provision of the parties’ stipulated dissolution judgment and by ordering
mother to amend her 2021 tax returns accordingly.
Affirmed.